Carmen Peramas v. Jeremy Davy and Karen Davy

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE CARMEN PERAMAS, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-1569-JNW Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER v. JEREMY DAVY and KAREN DAVY, Defendants.

The matter comes before the Court of its own accord. Pro se Plaintiff Carmen Peramas, proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP), alleges that Covington police deputies Jeremy Davy and Karen Davy violated her constitutional rights when they arrested her for violating a protective order. The Court previously dismissed Peramas’s complaint for, among other things, failing to provide “factual allegations connecting the defendants’ specific conduct to a deprivation of constitutional rights.” Dkt. No. 9. Peramas timely filed her first amended complaint (FAC). Dkt. No. 10. But for the reasons discussed below, Peramas’s amended complaint again fails to state a claim, and is therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the court must dismiss the action if the court determines the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). When reviewing complaints under § 1915(e)(2)(B), courts necessarily consider only the operative complaint. See Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that an amended complaint supersedes the original and renders the original of no legal effect).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Thus, a “document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). Courts are not to “dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Rosati v. Igbinoso,

791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam))). But even so, the duties imposed on district courts by Section 1915(e) are unwavering, and when the court determines that a complaint filed by an IFP plaintiff is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, the action must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The FAC generally alleges that on August 27, 2022, Peramas contacted the Covington Police Department to report “severe” abuse of an unidentified child by the child’s custodial parent. Dkt. No. 10 at 3. Rather than investigate Peramas’s report, Defendant Deputies Jeremy and Karen Davy arrested her for violating a

protective order held by the custodial parent. Id. Peramas spent “three whole days” in jail before being released. Id. at 5. She generally alleges that Defendants violated her constitutional rights by “misusing” the protective order, which she claims was “obtained unlawfully.” Id. at 5–6. Peramas states in a conclusory fashion that her constitutional claims stem from an “unlawful” protective order. But the FAC contains no concrete allegations

as to why the protective order was unlawful, what misrepresentations resulted in the order’s issuance, how Defendants relied on the protective order, and what attempts, if any, Peramas has made to contest the validity of the state court order in the state court system. Furthermore, by August 27, 2022, Peramas was subject to two protective orders—20-2-15362-1SEA and 22-2-04603-1KNT—but she fails to adequately allege which protective order she claims was unlawfully obtained. Dkt. No. 11.1 In sum, the FAC again relies on conclusory allegations which, without

more, are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defects of a complaint, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend before dismissal of the action. See Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, “dismissal without leave to amend is proper 1 The Court had placed this document under seal for containing personal identifying information and instructed Peramas to file redacted version of the document. She failed to do so. Any discussion of this document will be limited to ensure that the protected information is not inadvertently released to the public. if it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Est. of Strickland v. Nevada Cnty., 69 F.4th 614, 623 (9th Cir. 2023). Courts have

“’particularly broad’ discretion to deny leave to amend when the plaintiff has already had a chance to amend[.]” Id. (quoting Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013)). Peramas has had multiple chances to properly frame her complaint. Further amendment would be futile given her repeated inability to articulate the basis for her federal allegations. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this action WITH

Dated this 17th day of December, 2025. A Jamal N. Whitehead United States District Judge