Carmen Aracely Pablo Sequen, et al. v. Sergio Albarran, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 5:25-cv-06487
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CARMEN ARACELY PABLO SEQUEN, Case No. 25-cv-06487-PCP et al., 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY 9 INJUNCTION v. 10 Re: Dkt. No. 34 SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al., 11 Defendants.

12 13 Ligia Garcia and Yulisa Alvarado Ambrocio (“petitioners”) are asylum-seekers who each 14 arrived in the United States in 2024 and have lived in California for more than a year. On 15 September 18, 2025—as part of a now-familiar practice that courts in this district have 16 consistently held is likely unconstitutional—agents of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 17 (ICE) arrested Ms. Garcia as she was leaving the immigration court in San Francisco and detained 18 her without a hearing. ICE agents attempted to arrest and detain Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio under 19 similar circumstances on September 11, 2025, but they refrained from doing so because Ms. 20 Alvarado Ambrocio’s nursing infant was with her. Petitioners filed a writ of habeas corpus, 21 claiming that ICE’s conduct violated their procedural and substantive due-process rights under the 22 Fifth Amendment. On September 18, 2025, this Court issued a temporary restraining order 23 requiring the government to release Ms. Garcia and enjoining it from re-detaining her without 24 notice and a pre-arrest hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. Now before the Court is 25 petitioners’ request to convert that temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction that 26 prohibits the detention of either Ms. Garcia or Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio without notice and a pre- 27 deprivation hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants petitioners’ requested 1 STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 2 Two statutes—8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226—provide for the detention of noncitizens (or 3 “aliens”) pending removal proceedings. 4 Under § 1225, a noncitizen “who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is present’ in this 5 country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as ‘an applicant for admission.’” Jennings v. 6 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)). All noncitizens “who are 7 applicants for admission,” or who are “otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit 8 through the United States[,] shall be inspected by immigration officers” to assess whether they 9 may be admitted into the country. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). An inspecting officer must then 10 determine whether an applicant for admission is covered by either § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2). 11 See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Section 1225(b)(1) applies to noncitizens who, upon arriving, are 12 initially deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) or (a)(7) due to fraud, 13 misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). It also applies 14 to certain noncitizens designated by the Attorney General who are later determined to be 15 inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(C) or (a)(7) and were not continuously present in the United 16 States for the two-year period prior to that determination. See id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Section 17 1225(b)(2) covers all other “applicant[s] for admission” who are “seeking admission,” with 18 limited exceptions not applicable here. See id. § 1225(b)(2)(A), (B). 19 Subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) both authorize detention pending removal proceedings in 20 certain circumstances. Noncitizens covered by § 1225(b)(1) are subject to an expedited removal 21 process and will be “removed from the United States without further hearing or review” unless 22 they claim a right to asylum. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). If a noncitizen states an intent to apply for 23 asylum and an immigration officer determines that there is a credible fear of persecution, the 24 noncitizen “shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” Id. § 25 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Noncitizens covered by § 1225(b)(2) are not subject to expedited removal. 26 Instead, they are placed in standard removal proceedings under § 1229a, which include an 27 evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge, the right to counsel, and the right to seek review 1 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2018); see also Valencia Zapata v. 2 Kaiser, No. 25-CV-07492-RFL, 2025 WL 2741654, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (describing 3 the greater procedural protections available to noncitizens in standard removal proceedings). 4 Section 1225(b)(2) mandates that noncitizens “shall be detained” pending such proceedings unless 5 they are “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). “In other 6 words, noncitizens subject to 1225(b)(2) are not eligible for expedited removal but are subject to 7 mandatory detention while their full removal proceedings are pending.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, 8 No. 25-cv-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 2637503, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). The government 9 may release noncitizens detained under either § 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2) only on temporary parole “for 10 urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 300; see 8 U.S.C. 11 § 1182(d)(5)(A). 12 For noncitizens who are “already in the country,” § 1226 permits detention “pending the 13 outcome of removal proceedings” in certain circumstances. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. Unlike 14 § 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2), § 1226 affords the government significant discretion. After arresting a 15 noncitizen “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General,” the government “may continue to 16 detain the arreste[e]” until a final removal decision is made or “may release” them on “bond” or 17 “conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). “Conditional parole” may also be called “release 18 on recognizance.” See Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007). 19 Section 1226 prohibits the release of a detained noncitizen, whether on bond or conditional parole, 20 unless the noncitizen “satisfies [the government] that [she] will not pose a danger to the safety of 21 other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. 22 § 1226(a)(4); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). If a noncitizen wishes to contest the initial custody 23 determination—i.e., the denial or amount of bond—she has a right to do so before an immigration 24 judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1). “The noncitizen’s bond or parole can be revoked at any time, even 25 if the noncitizen was previously released; however, if an [immigration judge] has determined the 26 noncitizen ‘should be released, the DHS may not re-arrest that noncitizen absent a change in 27 circumstance.’” Valencia Zapata, 2025 WL 2741654, at *2 (quoting Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 1 In a handful of circumstances, § 1226 departs from its discretionary framework to mandate 2 detention. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The government “shall take into custody” noncitizens who are 3 inadmissible or deportable because they committed certain criminal offenses, id. § 1226(c)(1)(A)– 4 (C); are inadmissible based on terrorist affiliations or other security concerns, id. § 1226(c)(1)(D); 5 or are inadmissible on certain bases and have been charged, arrested, or convicted for specified 6 crimes, including burglary and shoplifting, id. § 1226(c)(E). 7 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 8 Ms. Garcia is a 54-year-old asylum-seeker from Colombia. After Ms. Garcia entered the 9 United States from Mexico, an agent of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) arrested her 10 and transported her to a nearby facility for processing. Shortly thereafter, around March 12, 2024, 11 DHS charged Ms. Garcia with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and released Ms. 12 Garcia on her own recognizance. DHS records from the time of Ms. Garcia’s release state that she 13 “has no criminal history” and “does not appear to be a threat to national security, border security, 14 or public safety.” When releasing Ms. Garcia, DHS served her with a notice to appear and placed 15 her in full removal proceedings in immigration court. 16 Following her release, Ms. Garcia moved to Santa Clara, where she has remained for the 17 past 19 months. She currently lives with her niece. After applying for asylum in February 2025, 18 Ms. Garcia received work authorization and has since been lawfully employed with a staffing 19 agency, through which she works as a dishwasher and in restaurant kitchens. Outside of work, Ms. 20 Garcia has become an active member of her church community and provides regular care for her 21 friends’ special-needs child. 22 On September 18, 2025, Ms. Garcia appeared at the immigration court in San Francisco for 23 a master hearing. She was unrepresented. During the hearing, the government moved to dismiss 24 Ms. Garcia’s pending removal proceedings with the intent to pursue expedited removal under 25 § 1225(b)(1). The immigration judge continued the hearing to allow Ms. Garcia to seek legal 26 counsel and respond to the motion. As Ms. Garcia exited the courtroom, ICE agents arrested her 27 and took her to a holding area elsewhere in the building. ICE records from the time of Ms. 1 Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio is a 24-year-old asylum seeker from Guatemala. After she entered 2 the United States in April 2024, Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio—who was pregnant at the time—was 3 arrested by DHS agents and placed in a detention center for two days. DHS then released Ms. 4 Alvarado Ambrocio on her own recognizance pursuant to its authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and 5 served her with a notice to appear in immigration court. 6 In the year and a half since her release, Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio has lived in San Francisco 7 with her partner and other members of his family. She gave birth to a daughter, her and her 8 partner’s first child, in December 2024. Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio spends much of her time caring 9 for her now-11-month-old daughter, who is still breastfeeding. Their family also attends church 10 each week in San Francisco, and Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio expects to seek work authorization after 11 filing an application for asylum, which she is currently preparing. 12 On September 11, 2025, Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio appeared at the San Francisco 13 Immigration Court with her breastfeeding infant for a routine hearing. During the hearing, the 14 government moved to dismiss Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio’s case. The immigration judge continued 15 the hearing for ten days to allow Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio to file a response. Before Ms. Alvarado 16 Ambrocio exited the courtroom, two attorneys warned her that ICE agents were waiting outside to 17 arrest her. With Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio’s consent, the attorneys negotiated with ICE on her 18 behalf, securing an agreement that ICE would not detain her that day. Instead, ICE imposed 19 monitoring requirements on Ms. Alvardo Ambrocio, requiring that she present in person every six 20 months. While the ICE agents permitted Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio to leave the immigration court, 21 they did not state whether they would arrest her after her next immigration-court hearing on 22 October 16, 2025. Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio fears that she will be detained when she next appears 23 in immigration court. 24 On September 18, 2025, the same day that ICE detained Ms. Garcia, petitioners filed a 25 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Rather than assert their habeas claims in a new case, 26 petitioners joined the amended complaint and petition of Carmen Aracely Pablo Sequen, an 27 asylum-seeker from Guatemala who initiated this action to challenge her earlier arrest and 1 injunction requiring ICE to release her from custody and enjoining ICE from re-detaining her 2 without notice and a pre-arrest hearing. The amended complaint and petition in this case asserts 3 individual habeas claims on behalf of Ms. Pablo Sequen, Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio, and Ms. 4 Garcia. It also asserts individual and class claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 5 U.S.C. § 706, and the U.S. Constitution challenging various policies of ICE and the Executive 6 Office for Immigration Review, as well as the conditions of confinement at ICE’s detention 7 facility at 630 Sansome Street in San Francisco. 8 Concurrent with their habeas petition, Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia filed an ex 9 parte application for a temporary restraining order. The next day, on September 19, 2025, the 10 Court issued a temporary restraining order requiring the government to release Ms. Garcia and 11 enjoining it from re-detaining her without notice and a pre-detention hearing before a neutral 12 decisionmaker. In compliance with the order, the government released Ms. Garcia from detention 13 that same evening. The Court denied Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio’s request for a temporary 14 restraining order because she had not established a sufficiently imminent risk of detention. The 15 government does not dispute that, absent judicial relief, Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio faces a likely risk 16 of detention by ICE following her October 16, 2025 hearing. 17 The Court’s temporary restraining order was originally set to expire at 5:00pm on October 18 2, 2025. After the hearing on this matter, the Court extended the temporary restraining order until 19 5:00pm on October 16, 2025 to enable the parties to file supplemental briefs and evidence 20 concerning petitioners’ request for a preliminary injunction. 21 LEGAL STANDARDS 22 To obtain a preliminary injunction, Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia must establish 23 that (1) they are “likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) they are “likely to suffer irreparable harm in 24 the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in [their] favor,” and (4) “an 25 injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 26 “If a plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser 27 showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if 1 satisfied.’” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Peña, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Shell 2 Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013)). “Where, as here, the 3 party opposing injunctive relief is a government entity, the third and fourth factors—the balance of 4 equities and the public interest—merge.” Hubbard v. City of San Diego, 139 F.4th 843, 854 (9th 5 Cir. 2025) (citation modified). 6 ANALYSIS 7 Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia request that the Court grant a preliminary 8 injunction prohibiting the government from detaining them without notice and a bond hearing 9 before a neutral decisionmaker. Ordinarily, the Court would evaluate that request based only on 10 the Winter factors. Here, however, the government has raised several threshold issues that the 11 Court must consider before reaching the Winter analysis. 12 First, the government argues that the Court’s prior order granting Ms. Pablo Sequen’s 13 request for a preliminary injunction provided all the relief Ms. Pablo Sequen sought. As a result, 14 the government contends, this case became moot before the filing of the amended complaint, such 15 that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia’s 16 newly-added habeas claims. But the Court’s prior order did not provide all the relief requested by 17 Ms. Pablo Sequen. Her original complaint sought, among other things, a declaration that her 18 detention without prior notice and a hearing violated the Fifth Amendment and a permanent 19 injunction prohibiting her re-detention without such process. The Court’s order declared only that 20 Ms. Pablo Sequen’s detention without a prior hearing likely violated the Fifth Amendment and 21 enjoined the government from re-detaining her only “during the pendency of these proceedings.” 22 Pablo Sequen, 2025 WL 2650637, at *10. The Court thus did not fully adjudicate Ms. Pablo 23 Sequen’s claims, and it retains jurisdiction over her claims. Cf. Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 24 200 (2025) (“Preliminary injunctions … do not conclusively resolve legal disputes.”). In any 25 event, there is no question that Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia’s habeas claims present a 26 live case or controversy within the scope of this Court’s Article III jurisdiction. Whether or not it 27 was procedurally proper for those claims to be added to Ms. Pablo Sequen’s amended complaint 1 Second, the government argues that because habeas claims may challenge only the fact or 2 duration of a petitioner’s confinement, and not its conditions, the Court must dismiss from the 3 amended complaint petitioners’ new claims concerning the conditions of confinement at 630 4 Sansome. See Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059, 1066–69 (9th Cir. 2023). Even if that were true, 5 however, it has no bearing on Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia’s request for a preliminary 6 injunction, which does not concern conditions of confinement. And in any event, petitioners’ 7 conditions-of-confinement claims do not invoke this Court’s habeas jurisdiction. Instead, they 8 invoke the Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising under the U.S. Constitution and the 9 Administrative Procedure Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 5 U.S.C. § 702, and the Court’s equitable 10 authority to restrain unlawful executive action, see Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 11 U.S. 320, 327 (2015); Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 694 (9th Cir. 2019). The government 12 has not argued or cited any authority holding that petitioners may not assert habeas and non- 13 habeas claims together in a single complaint. See Zepeda Rivas v. Jennings, 465 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 14 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (allowing conditions-of-confinement claims asserted in a habeas petition to 15 proceed pursuant to the Court’s non-habeas equitable authority); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) (“A 16 party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim may join, as independent or 17 alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.”). 18 Finally, the government argues that joinder of multiple habeas petitioners in a single case 19 is improper due to the factual specificity of habeas claims and that Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and 20 Ms. Garcia’s claims must therefore be severed from Ms. Pablo Sequen’s petition. District courts in 21 California take differing views on the propriety of joinder in habeas cases. Compare, e.g., Acord v. 22 California, No. 17-cv-01089-MJS, 2018 WL 347770, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2018) (noting that 23 “permitting multiple petitioners to file a single habeas petition … generally is not permitted”) with 24 Espinoza v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-CV-01101-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 2581185, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 25 2025) (explaining that “it is not unprecedented for a district court to issue injunctive relief to 26 multiple immigration detainees joined into one habeas Petition” and that doing so may be proper 27 where “the allegations in [a] habeas case involve a ‘systemic pattern of events’ that is common to 1 preliminary injunction. Even if the Court were to sever Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia’s 2 habeas claims from Ms. Pablo Sequen’s habeas petition, the Court would retain jurisdiction over 3 their claims and authority to grant injunctive relief based thereon. The government conceded at the 4 hearing that the issue of joinder does not bear on either moving party’s entitlement to preliminary 5 injunctive relief. The Court will defer consideration of the government’s joinder arguments until 6 the government formally moves to sever the new petitioners’ habeas claims from Ms. Pablo 7 Sequen’s petition. 8 Because none of the government’s threshold arguments impact the propriety of the 9 preliminary injunctive relief requested by Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia, the Court turns 10 to the Winter factors. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes petitioners are likely to 11 succeed on the merits of their due-process claim, are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent an 12 injunction, and have established that both the balance of equities and public interest favor granting 13 injunctive relief. The Court therefore grants petitioners’ requested preliminary injunction. 14 I. Petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim. 15 Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 16 merits of their claim that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment entitles them to a 17 hearing before ICE may re-detain them.1 18 The Due Process Clause protects all persons in the United States, including noncitizens, 19 from deprivations “of life, liberty, or property” by the federal government “without due process of 20 law[.]” U.S. Const. amend V; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). “Freedom 21 from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint— 22 23 1 Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia ask the Court to prohibit their detention under any 24 circumstances, contending that the government has no valid interest to justify their detention. Because the relief granted herein obviates any immediate need for the Court to address this 25 substantive due-process issue, the Court declines to do so at this time. And while petitioners also ask the Court to order that they remain within the Northern District of California in order to 26 preserve this Court’s jurisdiction over their petition, it is well-established that “when the Government moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate 27 custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner's release.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 1 lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Even when the 2 government has discretion to detain an individual, its subsequent decision to release the individual 3 creates “an implicit promise” that she will be re-detained only if she violates the conditions of her 4 release. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). Conditional release “is valuable and must 5 be seen as within the protection of the [Due Process Clause].” Id. at 482. Courts in this district 6 thus consistently hold that if DHS has released a noncitizen pending civil removal proceedings, 7 the noncitizen has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody. See, e.g., 8 Roa v. Albarran, No. 25-cv-07802-RS, 2025 WL 2732923, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2025); 9 Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263, at 6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 10 2025); Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 11 July 17, 2025). Here, after briefly detaining Ms. Garcia and Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio in March and 12 April 2024, respectively, DHS released them on their own recognizance subject to certain 13 conditions. Petitioners are therefore entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment with 14 respect to their protected liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody. 15 To determine what procedures are constitutionally sufficient to protect petitioners’ liberty 16 interest, the Court applies the test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).2 That test 17 calls for balancing the following three factors: 18 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 19 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 20 substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 21 administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 22 23 Id. at 335. Each of these factors supports petitioners’ constitutional right to a hearing before a 24

25 2 The government argues that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have held that the Mathews test applies to due-process challenges to immigration detention. In Rodriguez Diaz v. 26 Garland, however, the Ninth Circuit “assume[d] without deciding” that Mathews applies in this context, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 2022), and both the Ninth Circuit and other federal 27 courts of appeal regularly apply Mathews to due-process claims involving removal proceedings, see Garro Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Cal. July 1 neutral decisionmaker prior to any future detention. 2 A. Petitioners’ private interest is substantial. 3 As explained above, Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia have substantial private 4 interests in remaining out of custody. The liberty of a noncitizen released pending removal 5 proceedings, “although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty[.]” 6 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. Subject to the conditions of their release, petitioners “can be gainfully 7 employed and [are] free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments 8 of normal life.” Id. The termination of that liberty would “inflict[] a ‘grievous loss’” both on 9 petitioners and their loved ones. Id.; see also Cordero Pelico v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-07286-EMC, 10 2025 WL 2822876, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025); Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 11 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025). 12 The government argues that, while some noncitizens may have a constitutionally 13 cognizable interest in remaining out of custody, Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia have no 14 such interest because DHS initially detained them soon after they each arrived in the United 15 States. As a result, the government contends, the Due Process Clause affords them no rights 16 beyond those provided by statute. And the government argues that the applicable statute here is 17 § 1225(b), which mandates detention without providing any process to challenge that detention. 18 The government therefore insists that Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia have no protected 19 interest in remaining out of custody. 20 The government’s constitutional and statutory arguments both fail. The cases cited by the 21 government in arguing that the Fifth Amendment offers no protection to Ms. Alvarado 22 Ambrocio’s and Ms. Garcia’s interest in challenging their loss of liberty concern due-process 23 rights regarding admission into the country. See, e.g., Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140 (holding that 24 “an alien in respondent’s position has only those rights regarding admission that Congress has 25 provided by statute”); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (discussing “an alien seeking 26 initial admission” and his “constitutional rights regarding his application”); United States ex rel. 27 Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 539–40, 544 (1950) (holding that “an alien who seeks 1 prescribed by Congress are “due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned”). 2 “Petitioners are challenging their detentions, not the processes by which applications for 3 admission are decided. As such, the cases limiting the due process rights of noncitizens to 4 challenge how applications for admission are decided are inapplicable.” Valencia Zapata, 2025 5 WL 2741654, at *7; see also Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *6; Aviles-Mena v. Kaiser, 6 No. 25-cv-06783-RFL, 2025 WL 2578215, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025). 7 Further, while the government argues that petitioners have “only those rights ... that 8 Congress has provided by statute,” the cited cases apply narrowly to noncitizens “seeking initial 9 entry” who are “on the threshold” of entering the country. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139–40 10 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)). These cases make 11 clear that noncitizens “who have once passed through our gates, even illegally,” are entitled to 12 “proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.” 13 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212; see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. Although merely “set[ting] foot on 14 U.S. soil” may not be sufficient to “effect[] an entry” and trigger due-process protections for 15 admissions decisions if a noncitizen is detained shortly thereafter, Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139– 16 40, if a noncitizen “gain[s a] foothold in the United States,” Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 17 (1925), or “begins to develop ... ties” in this country, “h[er] constitutional status changes 18 accordingly,” and she “has a right to due process.” Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33 (1982); see also 19 Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903) (distinguishing noncitizens entitled to due 20 process from those “who ha[ve] been here for too brief a period to have become, in any real sense, 21 a part of our population”). Put another way, “aliens who have established connections in this 22 country have due process rights in deportation proceedings[.]” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107 23 (2020). 24 Here, both Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia have unquestionably gained a foothold 25 in this country and developed the connection needed to become “a part of our population.” 26 Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101. Each has built a community in California for more than a year and a 27 half, living with family or romantic partners and becoming active members of their church 1 work authorization. Ms. Garcia cares for friends’ special-needs child and works for as a 2 dishwasher and in restaurant kitchens “with the federal government’s express authorization.” 3 Pablo Sequen, 2025 WL 2650637, at *5. While the government insists that noncitizens who have 4 been released into the country on their own recognizance and physically present in the country for 5 over a year nevertheless remain “on the threshold” of entrance and lack due-process protections, 6 “the government cites no authority requiring the Court to accept th[at] legal fiction … [n]or does 7 that proposition make practical sense.” Id. Petitioners’ liberty interest in remaining out of custody 8 is therefore cognizable under the Due Process Clause whether or not Congress has provided a 9 statutory process to vindicate that interest. 10 Even if it were true that the statutory framework governing Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and 11 Ms. Garcia was relevant in evaluating the scope of their constitutionally protected liberty interests, 12 the government errs in contending that the relevant framework is that provided by § 1225(b). To 13 the contrary, petitioners are subject to § 1226(a), which “authorizes the [g]overnment to detain 14 certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings,” Jennings, 583 15 U.S. at 289, and permits detention only if a noncitizen “pose[s] a danger to the safety of other 16 persons or of property” or is not “likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. 17 § 1226(a)(4). Noncitizens subject to § 1226(a) therefore have a statutory as well as constitutional 18 interest in remaining out of custody unless they pose a threat to the public or a flight risk. 19 For more than a year and a half, the government properly treated petitioners as subject to 20 § 1226(a). DHS records show that after petitioners’ initial arrests in March and April 2024, DHS 21 conditionally paroled each of them into the United States on an Order of Release on Recognizance 22 issued under § 1226(a). See Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 23 2007) (“It is apparent that the [government] used the phrase ‘release on recognizance’ as another 24 name for ‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a).”). In accordance with § 1226(a), both petitioners 25 were placed in standard removal proceedings. 26 Despite its consistent invocation of § 1226(a) until last month, the government now argues 27 that Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia are subject to mandatory detention under 1 § 1225(b)(1) once their removal proceedings are dismissed from immigration court. Neither 2 provision applies. 3 Section 1225(b)(1) applies only in two circumstances. 4 First, it applies if a noncitizen is initially determined upon arriving in the United States to 5 be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) or (a)(7). See id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). That is not 6 the case here. As the government notes in its brief, DHS initially found both Ms. Alvarado 7 Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia inadmissible under a different provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). 8 Second, that section applies if the noncitizen is later determined to be inadmissible under 9 § 1182(a)(6)(C) or (a)(7); was not continuously present in the United States for the two years prior 10 to that determination; and is in a group designated by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. 11 § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). That is also not the case here. The government has offered no evidence that 12 an immigration officer has ever determined that Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio or Ms. Garcia are 13 inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(C) or (a)(7). The plain language of § 1225(b)(1) thus does not 14 cover them. 15 Section 1225(b)(2) also does not apply to Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio or Ms. Garcia. That 16 provision covers all applicants for admission who are not subject to § 1225(b)(1) and are “seeking 17 admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The government argues that a noncitizen who is present in the 18 United States without having been lawfully admitted—that is, an “applicant for admission”—is 19 necessarily “seeking admission,” even if the noncitizen has been released into the United States 20 and resided in this country for many years. “In other words, it treats the phrases ‘applicant for 21 admission’ and ‘seeking admission’ as synonymous.” Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8. 22 District courts throughout this district and across the country have rejected that argument, 23 see id. (collecting cases), for good reason. The government’s reading of “seeking admission” 24 ignores the plain meaning of that phrase, which “necessarily implies some sort of present-tense 25 action.” Martinez v. Hyde, No. 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6 (D. Mass. July 24, 26 2025); see also Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999, 1011 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he use of the 27 present progressive, like use of the present participle, denotes an ongoing process.”). Given the 1 § 1225(b)(2) applies only to “those arriving and seeking admission … , whereas those simply 2 residing in the country after being deemed inadmissible are subject to the mostly discretionary 3 detention scheme under section 1226.” Valencia Zapata, 2025 WL 2741654, at *10 (emphasis 4 added); see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (contrasting “aliens seeking admission into the 5 country” subject to § 1225(b) with “aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal 6 proceedings” subject to § 1226). The government’s own regulation implementing § 1225(b)(2) 7 confirms this reading: It refers to the class of noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under 8 § 1225(b)(2) as “arriving alien[s].” 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c)(1); see also Martinez, 2025 WL 2084238, 9 at *6. “Arriving alien” is defined, in relevant part, as “an applicant for admission coming or 10 attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry.” 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (emphasis added). 11 Both the plain meaning of § 1225(b)(2) and the relevant regulations, then, indicate that 12 § 1225(b)(2) applies only to applicants for admission who are actively “seeking admission” by 13 requesting entry into the United States upon arrival. That does not include Ms. Alvarado 14 Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia. 15 Further, “the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place 16 in the overall statutory scheme.” Depot U.S.A. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435, 441 (2019) (citation 17 modified). Here, the statutory scheme strongly counsels against reading § 1225(b)(2) to reach all 18 “applicants for admission,” including those who are not “seeking admission” upon arrival. As 19 explained above, where § 1225(b)(2) applies, it mandates detention unless a noncitizen is “clearly 20 and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Section 1226, by contrast, 21 affords the government significant discretion concerning detention of noncitizens arrested on a 22 warrant, providing that the Attorney General “may” continue to detain noncitizens or “may” 23 release them. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2); see Jennings, 583 U.S. at 300 (noting that “the word 24 ‘may’ ... implies discretion” (citation modified)). Section 1226(c) creates several exceptions to this 25 discretionary framework for criminals who are inadmissible due to criminal offenses, but it 26 contains no exception for noncitizens who are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). 27 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). “‘That express exception’ to Section 1226(a)’s discretionary framework 1 ... who are subject to Section 1226(a).” Gomes v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at 2 *6 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025) (citation omitted) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 300). Interpreting 3 § 1225(b)(2) to mandate detention for every “applicant for admission” would sweep in a huge 4 portion of noncitizens subject to § 1226(a) and “contravene Congress’s intent that Section 5 1226(a)’s discretionary detention framework apply to all noncitizens arrested on a warrant except 6 those subject to Section 1226(c)’s carve-out.” Id. 7 The government’s proposed reading would also violate the “core canon of statutory 8 construction” that courts must “construe a statute ‘so that effect is given to all its provisions, so 9 that no part will be inoperative or superfluous[.]’” In re Saldana, 122 F.4th 333, 342 (9th Cir. 10 2024) (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)). If every applicant for 11 admission were necessarily “seeking admission,” as the government suggests, the phrase “seeking 12 admission” in § 1225(b)(2) would have no effect. The government’s interpretation results in 13 surplusage elsewhere in the statutory scheme as well. Section 1225(b)(2) mandates detention for 14 covered noncitizens who cannot prove to an immigration officer that they are “clearly and beyond 15 a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Yet § 1226(c) also mandates detention 16 for noncitizens who are “inadmissible” on certain grounds. It is unclear how a noncitizen who is 17 “inadmissible” for the reasons listed in § 1226(c) could ever make the clear showing of 18 admissibility required to avoid detention under § 1225(b)(2). So interpreting § 1225(b)(2) to cover 19 every “applicant for admission,” including noncitizens subject to § 1226, would largely 20 nullify § 1226(c), including a subsection added by Congress in 2025. See Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. 21 No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3 (2025) (adding 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)). The Court declines to 22 adopt a reading of § 1225(b)(2) that would almost entirely negate another provision of the same 23 statutory scheme enacted just this year. See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 24 (2013); In re Saldana, 122 F.4th at 341 (“When Congress substantively revises a statute’s text, 25 ‘we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.’” (quoting Stone v. INS, 26 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995))). Instead, § 1225(b)(2) is best read to refer more narrowly to applicants 27 for admission who are “seeking admission” upon their initial arrival in the United States. 1 First, the government points to a recent decision by the BIA in Matter of Jonathan Javier 2 Yajure Hurtado, 29 I & N Dec. 216, 224 (BIA 2025). There, the BIA held that a noncitizen who is 3 an “applicant for admission” is necessarily “seeking admission,” such that § 1225(b)(2) covers all 4 “applicants for admission,” including those who have been released into and resided in the United 5 States for several years. See id. at 221–25. Because “agencies have no special competence in 6 resolving statutory ambiguities,” “the BIA decision is entitled to little deference.” Salcedo Aceros, 7 2025 WL 2637503, at *9 (quoting Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024)). 8 Instead, the BIA’s interpretation is owed deference only to the extent that “the validity of its 9 reasoning” and “its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements” give it “power to 10 persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The BIA’s reasoning fails to 11 persuade because, as explained above, its interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) needlessly renders the 12 phrase “seeking admission” superfluous, vitiates the discretionary-detention regime created by 13 § 1226(a), and nullifies much of § 1226(c). Any persuasive power the BIA’s decision might have 14 is further undercut by its inconsistency with the BIA’s earlier pronouncements, as another court in 15 this district recently explained: 16 Prior to its September 5 decision [in Yajure Hurtado], the BIA issued three non-precedential decisions taking the opposite position. In one 17 decision, the Board even stated that it was “unaware of any precedent” 18 that would support the Government’s position. Under Loper, the Court has no obligation to defer to the BIA’s view, particularly when 19 that view has not “remained consistent over time.” 20 Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *9 (citations omitted) (first citing Martinez, 2025 WL 21 2084238, at *8; and then quoting Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 386). 22 Second, the government argues that Congress’s use of “applicant for admission” and 23 “seeking admission” in § 1225(a)(3) demonstrates that the former is a subset of the latter. Section 24 1225(a)(2) states that “[a]ll aliens … who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking 25 admission or readmission to or transit through the United States shall be inspected by immigration 26 officers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). In the government’s view, “or otherwise” suggests that the phrase 27 preceding that term (i.e., “applicants for admission”) is entirely subsumed by the phrase that 1 States”). Not so. “Otherwise” generally means “in a different way or manner” or “in different 2 circumstances.” Otherwise, WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 835 (1984). So the 3 use of “or otherwise” in § 1225(a)(3) simply provides that immigration officers must inspect any 4 noncitizen who is “seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States,” 5 whether the noncitizen is an applicant for admission or differently situated. 6 To be certain, § 1225(a)(3) acknowledges some overlap between the categories of 7 “applicants for admission” and noncitizens “seeking admission,” with the latter serving as “a 8 ‘catch-all’ to describe non-citizens who must be inspected.” Cordero Pelico, 2025 WL 2822876, at 9 *14 (quoting Al Otro Lado v. Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., 138 F.4th 1102, 1119 (9th Cir. 2025)). 10 But that does not suggest that either category totally subsumes the other. There may still be 11 noncitizens “seeking admission” who are not applicants for admission. “For example, those 12 applying for a visa at a consulate abroad would be seeking admission but not be applicants for 13 admission, since they are neither present in the country nor arriving in it.” Id. (citing Matter of 14 Lemus-Losa, 25 I&N Dec. 734, 741 (BIA 2012)). And there are noncitizens like Ms. Alvarado 15 Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia who are applicants for admission but are not presently “seeking 16 admission” because they have already been released into the United States. Under these 17 circumstances, petitioners are not subject to § 1225(b)(2). Instead, they are subject to the 18 discretionary-detention framework of § 1226(a), which permits detention only of noncitizens who 19 pose a danger to other persons or property or are unlikely to appear for schedule removal 20 proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(4). 21 In sum, Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia have substantial interests in remaining out 22 of custody based on the government’s implicit promise of continued liberty pursuant to the 23 conditions of their release. Because petitioners are not challenging decisions to deny their 24 admission into the United States and are not “at the threshold” of entry, their liberty interests are 25 cognizable under the Due Process Clause, whether or not they are also protected by statute. The 26 first Mathews factor therefore strongly favors petitioners. 27 B. The risk of an erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional 1 procedural safeguards are high. 2 For the reasons noted above, Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia are subject to § 1226 3 and, if re-detained, would be entitled to a post-arrest bond hearing before an immigration judge. 4 Because such a hearing would only be provided after they have been detained and thereby 5 deprived of their liberty, however, there remains a substantial risk that the government will 6 erroneously deprive petitioners of their liberty by re-arresting them without first providing an 7 opportunity for them to demonstrate why their detention is unwarranted. 8 “[W]here ... the petitioner has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing,” 9 “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is high.” Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801, 10 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025) (citation modified). That is because “neither 11 Petitioner[s] nor Respondents had an opportunity to determine whether any valid basis exists for 12 [their] detention.” Oliveros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-07117-BLF, 2025 WL 2677125, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 13 Sept. 18, 2025). There are only two such bases for civil immigration detention: to prevent flight or 14 to protect against danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The government has 15 not offered any evidence that Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio’s or Ms. Garcia’s detention would serve 16 either purpose. The record before the Court suggests quite the opposite. Neither petitioner has a 17 criminal record, and both have attended all their scheduled immigration hearings, have strong 18 family ties in San Francisco, and are involved in their church and community, making it unlikely 19 that they will pose a threat or flee. See Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv-01424, 2021 WL 20 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021).3 Indeed, in order to release them on conditional parole in 21 2024, the government was required to determine that Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia 22 “will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and [are] likely to appear for 23 any scheduled proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(4); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). 24 25 3 In its brief, the government asserts that Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio “failed to report to Enforcement 26 and Removal Operations” on September 11, 2025 “as instructed.” Yet the government offers no evidence to support that assertion, and it admits that Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio presented herself in 27 immigration court for her scheduled hearing on September 11, 2025. The government’s unexplained and unsupported assertion regarding a single alleged failure to report cannot justify 1 Given the absence of any evidence justifying petitioners’ detention, there is a significant 2 risk that the deprivation of their liberty in the time between their arrest and a post-arrest bond 3 hearing under § 1226 would be entirely unjustified.4 Providing them with the procedural safeguard 4 of a pre-detention hearing will have significant value in helping ensure that any future detention 5 has a lawful basis. The second Mathews factor therefore also weighs in petitioners’ favor. 6 C. The government’s countervailing interest in detaining petitioners without a prior hearing is, at most, minimal. 7 8 Finally, for the same reasons explained in the Court’s prior order granting a preliminary 9 injunction in this case, “the government has only a minimal countervailing interest” in detaining 10 Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms Garcia “without first providing a hearing.” Pablo Sequen, 2025 11 WL 2650637, at *8. 12 The government may have “a strong interest” in detaining noncitizens during the pendency of removal proceedings as needed to “protect[] 13 the public from dangerous criminal aliens,” or to prevent flight and 14 thereby “increase the chance that ... the aliens will be successfully removed.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore v. Kim, 15 538 U.S. 510, 515 (2003)). Here, however, the government has made no attempt to show that [Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio or Ms. Garcia] is a 16 flight risk or a danger to the community. Nor can the government assert that providing a hearing would impose any financial or 17 administrative burden. Because custody hearings in immigration cost 18 “are routine and impose a minimal cost, ... it is likely that the cost to the government of detaining [petitioners] pending any bond hearing 19 would significantly exceed the cost of providing her with a pre- detention hearing.” Garro Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *6 (quoting 20

21 4 If the government were correct that Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia are subject to detention under § 1225 and not § 1226, that fact would, if anything, merely strengthen their due- 22 process claim. Section 1225 contains no mechanism whatsoever for an alien to challenge her detention pending removal; instead, the alien must be detained until the completion of 23 immigration proceedings. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty in the absence of a hearing before a neutral 24 decisionmaker is substantial.”). The risk that petitioners would be deprived of their liberty without any valid government justification would thus be significantly increased by any detention pursuant 25 to § 1225. Subjecting them to expedited removal would further increase the constitutional risk because they would be denied any opportunity to prove their claims for asylum in a full 26 evidentiary hearing or to pursue judicial review of the denial of their application. See Martinez-de Bojorquez v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 800, 805 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “the private liberty interests 27 involved in deportation proceedings are among the most substantial” and that a noncitizen's loss of Singh, 2025 WL 1918679, at *8). 1 Id. Thus, the third Mathews factor also favors petitioners. 2 Because each of the Mathews factors supports Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia’s 3 right to a bond hearing before an immigration judge prior to any re-arrest or detention, they have 4 shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their due-process claim. 5 II. Petitioners will likely experience irreparable harm absent an injunction. 6 Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia are also likely to suffer immediate and irreparable 7 harm without preliminary injunctive relief. ICE has already detained Ms. Garcia once and released 8 her only after this Court issued a temporary restraining order. “Given the government’s position 9 that [Ms. Garcia]’s detention is mandated by statute, there is little question that ICE would 10 immediately re-detain her in the absence of an injunction.” Pablo Sequen, 2025 WL 265037, at *9. 11 While ICE did not detain Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio at her last appearance in immigration court, that 12 was only because Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio’s nursing infant was with her and because counsel 13 intervened. The ICE agents who threatened to arrest Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio would not commit to 14 let her attend her next appearance in immigration court on October 16, 2025 without being 15 detained. Far from offering any assurance to that effect, the government expressly conceded at the 16 hearing on this matter that ICE would likely detain Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio after the October 16 17 hearing absent judicial relief. 18 The likely unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. 19 Garcia face is an immediate and irreparable harm, even if it lasts only until a post-detention bond 20 hearing. “The loss or threatened infringement upon [constitutional] rights for even minimal 21 periods of time unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Cuviello v. City of Vallejo, 944 F.3d 22 816, 832 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). “When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right 23 is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Baird v. 24 Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). “[I]t follows inexorably from [the 25 Court’s] conclusion” that petitioners “will likely be deprived of their physical liberty 26 unconstitutionally in the absence of the injunction ... that [they] have also carried their burden as 27 to irreparable harm.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017). Ms. Alvarado 1 Ambrocio’s detention would likely also separate her from her still-nursing baby, an additional 2 grave and irreparable injury. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017) 3 (explaining that government action that “separated families” caused “substantial injuries and even 4 irreparable harms”); Levia-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 969–70 (9th Cir. 2011) (identifying 5 “separation from family members” as an “important irreparable harm factor” (citation modified) 6 (quoting Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 484 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). 7 III. The balance of the equities and public interest weigh in favor of granting a preliminary injunction. 8 9 The final two Winter factors—the balance of the equities and public interest—merge 10 because the government is the opposing party. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). Once 11 again, these factors weigh heavily in favor of an injunction: 12 “Because public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been violated, all citizens have a stake in 13 upholding the Constitution, meaning it is always in the public interest 14 to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Baird, 81 F.4th at 1042 (citation modified). Further, “the Ninth Circuit has 15 recognized that ‘the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.’” Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv-01424, 2021 WL 16 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (citation modified) (quoting Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996). “Given the low risk that [petitioners] 17 would cause harm to others or flee, in light of [their] strong family 18 ties … and [Ms. Garcia’s] work commitments, such government expenditure in this case would not greatly serve the interests of the 19 general public.” Id. (citation modified). And in contrast to the irreparable harm that [petitioners] would suffer absent an injunction, 20 the potential harm to the government is minimal—at most, a short delay in detaining [petitioners] if it ultimately demonstrates to a 21 neutral decisionmaker that [their] detention is necessary. See id.at *3; 22 Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025). Moreover, the government “cannot reasonably assert 23 that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th 24 Cir. 1983); see also Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1145 (9th 25 Cir. 2013) (holding that the government “cannot suffer harm from an injunction that merely ends an unlawful practice” implicating 26 “constitutional concerns”). 27 Pablo Sequen, 2025 WL 2650637, at *9. As in its prior order, the Court “ha[s] little difficulty 1 additional administrative costs to the government are far outweighed by the considerable harm to 2 [their] constitutional rights.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996 (quoting Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 3 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983)).

4 IV. The Parameters of the Pre-Detention Hearing 5 Prior to any future detention by ICE, Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia are entitled 6 to notice and a pre-deprivation hearing at which a neutral arbiter must determine whether there is 7 any valid basis for their detention—i.e., whether they pose a threat to the community or a flight 8 risk that can only be mitigated through detention. Petitioners argue that, at such a hearing, the 9 government should bear the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that a valid 10 basis exists for their detention. Indeed, in Singh v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit held that “the 11 government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger 12 to the community to justify denial of bond.” 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011). 13 Citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez Diaz, the government argues that it should 14 not bear the burden of proof at any bond hearing. See 53 F.4th 1189. Rodriguez Diaz rejected a 15 habeas petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to a second bond hearing after a lengthy period 16 of detention because the government had not had the burden of proof at his initial bond hearing 17 pursuant to § 1226(a). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Fifth Amendment did not require the 18 government to prove a valid basis for detention by clear and convincing evidence at the initial 19 hearing because, while not imposing such a burden on the government, the statutory framework 20 provided the petitioner with “extensive procedural protections” in other respects, “including 21 several layers of review of the agency’s initial custody determination, … the opportunity to be 22 represented by counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new 23 hearing when circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1210–12. Notably, however, Rodriguez 24 Diaz recognized that even where such statutory protections are available, greater protections may 25 be constitutionally necessary in individual cases where the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 26 liberty is particularly high. See id. at 1212–13. 27 Rodriguez Diaz addressed circumstances entirely different from those presented here, in 1 § 1226(a) and face a high risk of the erroneous deprivation of physical liberty. As a result, the 2 || constitutional principles announced in Singh, not those considered in Rodriguez Diaz, apply here.° 3 || Under that precedent, the government must establish a valid basis for petitioners’ detention by 4 || clear and convincing evidence. 5 CONCLUSION 6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio and Ms. Garcia’s 7 request for a preliminary injunction. The government may not detain Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio, and 8 may not re-detain Ms. Garcia, during the pendency of these proceedings without providing them 9 || with pre-detention bond hearings before a neutral immigration judge. The government may detain 10 || petitioners only if, at such a bond hearing, the government bears its burden of demonstrating by 11 clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Alvarado Ambrocio or Ms. Garcia are a danger to the 12 || community or a flights risk and that no conditions other than detention would be sufficient to

13 prevent such harms.

v 14 IT IS SO ORDERED.

15 || Dated: October 15, 2025 16 Zo

= 17 P. Casey Pitts 8 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 s To be certain, when Singh considered what standard of proof applies in bond hearings, the Ninth 25 Circuit believed that such hearings were required by statute—a conclusion that was subsequently abrogated by Jennings, 583 U.S. 281. But Singh’s holding on the burden of proof was based on 26 || constitutional due process principles rather than any interpretation of the statute. See Singh, 638 F.3d at 1204 (first citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 363 (1996); and then citing Santosky 27 v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982)). Thus, “Singh’s constitutional holding ... remains binding 28 law.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 83 F.4th 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 2023) (mem.) (Paez, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).