MESCHKE, Justice.
Dunn County, the members of its Board of Commissioners, Albert Sickler, Leonard Steckler, George Ferebee, and its Auditor, Reinhard Hauck (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Board) have appealed from a district court judgment ordering (1) the Board pay claims for compensation of sheriffs special deputies, Renee C. Tysver for $224.25 and Brent J. Woodworth for $39.00; (2) a claim by Sheriff Doug Carlson be remanded to the Board for reconsideration; and (3) the Board pay $450 for Carlson, Woodworth, and Tysver’s attorney fees and costs. Carlson, Woodworth, and Tysver have cross-appealed from the remand of Carlson's claim and have requested attorney fees on appeal. We affirm, award attorney fees, and remand with directions.
At a meeting on July 1, 1986, the Board rejected claim vouchers presented by Carlson, Woodworth, and Tysver:
“The Board began the audit of bills. Commissioner Steckler moved and Commissioner Ferebee seconded the motion that the following bills be rejected because of a motion passed on May 7,1985, stating the Sheriff can have only the equivalent of five full tim [sic] people, The Sheriff, three full time deputies, and a dispatcher and a motion passed on July 2, 1986 stating that the county will no longer allow the Sheriff's Department special deputies and if hired the Board will no longer allow payment for those deputies: Renee C. Tysver $224.25 for [113]*113Clerical work, Prisoner Transport, and Courtroom Security, Brent J. Wood-worth, $39.00 for Court Security, Doug Carlson, $38.44 for meals for witnesses and court security. The motion carried.”
Carlson, Woodworth, and Tysver appealed to the district court. The district court recognized that the Board was authorized to fix the number and salaries of the sheriffs deputies under § 11-10-11, N.D.C.C.,1 as it did in its resolution of May 7, 1985. The court noted that the Board’s resolution of July 2, 1985, that the “Sheriffs Department ‘would not be allowed special deputies and further that the Board would not allow payment for such deputies’ ” was adopted “apparently without reference to any legal authority, possibly without legal advice.” The court ruled that § 11-15-02, N.D.C.C.,2 “clearly implies that the Commissioners must budget some reasonable amount for special deputies to be appointed by the Sheriff.” The court found that there were sufficient other funds within the sheriff’s budget and ordered that the claims of special deputies Woodworth and Tysver be paid from those other funds.3 The trial court, concluding that “the record ... is uncertain” whether Sheriff Carlson’s claim should have been paid, remanded that item to the Board for reconsideration “pursuant to the applicable law and any applicable ordinances, resolutions or administrative policies adopted by the Dunn County Commissioners.” Pursuant to § 11-11-39, N.D.C.C.,4 the court awarded costs and attorney fees of $450.
On appeal, the Board asserts that the trial court erred in determining that § 11-15-02, N.D.C.C., implies that the Board must budget a reasonable amount for special deputies to be appointed by the sheriff.
Historically, sheriffs have been granted wide latitude in the appointment of deputies. Section 371, R.C. 1895, provided that “[t]he sheriff may appoint such number of deputies as he may deem necessary.” Section 11-10-11, N.D.C.C., allows county commissioners to fix the number and salaries of regular deputies. Section 11-15-02, N.D.C.C., however, deals specifically with special deputies. As originally adopted (S.L.1911, ch. 275, § 5), what is now codified as § 11-15-02 provided that “[i]n case of any emergency the sheriff shall have the authority to appoint and qualify special deputies in such numbers as in his judgment the conditions may require.” In 1983, the requirement of an “emergency” was deleted and the phrase “within the limits of funds budgeted for such purpose” was inserted. S.L.1983, ch. 151, § 1. [114]*114Thus, § 11-15-02, N.D.C.C., is calculated to give sheriffs some latitude in appointing special deputies when necessary, while also giving county commissioners some measure of fiscal control.
There has been no assertion that the services of the special deputies were not “required by the conditions.” Presumably, therefore, their services were required, the sheriff was justified in appointing them, and payment for their services “is a proper expenditure to be defrayed out of the [county] treasury.” See State ex rel. Byrne v. Baker, 65 N.D. 190, 262 N.W. 183, 184 (1934), where this court held that an expenditure for constitutionally required publicity pamphlets incident to an election was authorized by law even without an appropriation:
“The provisions of the Constitution involved here are mandatory. North Dakota Constitution, §§ 21, 25. The constitutional provision quoted above enjoins upon the secretary of state a specific duty_ It is apparent that the secretary of state cannot perform the duty enjoined upon him by the provisions of the Constitution without incurring the expense incident to the publication and mailing of the publicity pamphlet. If the Legislative Assembly could prevent the secretary of state from performing this duty by failing or refusing to appropriate funds for the prescribed constitutional purpose, it could, in effect, nullify the constitutional mandate. We are of the opinion that ... the cost incident to the publication and distribution of the publicity pamphlet is a proper expenditure to be defrayed out of the state treasury, ..., even though the Legislative Assembly has made no specific appropriation for the purpose.”
Like reasoning can apply to statutes defining the organization of county government and the relationship of a county commission to the county sheriff.
The Board may be authorized by § 11-15-02, N.D.C.C., to limit the sheriffs budget for special deputies for a good reason. In this case, however, the record contains no reason for the Board’s blanket refusal to allow the sheriff to appoint special deputies. We are not persuaded that the district court erred in ordering the Board to pay the claims of special deputies Wood-worth and Tysver.
Carlson contends that the district court erred in not ordering the Board to pay his claim. Carlson’s voucher was for meals purchased for witnesses and special deputies, which is a different kind of expense than salaries of special deputies. Thus, different considerations may come into play. In remanding this item to the Board for reconsideration, the court noted that the parties did not brief “the question of whether the Sheriff may validly seek reimbursement for meals he voluntarily purchases for other persons and the Court is not aware of what policies Dunn County may have established in the past in regard to such claims for reimbursement.” We conclude that the district court did not err in remanding Carlson’s claim for reconsideration.
Having ruled in favor of Carlson, Woodworth, and Tysver in their appeal from the Board’s decision, the district court ordered the Board to pay $450 for costs and attorney fees pursuant to § 11-11-39, N.D.C.C. The Board has not asserted that the award was not reasonable and it is, therefore, affirmed.
Carlson, Woodworth, and Tysver request that the Board be ordered, to pay their attorney fees of $1,500 on this appeal. Recently, in awarding attorney fees on appeal in Troutman v. Pierce, Inc.,
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MESCHKE, Justice.
Dunn County, the members of its Board of Commissioners, Albert Sickler, Leonard Steckler, George Ferebee, and its Auditor, Reinhard Hauck (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Board) have appealed from a district court judgment ordering (1) the Board pay claims for compensation of sheriffs special deputies, Renee C. Tysver for $224.25 and Brent J. Woodworth for $39.00; (2) a claim by Sheriff Doug Carlson be remanded to the Board for reconsideration; and (3) the Board pay $450 for Carlson, Woodworth, and Tysver’s attorney fees and costs. Carlson, Woodworth, and Tysver have cross-appealed from the remand of Carlson's claim and have requested attorney fees on appeal. We affirm, award attorney fees, and remand with directions.
At a meeting on July 1, 1986, the Board rejected claim vouchers presented by Carlson, Woodworth, and Tysver:
“The Board began the audit of bills. Commissioner Steckler moved and Commissioner Ferebee seconded the motion that the following bills be rejected because of a motion passed on May 7,1985, stating the Sheriff can have only the equivalent of five full tim [sic] people, The Sheriff, three full time deputies, and a dispatcher and a motion passed on July 2, 1986 stating that the county will no longer allow the Sheriff's Department special deputies and if hired the Board will no longer allow payment for those deputies: Renee C. Tysver $224.25 for [113]*113Clerical work, Prisoner Transport, and Courtroom Security, Brent J. Wood-worth, $39.00 for Court Security, Doug Carlson, $38.44 for meals for witnesses and court security. The motion carried.”
Carlson, Woodworth, and Tysver appealed to the district court. The district court recognized that the Board was authorized to fix the number and salaries of the sheriffs deputies under § 11-10-11, N.D.C.C.,1 as it did in its resolution of May 7, 1985. The court noted that the Board’s resolution of July 2, 1985, that the “Sheriffs Department ‘would not be allowed special deputies and further that the Board would not allow payment for such deputies’ ” was adopted “apparently without reference to any legal authority, possibly without legal advice.” The court ruled that § 11-15-02, N.D.C.C.,2 “clearly implies that the Commissioners must budget some reasonable amount for special deputies to be appointed by the Sheriff.” The court found that there were sufficient other funds within the sheriff’s budget and ordered that the claims of special deputies Woodworth and Tysver be paid from those other funds.3 The trial court, concluding that “the record ... is uncertain” whether Sheriff Carlson’s claim should have been paid, remanded that item to the Board for reconsideration “pursuant to the applicable law and any applicable ordinances, resolutions or administrative policies adopted by the Dunn County Commissioners.” Pursuant to § 11-11-39, N.D.C.C.,4 the court awarded costs and attorney fees of $450.
On appeal, the Board asserts that the trial court erred in determining that § 11-15-02, N.D.C.C., implies that the Board must budget a reasonable amount for special deputies to be appointed by the sheriff.
Historically, sheriffs have been granted wide latitude in the appointment of deputies. Section 371, R.C. 1895, provided that “[t]he sheriff may appoint such number of deputies as he may deem necessary.” Section 11-10-11, N.D.C.C., allows county commissioners to fix the number and salaries of regular deputies. Section 11-15-02, N.D.C.C., however, deals specifically with special deputies. As originally adopted (S.L.1911, ch. 275, § 5), what is now codified as § 11-15-02 provided that “[i]n case of any emergency the sheriff shall have the authority to appoint and qualify special deputies in such numbers as in his judgment the conditions may require.” In 1983, the requirement of an “emergency” was deleted and the phrase “within the limits of funds budgeted for such purpose” was inserted. S.L.1983, ch. 151, § 1. [114]*114Thus, § 11-15-02, N.D.C.C., is calculated to give sheriffs some latitude in appointing special deputies when necessary, while also giving county commissioners some measure of fiscal control.
There has been no assertion that the services of the special deputies were not “required by the conditions.” Presumably, therefore, their services were required, the sheriff was justified in appointing them, and payment for their services “is a proper expenditure to be defrayed out of the [county] treasury.” See State ex rel. Byrne v. Baker, 65 N.D. 190, 262 N.W. 183, 184 (1934), where this court held that an expenditure for constitutionally required publicity pamphlets incident to an election was authorized by law even without an appropriation:
“The provisions of the Constitution involved here are mandatory. North Dakota Constitution, §§ 21, 25. The constitutional provision quoted above enjoins upon the secretary of state a specific duty_ It is apparent that the secretary of state cannot perform the duty enjoined upon him by the provisions of the Constitution without incurring the expense incident to the publication and mailing of the publicity pamphlet. If the Legislative Assembly could prevent the secretary of state from performing this duty by failing or refusing to appropriate funds for the prescribed constitutional purpose, it could, in effect, nullify the constitutional mandate. We are of the opinion that ... the cost incident to the publication and distribution of the publicity pamphlet is a proper expenditure to be defrayed out of the state treasury, ..., even though the Legislative Assembly has made no specific appropriation for the purpose.”
Like reasoning can apply to statutes defining the organization of county government and the relationship of a county commission to the county sheriff.
The Board may be authorized by § 11-15-02, N.D.C.C., to limit the sheriffs budget for special deputies for a good reason. In this case, however, the record contains no reason for the Board’s blanket refusal to allow the sheriff to appoint special deputies. We are not persuaded that the district court erred in ordering the Board to pay the claims of special deputies Wood-worth and Tysver.
Carlson contends that the district court erred in not ordering the Board to pay his claim. Carlson’s voucher was for meals purchased for witnesses and special deputies, which is a different kind of expense than salaries of special deputies. Thus, different considerations may come into play. In remanding this item to the Board for reconsideration, the court noted that the parties did not brief “the question of whether the Sheriff may validly seek reimbursement for meals he voluntarily purchases for other persons and the Court is not aware of what policies Dunn County may have established in the past in regard to such claims for reimbursement.” We conclude that the district court did not err in remanding Carlson’s claim for reconsideration.
Having ruled in favor of Carlson, Woodworth, and Tysver in their appeal from the Board’s decision, the district court ordered the Board to pay $450 for costs and attorney fees pursuant to § 11-11-39, N.D.C.C. The Board has not asserted that the award was not reasonable and it is, therefore, affirmed.
Carlson, Woodworth, and Tysver request that the Board be ordered, to pay their attorney fees of $1,500 on this appeal. Recently, in awarding attorney fees on appeal in Troutman v. Pierce, Inc., 402 N.W.2d 920, 925 (N.D.1987), we said:
“We do not believe that a prevailing consumer’s attorney-fee award under the Magnusson-Moss Act at the trial level should be dissipated by uncompensated costs, expenses and attorney fees in successfully defending a judgment on appeal.”
We similarly believe that an attorney fee award under § 11-11-39, N.D.C.C., should not be dissipated by uncompensated attorney fees incurred in successfully defending a judgment on appeal.
[115]*115In awarding attorney fees on appeal, we would ordinarily, as we did in Troutman, supra, remand the matter to the trial court for a determination of the amount of attorney fees to be allowed for the appeal. In this case, however, by failing to file a reply brief or otherwise respond to the request for attorney fees on appeal, the Board has not contested the $1,500 request for attorney fees. We, therefore, award $1,500 for attorney fees, as requested.
The judgment is affirmed and attorney fees on appeal are awarded in the amount of $1,500. On remand, the district court is directed to modify the judgment to order the Board to pay attorney fees of $1,500 on appeal.
ERICKSTAD, C.J., and GIERKE, J., concur.