Carlson v. Benton

92 N.W. 600, 66 Neb. 486, 1902 Neb. LEXIS 441
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 19, 1902
DocketNo. 12,151
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 92 N.W. 600 (Carlson v. Benton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carlson v. Benton, 92 N.W. 600, 66 Neb. 486, 1902 Neb. LEXIS 441 (Neb. 1902).

Opinion

Albert, 0.

It is alleged in the petition, among other things, that the plaintiff sustained a fracture of the bones of his leg below the knee and a dislocation of one of said bones, and that, the defendants, at his instance and request, undertook, as physicians and surgeons, to treat and heal such injuries; that because of the negligence and lack of skill on the part of the defendants, the ends of the broken bones were not properly brought together, and the dislocation was not reduced; that by reason of such omission, the fractured bones failed to unite properly, leaving the plaintiff lame and causing him great bodily pain. The answer admits the fracture of the bones, as alleged in the petition, and that the defendants were employed as physicians and sur[488]*488geons to reduce such, fractures; all the other allegations of the petition are denied. The answer also charges contributor negligence. A trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants. Judgment accordingly. The plaintiff brings error.

On the trial the plaintiff offered in evidence an X-ray photograph of his injured leg, taken after his injuries had been treated by the defendants. It was objected to, on the ground that a sufficient foundation had not been laid. The objection was sustained, and the ruling of the court in that behalf is now assigned as error. The defendants insist that the ruling of the court was right, because the competency of the person taking the photograph, the condition of the apparatus with which it was taken, and that the circumstances under which it was taken, were such as to insure an accurate picture, had not been sufficiently shown in evidence. To show such matters is simply one way of establishing the accuracy of the picture. We do not understand that such way is exclusive. Refore the photograph was last offered in evidence, the plaintiff had introduced evidence tending to prove all the material allegations of his petition. In addition, Doctor Arnold had testified, in effect, after showing his competency as an expert, that he had examined the injured leg by means of the X-ray, after it had been treated by the defendants, and found the fracture and dislocation alleged in the petition. His testimony tended to show that neither the fracture nor the. dislocation had been properly reduced. He further testified that the photograph offered in evidence was a true representation of the position, location and condition of the bones of the injured leg, as they were at the time he made the examination. The testimony of Doctors Robinson and Hunt is to the same effect, save that the former ascertained the position, location and condition of the bones by manipulation. The means employed by the latter to ascertain such facts do not appear. In view of this testimony we do not deem it necessary to go into the question of the competency of the person who took the photograph, the con[489]*489dition of the apparatus by means of which it was taken nor the circumstances under which it was taken. Such matters would be far less satisfactory evidence, to the ordinary mind, that the photograph was an accurate representation of what it was claimed to represent than would the testimony of witnesses who were competent to compare it with the original and who had thus compared it. The defendants cite Bruce v. Beall, 41 S. W. Rep. [Tenn.], 445, in which the court says: “It is not to be understood, however, that every photograph offered as taken by the cathode or X-ray process would be admissible. Its competency, to be first determined by the trial judge, depends upon the science, skill, experience and intelligence of the party taking the picture and testifying with regard to it, and, lacking these important qualifications, it should not be admitted.” The rule thus announced was applicable, doubtless, to the facts before the court in that case; but it is too narrow to be regarded as a general rule. The novelty of the X-ray photograph does not extend to the rules governing its reception in evidence. Maps, photographs, drawings and models are admissible in evidence when it is shown that they fairly represent the object or objects under investigation. There is no good reason why the same rule should not apply to photographs of this character. But the defendants insist that the admission of such evidence rests within the discretion of the trial judge, and consequently the exclusion of the photograph is not reversible error. Whatever discretion the trial judge may have in matters of this kind, such discretion is not unlimited, nor may it be exercised arbitrarily. Reimer v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 59 N. E. Rep. [Mass.], 671. The uncontradicted testimony of the three surgeons mentioned leaves no room for a difference of opinion as to the accuracy of the photograph offered in evidence. To exclude it under such circumstances, on the ground that a sufficient foundation had not been laid, was an abuse of discretion.

Lastly, it is urged that, whatever error may have been in the exclusion of the photograph, it was error without [490]*490prejudice, because there is no conflict in the testimony on the question of the existence of the dislocation and improper union of the bones. ' The record does not bear out this statement, especially as relates to the dislocation. But if it did, it would not be safe to say that the exclusion of, the photograph worked no prejudice to the plaintiff. The condition and position of the bones of the plaintiff’s leg after it had been treated by the defendants, 'were among the matters to be investigated by the jury. It is hardly possible to convey such matters to the average mind as clearly by oral testimony as it may be conveyed by means of a photograph. The verdict of the jury is general, and it would be rash to assume that it was not influenced by the exclusion of the evidence in question.

The court, on its own motion, among other things, instructed the jury as follows:

“8. You are further instructed that the material allegations of the petition, not so admitted and assumed, as set forth in the last preceding instruction, and upon which you must deliberate and make findings before you can render a verdict in this case are as follows: First. That the defendants carelessly, unskillfully and negligently failed to bring the ends and parts of the broken bones into apposition so that they could properly unite together; that is to place each part opposite to and in close contact with the part from which it was broken. Second. That the defendants carelessly, negligently and unskilfully failed to reduce the dislocation of the fibula of the plaintiff’s leg; that is to place the joint in proper position. Third. That defendants carelessly, negligently and un-skilfully failed to apply to said fractures and dislocations the proper extensions and counter-extensions, splints and bandages to retain said broken bones and dislocated bone in their proper position. Fourth. That the defendants carelessly, negligently and unskillfully bandaged and dressed said injured leg and dislocated joint so that they could not properly heal and unite.”
“4., You are instructed that the burden is upon the [491]*491plaintiff and.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Busboom v. Gregory
137 N.W.2d 825 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1965)
Norton & Siegel, Inc. v. Nolan
251 A.D. 894 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1937)
Davis v. Whitmore
32 P.2d 340 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1934)
Walton v. Walton
278 P. 780 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1929)
Alabama Trunk & Luggage Co. v. Hauer
108 So. 339 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1926)
Ehrenheim v. Yellow Cab Co.
239 Ill. App. 403 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1926)
Avery v. Peterson
163 N.W. 677 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 1917)
Davis v. Dunn
98 A. 81 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1916)
Bane v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
88 S.E. 477 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1916)
Ingebretsen v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad
176 Iowa 74 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1915)
Moulton v. Globe Mutual Insurance
154 N.W. 830 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 1915)
Lupton v. Southern Express Co.
169 N.C. 671 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1915)
Lupton v. . Express Co.
86 S.E. 614 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1915)
Griffith v. American Coal Co.
84 S.E. 621 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1915)
Zancanella v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway Co.
142 N.W. 190 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1913)
Hughes v. State
126 Tenn. 40 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1912)
Diller v. Northern California Power Co.
123 P. 359 (California Supreme Court, 1912)
Chicago, B. & Q. R. v. Upton
194 F. 371 (Eighth Circuit, 1912)
State v. Matheson
103 N.W. 137 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1905)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
92 N.W. 600, 66 Neb. 486, 1902 Neb. LEXIS 441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carlson-v-benton-neb-1902.