1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, an individual Case No. 25-cv-00626-BAS-DEB and on behalf of all others similarly 13 situated, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 14 MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO Plaintiff, STATE COURT 15 v. 16 (ECF Nos. 12, 13) GENERAL DYNAMICS 17 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INC.; DAVID AIMILIOS, 18 Defendants. 19
20 21 Defendant General Dynamics Information Technology, Inc. removed this case from 22 San Diego County Superior Court, asserting jurisdiction exists under the Class Action 23 Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). (Notice of Removal (“Notice”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff 24 Carlos Rodriguez filed a Motion to Remand, arguing Defendant’s Notice of Removal fails 25 to show CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied. (Mot. to Remand, ECF 26 Nos. 12, 13.) Plaintiff also argues the Court should sever and remand one of his claims for 27 lack of equitable jurisdiction. (Id.) Defendant opposes (Opp’n, ECF No. 16), and Plaintiff 28 replies (Reply, ECF No. 17). The Court finds this Motion suitable for determination on 1 the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 2 7.1(d)(1). 3 For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds CAFA’s amount-in-controversy 4 requirement is satisfied and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. The Court also 5 DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s request to sever and remand the equitable 6 claim. The Court orders Defendant to file a supplemental brief addressing new precedent 7 on this issue. 8 BACKGROUND 9 Defendant is an information technology company that employed Rodriguez as a non- 10 exempt employee from June 2023 to June 2024. (Compl. ¶¶ 1–2, ECF No. 1-2.)1 Plaintiff 11 alleges Defendant denied him and other employees the benefits of the California Labor 12 Code. (Id. ¶¶ 14–22.) Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to pay minimum and 13 overtime wages, provide meal and rest periods, furnish the full amount of wages due at 14 termination, and maintain accurate itemized wage statements. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts these 15 claims on behalf of himself and “all other current and former non-exempt employees of 16 Defendant within the State of California at any time commencing four (4) years preceding 17 the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint up until the time that notice of the class action is provided 18 to the class (collectively referred to as ‘Class Members’).” (Id. ¶ 23.) 19 LEGAL STANDARD 20 A case is removable if it could have originally been filed in federal court. Chicago 21 v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). Whether 22 removal is proper depends on the pleadings “as of the time the complaint is filed and 23 removal is effected.” Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th 24 Cir. 2002). 25 “[N]o antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA,” and a defendant’s 26 notice of removal need only include a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy 27 1 The Court refers only to Defendant General Dynamics because, to the Court’s knowledge, 28 1 exceeds the threshold. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 2 (2014). “The burden of establishing removal jurisdiction remains, as before, on the 3 proponent of federal jurisdiction.” Abrego v. Dow Chem., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 4 2006). 5 CAFA confers federal jurisdiction over class actions involving: (1) minimal 6 diversity; (2) at least 100 putative members; and (3) over $5 million in controversy, 7 inclusive of attorneys’ fees but exclusive of costs and interest. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), 8 (d)(5). Class members’ claims may be aggregated to satisfy the amount-in-controversy 9 requirement. E.g., Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 2015). 10 The amount in controversy “encompasses all relief a court may grant on that complaint if 11 the plaintiff is victorious.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 791 12 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 414–15 (9th 13 Cir. 2018)). 14 ANALYSIS 15 I. Amount in Controversy 16 At issue is first whether Defendant shows that the amount-in-controversy 17 requirement under CAFA is met.2 The Court starts by reviewing the short and plain 18 statement requirement and Defendant’s amount-in-controversy assessment. Next, the 19 Court considers Plaintiff’s attacks on Defendant’s assessment, including Defendant’s 20 proposed violation rates and calculations. 21 A. “Short and Plain” Statement 22 To remove a case to federal court, the defendant must file a notice of removal 23 “containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). 24 As mentioned, the defendant’s notice of removal “need include only a plausible allegation 25 26 2 Minimal diversity exists under CAFA as the putative class includes California citizens, and 27 Defendant is a Virginia corporation. (Notice ¶ 12.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). Additionally, Defendant alleges the putative class is greater than 100 members, and Plaintiff’s Opposition is limited to 28 1 that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee, 574 2 U.S. at 89. “[A] defendant cannot establish removal jurisdiction by mere speculation and 3 conjecture, with unreasonable assumptions.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197. 4 Defendant’s Notice of Removal meets this requirement. Defendant relies on 5 allegations in the Complaint and several assumptions to approximate the amount in 6 controversy for four of Plaintiff’s claims. (Notice ¶¶ 14–46.) For example, for Plaintiff’s 7 meal and rest period claims, Defendant assumes one meal and one rest period violation per 8 workweek per employee in light of the Complaint’s allegations. (Id. ¶¶ 22–28.) Defendant 9 further alleges that its non-exempt employees worked at least 65,000 workweeks over the 10 relevant period, and the average hourly rate of these employees was approximately $28.50. 11 (Id. ¶ 27.) These data points allow Defendant to reasonably estimate the potential value of 12 the claims. (Id. ¶ 28.) Defendant similarly assesses Plaintiff’s claims for waiting time 13 penalties and inaccurate wage statements. (Id. ¶¶ 29–41.) Overall, Defendant plausibly 14 alleges that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. (Id. ¶ 42.) 15 B. Defendant’s Evidence 16 Although the Notice of Removal is sufficient, more is required to fend off Plaintiff’s 17 Motion to Remand. Where the plaintiff contests the amount in controversy, “evidence 18 establishing the amount is required.” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89. “In such a case, both 19 sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the 20 amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 88. 21 Under this standard, a defendant may rely on “reasonable assumptions” to establish 22 its amount-in-controversy assessment. Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 23 922 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197–99). The removing defendant may 24 present “a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions” so long as those assumptions are 25 grounded in the complaint or other evidence. See id. at 925. Assumptions “cannot be 26 pulled from thin air,” but may be reasonable if tethered to the allegations of the complaint. 27 Id. A defendant may also support its showing with “evidence outside the complaint, 28 including affidavits or declarations, or other ‘summary-judgment-type evidence relevant 1 to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197 (quoting 2 Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). 3 In responding to Plaintiff’s challenge, Defendant again relies on assumptions based 4 on Plaintiff’s Complaint but also points to a declaration from Michele Shuster, Defendant’s 5 Director of Data Analytics. (Shuster Decl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 16-2.) Ms. Shuster’s declaration 6 analyzes a summary report of electronic employment records, including personnel files, 7 dates of employment, time data, and pay data. (Id. ¶ 2.) According to Ms. Shuster, the 8 summary report covers 806 non-exempt employees in California who collectively worked 9 65,317 weeks between February 5, 2021, and September 9, 2024. (Id. ¶ 3.) Her review 10 indicates that employees were typically scheduled to work shifts of 7–8 hours, 5 days per 11 week, for an average of 38 hours per week (7.6 hours per day). (Id.) 12 Ms. Shuster also determined that employees’ base hourly rates ranged from $14.57 13 per hour to $62.50, with an average rate of $28.76 per hour. (Shuster Decl. ¶ 4.) 14 Additionally, Ms. Shuster identified that the employment of 286 of the 806 hourly non- 15 exempt employees ended between February 5, 2022, and September 9, 2024. (Id. ¶ 5.) 16 These former employees worked an average of 37.6 hours per week with an average base 17 hourly rate of $28.18. (Id.) Defendant uses this evidence to calculate the amount in 18 controversy for the following claims. 19 1. Meal and Rest Periods 20 Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action seek damages on behalf of the Class 21 Members under Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512 for failure to pay meal and rest period 22 premiums. (Compl. ¶¶ 46–61.) Defendant calculates the amount in controversy for these 23 claims using the formula: $28.76 per hour x (1 meal period violation per week + 1 rest 24 period violation per week) x 65,317 workweeks. (Opp’n 9:17–21.) Consequently, 25 Defendant approximates a total of $3,757,033 in controversy for these two claims. (See id. 26 (rounding down).) 27 28 1 2. Waiting Time Penalties 2 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “intentionally adopted policies or practices 3 incompatible with the requirements of California Labor Code sections 201 and 202.” 4 (Compl. ¶ 66.) As a result, “Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to waiting time 5 penalties from the date their earned and unpaid wages were due, upon termination or 6 resignation, until paid, up to a maximum of thirty (30) days.” (Id. ¶ 67.) 7 According to Ms. Shuster’s declaration, between February 5, 2022, and September 8 9, 2024, 286 putative class members ended their employment with Defendant in California. 9 (Shuster Decl. ¶ 5.) Ms. Shuster states that the average final hourly rate of pay for these 10 former employees was $28.18 per hour, and they worked an average of 37.6 hours per 11 week. (Id.) She further notes that the average daily shift worked was approximately 7.5 12 hours. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5.) Defendant estimates the amount in controversy for this claim using 13 the formula: 7.5 hours per day x $28.18 per hour x 30 days x 286 employees. (Opp’n 12:7– 14 12.) Based on this calculation, Defendant approximates a total of $1,813,383. (Id.) 15 3. Wage Statements 16 Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action seeks damages on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class 17 Members under California Labor Code section 226 for failure to provide accurate and 18 itemized wage statements. (Compl. ¶¶ 70–77.) Where the statutory penalties are sought, 19 violations under section 226 are assessed at $50 for the first violation and $100 for each 20 subsequent violation, up to an aggregate maximum of $4,000 per employee. Cal. Lab. 21 Code § 226(e)(1). 22 To calculate the amount in controversy, Defendant states that it issued wage 23 statements to non-exempt employees in California on a biweekly basis. (Shuster Decl. 24 ¶ 6.) Ms. Shuster states that Defendant had 488 non-exempt employees in California who 25 worked from February 5, 2024, to September 9, 2024, who collectively received 26 approximately 6,633 wage statements during that period. (Id.) Defendant subtracts the 27 488 initial pay periods from the total of 6,633 pay periods to arrive at 6,145 subsequent 28 violations. (Opp’n 13 n.8.) Additionally, Defendant asserts that no single putative class 1 member exceeded the $4,000 statutory cap. (Id.; Shuster Decl. ¶ 6.) Based on these figures, 2 Defendant calculates the amount in controversy for this claim as $638,900 using the 3 formula: (488 initial violations x $50) + (6,145 subsequent violations x $100). (Opp’n 4 13:24–25.) 5 4. Attorneys’ Fees 6 Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ fees for each California Labor Code cause of 7 action. (Compl. ¶¶ 39, 45, 53, 61, 77; Prayer for Relief ¶ M.) Defendant assumes that, if 8 Plaintiff prevails, Plaintiff would be awarded an additional 25% of the value of the recovery 9 as attorneys’ fees, which Defendant contends is the benchmark used to estimate attorneys’ 10 fees for amount in controversy purposes. (See Notice ¶¶ 43–45.) 11 Defendant argues that attorneys’ fees should be included in the amount in 12 controversy. (Opp’n 14:10–25.) See Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 794 (“[A] court must include 13 future attorneys’ fees recoverable by statute or contract when assessing whether the 14 amount-in-controversy requirement is met”). Based on this approach, Defendant estimates 15 that attorneys’ fees would add up to approximately $1,552,329 for the meal and rest period, 16 waiting time penalties, and wage statement claims. (See Opp’n 16:13–14.)3 17 Overall, Defendant substantiates the allegations from its Notice of Removal with 18 evidence, and Defendant’s calculations are not materially different from those found in the 19 Notice’s short and plain statement of the grounds for removal. 20 C. Plaintiff’s Challenges to Defendant’s Showing 21 Plaintiff challenges the reasonableness of Defendant’s assumptions regarding the 22 amount in controversy. (See generally Reply.) One way to challenge the defendant’s 23 jurisdictional allegations is to make a “factual attack.” Harris v. KM Indus., Inc., 980 F.3d 24 694, 699–700 (9th Cir. 2020). A factual attack includes “making a reasoned argument as 25
26 3 Defendant’s Opposition calculates the potential fees as $1,602,470 instead of $1,552,329, but this figure appears to be a mistake. (See Opp’n 16:13–14.) Defendant uses $6,409,881 as the sum of the 27 amount in controversy for the underlying Labor Code claims, but adding $3,757,033 (meal and rest period claims); $1,813,383 (waiting time penalties claim); and $638,900 (wage statements claim) together is 28 1 to why any assumptions on which [the allegations] are based are not supported by 2 evidence.” Id. There is no requirement that a plaintiff must produce any evidence or 3 alternative assumptions. See Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199. Yet, a plaintiff may bolster the 4 challenge by submitting evidence, such as a declaration detailing how often the plaintiff 5 personally experienced the alleged violations. See id.; see also Harris, 980 F.3d at 700 6 (holding a plaintiff may challenge a defendant’s jurisdictional assumptions through factual 7 arguments without introducing contrary evidence, thereby requiring the defendant to 8 support its allegations with proof). 9 Here, as in Harris, Defendant treats Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand as a factual attack. 10 See 980 F.3d at 700. By submitting Ms. Shuster’s declaration, Defendant provides 11 evidence to support its assumptions underlying the calculation of the amount in 12 controversy. Hence, the Court must assess Plaintiff’s arguments and determine whether 13 Defendant has shown “by a preponderance of the evidence that its assumptions” are 14 reasonable. See id. at 701. 15 To that end, Plaintiff argues Defendant’s calculations should be rejected because 16 Defendant’s assumptions are not tethered to the Complaint. (Reply 1:6–7.) Plaintiff argues 17 that Ms. Shuster’s declaration does not address Defendant’s violation rates or provide any 18 information regarding Defendant’s policies or practices that would support the assumed 19 rates. (Id. at 2:26–28.) However, “a party’s access to additional information does not 20 necessarily render the assumptions made by that party unreasonable.” Shachno v. Marriott 21 Int’l, Inc., No. 22-CV-1215-TWR (JLB), 2023 WL 316367, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2023). 22 Indeed, “a defendant need not make the plaintiff’s case for [him] or prove the amount in 23 controversy beyond a legal certainty.” Harris, 980 F.3d at 701. 24 As is inescapable at this early stage of the litigation, the removing party must be able to rely “on a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions to satisfy 25 its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in 26 controversy exceeds $5 million,” as long as the reasoning and underlying assumptions are reasonable. 27 28 1 Jauregui v. Roadrunner Transp. Servs., Inc., 28 F.4th 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 2 LaCross v. Knight Transp. Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 2015)). Here, Defendant’s 3 reliance on Ms. Shuster’s analysis of its employment records, time records, and payroll 4 data reasonably supports Defendant’s calculations. (See Shuster Decl. ¶¶ 2–6.) 5 Moreover, Defendant’s assumptions are reasonably based on both Ms. Shuster’s 6 analysis and the language in Plaintiff’s Complaint. See Perez v. Rose Hills Co., 131 F.4th 7 804, 809 (9th Cir. 2025). Whether the alleged violations occurred from time to time, as a 8 matter of pattern and practice, or uniformly, as alleged in the complaint, impacts the 9 amount in controversy calculation for wage-and-hour claims. See Arias, 936 F.3d at 925– 10 26. This frequency informs the court’s adoption of a violation rate expressed as a 11 percentage when calculating the amount in controversy. See, e.g., Powell v. USI Ins. 12 Servs., LLC, No. 2:23-cv-04129-ODW (BFMx), 2023 WL 6276578, at *3–5 (C.D. Cal. 13 Sept. 25, 2023) (distinguishing between allegations of a pattern and practice, which could 14 not reasonably support a 100% violation rate, and allegations resulting from a uniform 15 policy, which could plausibly support a 100% violation rate); Olson v. Becton, Dickinson 16 & Co., No. 19-cv-865-MMA-BGS, 2019 WL 4673329, at *2–5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2019) 17 (assessing violation rates to resolve motion to remand). Accordingly, the Court considers 18 the violation rate for each challenged calculation below. 19 1. Meal and Rest Periods 20 Plaintiff argues the Court should reject Defendant’s calculation of the amount in 21 controversy for the third and fourth causes of action, contending that Defendant improperly 22 applies a 20% violation rate to all class members when “the number of affected employees 23 cannot reasonably be assumed to be 100% of employees.” (Reply 2:15–20.) 24 In aggregating the claims for missed meal and rest periods, Defendant estimates the 25 total is $3,757,033. See supra Section I.B.1. In calculating this amount, Defendant relies 26 on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perez, 131 F.4th 804. There, the Ninth Circuit explained 27 that where a complaint alleges violations occurred “at times,” it is reasonable to compute 28 the amount in controversy by making an assumption about the rate at which violations 1 occurred, so long as that assumption is tethered to the language of the complaint. Id. The 2 Ninth Circuit contrasted that circumstance from Ibarra, where “the defendant had to submit 3 evidence of the violation rate because its interpretation of the allegations in the 4 complaint was unreasonable.” Id. at 809. Here, Defendant uses a 20% violation rate, 5 which is appropriately tethered to the “at times” language in Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Opp’n 6 8:17–20.) 7 Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that it is unreasonable to assume that all class 8 members were affected by the violations alleged in the third and fourth causes of action. 9 (Reply 2:17–20.) In Plaintiff’s view, the Complaint suggests a narrower group because the 10 Complaint contains language providing that “Plaintiff and [the] Class Members, or some 11 of them,” suffered the alleged wage-and-hour violations “at times.” (Id.; see also Compl. 12 ¶¶ 13–19.) 13 However, it is Plaintiff who chose to plead his allegations with a net instead of a 14 spear. By doing so, Plaintiff left the Complaint subject to the reasonable inference that all 15 class members could recover for the alleged violations. The Complaint does not allege 16 only some of the class members suffered the violations. Rather, it alleges all of them—or, 17 alternatively, “some of them”—suffered the violations. (Compl. ¶¶ 13–19.) This language, 18 when viewed in context with the class allegations, supports the inference that all class 19 members could potentially recover for these violations. (Id. ¶¶ 23–32.) Indeed, “the 20 amount in controversy reflects the maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably 21 recover.” See Arias, 936 F.3d at 927. And Plaintiff’s class allegations necessarily plead 22 that all the class members were subject to “Defendants’ common course of conduct,” with 23 various common questions of law or fact. (Compl. ¶¶ 28–29.) 24 Thus, Defendant is entitled to rely on Plaintiff’s allegations that indicate the 25 violations were suffered by all the class members. See Demaria v. Big Lots Stores–PNS, 26 LLC, No. 2:23-CV-00296-DJC-CKD, 2023 WL 6390151, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2023) 27 (“While Plaintiff uses language potentially limiting recovery to only some class members, 28 i.e., ‘or some of them,’ ‘or’ indicates that all class members could conceivably recover[.]”). 1 Based on those allegations, Defendant reasonably assumes that the alleged meal and rest 2 period violations were suffered by all the class members. (See Compl. ¶¶ 51, 59.) 3 Defendant also reasonably assumes a 20% violation rate for these claims based on the “at 4 times” language in the Complaint. (See id. ¶¶ 13–19.) See Perez, 131 F.4th at 809–10. 5 Hence, the Court finds Defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that 6 Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action place $3,757,033 in controversy. 7 2. Waiting Time Penalties 8 Plaintiff next disputes Defendant’s calculation of waiting time penalties under 9 California Labor Code sections 201–203. As mentioned, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 10 failed to timely pay all wages due at resignation or termination and seeks penalties under 11 section 203 for up to thirty days’ wages for each class member. (Compl. ¶¶ 65–67.) 12 If an employer “willfully fails to pay” all earned and unpaid wages at the time of 13 separation, the employee is entitled to a waiting time penalty equal to his or her daily wage 14 for each day the wages remain unpaid, up to thirty days. Cal. Lab. Code § 203; see also 15 Hill v. Walmart Inc., 32 F.4th 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2022). Courts have held that a single 16 unpaid wage at the time of separation is sufficient to trigger liability. E.g., Serrieh v. Jill 17 Acquisition LLC, 707 F. Supp. 3d 968, 977 (E.D. Cal. 2023) (“Further, recovery of waiting 18 time penalties does not hinge on the number of violations committed; rather the defendant 19 need only have caused and failed to remedy a single violation per employee for waiting 20 time penalties to apply.” (citation modified)); Noriesta v. Konica Minolta Bus. Sols. U.S.A., 21 Inc., No. ED CV 19-0839-DOC-SPx, 2019 WL 7987117, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2019) 22 (same). Waiting time penalties are derivative and depend on an underlying wage violation. 23 Alarcon v. Target Corp., No. 5:25-CV-01276-SPG-SP, 2025 WL 2155371, at *4 (C.D. 24 Cal. July 28, 2025). 25 Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s estimate on the grounds that it unreasonably 26 assumes a 100% violation rate for the waiting time penalties claim. (Reply 2:21–28, 3:1– 27 12.) This argument is unpersuasive. Because the waiting time claim is derivative of the 28 underlying wage-and-hour claims, it is reasonable to apply a 100% violation rate. See, 1 e.g., Serrieh, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 977; Alarcon, 2025 WL 2155371, at *4. As explained 2 above, Defendant reasonably assumes that all the class members suffered meal and rest 3 period violations at a 20% violation rate. Given the Complaint’s allegations, it is also 4 reasonable to assume each separated employee would have experienced at least one 5 instance of unpaid wages persisting through termination, thereby triggering section 203 6 penalties. See Cal. Lab. Code § 203; Jauregui, 28 F.4th 989, 993–94; see also, e.g., Cavada 7 v. Inter-Cont’l Hotels Grp., Inc., No. 19-cv-1675-GPC(BLM), 2019 WL 5677846, at *8– 8 9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2019) (finding that based upon one missed meal and rest period, 9 defendant’s assumption of a 100% violation rate for wage statement and waiting time 10 penalties claims was reasonable). Plaintiff argues the Court must read the “at times” 11 language in the waiting time penalties cause of action in isolation (see Reply 2:21–3:12), 12 but this strained construction is not supported by the Complaint as a whole, which alleges 13 Defendant did not pay all the wages owed to the class members on various theories. Cf. 14 Jauregui, 28 F.4th 989, 993–94 (reasoning “it was not unreasonable for [Defendant] to 15 assume that the vast majority (if not all) of the alleged violations over the four years at 16 issue in this case would have happened more than 30 days before the suit was filed, which 17 would entitle the employees to the 30-day penalty”). Accordingly, Defendant’s estimate of 18 $1,813,383 in waiting time penalties is supported by competent evidence and reasonable 19 assumptions. 20 3. Wage Statements 21 Plaintiff likewise argues that Defendant’s use of a 100% violation rate for the 22 inaccurate wage statement claim is an unreasonable interpretation of the allegations 23 because the Complaint uses qualifying language such as “at times” and “some of them.” 24 (Reply 2:21–22, 3:1–3.) The Court’s reasoning above carries over to this argument. 25 Like the waiting time penalties claim, Defendant’s assumption is supported both by 26 Plaintiff’s allegations and by Defendant’s employment records. Plaintiff’s wage statement 27 claim is derivative of the underlying wage-and-hour violations, including the meal and rest 28 period claims considered in this order. Hence, if it is reasonable to assume that 100% of 1 the class members suffered a meal or rest period violation 20% of the time, then each class 2 member would have averaged at least one violation for that pay period. That, in turn, 3 would render each affected pay stub inaccurate, meaning 100% of class members also 4 suffered an inaccurate wage statement violation for that pay period. See, e.g., Thompson 5 v. La Petite Acad., Inc., No. 2:22-CV-04348-AB (JPRx), 2022 WL 5241838, at *4 (C.D. 6 Cal. Oct. 6, 2022) (“Given the allegations about the existence of policies resulting in the 7 underlying violations, it was reasonable to assume that each wage statement contained at 8 least one inaccuracy, making Defendants’ assumption in their calculation reasonable.”); 9 Cavada, 2019 WL 5677846, at *8 (“Therefore, since one missed meal and rest period was 10 reasonable, that would mean that every wage statement was inaccurate and subject to the 11 penalties.”). The Court is likewise unconvinced by Plaintiff’s reliance on the “at times” 12 language in the Complaint. Given the Complaint’s other allegations, Plaintiff’s decision 13 to disperse indeterminate qualifiers throughout this cause of action does not change the 14 claim’s derivative nature or render Defendant’s assumption unreasonable. 15 Accordingly, Defendant’s assumption of a 100% violation rate for the wage 16 statement claim is a reasonable, evidence-supported interpretation of Plaintiff’s 17 allegations. Thus, Defendant’s estimate of $638,900 for wage statement penalties 18 withstands scrutiny. 19 Cause of Action Amount in Controversy Missed Meal Periods $1,878,516.50 20 Missed Rest Periods $1,878,516.50 21 Waiting Time Penalties $1,813,383.00 Inaccurate Wage Statements $638,900.00 22 Total $6,209,316.00 23
24 Overall, Defendant persuasively shows the amount in controversy surpasses the $5 25 million required by CAFA. The Court underscores that Defendant’s analysis is 26 conservative because it does not address all the wage-and-hour claims in the Complaint. 27 Further, because the amount placed in controversy for the substantive violations exceeds 28 $5 million, the Court does not further consider the issue of attorneys’ fees. Hence, 1 Defendant establishes the requisite amount in controversy by a preponderance of the 2 evidence. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand on this basis is denied. 3 II. Equitable Jurisdiction 4 Plaintiff contends the Court lacks equitable jurisdiction over his claim under 5 California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). (Mot. 15:26–17:17.) Plaintiff argues his 6 UCL claim cannot proceed under this Court’s equitable jurisdiction because he does not 7 allege the lack of an adequate remedy at law. (Id.) He further requests that, “should this 8 Court decide not to remand the entirety of this action, at a minimum it should sever 9 Plaintiff’s UCL claim and remand it to state court.” (Id. 17:25–26.) In response, Defendant 10 argues the appropriate course is for this Court to dismiss, not remand, the UCL claim for 11 lack of equitable jurisdiction. (Opp’n 16:15–18:15.) 12 While this Motion was pending, however, the landscape shifted. In Ruiz v. Bradford 13 Exchange, Ltd., 153 F.4th 907 (9th Cir. 2025), the Ninth Circuit addressed this issue. It 14 started by summarizing the authorities discussed in Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s briefs: 15 The Sonner cases and Guzman, which all concerned lawsuits initially filed in federal court, yield a few key conclusions that are relevant here: federal courts 16 in diversity cases apply federal principles of equitable jurisdiction; a plaintiff 17 who fails to allege the lack of an adequate remedy at law cannot utilize a federal court’s equitable jurisdiction; equitable jurisdiction is not a matter of 18 subject matter jurisdiction; and when a case is initially filed in federal court 19 and the defendant demonstrates that equitable jurisdiction is lacking, a court must dismiss the case, but without prejudice. 20 21 Id. at 912. The Ninth Circuit then assessed whether remand instead of dismissal would be 22 appropriate in a case removed under CAFA. Ultimately, it held “district courts have the 23 power to remand a removed case to state court for lack of equitable jurisdiction.” Id. at 24 915. 25 “But that is not the end of the matter,” as the Ninth Circuit explained. Ruiz, 153 26 F.4th at 915. The Ninth Circuit concluded a defendant can waive “the adequate-remedy- 27 at-law issue.” Id. at 918. “That is especially so when, at bottom, the plaintiff is seeking 28 the same ultimate relief that would be afforded through claims at law—money—but is 1 bringing claims for equitable restitution to avoid removal.” Id. Ultimately, the Ninth 2 Circuit held that “if a plaintiff files a lawsuit in state court seeking only equitable relief and 3 the case is properly removed to federal court, a defendant can defeat remand on equitable 4 jurisdiction grounds by waiving the adequate-remedy-at-law issue.” Id. at 918; see also 5 Avery v. TEKsystems, Inc., No. 22-CV-02733-JSC, 2025 WL 2837786, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 6 Oct. 7, 2025) (severing and remanding UCL claims following the defendant’s choice to 7 waive this issue following Ruiz). 8 Here, the Court recognizes that Ruiz is not on all fours. The plaintiff in Ruiz sought 9 only equitable relief; Plaintiff here is seeking both damages and equitable relief. Plaintiff 10 is therefore asking the Court to sever the UCL claim and order a partial remand, as opposed 11 to a complete remand. Other courts have permitted this approach. See Avery, 2025 WL 12 2837786, at *3; see also Morgan v. Rohr, Inc., No. 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG, 2023 WL 13 7713582, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2023) (collecting cases and concluding remand of UCL 14 claim in wage-and-hour class action removed under CAFA was appropriate). Further, 15 Defendant has not waived the adequate-remedy-at-law issue. Rather, Defendant argues in 16 its pending Motion to Dismiss that the Court should dismiss the UCL claim for lack of 17 equitable jurisdiction. (See ECF No. 11 (“Here, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL 18 claim because Plaintiff has not pleaded, and cannot plead, actual facts demonstrating he 19 lacks an adequate remedy at law.”).) 20 Fairness, however, dictates that Defendant should have the opportunity to address 21 Ruiz before the Court continues. Defendant may choose to waive this issue to preclude a 22 partial remand. Therefore, the Court denies without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion to 23 Remand on this point. The Court will also order Defendant to file a supplemental brief 24 addressing Ruiz. 25 26 27 28 l CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction 3 || over this action pursuant to CAFA. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to 4 ||Remand (ECF Nos. 12, 13) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court DENIES 5 || WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's request to sever and remand the UCL claim for lack 6 || of equitable jurisdiction. 7 In addition, the Court ORDERS Defendant to file a supplemental brief indicating 8 || whether it waives the adequate-remedy-at-law issue with respect to Plaintiff's UCL claim. 9 || Defendant may also raise any arguments based on Ruiz v. Bradford Exchange, Ltd., 153 10 || F.4th 907 (9th Cir. 2025), but Defendant’s brief may not exceed three pages. The Court 11 |} will review the brief and determine whether a response from Plaintiff is necessary before 12 || revisiting the issue. Defendant’s brief must be filed no later than November 14, 2025. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 15 || DATED: November 4, 2025 yatta Bahar 16 H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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