COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-10-00135-CR
CARLOS JONATHAN ARRANAGA APPELLANT A/K/A CARLOS ARRANAGA
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
A jury convicted Appellant Carlos Jonathan Arranaga a/k/a Carlos
Arranaga of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, and
assessed his punishment at five years’ confinement. Appellant brings a single
issue on appeal, challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. conviction. Because we hold that the evidence is sufficient under the standard
enunciated by Jackson v. Virginia,2 we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Statement of Facts
Isaac Payen and Maryella Longoria worked together at a Fiesta Food Mart
store in Fort Worth. Longoria’s boyfriend, Appellant, attended high school with
Payen. Payen testified at trial that he and Longoria were friends; Appellant
testified that Longoria would ask Payen to leave her alone and that Payen would
not listen.
On July 15, 2009, Longoria told Payen that she thought she was pregnant
and that Appellant was the father. In response, Payen told her that Appellant
“better not be” the father “because he’s no good, he is like a low life.” Payen’s
statement upset Longoria, who called Appellant, crying. Appellant testified that
Longoria told him that Payen “kept bothering her, wouldn’t leave her alone.”
Appellant’s friend Arturo Zaragoza testified that he gave Appellant a ride to
Fiesta that night because Appellant wanted to talk to Payen. Zaragoza testified
that Appellant stated that he wanted to scare Payen. Zaragoza also testified that
he had given Appellant a gun three days before because Appellant wanted to
show it to his father. Appellant testified that Zaragoza only gave him the gun
when he got in Zaragoza’s truck that day, and Appellant denied telling Zaragoza
that he wanted to scare Payen.
2 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979).
2 When Appellant and Zaragoza arrived at Fiesta, Payen was leaving in his
car. Zaragoza stopped his truck at a stop sign next to Payen’s car so that
Appellant, sitting in the passenger seat, was next to Payen’s driver’s side
window. Appellant told Payen that he “thought [he and Payen] had already . . .
settled this, . . . you know,” and asked Payen, “[W]hy you still, you know, messing
with my girlfriend?” Zaragoza testified that Payen and Appellant exchanged
words until Zaragoza pulled away. When Payen turned down the street where
Longoria lived, Appellant asked Zaragoza to follow him. Payen’s car was
stopped in the street, and Zaragoza stopped his truck behind Payen’s car.
Zaragoza testified that after a while, Payen got out of his car, approached
Zaragoza’s truck, and told Appellant to get out of the truck so that they could
“settle this,” but Appellant told Payen that he did not want to fight. Zaragoza
stated that Payen threw a punch at Appellant while Appellant was still in the
truck. Appellant testified that Payen grabbed him by the shirt and that he showed
Payen the gun so that Payen would let go of him. Zaragoza testified that Payen
grabbed Appellant by his hand and that Appellant and Payen struggled over the
gun. Zaragoza stated that the gun was in Appellant’s hand when it was fired but
that he could not see whose finger was on the trigger. The gun went off,
shooting Payen in the chest.
Zaragoza drove away, with Appellant still in the passenger seat of his
truck, and Appellant called Longoria and asked her to call 911. Zaragoza drove
to the Trinity River, and Appellant threw the gun into the river.
3 Payen testified at trial that because of his injury, he had had a stroke, and
as a result, he could not remember what happened that evening.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
As Appellant points out, the indictment in this case contained two counts,
the first count alleging that Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused bodily
injury to the complainant, Payen, by shooting him with a firearm, and the second
count alleging that Appellant threatened bodily injury to Payen by using or
exhibiting a deadly weapon, a firearm. Both counts were submitted to the jury in
a single application paragraph, and a single verdict form allowed the jury to
convict under either Count One or Count Two.
The evidence also reflects that the State offered immunity to Zaragoza, the
person who provided the gun and drove Appellant to confront Payen. No
accomplice witness instruction was either provided to the jury or requested.
Appellant did request a self-defense instruction, which was denied.
On appeal, however, Appellant makes no complaints about the jury
charge, raising only what he styles as a legal sufficiency challenge. For these
reasons, we address only the sufficiency question.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that there is no meaningful
distinction between the legal sufficiency standard and the factual sufficiency
standard.3 Thus, the Jackson standard, which is explained below, is the “only
3 Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (overruling Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 131–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
4 standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence
is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”4
The sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is not determined by a
no-evidence standard.5 Instead, in our due-process review of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 6
Appellant divides his argument into an analysis of the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict under Count One of the indictment and an analysis of the
sufficiency of the evidence to convict under Count Two of the indictment. When
the jury is authorized to convict on any one of several theories or methods of the
commission of the same offense (for example, two different statutory definitions
of the same offense) and returns a general verdict of guilt, it does not matter that
the evidence is insufficient to sustain one or more of the theories, so long as the
evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction under at least one theory. 7 Because
4 Id. 5 Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 6 Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 7 Grissam v.
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COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-10-00135-CR
CARLOS JONATHAN ARRANAGA APPELLANT A/K/A CARLOS ARRANAGA
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
A jury convicted Appellant Carlos Jonathan Arranaga a/k/a Carlos
Arranaga of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, and
assessed his punishment at five years’ confinement. Appellant brings a single
issue on appeal, challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. conviction. Because we hold that the evidence is sufficient under the standard
enunciated by Jackson v. Virginia,2 we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Statement of Facts
Isaac Payen and Maryella Longoria worked together at a Fiesta Food Mart
store in Fort Worth. Longoria’s boyfriend, Appellant, attended high school with
Payen. Payen testified at trial that he and Longoria were friends; Appellant
testified that Longoria would ask Payen to leave her alone and that Payen would
not listen.
On July 15, 2009, Longoria told Payen that she thought she was pregnant
and that Appellant was the father. In response, Payen told her that Appellant
“better not be” the father “because he’s no good, he is like a low life.” Payen’s
statement upset Longoria, who called Appellant, crying. Appellant testified that
Longoria told him that Payen “kept bothering her, wouldn’t leave her alone.”
Appellant’s friend Arturo Zaragoza testified that he gave Appellant a ride to
Fiesta that night because Appellant wanted to talk to Payen. Zaragoza testified
that Appellant stated that he wanted to scare Payen. Zaragoza also testified that
he had given Appellant a gun three days before because Appellant wanted to
show it to his father. Appellant testified that Zaragoza only gave him the gun
when he got in Zaragoza’s truck that day, and Appellant denied telling Zaragoza
that he wanted to scare Payen.
2 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979).
2 When Appellant and Zaragoza arrived at Fiesta, Payen was leaving in his
car. Zaragoza stopped his truck at a stop sign next to Payen’s car so that
Appellant, sitting in the passenger seat, was next to Payen’s driver’s side
window. Appellant told Payen that he “thought [he and Payen] had already . . .
settled this, . . . you know,” and asked Payen, “[W]hy you still, you know, messing
with my girlfriend?” Zaragoza testified that Payen and Appellant exchanged
words until Zaragoza pulled away. When Payen turned down the street where
Longoria lived, Appellant asked Zaragoza to follow him. Payen’s car was
stopped in the street, and Zaragoza stopped his truck behind Payen’s car.
Zaragoza testified that after a while, Payen got out of his car, approached
Zaragoza’s truck, and told Appellant to get out of the truck so that they could
“settle this,” but Appellant told Payen that he did not want to fight. Zaragoza
stated that Payen threw a punch at Appellant while Appellant was still in the
truck. Appellant testified that Payen grabbed him by the shirt and that he showed
Payen the gun so that Payen would let go of him. Zaragoza testified that Payen
grabbed Appellant by his hand and that Appellant and Payen struggled over the
gun. Zaragoza stated that the gun was in Appellant’s hand when it was fired but
that he could not see whose finger was on the trigger. The gun went off,
shooting Payen in the chest.
Zaragoza drove away, with Appellant still in the passenger seat of his
truck, and Appellant called Longoria and asked her to call 911. Zaragoza drove
to the Trinity River, and Appellant threw the gun into the river.
3 Payen testified at trial that because of his injury, he had had a stroke, and
as a result, he could not remember what happened that evening.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
As Appellant points out, the indictment in this case contained two counts,
the first count alleging that Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused bodily
injury to the complainant, Payen, by shooting him with a firearm, and the second
count alleging that Appellant threatened bodily injury to Payen by using or
exhibiting a deadly weapon, a firearm. Both counts were submitted to the jury in
a single application paragraph, and a single verdict form allowed the jury to
convict under either Count One or Count Two.
The evidence also reflects that the State offered immunity to Zaragoza, the
person who provided the gun and drove Appellant to confront Payen. No
accomplice witness instruction was either provided to the jury or requested.
Appellant did request a self-defense instruction, which was denied.
On appeal, however, Appellant makes no complaints about the jury
charge, raising only what he styles as a legal sufficiency challenge. For these
reasons, we address only the sufficiency question.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that there is no meaningful
distinction between the legal sufficiency standard and the factual sufficiency
standard.3 Thus, the Jackson standard, which is explained below, is the “only
3 Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (overruling Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 131–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
4 standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence
is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”4
The sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is not determined by a
no-evidence standard.5 Instead, in our due-process review of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 6
Appellant divides his argument into an analysis of the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict under Count One of the indictment and an analysis of the
sufficiency of the evidence to convict under Count Two of the indictment. When
the jury is authorized to convict on any one of several theories or methods of the
commission of the same offense (for example, two different statutory definitions
of the same offense) and returns a general verdict of guilt, it does not matter that
the evidence is insufficient to sustain one or more of the theories, so long as the
evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction under at least one theory. 7 Because
4 Id. 5 Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 6 Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 7 Grissam v. State, 267 S.W.3d 39, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Rabbani v. State, 847 5 the jury was instructed in a single application paragraph and provided a single
verdict form on which to find Appellant guilty of aggravated assault as alleged in
the indictment, rather than a verdict form on each count, we address sufficiency
of the evidence under the standard that requires us to convict if the evidence is
sufficient as to either theory, as though they had been pled in a single count with
two paragraphs rather than two separate counts.
The witnesses in the case included Appellant, Zaragoza, and Payen, as
well as various police officers. The evidence reflects that Appellant armed
himself and sought out Payen, who was unarmed. Detective Shane Drake
testified that Appellant told him that Payen had grabbed his arm, pulled at him,
and swung at him but missed. In response, Appellant pulled the gun, and the
gun went off.
Detective Drake testified that Appellant did not ever state that Payen had
actually gotten hold of the gun or even had his hand on the gun. Detective Drake
also testified that Appellant never told him that Payen had a gun, a knife, or any
kind of sharp instrument when he approached Appellant. Indeed, the detective
testified that Appellant told him that from what he saw, Payen had no type of
weapon.
The jury heard the testimony that Appellant had gone to look for Payen,
had armed himself, and had told Payen that he did not want to fight; that the two
S.W.2d 555, 558–59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 926 (1993)); see also Jefferson v. State, 189 S.W.3d 305, 311–13 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 957 (2006).
6 men had words; that Appellant had told Zaragoza to follow Payen down the
street to where Longoria lived; that Zaragoza had stopped his truck behind
Payen’s car; and that Payen had gotten out of his car and confronted Appellant,
telling him to get out of the truck so they could “settle this,” but that Appellant had
told Payen that he did not want to fight. The jury also heard that Payen threw a
punch at Appellant while Appellant was still in the truck, that Payen had grabbed
Appellant by the shirt, and that Appellant had shown Payen the gun to convince
Payen to let go of him. The jury heard testimony that Payen grabbed Appellant,
the two struggled over the gun, and the gun went off, but the jury heard no
testimony as to who actually fired the gun. Even excluding Zaragoza’s evidence,
Appellant himself provided sufficient evidence at trial and to the police to sustain
his conviction.8
From the evidence before the jury, the jury could have reasonably
concluded that Appellant threatened Payen with the firearm. There was also
evidence that the firearm in Appellant’s hand was fired, injuring Payen. The jury
could have concluded from the evidence that Appellant pulled the trigger,
causing the gun to fire.
As the sole trier of fact, it was the jury’s obligation to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be placed on the testimony of each
8 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14 (Vernon 2005) (“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.”).
7 witness.9 The jury was free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony of each
of the witnesses.10 If the evidence is sufficient to prove one theory of conviction,
the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, even when multiple theories
are offered to the jury.11
Conclusion
Because the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that
Appellant was guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, we overrule
Appellant’ sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: April 21, 2011
9 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2075 (2009). 10 See Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 730–31 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 962 (2005); Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006). 11 Grissam, 267 S.W.3d at 41.