Carlentine v. Duggan

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedApril 10, 2020
Docket8:19-cv-00251
StatusUnknown

This text of Carlentine v. Duggan (Carlentine v. Duggan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carlentine v. Duggan, (D. Neb. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

CHASE A. CARLENTINE,

Plaintiff, 8:19CV251

vs. MEMORANDUM COLIN DUGGAN and AND ORDER JESSICA DUGGAN,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a non-prisoner, has been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing 6.) The court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff’s claims to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (requiring the court to dismiss actions filed in forma pauperis if they are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief).

I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff sues the owners of the Kitchen Table restaurant in Omaha, Nebraska, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 to 12117 (Westlaw 2020) (“ADA”), for terminating his employment, failing to promote him, failing to accommodate his disability, and harassing him due to his disability. (Filing 1 at CM/ECF p. 4.) Plaintiff identifies his disability as “spinal fusion, hardware” and claims that “(1) Manager Eliza denied me hours to my face (2) owner Jessica denied me hours and accom[m]odations (3) Jessica fired me cause of my back.” (Id. at pp. 4-5.) He requests $45,000 for “disability discrimination and emotional damages.” (Id. at p. 6.) II. STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).

“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, “[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In discrimination cases, “[t]he complaint is not required to fit any specific model since there is no ‘rigid pleading standard for discrimination cases.’” Cook v. George’s, Inc., 952 F.3d 935, 938 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)). “Instead, the ‘simplified notice pleading standard,’ merely requires that a complaint ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Cook, 952 F.3d at 938-39 (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512).

2 III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s limited factual allegations suggest claims for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and a hostile work environment based on his disability under the ADA and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act (“NFEPA”), Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-1101 et seq.1

A. Discrimination Under ADA

The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits covered employers from discriminating against “a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees . . . and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A “qualified individual” is a person “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of a job. Id. § 12111(8).

To establish disability discrimination under the ADA, an aggrieved employee must show (1) that he or she has a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); (2) that he or she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that he or she has suffered an adverse employment action on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Eighth Circuit Civil Jury Instructions at p. 9-1 (2019); Moses v. Dassault Falcon Jet-Wilmington Corp., 894 F.3d 911, 923 (8th Cir. 2018).2

1 “The disability discrimination provisions in the NFEPA are patterned after the ADA, and the statutory definitions of ‘disability’ and ‘qualified individual with a disability’ contained in the NFEPA are virtually identical to the definitions of the ADA.” Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1102(9) & (10); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12111(8)). “In construing the NFEPA, Nebraska courts have looked to federal decisions, because the NFEPA is patterned after Title VII and the ADA.” Id. Thus, the court’s discussion of Plaintiff’s ADA claims also encompasses claims under the NFEPA.

2 While the Plaintiff need not plead facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, “[t]he elements of a successful ADA claim are, however, still part of the background against which a 3 Here, Plaintiff lists his disability as “spinal fusion, hardware.” The ADA defines a disability as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.
534 U.S. 506 (Supreme Court, 2002)
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett
535 U.S. 391 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Stephen C. Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
297 F.3d 720 (Eighth Circuit, 2002)
Ryan v. Capital Contractors, Inc.
679 F.3d 772 (Eighth Circuit, 2012)
Samvel Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
760 F.3d 843 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
Moses v. Dassault Falcon Jet-Wilmington Corp
894 F.3d 911 (Eighth Circuit, 2018)
Raul Gardea v. JBS USA. LLC
915 F.3d 537 (Eighth Circuit, 2019)
Jerry Cook v. George's, Inc.
952 F.3d 935 (Eighth Circuit, 2020)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Carlentine v. Duggan, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carlentine-v-duggan-ned-2020.