Carl Moore v. Penny Mac Corp.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: October 25, 2016
• Docket: A17A0326
• Status: Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________ October 20, 2016

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17A0326. MOORE v. PENNYMAC CORP.

In this quiet title case involving multiple parties, Carl Moore appeals from the trial court’s entry of default judgment against him. Appellee PennyMac Corp. has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the default judgment from which Moore appeals was not a final judgment and was not directly appealable because the case remained pending in the trial court. In a case involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a decision adjudicating fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties is not a final judgment. In such circumstances, there must be an express determination under OCGA § 9-11-54 (b)[1] or there must be compliance with the interlocutory appeal requirements of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). Where neither of these code sections are followed, the appeal is premature and must be dismissed.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. Hosp. Corp. of America, 192 Ga. App. 628, 629 (385 SE2d 731) (1989). See generally OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1). The entry of default judgment against Moore did not adjudicate the claims, rights, and/or liabilities of a third party involved in the lawsuit. Therefore, the default judgment was not a final judgment within the contemplation of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1)

1 OCGA § 9-11-54 (b) provides, that “[w]hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay . . . .” and was not immediately appealable as a matter of right. See Johnson, 192 Ga. App. at 629. Moreover, the trial court made no express determination in the judgment that pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-54 (b) there was no just reason for delay. Because neither OCGA § 9-11-54 (b) nor OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) was followed, Moore’s appeal was premature and must be dismissed.2 See generally Wise v. Ga. State Bd. for Examination, Qualification & Registration of Architects, 244 Ga. 449-450 (260 SE2d 477) (1979). Therefore, it is ordered that Appellee PennyMac Corp.’s motion to dismiss this appeal is hereby GRANTED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia 10/20/2016 Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________ I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

2 Approximately two months after the trial court entered the default judgment against Moore, the court entered a “Final Decree and Judgment Quieting Title Against All the World.” This order, unlike the default judgment order, contained language adjudicating the claims, rights, and/or liabilities of the third party to the litigation. No appeal from this final order is noted in the record.