Carickhoff v. Wedbush Securities, Inc.

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware
DecidedJune 16, 2023
Docket21-50989
StatusUnknown

This text of Carickhoff v. Wedbush Securities, Inc. (Carickhoff v. Wedbush Securities, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carickhoff v. Wedbush Securities, Inc., (Del. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE In re: Chapter 7 LIVE WELL FINANCIAL, INC.,, Case No. 19-11317 (LSS) Debtor.

DAVID W. CARICKHOFF, as Chapter 7 Trustee of LIVE WELL FINANCIAL, INC., Plaintiff, Adv. Pro. No. 21-50989 (LSS) Re: Docket No. 13 WEDBUSH SECURITIES, INC., and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants.

OPINION On June 10, 2019, creditors filed an involuntary chapter 7 petition against Live Well Financial, Inc. (“Live Well or Debtor”).’ On July 1, 2019, an Order for Relief was entered and David W. Carickhoff was appointed as the chapter 7 trustee (“Trustee”). In this adversary proceeding, Trustee seeks to avoid and recover certain allegedly fraudulent transfers made by Debtor to Wedbush Securities, Inc. (“Wedbush”) on account of an

1 references to the docket of the above-captioned adversary proceeding will be cited as “A.P.” References to the docket of the main bankruptcy case will be cited as “D.I.”

antecedent debt2 Wedbush filed its Motion to Dismiss’ challenging the fraudulent intent of the transfers. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is denied. Background* Live Well, founded in 2005, was a private financial services company participating in the reverse mortgages market. In 2014, Live Well decided to expand its business to invest in Home Equity Conversion Mortgage, Interest Only (HECM IO) bond strips. These bonds are reverse mortgage-backed securities that entitle the bondholder to receive a portion of interest payments made on the underlying reverse mortgage. To finance the acquisition of these bonds, Live Well entered into repurchase agreements with various lenders, including Wedbush, where the lender would buy the securities from the seller (Live Well) at a discounted price (80-90% of the then-current value of the bonds) and Live Well would agree to repurchase the bonds at the total purchase price plus interest and fees. If the prices of the bonds went up, Live Well could borrow more against the bond, but if the prices went down, Live Well was obligated to post margin (make a payment) to the lender proportional to the decrease in value of the bonds. There is a limited market for this type of bond trading, making the value of the bonds difficult to calculate. Therefore, Live Well engaged Interactive Data Pricing and Reference Data LLC (“IDC”) to publish prices for the Live Well bonds. In November 2014, Live

2 AP 1(Complaint by David W. Carickhoff against Wedbush Securities, Inc.) (“Complaint”). 3 AP. 13 (Wedbush Securities, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Adversary Complaint). 4 As required on a motion to dismiss the facts recited herein are taken from the Complaint. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). A court is not required to make findings of fact or conclusions of law on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012, and I make none. See Fed. R. Civ, P. 52(a)(3), made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052.

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Well purchased $46 million worth of bonds funded by repurchase agreements with three different lenders, including Wedbush. However, fluctuations in the bond values posted by IDC created a liquidity crisis for Live Well. As the prices of the bonds went down, the lenders requested that Live Well make the required margin payments. As a result, Michael Hild, the founder, chairman and CEO of Live Well, tasked Charles Stumberger, the executive vice president of Live Well, with solving the problem. On February 12, 2015, Stumberger informed Hild that the problem was solved—IDC would no longer independently value the bonds but instead publish prices supplied by Live Well “verbatim.” Thereafter, Live Well began to inflate bond prices and draw on its increased credit from the lenders. From September 2015 to December 2016 Live Well increased the amount of its bond-related borrowings from $124 million to over $430 million. By December 2016, Wedbush had extended approximately $225 million in repurchase loans to Live Well. In January 2017, Wedbush began to express concerns about the IDC valuations of the bonds, requested the name of a broker dealer that could verify the market prices provided by IDC, and sought to reduce its line of credit by requiring Live Well to repurchase some of the bonds. Because the bond prices were grossly inflated, Live Well could not simply liquidate the bonds. Instead, Live Well needed time to find new lenders to pay down its existing credit lines with Wedbush. Wedbush allowed this additional time and in exchange chose to exercise certain remedies such as, mcreasing the “haircut” it applied to the purchase price of the bonds from 10% to 15%, placing the Live Well bonds on open (meaning Wedbush could require Live Well to repurchase any or all of the bonds at any time) and decreasing Live Well’s line of credit from $225 million to $125 million. Trustee alleges (upon information and belief) that Wedbush reduced Live Well’s

line of credit because the Securities and Exchange Commission contacted Wedbush in its investigation of Live Well which began in March 2017. To pay off Wedbush, Live Well had to find more botrowing capacity. In February and March of 2017, Live Well began moving Wedbush bonds to two of its existing lenders, ICBC and Nomura, and entered into a new repo agreement with Flagstar Bank FSB.° Live Well repurchased Wedbush bonds by using proceeds it received from these sources. In the summer and fall of 2017, Live Well continued to repurchase Wedbush bonds, including with funds from another repo lender, Mirae Asset Securities (USA) Inc. From June 10, 2017 (two years prior to the bankruptcy filing) to the end of October 2017, Live Well made the following transfers to Wedbush to repurchase bonds and pay interest and fees under Wedbush’s repurchase agreements: Date | Amount | 06/29/2017 | $18,718.33 | 07/07/2017, | $37,411.19 | or/7/ } $228 ATLIL 07/21/2017, | $8,577.19 | [07/21/2017 □ ——s« $549,000.00 | | 07/31/2017 $20,420.00 | 08/03/2017 | $135,990.63 | 08/03/2017 _—s|_——$1,476,000.00 08/22/2017 $20,000,000.00 08/31/2017 ___|_$10,210,000.00 09/05/2017, | $19,342.28 09/05/2017 | $6,179,000.00 |

09/27/2017 $214,000.00 |

5 Just moving bonds to Nomura would not generate sufficient funds to fully pay off or repurchase the bonds from Wedbush because Nomura did not rely on [DC’s valuation of the bonds. The bond prices submitted to IDC by Live Well were 45.7% higher than those used by Nomura.

(09/27/2017 |__-$35,272,000.00 | - (09/27/2017 | $59,947.59 | 09/29/2017 i $1,773.78 09/29/2017 ss, ~—s«$7,,982,000.00 (10/05/2017 | ow $29,819.55 10/05/2017 $33,547,000.00 | 10/20/2017 | $7,856.18 | 10/20/2017, $4,150,000.00 ___ Total: — $120,451,144.26 Trustee alleges these transfers were made with the intent to conceal a Ponzi-like scheme. Live Well used new loans to pay off old ones, increasing Live Well’s liabilities beyond the value of the underlying assets, making it inevitable that the scheme would collapse, and creditors would be harmed. These payments, which prolonged the scheme, _ worsened Live Well’s financial condition and increased the inevitable shortfall of assets available for Live Well’s victims and creditors when the scheme finally collapsed. On May 3, 2019, Live Well wound down its operations and terminated all of its employees.

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