Cargail Downer v. Prince George's County Public Schools

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: July 14, 2025
• Docket: 24-1704
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1704

CARGAIL T. DOWNER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland at Greenbelt. Brendan A. Hurson, District Judge. (8:21-cv-01618-BAH)

Submitted: April 22, 2025 Decided: July 14, 2025

Before WYNN, RICHARDSON, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Samantha Vanterpool Rucker, THE SPIGGLE LAW FIRM, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Darryl G. McCallum, SHAWE ROSENTHAL LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Cargail Downer is an HVAC mechanic employed by Prince George’s County Board

of Education. In June 2021, the County placed Downer on paid administrative leave after

he threatened his supervisor. Downer sued, alleging race and national origin

discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation. The district court awarded

summary judgment to the County. We affirm.

I. Background

Downer is a Black man and native of Guyana. He began working for Prince

George’s County Board of Education (the County) as an HVAC mechanic in April 2018.

Beginning in late 2019, Downer filed several internal complaints alleging employment

discrimination.

Downer filed his first internal complaint in October 2019, alleging that he was

improperly demoted and wrongly denied overtime, training, and job assistance. Shortly

after Downer filed this first internal complaint, the County’s Equal Employment

Opportunity Officer began investigating. A few months later, while the County’s

investigation was still ongoing, Downer filed a second internal complaint. This second

complaint alleged that various “corrective actions” taken by Downer’s supervisors

amounted to harassment and retaliation and created a hostile work environment. Neither of

the first two complaints mentioned race or national origin discrimination.

In August 2020, Downer filed a third internal complaint. This time, however,

Downer also initiated a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

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(EEOC). Downer’s third complaint concerned a confrontation with a co-worker that

resulted in a change to Downer’s shift assignment. Downer confronted the co-worker about

that individual’s refusal to wear a mask, which was a violation of the County’s COVID-19

related policies. According to Downer, the co-worker responded, “the next time you say

something to me about a mask I’m going to put a bullet in your f[***]ing head and get you

out of here!” J.A. 544. Downer obtained a temporary peace order against the co-worker

from a Maryland state court. To comply with that order, the County separated Downer and

his co-worker into different shifts. The County assigned Downer to the earlier shift, which

the County alleges was necessary to maintain equal numbers of specialized mechanics

across shifts. In his EEOC charge, Downer alleged discrimination on the basis of race and

national origin, as well as unlawful retaliation. The EEOC did not substantiate Downer’s

claims and issued him a right to sue letter in May 2021.

In June 2021, Downer returned to work after a three-month absence due to

COVID-19. Upon his return, the County informed him that he would need to travel to job

sites with co-workers rather than have a vehicle to himself. Downer previously drove alone

to job sites in a County-owned vehicle. Because the number of vehicles was limited,

however, it was common for County employees to be required to share vehicles.

After being told that he would need to share a vehicle, Downer confronted his

supervisor, Lance Schiemer. Downer admits that he “point[ed his] finger [at Schiemer] and

said, you are very vindictive, you know, and for what you have done you need to get out

of this shop.” J.A. 225. Schiemer reported the altercation to his supervisors, and Downer

was placed on paid administrative leave on June 22, 2021.

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On June 30, 2021, Downer filed this suit under Title VII and Section 1981, alleging

race and national origin discrimination, a hostile work environment, and unlawful

retaliation. He also brought claims under state and local anti-discrimination laws. In August

2023, the County filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted on

all claims. At the time of the county’s motion for summary judgment, Downer remained

on paid administrative leave. Downer appeals the grant of summary judgment, but only as

to the federal claims.

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

standards as the district court. Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 129 (4th Cir. 2023). Thus,

we “construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party”—here, Downer—and ask whether genuine disputes of material fact

preclude judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). This court has

emphasized that “the aim of summary judgment is not to determine the exact strength of a

case and dispose of so-called weak cases, but instead to determine whether a rational jury

could find in the plaintiff’s favor.” Webster v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 38 F.4th 404,

412 (4th Cir. 2022). For this reason, we “examine the course of a plaintiff’s conduct

through a panoramic lens, viewing the individual scenes in their broader context and

judging the picture as a whole.” DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 418 (4th Cir.

2015).

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III. Analysis

Courts analyze Title VII and Section 1981 claims under the same basic framework.

See Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc., 126 F.4th 244, 255 n.4 (4th Cir. 2025). Title

VII prohibits employers from “discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise discriminat[ing]

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Title VII also prohibits an employer from creating a hostile work

environment or retaliating against an employee who engages in protected activities. Harris

v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Laurent-Workman v. Wormuth, 54 F.4th 201,

212 (4th Cir. 2022).

A. Race and National Origin Discrimination

A plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title VII can meet his summary judgment

burden—establishing a genuine dispute of material fact—either through direct evidence,

or through circumstantial evidence under the scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Wannamaker-Amos, 126 F.4th at 255. Because

Downer has offered no direct evidence of discrimination, he proceeds under the three-step

McDonnell Douglas framework. Under this framework, a plaintiff must first make out a

prima facie case of discrimination. Id. The burden of production then shifts to the employer

to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for its allegedly discriminatory

action. Id. If the employer carries this burden, the plaintiff then must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the neutral reasons offered by the employer “were not

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its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

The district court held that Downer failed to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination. To establish a prima facie case, “a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a

member of a protected class; (2) her employer took an adverse action against her; (3) she

had been fulfilling her employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse action;

and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference

of unlawful discrimination.” Sempowich v. Tactile Sys. Tech., Inc., 19 F.4th 643, 649–50

(4th Cir. 2021). The district court concluded that Downer failed to meet the second prong.

According to the district court, “none of the corrective actions” taken against Downer

constituted “adverse actions” for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case under Title

VII. J.A. 560.

Though we affirm the district court’s judgment, we resolve this case on different

grounds. Even if some of the actions taken by the County did constitute “adverse actions”

under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, Downer still failed to meet his

burden to establish a prima facie case. That is because none of the County’s actions

“occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful

discrimination.” Sempowich, 19 F.4th at 649–50. Simply put, Downer presented zero

evidence that his alleged mistreatment was based on his race or national origin. As a result,

Downer did not establish the fourth prong of a prima facie case.

Even if Downer were able to establish a prima facie case, the County easily met its

burden of “articulat[ing] a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse

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employment action” at step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Holland v.

Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007). The County produced copious

evidence that several of the actions alleged by Downer simply did not occur, as well as

extensive testimony from Downer’s coworkers stating that he engaged in highly disruptive

workplace behavior.

Within Downer’s first few months on the job, his supervisors and colleagues began

raising concerns about his demeanor and work performance. In May 2018, Downer’s

supervisors requested an extension of Downer’s probationary period, noting that he was

“very confrontational and appears to be missing the basic knowledge needed to effectively

troubleshoot HVAC units . . . He has been placed with numerous employees and they all

have the same concerns of him being very confrontational.” J.A. 547. Downer’s colleagues

reported that they “felt threatened” by Downer; that Downer demonstrated a “very

aggressive attitude”; that his “knowledge of the HVAC field was not there and [he] would

not take criticism at all.” J.A. 547. One of Downer’s colleagues stated, “[h]e is very

argumentative toward me and his lack of knowledge in the trade makes me unwilling to

work with [him].” J.A. 547.

Downer was issued numerous “corrective actions,” and his performance reviews

consistently noted that he needed to improve his work relationships. In June 2019, for

example, Downer received a verbal warning for failure to follow his supervisor’s

instructions. He was issued seven additional corrective actions between June 2019 and

January 2021. Because of Downer’s confrontational behavior, his colleagues refused to

ride in a truck with him. In Downer’s April 2019 performance review, his supervisor

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commented that he “would like to see [Downer] work on and improve his work relationship

with his intimate foreman and leads. In this industry and with our equipment you will often

have to ride two men to a truck and help each other service our facilities.” J.A. 549.

When Downer learned that he would need to share a truck upon returning from a

three-month medical leave, he confronted and threatened his supervisor. Downer concedes

that he pointed his finger at his supervisor and told him “you need to get out of this shop.”

J.A. 225. Through these undisputed facts, the County met its burden of articulating a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.

Downer did not even attempt to satisfy his burden under the third step of the

McDonnell Douglas framework. Where an employer offers legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for an adverse action, a plaintiff then must prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that the reasons offered by the employer were pretextual. Burdine, 450 U.S. at

253. Yet Downer has not argued—let alone provided evidence to prove—that the County’s

justifications were pretextual. He thus fails at both the first and third steps of the McDonnell

Douglas framework, either of which would be fatal on its own.

B. Hostile Work Environment

Downer’s hostile work environment claims are similarly devoid of factual support.

To prevail under both Title VII and Section 1981, a plaintiff must “show that there is (1)

unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the plaintiff’s . . . race; (3) which is sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s conditions of employment and to create an

abusive work environment; and (4) which is imputable to the employer.” Okoli v. City of

Baltimore, 648 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2011). Again here, Downer failed to produce

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evidence to support his claim that the County’s alleged adverse actions were connected to

his race or national origin. Downer thus cannot satisfy the second prong of this framework.

C. Retaliation

Finally, though Downer alleges that the County retaliated against him for engaging

in protected activity, he has not connected any of the alleged “retaliatory” actions to his

protected activity. For instance, Downer asserts that after he submitted a complaint on

February 24, 2021, he was retaliated against by having his “work truck . . . taken from

him,” on June 14, 2021. J.A. 21. The record, however, indicates that Downer’s work truck

was not “taken from him.” J.A. 21. Most employees in his position were required to share

vehicles. The only reason Downer previously was not required to do so was that other

employees were afraid to ride with him. Downer’s placement on administrative leave,

which he also characterizes as unlawful retaliation, is similarly disconnected to any

protected activity. Downer admits that he was placed on paid administrative leave

immediately after he threatened his supervisor by pointing his finger at him and telling him

“I will get you out of this office.” See J.A. 550. Downer does not assert that this was

protected activity, nor could he.

IV. Conclusion

Because Downer failed to produce evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to

rule in his favor, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Prince

George’s County Board of Education.

AFFIRMED