STATE OF l\lIAINE SUPERIOR COURT OXFORD, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-22-22
) SETH T. CAREY, ) ) Plaintiff ) ) V. ) ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS ) TOWN OF RUMFORD and ) RUMFORD FIRE DEPARTMENT ) ) Defendants ) ) )
Plaintiff Seth T. Carey brings this suit against Defendants Town of Rumford
and the Rumford Fire Department. There are multiple pending motions in this
matter, including: the plaintiffs Request for Temporary Restraining Order and
Permanent Injunction; Rumford Fire Department's Motion to Dismiss; and Town of
Rumford's Motion to Dismiss. For the following reasons, the com·t grants both
motions to dismiss and denies the remaining motions as moot.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case stems from a fire that took place at the plaintiff's home on October
5, 2020. Due to the extensive structural damage, the 'Town of Rumford ("the Town")
declared the home a "Dangerous Building" and ordered its demolition. The plaintiff
filed an appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. SOB. The court
1 affirmed the Town's decision.I The plaintiff then filed the instant lawsuit, which
was docketed on June 2, 2022. Count I alleges that the responding firefighters from
the Rumford Fire Department ("the Fire Department") negligently failed to save the
plaintiffs home. Count II alleges that the Town was negligent in hiring Chris Reed
as its fire chief. Counts III and IV allege negligent infliction of emotional distress
and intentional infliction of emotional distress by both defendants.
DISCUSSION
A motion to dismiss under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint. Seacoast Hangar Condo. II Ass'n v. Martel, 2001 ME 112, 4116, 775 A2d
1166. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must "view the facts alleged
in the complaint as if they were admitted and in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff' in order to determine whether the complaint "'sets forth elements of a
cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to
some legal theory,"' Lalonde v. Cent. Me. Med. Ctr., 2017 ME 22, 4111, 155 A3d 426
(quoting Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm'n, 2004 ME 20, ~ 7, 843 A.2d 43).
"Dismissal is warranted when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is not
entitled to relief under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim."
Johanson v. Dunnington, 2001 ME 169, 41 5, 785 A2d 1244.
Dismissal is warranted in the instant case. First, the Fire Department is not
a separate legal entity from the Town and thus lacks the capacity to be sued. In an
1 See Seth Carey v. Town of Rumford, Docket No. SOPSC-AP-2021-03, decided 11/17/21.
2 action involving a town or its departments or subdivisions, the proper party is the
town itself; "subordinate entities do not have the capacity to sue or be sued." 56 Am.
Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions § 735.
The Law Court recognized this principle in Faucher u. City of Auburn when it
"change[d] the title of the case from City of Auburn School Department to City of
Auburn" because the city itself was the "appropriate defendant." 465 A2d 1120,
1120 n. * (Me. 1983). In similar cases, the federal district courts of Maine and
Massachusetts have likewise found that a town or county itself is the only proper
defendant. Estate of Hampton v. Androscoggin Cnty., 245 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158 n.17
(D. Me. 2002) (sheriffs department not a proper defendant because it is merely a
subdivision of the county); Cronin v. Town of Amesbury, 895 F. Supp. 375, 383 (D.
Mass. 1995) (police department not a proper defendant because it has no legal
identity separate from that of the town), affd, 81 F.3d 257 (1st Cir. 1996). Because
the Fire Department is simply a subdivision of the Town and lacks the legal
capacity to be sued, it is not properly named as a defendant.
Second, Mr. Carey's claims against the Town must be dismissed because the
Town is entitled to sovereign immunity. Governmental entities enjoy broad
immunity from tort claims. The Maine 'I'ort Claims Act ("MTCA'') provides: "Except
as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all governmental entities shall be
immune from suit on any and all tort claims seeking recovery of damages." 14
M.R.S. § 8103(1). The statute then enumerates several exceptions to that
immunity, including the provision that "[a] governmental entity is liable for its
3 negligent acts or omissions in its ownership, maintenance, or use of' various types
of "vehicles, machinery and equipment." 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(l). Because "'the MTCA
employs an exception-to-immunity approach rather than an exception-to-liability
approach,' when [a court] consider[s] the exceptions to immunity for governmental
entities, '[it] start[s] from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to
immunity are to be strictly construed."' Day's Auto Body, Inc. v. Town of lYiedway,
2016 ME 121, i[ 8, 145 A.3d 1030. Here, Mr. Carey argues that his claims fall within
section 8104-A(l)'s exception concerning "vehicles, machinery and equipment." 14
M.R.S. § 8104-A(l). Specifically, he asserts that members of the Fire Department
refused to deploy a pumper truck in a timely fashion, thereby allowing a small fire
to rapidly spread. Complaint at pages 3-4.
The Law Court has "made clear that the mere fact that a vehicle or piece of
equipment or machinery is involved in the conduct that allegedly caused harm does
not, in itself, implicate the exception to immunity." Day's Auto Body, 2016 ME 121,
'j] 9, 145 A.3d 1030. Instead, the vehicle exception applies only where a tort claim
"involves harms that flow naturally or directly from the negligent use or
maintenance of vehicles." Thompson v. Dep't of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 2002
ME 78, 'j] 7, 796 A.2d 674 (affirming dismissal of complaint where plaintiff claimed
to have been injured "not by contact with a negligently operated or maintained
vehicle, but by the State's failure [to use government vehicles] to execute an
efficient rescue"). "[T]he focus is on the risk of harm naturally or directly caused by
the vehicle's contact with the general public." Id. '11 8.
4 The Day's Auto Body case is instructive. There, the plaintiff brought a
negligence action against the 'rown of Medway, claiming that the fire department
had "refused to allow firefighters to enter the building, refilled fire trucks from a
single hydrant instead of from two other available hydrants... [and] connected a
water hose to a nozzle impropedy," among other allegations. 2016 ME 121, ,r 2, 145
A.3d 1030. The Law Court upheld the trial court's finding of immunity, reasoning
that even if the fire department's decisions were poor ones, "they do not create the
type of risk for which the Legislature intended governmental entities to incur tort
liability." Id. ,I 11.
Here, as in Day's Auto Body, the gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint is that
"the Town made imprudent tactical decisions in the course of fighting the fire." Id. ii
11.
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STATE OF l\lIAINE SUPERIOR COURT OXFORD, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-22-22
) SETH T. CAREY, ) ) Plaintiff ) ) V. ) ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS ) TOWN OF RUMFORD and ) RUMFORD FIRE DEPARTMENT ) ) Defendants ) ) )
Plaintiff Seth T. Carey brings this suit against Defendants Town of Rumford
and the Rumford Fire Department. There are multiple pending motions in this
matter, including: the plaintiffs Request for Temporary Restraining Order and
Permanent Injunction; Rumford Fire Department's Motion to Dismiss; and Town of
Rumford's Motion to Dismiss. For the following reasons, the com·t grants both
motions to dismiss and denies the remaining motions as moot.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case stems from a fire that took place at the plaintiff's home on October
5, 2020. Due to the extensive structural damage, the 'Town of Rumford ("the Town")
declared the home a "Dangerous Building" and ordered its demolition. The plaintiff
filed an appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. SOB. The court
1 affirmed the Town's decision.I The plaintiff then filed the instant lawsuit, which
was docketed on June 2, 2022. Count I alleges that the responding firefighters from
the Rumford Fire Department ("the Fire Department") negligently failed to save the
plaintiffs home. Count II alleges that the Town was negligent in hiring Chris Reed
as its fire chief. Counts III and IV allege negligent infliction of emotional distress
and intentional infliction of emotional distress by both defendants.
DISCUSSION
A motion to dismiss under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint. Seacoast Hangar Condo. II Ass'n v. Martel, 2001 ME 112, 4116, 775 A2d
1166. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must "view the facts alleged
in the complaint as if they were admitted and in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff' in order to determine whether the complaint "'sets forth elements of a
cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to
some legal theory,"' Lalonde v. Cent. Me. Med. Ctr., 2017 ME 22, 4111, 155 A3d 426
(quoting Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm'n, 2004 ME 20, ~ 7, 843 A.2d 43).
"Dismissal is warranted when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is not
entitled to relief under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim."
Johanson v. Dunnington, 2001 ME 169, 41 5, 785 A2d 1244.
Dismissal is warranted in the instant case. First, the Fire Department is not
a separate legal entity from the Town and thus lacks the capacity to be sued. In an
1 See Seth Carey v. Town of Rumford, Docket No. SOPSC-AP-2021-03, decided 11/17/21.
2 action involving a town or its departments or subdivisions, the proper party is the
town itself; "subordinate entities do not have the capacity to sue or be sued." 56 Am.
Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions § 735.
The Law Court recognized this principle in Faucher u. City of Auburn when it
"change[d] the title of the case from City of Auburn School Department to City of
Auburn" because the city itself was the "appropriate defendant." 465 A2d 1120,
1120 n. * (Me. 1983). In similar cases, the federal district courts of Maine and
Massachusetts have likewise found that a town or county itself is the only proper
defendant. Estate of Hampton v. Androscoggin Cnty., 245 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158 n.17
(D. Me. 2002) (sheriffs department not a proper defendant because it is merely a
subdivision of the county); Cronin v. Town of Amesbury, 895 F. Supp. 375, 383 (D.
Mass. 1995) (police department not a proper defendant because it has no legal
identity separate from that of the town), affd, 81 F.3d 257 (1st Cir. 1996). Because
the Fire Department is simply a subdivision of the Town and lacks the legal
capacity to be sued, it is not properly named as a defendant.
Second, Mr. Carey's claims against the Town must be dismissed because the
Town is entitled to sovereign immunity. Governmental entities enjoy broad
immunity from tort claims. The Maine 'I'ort Claims Act ("MTCA'') provides: "Except
as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all governmental entities shall be
immune from suit on any and all tort claims seeking recovery of damages." 14
M.R.S. § 8103(1). The statute then enumerates several exceptions to that
immunity, including the provision that "[a] governmental entity is liable for its
3 negligent acts or omissions in its ownership, maintenance, or use of' various types
of "vehicles, machinery and equipment." 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(l). Because "'the MTCA
employs an exception-to-immunity approach rather than an exception-to-liability
approach,' when [a court] consider[s] the exceptions to immunity for governmental
entities, '[it] start[s] from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to
immunity are to be strictly construed."' Day's Auto Body, Inc. v. Town of lYiedway,
2016 ME 121, i[ 8, 145 A.3d 1030. Here, Mr. Carey argues that his claims fall within
section 8104-A(l)'s exception concerning "vehicles, machinery and equipment." 14
M.R.S. § 8104-A(l). Specifically, he asserts that members of the Fire Department
refused to deploy a pumper truck in a timely fashion, thereby allowing a small fire
to rapidly spread. Complaint at pages 3-4.
The Law Court has "made clear that the mere fact that a vehicle or piece of
equipment or machinery is involved in the conduct that allegedly caused harm does
not, in itself, implicate the exception to immunity." Day's Auto Body, 2016 ME 121,
'j] 9, 145 A.3d 1030. Instead, the vehicle exception applies only where a tort claim
"involves harms that flow naturally or directly from the negligent use or
maintenance of vehicles." Thompson v. Dep't of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 2002
ME 78, 'j] 7, 796 A.2d 674 (affirming dismissal of complaint where plaintiff claimed
to have been injured "not by contact with a negligently operated or maintained
vehicle, but by the State's failure [to use government vehicles] to execute an
efficient rescue"). "[T]he focus is on the risk of harm naturally or directly caused by
the vehicle's contact with the general public." Id. '11 8.
4 The Day's Auto Body case is instructive. There, the plaintiff brought a
negligence action against the 'rown of Medway, claiming that the fire department
had "refused to allow firefighters to enter the building, refilled fire trucks from a
single hydrant instead of from two other available hydrants... [and] connected a
water hose to a nozzle impropedy," among other allegations. 2016 ME 121, ,r 2, 145
A.3d 1030. The Law Court upheld the trial court's finding of immunity, reasoning
that even if the fire department's decisions were poor ones, "they do not create the
type of risk for which the Legislature intended governmental entities to incur tort
liability." Id. ,I 11.
Here, as in Day's Auto Body, the gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint is that
"the Town made imprudent tactical decisions in the course of fighting the fire." Id. ii
11. He does not allege that he was injured by contact with a negligently operated or
maintained fire truck, just that the firefighters did not deploy the truck properly.
'l'hus, even accepting as true the plaintiffs claims that the firefighters acted
negligently, the vehicle exception does not apply. Id. Because section 8104-A(l)'s
vehicle except.ion is inapplicable and the plaintiff makes no claim that any other
exception to immunity applies, the court concludes that the Town is immune from
the plaintiffs suit pursuant to section 8103(1) of the MTCA.
Finally, where all counts are now dismissed, the other pending motions are
moot.
5 The court accordingly orders as follows:
1. Defendant Rumford Fire Department's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
2. Defendant Town of Rumford's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
3. Plaintiff Seth Carey's Request for Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction is DENIED as moot.
4. Defendant Rumford Fire Department's Motion to Exempt this Matter from Rule 16B ADR Requirements is DENIED as moot.
5. Defendant Rumford Fire Department's Motion to Stay Discovery is DENIED as moot.
6. Defendant Town of Rumford's Motion to Quash Subpoenas is DENIED as moot.
The clerk is directed to incorporate this order on the docket by reference
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).
'
Julia M,Lipez ' O Justice, Superior Court