UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-40793 Summary Calendar
JENNIFER CAREY, Individually and As Representative of the ESTATE OF GARY ANTHONY CAREY, Deceased, and As Next Friend of DANIEL ANTHONY CAREY, and LEE RICHARD CAREY and GARY MARTIN JOHN CAREY; ANNE CAREY; and ROLAND LEE BRUMLEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
SUB SEA INTERNATIONAL, INC.; SUB SEA OFFSHORE, LIMITED; MOBIL CORPORATION; MOBIL NORTH SEA, LIMITED; COOPER CAMERON CORPORATION; and COOPER CAMERON (UK) LIMITED,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas No. 1:98-CV-1917
March 23, 2000 Before SMITH, BARKSDALE and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Plaintiff-Appellants seek reversal of the district court's
dismissal of their case for lack of personal jurisdiction and for
lack of a convenient forum. In addition, plaintiff-appellants
seek remand of their suit to state court due to lack of complete
1 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
-1- diversity. Because we find that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by addressing the issues of personal jurisdiction
and forum non conveniens before determining subject-matter
jurisdiction, we AFFIRM.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In a third attempt to recover damages under the laws of the
State of Texas for an oilfield accident in the North Sea,
appellants filed suit in state court in Jefferson County, Texas.
Sub Sea Offshore managed the two employees that were injured in
this accident: Gary Anthony Carey and Roland Lee Brumley.2 A
portion of the wellhead involved in the accident was manufactured
by Cooper Cameron (U.K.), Ltd. and was sold under contract to
Mobil North Sea Ltd.
The district court held that the domestic defendants--Cooper
Cameron, Sub Sea International, Inc. and Mobil Corporation--had
no connection with the accident that was the subject of the suit
and that they could not possibly be held liable to appellants.
Thus, the district court concluded that these defendants were
fraudulently joined. The district court then determined that the
foreign defendants--Mobil North Sea, Ltd., Cooper Cameron (U.K.)
Ltd. and Sub Sea Offshore Ltd.--did not have sufficient contacts
with the State of Texas to justify the court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction over them. As an alternative ground for
2 Mr. Carey was employed and trained by Sub Sea Offshore Ltd. Mr. Brumley was hired by Sub Sea Overseas, Inc., but was trained and paid by Sub Sea Offshore.
-2- dismissal, the district court noted that the case would be better
brought in Scotland because that was where all the witnesses were
located. Based on these findings, inter alia, the district court
held that the motion to remand should be denied and that the
motions to dismiss the case should be granted.
Appellants raise two primary points of error on appeal.
First, they argue that the district court did not have discretion
to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction and forum
non conveniens without first completely deciding subject-matter
jurisdiction. Second, appellants argue that the district court
erred in finding that the domestic defendants were fraudulently
joined.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Ruhrgas AG v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 119 S. Ct. 1563 (1999), a court's
decision to address non-merits matters (such as personal
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens) prior to deciding the
issue of subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See Marathon Oil, 526 U.S. at ---, 119 S. Ct. at
1572. A court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. See Doddy v. OXY
USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 460 (5th Cir. 1996). The appropriate
standard by which to review the district court's decision to
dismiss the case based on forum non conveniens is abuse of
discretion. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257
(1981); Dickinson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331,
-3- 335 (5th Cir. 1999).
Because the district court's fraudulent joinder
determination was resolved under a summary judgment-like
procedure, see, e.g., Burden v. General Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d
213, 217 n.18 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing cases), our review of that
decision is de novo. See id. at 221 n.44 (“We have previously
observed that the standard of review for a fraudulent joinder
claim is similar to that used on a motion for summary judgment.”)
(citing B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 n.9
(5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981)).
DISCUSSION
I. Fraudulent Joinder and Personal Jurisdiction.
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Order of Determination.
In Marathon Oil, the Supreme Court reviewed an en banc
decision from this circuit which held that, in removed cases, a
district court must decide the issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction before deciding issues of personal jurisdiction.
See 143 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 526 U.S. 574, 119
-4- S. Ct. 1563 (1999).3 After noting that courts usually decide the
question of subject-matter jurisdiction at the outset, the
Supreme Court held that a court “does not abuse its discretion by
turning directly to personal jurisdiction.” Marathon Oil, 526
U.S. at ---, 119 S. Ct. at 1572. See also Alpine View Co. v.
Atlas Copco AB, --- F.3d ---, ---, No. 97-20879, 2000 WL 223821,
at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 2000).
The facts of Marathon Oil are strikingly similar to those of
the case sub judice. Marathon joined an alien plaintiff as well
as an alien defendant. The Court reasoned that if the joinder of
the alien defendant was legitimate, the complete diversity
required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would have been
absent. See Marathon Oil, 526 U.S. at ---, 119 S. Ct. at 1570.
In this case, if joinder of the domestic defendants was
legitimate, then diversity would have been absent because of the
fact that at least one of the appellants was a Texas resident.
We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the domestic defendants were fraudulently joined
prior to a finding on subject-matter jurisdiction.
After finding that the domestic defendants were fraudulently
joined, the district court held that the foreign defendants
lacked sufficient contacts with the State of Texas to establish
personal jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm statute. Before
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-40793 Summary Calendar
JENNIFER CAREY, Individually and As Representative of the ESTATE OF GARY ANTHONY CAREY, Deceased, and As Next Friend of DANIEL ANTHONY CAREY, and LEE RICHARD CAREY and GARY MARTIN JOHN CAREY; ANNE CAREY; and ROLAND LEE BRUMLEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
SUB SEA INTERNATIONAL, INC.; SUB SEA OFFSHORE, LIMITED; MOBIL CORPORATION; MOBIL NORTH SEA, LIMITED; COOPER CAMERON CORPORATION; and COOPER CAMERON (UK) LIMITED,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas No. 1:98-CV-1917
March 23, 2000 Before SMITH, BARKSDALE and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Plaintiff-Appellants seek reversal of the district court's
dismissal of their case for lack of personal jurisdiction and for
lack of a convenient forum. In addition, plaintiff-appellants
seek remand of their suit to state court due to lack of complete
1 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
-1- diversity. Because we find that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by addressing the issues of personal jurisdiction
and forum non conveniens before determining subject-matter
jurisdiction, we AFFIRM.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In a third attempt to recover damages under the laws of the
State of Texas for an oilfield accident in the North Sea,
appellants filed suit in state court in Jefferson County, Texas.
Sub Sea Offshore managed the two employees that were injured in
this accident: Gary Anthony Carey and Roland Lee Brumley.2 A
portion of the wellhead involved in the accident was manufactured
by Cooper Cameron (U.K.), Ltd. and was sold under contract to
Mobil North Sea Ltd.
The district court held that the domestic defendants--Cooper
Cameron, Sub Sea International, Inc. and Mobil Corporation--had
no connection with the accident that was the subject of the suit
and that they could not possibly be held liable to appellants.
Thus, the district court concluded that these defendants were
fraudulently joined. The district court then determined that the
foreign defendants--Mobil North Sea, Ltd., Cooper Cameron (U.K.)
Ltd. and Sub Sea Offshore Ltd.--did not have sufficient contacts
with the State of Texas to justify the court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction over them. As an alternative ground for
2 Mr. Carey was employed and trained by Sub Sea Offshore Ltd. Mr. Brumley was hired by Sub Sea Overseas, Inc., but was trained and paid by Sub Sea Offshore.
-2- dismissal, the district court noted that the case would be better
brought in Scotland because that was where all the witnesses were
located. Based on these findings, inter alia, the district court
held that the motion to remand should be denied and that the
motions to dismiss the case should be granted.
Appellants raise two primary points of error on appeal.
First, they argue that the district court did not have discretion
to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction and forum
non conveniens without first completely deciding subject-matter
jurisdiction. Second, appellants argue that the district court
erred in finding that the domestic defendants were fraudulently
joined.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Ruhrgas AG v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 119 S. Ct. 1563 (1999), a court's
decision to address non-merits matters (such as personal
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens) prior to deciding the
issue of subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See Marathon Oil, 526 U.S. at ---, 119 S. Ct. at
1572. A court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. See Doddy v. OXY
USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 460 (5th Cir. 1996). The appropriate
standard by which to review the district court's decision to
dismiss the case based on forum non conveniens is abuse of
discretion. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257
(1981); Dickinson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331,
-3- 335 (5th Cir. 1999).
Because the district court's fraudulent joinder
determination was resolved under a summary judgment-like
procedure, see, e.g., Burden v. General Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d
213, 217 n.18 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing cases), our review of that
decision is de novo. See id. at 221 n.44 (“We have previously
observed that the standard of review for a fraudulent joinder
claim is similar to that used on a motion for summary judgment.”)
(citing B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 n.9
(5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981)).
DISCUSSION
I. Fraudulent Joinder and Personal Jurisdiction.
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Order of Determination.
In Marathon Oil, the Supreme Court reviewed an en banc
decision from this circuit which held that, in removed cases, a
district court must decide the issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction before deciding issues of personal jurisdiction.
See 143 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 526 U.S. 574, 119
-4- S. Ct. 1563 (1999).3 After noting that courts usually decide the
question of subject-matter jurisdiction at the outset, the
Supreme Court held that a court “does not abuse its discretion by
turning directly to personal jurisdiction.” Marathon Oil, 526
U.S. at ---, 119 S. Ct. at 1572. See also Alpine View Co. v.
Atlas Copco AB, --- F.3d ---, ---, No. 97-20879, 2000 WL 223821,
at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 2000).
The facts of Marathon Oil are strikingly similar to those of
the case sub judice. Marathon joined an alien plaintiff as well
as an alien defendant. The Court reasoned that if the joinder of
the alien defendant was legitimate, the complete diversity
required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would have been
absent. See Marathon Oil, 526 U.S. at ---, 119 S. Ct. at 1570.
In this case, if joinder of the domestic defendants was
legitimate, then diversity would have been absent because of the
fact that at least one of the appellants was a Texas resident.
We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the domestic defendants were fraudulently joined
prior to a finding on subject-matter jurisdiction.
After finding that the domestic defendants were fraudulently
joined, the district court held that the foreign defendants
lacked sufficient contacts with the State of Texas to establish
personal jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm statute. Before
3 The Supreme Court's opinion in Marathon Oil was not published until nearly a month after Judge Cobb filed his Memorandum Order.
-5- performing our de novo review of this determination, we turn to
the issue of whether the district court's decision to examine the
question of personal jurisdiction before deciding subject matter
jurisdiction was wrong.
We agree with appellees that appellants' argument that the
district court could not proceed to the issue of personal
jurisdiction after its finding of fraudulent joinder is
simplistic. The appropriate inquiry is whether the district
court, in its discretion, can dismiss the case on non-merits
grounds before answering the question of subject-matter
jurisdiction. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has
articulated this principle.
Thus, although, subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes (e.g., the duty of courts to bring it up on their own), a court that dismisses on other non- merits grounds such as forum non conveniens and personal jurisdiction, before finding subject-matter jurisdiction, makes no assumption of law-declaring power that violates the separation of powers . . . . * * * [D]ismissal for want of personal jurisdiction is independent of the merits and does not require subject- matter jurisdiction.
Papandreou v. United States, 139 F.3d 247, 255-56 (D.C. Cir.
1998), quoted with approval in Marathon Oil, 526 U.S. at ---, 119
S. Ct. at 1570. Under the facts of this case, we find that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in resolving the
issue of personal jurisdiction antecedent to a finding on
subject-matter jurisdiction.
B. Fraudulent Joinder.
The district court held that the affidavits and exhibits to
-6- defendants' motion to dismiss amply support their contention of
fraudulent joinder. Appellants argue that this ruling should
reversed and remanded because the district court acted sua sponte
in violation of their due process rights. After examination of
the record, we disagree. The district court's fraudulent joinder
ruling is affirmed.
C. Personal Jurisdiction.
The district court determined that the foreign defendants--
Mobil North Sea, Ltd., Cooper Cameron (U.K.) Ltd. and Sub Sea
Offshore Ltd.--were not amenable to suit in the United States.
We find nothing in the record to dispute this finding. The
district court's ruling on personal jurisdiction is affirmed.
II. Forum Non Conveniens.
Appellants argue that the district court's forum non
conveniens ruling was erroneous because it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to make this determination. This argument fails
whether it is applied to personal jurisdiction or forum non
conveniens. See Marathon Oil, 526 U.S. at ---, 119 S. Ct. at
1570 (“It is hardly novel for a federal court to choose among
threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the
merits.”); “Forum non conveniens does not raise a jurisdictional
bar but instead involves a deliberate abstention from the
exercise of jurisdiction. While such abstention may appear
logically to rest on an assumption of jurisdiction, it is as
merits free as a finding of no jurisdiction.” Papandreou, 139
F.3d at 255 (citations omitted). For reasons similar to those
-7- stated supra, we decline to accept appellants' rigid sequencing
of appropriate district court actions which is contrary to the
letter and spirit of Marathon Oil.
Because we find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing appellants' case on the grounds of forum
non conveniens, we affirm.
CONCLUSION
We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in ruling on the issues of personal jurisdiction and forum non
conveniens prior to making a finding that subject matter
jurisdiction existed. Furthermore, the district court's ruling
on fraudulent joinder and its ruling on personal jurisdiction
with respect to the foreign defendants were not erroneous.
AFFIRMED.
-8-