Carey v. Massaro

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Carey v. Massaro

270 A.D.2d 222, 704 N.Y.S.2d 846, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2522

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 6, 2000

StatusPublished

This text of 270 A.D.2d 222 (Carey v. Massaro) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Carey v. Massaro, 270 A.D.2d 222, 704 N.Y.S.2d 846, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2522 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injures, etc., the defendant Town of Hempstead appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (DiNoto, J.), dated March 4, 1999, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

It is undisputed that the Town of Hempstead did not have prior written notice of the hazardous condition alleged by the plaintiffs to have caused the instant collision (see, Town of Hempstead Code § 6-1). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court properly denied the Town’s motion for summary judgment as the plaintiffs successfully demonstrated the existence of an issue of fact as to whether the Town created the condition (see, Doherty v Town of Orangetown, 221 AD2d 310; Humes v Town of Hempstead, 166 AD2d 503). Ritter, J. P., Sullivan, S. Miller, Luciano and H. Miller, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injures, etc., the defendant Town of Hempstead appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (DiNoto, J.), dated March 4, 1999, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

It is undisputed that the Town of Hempstead did not have prior written notice of the hazardous condition alleged by the plaintiffs to have caused the instant collision (see, Town of Hempstead Code § 6-1). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court properly denied the Town’s motion for summary judgment as the plaintiffs successfully demonstrated the existence of an issue of fact as to whether the Town created the condition (see, Doherty v Town of Orangetown, 221 AD2d 310; Humes v Town of Hempstead, 166 AD2d 503). Ritter, J. P., Sullivan, S. Miller, Luciano and H. Miller, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

270 A.D.2d 222, 704 N.Y.S.2d 846, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2522, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carey-v-massaro-nyappdiv-2000.

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