Carew, Shaw & Bernasconi, Inc. v. General Casualty Co. of America

65 P.2d 689, 189 Wash. 329, 1937 Wash. LEXIS 490
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 3, 1937
DocketNo. 26507. Department One.
StatusPublished
Cited by45 cases

This text of 65 P.2d 689 (Carew, Shaw & Bernasconi, Inc. v. General Casualty Co. of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carew, Shaw & Bernasconi, Inc. v. General Casualty Co. of America, 65 P.2d 689, 189 Wash. 329, 1937 Wash. LEXIS 490 (Wash. 1937).

Opinion

Millard, J.

This action was instituted for recovery on a burglary insurance policy on a safe and its contents. Trial of the cause to a court and a jury resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount for which it prayed. Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted, and judgment of dismissal entered. Plaintiff appealed.

On September 29, 1934, appellant, a domestic corporation, commenced business as a cash department store in Seattle. Mark T. Shaw, its vice-president, was charged with the duty of obtaining insurance protection for appellant. On September 28, 1934, when Graham John Smith, an agent of respondent insurance company, endeavored to interest Shaw in fire insurance, the latter informed Smith that the appellant desired nothing other than burglary safe insurance.

Smith stated to appellant’s vice-president that it was necessary for the safe to be examined by George Fuller, an employee of respondent, who was familiar with burglary safe insurance. Later the same day, Fuller and Smith called on Shaw. On that occasion, Fuller examined the safe and the chest inside of the safe, measuring the thickness and ascertaining the nature of the walls to determine the amount of the premium for the burglary insurance desired. This investigation disclosed that the chest inside the safe was *331 burglar-proof, under the accepted rating classification, and would carry the basic rate of $5.00 for one thousand dollars of insurance, from which a 10% credit for a watchman and a 15% credit for an alarm service were deducted, making a total of $3.82%, while the safe proper, being fire-proof only, would take a basic rate of $16.50, subject to the same deductions.

Testimony on behalf of the respondent is to the effect that inquiry was made by Fuller and Smith as to whether the money was to be kept in the burglar-proof chest or in the safe outside the chest. The place in which the money was kept would, of course, make the difference in the amount of the premium. Though Shaw and two employees of the appellant denied that such an inquiry was made, appellant, in its reply to respondent’s answer, admitted that agents of respondent “examined the safe to be insured and asked if the property to be insured was kept, or to be kept, in the inner chest.” Smith, respondent’s agent, testified that, at the time of the meeting of Fuller and Shaw, Fuller informed Shaw of the difference in the rate, and, on Shaw’s assurance that the money was kept in the chest, quoted to Shaw only the lower rate covering the chest.

After Fuller examined and measured the safe and quoted the rate for insurance to Shaw, the latter telephoned to Lambuth, of the firm of Lambuth, Sills & Company, insurance and real estate agents, who handled the appellant’s insurance business, discussed the rate with Lambuth, and, after that telephonic conversation, Shaw advised Fuller and Smith he would give his answer to them later on the matter of insurance. Shaw then instructed Lambuth to obtain the insurance from respondent. Lambuth, in turn, so instructed H. C. Eoach, of the office of Lamping & Company. Eoach telephoned to Fuller, ordering the in *332 snrance and at the same time ordering a binder to give protection pending delivery of the policy. Fuller thereupon executed and delivered the insurance binder to Shaw, who carefully examined it, noted that it was in accordance with his oral order to Fuller, and filed it away. The binder, which is dated September 28,1934, was issued, respondent admits, by Fuller on that date, and covered the entire safe, which binder was mailed to Lamping & Company.

In explanation of the coverage of the safe and chest and the issuance of the binder, Fuller testified that the respondent had not received a definite order for the business on the basis of the quotation to Shaw, and that it is the practice of the insurance company, when so requested by the agent, to issue a binder giving to the assured protection until the definite order is received. This binder, which reads as follows, is dated September 28, 1934, and was received by Shaw the following day:

“General Casualty Company op America ■
“Seattle, - Wash.
hereby acknowledges itself bound by a Burglary or Glass Insurance undertaking, the subject matter of the insurance being described in the following Schedule; and during the term of this Binder the actual contract of insurance shall be evidenced by such of the printed policy form blanks in use by the Company during such term as are indicated by the letters given in the Schedule. The term of this Binder shall end at twelve and one minute o’clock A. M. of the tenth day following that upon which the Binder takes effect. Standard Time to apply at the place where this Binder has been countersigned.
“A pro rata premium charge will be made for this Binder unless a policy or policies are issued and accepted by the Assured covering its term, and the issuance of such a policy or policies shall void this Binder.
*333 “Schedule

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Bluebook (online)
65 P.2d 689, 189 Wash. 329, 1937 Wash. LEXIS 490, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carew-shaw-bernasconi-inc-v-general-casualty-co-of-america-wash-1937.