Caren Trejo Medina v. Todd Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 2, 2026
• Docket: 15-72693
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 2 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CAREN XIMARA TREJO MEDINA, AKA No. 15-72693 Karen Xiomara Trejo Medina, Agency No. A205-988-076 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 24, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: FRIEDLAND and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and TRAUM,*** District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Anne R. Traum, United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation. Petitioner Caren Trejo Medina petitions for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration

judge’s (“IJ’s”) decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and post-conclusion voluntary departure.1 We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252.

“Where, as here, the BIA cites Burbano and also provides its own review of

the evidence and law, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.” Ali v.

Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011). We review for substantial evidence

the agency’s factual findings, and review questions of law de novo. Zehatye v.

Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006); Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909,

911 (9th Cir. 2020). We deny in part and grant in part the petition for review, and

we remand.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Trejo Medina is

ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal. The record does not compel the

conclusion that Trejo Medino experienced past harm rising to the level of

persecution. Although petitioner was kidnapped and threatened, she was held only

briefly before being released, was not physically harmed, and had no subsequent

interactions with the gang members. See Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1061-

1 The agency also denied relief under the Convention Against Torture, but Trejo Medina does not seek review of that denial.

2 62 (9th Cir. 2021) (looking to whether petitioner “suffered serious injuries,” the

“length and quality of [her] detention,” and whether threats were “repeated,

specific and combined with confrontation or other mistreatment” (citation

omitted)).

On the record before us, the agency also appropriately concluded that Trejo

Medina did not produce evidence sufficient to meet her burden to show that any

future harm would have a nexus to a proposed social group. The BIA concluded

that “there is no evidence that the gang members [who kidnapped or threatened

Trejo Medina] are, or could become, aware of [her] opposition to them.” Petitioner

points to no evidence belying that conclusion. Indeed, the record amply supports

the agency’s determination that the gang members are running an “extortion”

scheme targeted at petitioner’s aunt.

Trejo Medina requests a remand so the agency may reconsider her

application for post-conclusion voluntary departure. The IJ denied her request for

voluntary departure solely because she had not been physically present in the

United States for a period of one year immediately preceding the date that her

Notice to Appear (“NTA”) was served, and the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision by

3 citing Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994).2 Since that time, the

way we calculate physical presence has changed. See Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S.

198 (2018); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021). In Posos-Sanchez v.

Garland, 3 F.4th 1176 (9th Cir. 2021), we held that “a noncitizen builds up

physical-presence time under [8 U.S.C.] § 1229c(b)(1)(A) from the moment he

enters the United States until the moment he receives a single document that

provides him with all the information Congress listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)—i.e., a

§ 1229(a) NTA.” Id. at 1185. Because Trejo Medina’s NTA from 2013 was

deficient under § 1229(a), we grant the petition for review as to Trejo Medina’s

voluntary departure claim, and we remand for the BIA to reconsider that claim in

light of Posos-Sanchez. See Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 630 (9th

Cir. 2024) (explaining that “remand is appropriate to allow the BIA to consider the

impact of subsequent case law” regarding statutorily deficient NTAs).3

2 For this reason, the Government’s argument that Trejo Medina failed to exhaust her voluntary departure claim is misplaced. See Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 3 Because we decided Posos-Sanchez after the BIA dismissed Trejo Medina’s appeal but while Trejo Medina’s petition was pending, we reject the Government’s contention that Trejo Medina must seek relief by filing a motion to reopen with the BIA. See Cordoba v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (remanding for the agency to consider an intervening decision without requiring the petitioner to file a motion to reopen); Valdez v. Garland, 28 F.4th 72, 81 (9th Cir. 2022) (same).

4 PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; GRANTED in part;

REMANDED.4

4 The temporary administrative stay is lifted, and the motion to stay removal, Dkt. No. 1, is denied.