NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-547
CARE AND PROTECTION OF FRANCINE (and two companion cases1).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
In this care and protection proceeding, after trial, a
judge of the Juvenile Court concluded that the mother was unfit
to parent all three of the subject children2 and that her
unfitness was likely to continue into the future. With respect
to Amy and Laura, the two younger children, the judge concluded
that it was in their best interests to terminate the mother's
parental rights. She did not terminate the mother's parental
rights with respect to Francine, the oldest subject child.
The mother has appealed. Francine has also appealed,
arguing that the mother should not have been found unfit with
1Adoption of Amy and Adoption of Laura. The names of the children are pseudonyms.
2The mother has two older children who are not subjects of this proceeding. respect to her. Amy and Laura defend the finding of unfitness
and the termination of the mother's parental rights as to them
in its entirety and take no position with respect to the case of
Francine.
1. The younger children. It appears that no party claims
that the judge erred in finding the mother currently unfit to
parent Amy and Laura, the two younger children. The mother,
however, asserts that her unfitness was only temporary and that
the Department of Children and Families (department) could not
show that her unfitness was likely to continue indefinitely into
the future because it failed to make reasonable efforts to
reunify the family.
We conclude that the judge did not err in concluding the
mother was unfit with respect to the two younger children. The
judge provided a detailed, eighty-six page, single-spaced
decision in this case containing 331 factual findings and forty-
three conclusions of law. The facts the judge found reflect
clear and convincing evidence supporting the judge's conclusion
that the mother is unfit and that her unfitness is likely to
continue indefinitely into the future. See Adoption of Ilona,
459 Mass. 53, 60 (2011). We need not recite those facts in
full, but note the following findings as examples of the
mother's neglect of these two children. When the department
2 gained emergency temporary custody of them, Amy was seven and
Laura was six. Laura was not toilet trained. Both children
were behind educationally, as neither had been enrolled in
school. Laura did not know how to write her name and could not
recognize it in writing. The judge found that the mother never
enrolled the younger children in school, and, despite the
judge's emphasis on the importance of the mother's obtaining the
valid identification required to have them enrolled, at the time
of trial, the mother had still not obtained a valid
identification.
The mother failed to provide adequate housing for the
children. She had a subsidized Section 8 apartment, but its
condition was terrible. Plumbing issues caused the dishwasher
to clog and flood and the sink and toilets to back up, and mold
to grow. Notably, the apartment was infested with mice to such
a degree that they once ate the wires of the stove, leaving the
mother without a stove for several months, and they frequently
ate their way into the family's refrigerator, where they then
died. The mold and mice issues were so severe the board of
health's "hazmat team" came to the apartment.
Of course, we appreciate that the likelihood of obtaining a
decent apartment is lower for those in poverty. See Carter v.
Lynn Hous. Auth., 450 Mass. 626, 638 (2008), quoting Spence v.
3 Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 275 (1982) (noting that those in public
housing "may have nowhere else to turn"). But in this case, for
over four years, with children living in these conditions, the
mother never took even the first step toward finding alternate
subsidized housing. Again, this was something that she could
not do without a valid identification, and she never obtained an
The mother, at one point, directed the younger children's
former foster parent, who was watching them for the weekend, to
give one of the children an expired medication that the pharmacy
indicated should not be used. The mother failed to obtain any
dental treatment for the children for three years, so that when
they left her care, they required massive dental work, including
a full mouth dental rehabilitation for Amy, which involved
multiple root canals, tooth extractions, and caps. Laura also
received a full mouth dental rehabilitation.
More than once when the mother did have the children in her
custody, she sent them to stay with other family members because
she was unable or unwilling to care for them. After the death
of her sister, the mother sent the younger children to live with
their paternal grandmother, repeatedly extending their stay
while allowing Francine to return home. Roughly nine months
after the younger children eventually returned to the mother's
4 home, she again sent them away -- this time, to live with their
maternal grandmother -- claiming that she, the mother, was
overwhelmed and had too much going on with Francine. The mother
left the younger children with the maternal grandmother for
nearly two months and never visited them. The children later
disclosed that the maternal grandmother hit them, but the mother
denied knowing this at the time.
Again, the facts articulated in the judge's findings of
fact demonstrate that there is clear and convincing evidence
supporting the finding not only of unfitness, but, given how
long her unfitness has persisted and her unwillingness or
inability to correct it, and the extensive health, educational,
and behavioral needs of the children, that the unfitness "is
reasonably likely to continue for a prolonged or indeterminate
period." Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 59.
As to termination of parental rights, given the need for
stability and permanency in the lives of Amy and Laura if they
are to have hope of a successful future, and given the length of
time during which the mother failed to remedy her grievous
shortcomings, we think the judge did not abuse her discretion
nor commit a clear error of law in determining that it was in
their best interests to terminate the mother's parental rights.
See Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass. 24, 30 (2006).
5 The mother argues that the department did not make
reasonable efforts to assist her in addressing her parental
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-547
CARE AND PROTECTION OF FRANCINE (and two companion cases1).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
In this care and protection proceeding, after trial, a
judge of the Juvenile Court concluded that the mother was unfit
to parent all three of the subject children2 and that her
unfitness was likely to continue into the future. With respect
to Amy and Laura, the two younger children, the judge concluded
that it was in their best interests to terminate the mother's
parental rights. She did not terminate the mother's parental
rights with respect to Francine, the oldest subject child.
The mother has appealed. Francine has also appealed,
arguing that the mother should not have been found unfit with
1Adoption of Amy and Adoption of Laura. The names of the children are pseudonyms.
2The mother has two older children who are not subjects of this proceeding. respect to her. Amy and Laura defend the finding of unfitness
and the termination of the mother's parental rights as to them
in its entirety and take no position with respect to the case of
Francine.
1. The younger children. It appears that no party claims
that the judge erred in finding the mother currently unfit to
parent Amy and Laura, the two younger children. The mother,
however, asserts that her unfitness was only temporary and that
the Department of Children and Families (department) could not
show that her unfitness was likely to continue indefinitely into
the future because it failed to make reasonable efforts to
reunify the family.
We conclude that the judge did not err in concluding the
mother was unfit with respect to the two younger children. The
judge provided a detailed, eighty-six page, single-spaced
decision in this case containing 331 factual findings and forty-
three conclusions of law. The facts the judge found reflect
clear and convincing evidence supporting the judge's conclusion
that the mother is unfit and that her unfitness is likely to
continue indefinitely into the future. See Adoption of Ilona,
459 Mass. 53, 60 (2011). We need not recite those facts in
full, but note the following findings as examples of the
mother's neglect of these two children. When the department
2 gained emergency temporary custody of them, Amy was seven and
Laura was six. Laura was not toilet trained. Both children
were behind educationally, as neither had been enrolled in
school. Laura did not know how to write her name and could not
recognize it in writing. The judge found that the mother never
enrolled the younger children in school, and, despite the
judge's emphasis on the importance of the mother's obtaining the
valid identification required to have them enrolled, at the time
of trial, the mother had still not obtained a valid
identification.
The mother failed to provide adequate housing for the
children. She had a subsidized Section 8 apartment, but its
condition was terrible. Plumbing issues caused the dishwasher
to clog and flood and the sink and toilets to back up, and mold
to grow. Notably, the apartment was infested with mice to such
a degree that they once ate the wires of the stove, leaving the
mother without a stove for several months, and they frequently
ate their way into the family's refrigerator, where they then
died. The mold and mice issues were so severe the board of
health's "hazmat team" came to the apartment.
Of course, we appreciate that the likelihood of obtaining a
decent apartment is lower for those in poverty. See Carter v.
Lynn Hous. Auth., 450 Mass. 626, 638 (2008), quoting Spence v.
3 Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 275 (1982) (noting that those in public
housing "may have nowhere else to turn"). But in this case, for
over four years, with children living in these conditions, the
mother never took even the first step toward finding alternate
subsidized housing. Again, this was something that she could
not do without a valid identification, and she never obtained an
The mother, at one point, directed the younger children's
former foster parent, who was watching them for the weekend, to
give one of the children an expired medication that the pharmacy
indicated should not be used. The mother failed to obtain any
dental treatment for the children for three years, so that when
they left her care, they required massive dental work, including
a full mouth dental rehabilitation for Amy, which involved
multiple root canals, tooth extractions, and caps. Laura also
received a full mouth dental rehabilitation.
More than once when the mother did have the children in her
custody, she sent them to stay with other family members because
she was unable or unwilling to care for them. After the death
of her sister, the mother sent the younger children to live with
their paternal grandmother, repeatedly extending their stay
while allowing Francine to return home. Roughly nine months
after the younger children eventually returned to the mother's
4 home, she again sent them away -- this time, to live with their
maternal grandmother -- claiming that she, the mother, was
overwhelmed and had too much going on with Francine. The mother
left the younger children with the maternal grandmother for
nearly two months and never visited them. The children later
disclosed that the maternal grandmother hit them, but the mother
denied knowing this at the time.
Again, the facts articulated in the judge's findings of
fact demonstrate that there is clear and convincing evidence
supporting the finding not only of unfitness, but, given how
long her unfitness has persisted and her unwillingness or
inability to correct it, and the extensive health, educational,
and behavioral needs of the children, that the unfitness "is
reasonably likely to continue for a prolonged or indeterminate
period." Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 59.
As to termination of parental rights, given the need for
stability and permanency in the lives of Amy and Laura if they
are to have hope of a successful future, and given the length of
time during which the mother failed to remedy her grievous
shortcomings, we think the judge did not abuse her discretion
nor commit a clear error of law in determining that it was in
their best interests to terminate the mother's parental rights.
See Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass. 24, 30 (2006).
5 The mother argues that the department did not make
reasonable efforts to assist her in addressing her parental
shortcomings. As this was not raised below at any point at
which the judge could have addressed the claim if it had merit,
the claim is waived. See Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct.
238, 242 (2020). In any event, even in cases where reasonable
efforts have not been made, the judge is bound to act in the
best interests of the child, see Ilona, 459 Mass. at 61, citing
G. L. c. 119, § 29C, and in light of the mother's current
circumstances, and with respect to the two younger children, the
children's best interests clearly warrant the judge's action.
2. The older child. a. Background. Francine's situation
is more complex. Both she and the mother argue that the mother
is fit with respect Francine.
While in the mother's care, Francine was educationally
behind, lacked seasonally appropriate clothing, and, as with two
younger children, lacked safe and clean housing, adequate
medical care, and proper dental care. Additionally, the mother
inappropriately relied on Francine to care for the younger
children, and, on at least one occasion, had Francine stay home
from school to watch Amy and Laura. Francine is a kind and
loving person who loves her mother and her siblings. The
mother, however, has failed utterly to adequately supervise
6 Francine or to place the child's needs above her own. When
Francine was twelve and essentially in charge of the younger
children, she took out the trash one day, bringing Amy with her.
Francine thought the mother's explanation for forbidding her
from visiting a friend in Boston was unreasonable and, with Amy,
disappeared.
The mother looked for Francine and Amy and learned that
they had been seen at the grocery store across the street. She
went to the grocery store and had an employee call for the
children over the loudspeaker, before returning home and calling
the police, Francine's friend, and the transit police. The
mother eventually learned that Francine and Amy had gone to
Boston, and the mother called her sister and asked her to pick
up the children while the mother drove to Boston. The mother's
sister recovered Amy, but not Francine. Francine eventually
called the mother, and the mother was able to locate her and
pick her up. Francine had been at a friend's house, and she
admitted that, while there, she smoked marijuana. After the
family returned home, police arrived, and Francine panicked and
felt dizzy and sleepy. As a result, an ambulance was called,
and she was taken to the hospital.
While in the mother's care, Francine exhibited concerning
sexual behaviors, and the mother often did not respond
7 appropriately. When Francine was thirteen, there were concerns
she may have been pregnant. While the mother initially agreed
to take Francine to the doctor and to look into birth control
for her, the mother failed to follow through on these
commitments. Francine continued to run away from the mother's
home. The department harbored concerns that Francine was at
risk for commercial sexual exploitation. On multiple occasions,
the mother refused to cooperate with investigations into
potential sexual exploitation of Francine.
The department filed this care and protection petition and
took emergency temporary custody of all three children, alleging
that they were at risk for neglect.
Unfortunately for this family, however, the department
failed adequately to provide for the "care and protection,"
G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b), of Francine. While in the placements
the department chose for her, Francine routinely ran away. The
department remained concerned that Francine was subject to
commercial sexual exploitation in its custody beginning when the
child was fourteen. The department was aware that Francine had
unexplained access to money, and that older men sent her money
through online accounts. While in the department's custody,
Francine repeatedly left the placement in which the department
placed her to meet men. The men provided her with money,
8 alcohol and drugs, and sometimes had sex with her. During one
of these encounters, she was forcibly raped.3
When on the run from her placements, Francine sometimes
returned to the mother's home. She kept in touch with the
mother, almost always contacting the mother when she went on the
run and sometimes informing the mother of her whereabouts.
After roughly eight months and seven placements, the
department decided that, employing a tactic known as "harm
reduction," it would place Francine with the mother because
Francine identified the mother's home as a place where she would
feel safe and not feel the need to run. Unfortunately, while in
the mother's care, Francine continued to run away. On one of
these occasions, the mother told Francine that she was not
welcome back in the home, and the child returned to the
3 The premise of the law's willingness to allow the Commonwealth to interfere with the constitutionally protected bonds of family is that it is necessary to do so in some circumstances to protect the child. See Care & Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. 52, 60 (1990). The Supreme Judicial Court recently recognized that "[o]nce the state assumes wardship of a child, the state owes the child, as part of that person's protected liberty interest, reasonable safety and minimally adequate care and treatment appropriate to the age and circumstances of the child." Gotay v. Creen, 495 Mass. 537, 547 (2024), quoting Tamas v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 603 F.3d 833, 846-847 (9th Cir. 2010). If the government is unable to protect a child, as it was unable to here, the removal of the child from a parent or parents who can do so even marginally better could raise serious constitutional questions.
9 department's care. After another four months and three
additional placements, the department again allowed Francine to
return to the mother's care. After one month with the mother,
Francine was arrested and taken into custody by the Department
of Youth Services, where she remained for at least some of the
course of the care and protection trial. When she ran, Francine
returned sooner if she was at the mother's, and as described
above, she remained in contact with the mother, who clearly
cared about her.
b. Analysis. This unusual set of circumstances provides
the backdrop to the appeals by Francine and the mother. We are
faced with a circumstance in which the department argues that
the mother is unfit to parent this child, and should therefore
lose custody of her, and yet also asserts that the mother offers
the best available physical placement for this child.
Francine argues that the department's inability to care for
her and its willingness in these circumstances to place her with
the mother means that the mother is not only fit, but that the
mother is the best possible caretaker for Francine. We do not
agree with Francine on this point.
The conclusion of the department that placement with the
mother was, at the time of trial, the best available placement
for the child, is well supported. Unfortunately, this does not
10 mean that the mother is, herself, fit. The judge's findings
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the mother is
unfit to provide adequate supervision, to meet Francine's
educational needs, to provide safe and stable housing, and to
care for Francine. See Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 59. The
inability of the department to protect or care for Francine
properly does not change that, so we are not in a position to
overturn the finding of unfitness.
At the same time, we conclude that the judge acted
appropriately in approving the department's formal goal of
"reunification" with the mother, rather than "adoption," and its
plan, at least as of the time of the trial, to place Francine
where she feels "safe and supported": with her mother. As the
judge noted, "While the Court does not find that this
constitutes a superior plan, it nonetheless finds that it is in
11 [Francine's] best interests under the circumstances present in
this case." In these circumstances, we think approval of this
plan was appropriate.
Judgment and decrees affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin, Hand & Smyth, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: May 16, 2025.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.