Reid, C. J.
Plaintiff brought his action against the 2 defendants to recover damages ■ for injuries to his person and to his automobile and loss of use of automobile, all occurring as the result of a collision between plaintiff’s automobile and an automobile owned by defendant Francis Nemecek and, Avith said defendant’s consent, driven by his son, defendant Otto Nemecek.
[617]*617From a verdict by tbe jury and judgment thereon for defendants, plaintiff appeals.
Consolidated with this suit for purposes of the trial by order of the court against plaintiff’s objection, was also the suit brought by plaintiff’s wife, Annette Card, against the same defendants for her personal injuries caused by the same accident.
The intersection of Jefferson avenue and Cherry street in Grand Rapids is controlled by an automatic overhead traffic signal which has a 60-second cycle showing green for 25 seconds on Cherry and 35 seconds on Jefferson, with an amber or caution light that shows for 3-J seconds as the light changes from green to red. The light was working properly on October 11, 1948. At about 5:20 p. m. of that day, the plaintiff Harold Card was driving his Packard automobile in an easterly direction on Cherry street approaching Jefferson. His wife Annette Card was sitting in the front seat with him. At that same time the defendant Otto Nemecek was driving a Chevrolet automobile, owned by his father defendant Francis Nemecek, in a southerly direction on Jefferson avenue approaching Cherry. The 2' cars continued to a collision in the intersection of these 2 streets, the impact being between the front end of the Nemecek vehicle and the center (or to the rear of the center) of the left side of the Card vehicle.
The condition of the traffic signal at the time of this accident is in sharp dispute. Plaintiff claims .and produced credible witnesses to prove that the traffic light was green in his favor as he entered the intersection. Defendants claim and ‘offered testimony to prove to the contrary that the traffic light was green in defendant’s favor as he entered the intersection. We cannot say that the testimony in favor of plaintiff is overwhelming and must accept [618]*618the verdict as establishing the facts so far as our decision is concerned.
Plaintiff claims erroneous the court’s order made before trial and against plaintiff’s objection, consolidating his case for trial with that of his wife against the same 2 defendants for her personal injuries, in the same accident. After the trial was had of the consolidated cases and verdict rendered, the court found that plaintiff Annette had been prejudiced by the consolidation, and the court set aside the verdict as to her, gave her a separate new trial and rendered judgment on the verdict against plaintiff Harold.
Defendants claim that the general powers granted courts are such as to include the right to order consolidation of 2 cases with different plaintiffs against the same 2 defendants for damages arising from the same collision.
Defendants cite and rely on decisions as to consolidation of cases, in Federal and State courts, where statutes differing from our statute are in effect.
Defendants do not claim that the statute, hereinafter quoted, gave the court any right to consolidate the 2 cases without consent of both plaintiffs.
While we have had occasion to note that in many instances, 2 cases with different plaintiffs arising out of the same collision have been consolidated by consent of the parties, still we have not determined that such consolidation may be ordered without the consent of the plaintiffs.
It is clear that the common law did not sanction the consolidation of actions by diverse plaintiffs without their consent. The legislature enacted a statute incorporated in the revised statutes of 1846, which (after successive amendments) was later, in' án amended form, incorporated as a part of the [619]*619judicature act of 1915, which part of the judicature act is as follows:
“The plaintiff may join in 1 action, at law or in equity, as many causes of action as he may have against the defendant, hut legal and equitable causes of action shall not be joined; but when there is more than 1 plaintiff, the causes of action joined must be' joint, and if there be more than 1 defendant, the liability must be one asserted against all of the material defendants, or sufficient grounds must appear for uniting the causes of action in order to promote the convenient administration of justice, or when several suits shall be commenced against joint and several debtors, in the same court, the plaintiff may, in any stage of the proceedings, consolidate them into 1 action. If it appear that any such causes of action cannot he conveniently disposed of together, the court may order separate trials, or whenever several suits shall he pending in the same court, hy the same plaintiff against the same defendant, for causes of action which may he joined, the court in which the same shall he prosecuted may, in its discretion, order the several suits to he consolidated into 1 action.” CL 1915, § 12309 (CL 1948, § 608.1 [Stat Ann § 27.591]). (Italics supplied.)
The words which are not italicized in the above .quotation from the statute all relate to what plaintiffs may do, while the words which are italicized contain a grant of authority to courts as to consolidation of cases. Impliedly, the legislature intended that the courts should go no further than such grant and the common law as thereby modified.
We. are not to extend the terms of such- statute beyond necessary inferences. The statute cannot !be extended by any reasonable inference to cover the consolidation in question in the instant case. It is ■not contended that the statute authorizes the consolidation order in the instant. case. Decisions in othef States 'and Federal courts where there is a [620]*620statute differing from ours, or no statute, as to consolidation, are not controlling.
In Bostrom v. Jennings, 326 Mich 146, a plaintiff husband sued in his individual capacity to recover for his own damages and as administrator of his deceased wife’s estate joined a cause of action to recover for damages for her personal injuries resulting in her death. In both-'the prevailing opinion at page 158 and the dissenting opinion at page 168, it was held that such 2 causes of action may- not be joined in 1 suit. Plaintiff in the Bostrom Case was required to present his different causes of action in 2 suits.
The Bostrom Case while not controlling the instant case, is authority for'-the proposition that plaintiff Card and his wife had no right to join' their separate causes of action in 1 suit.
Defendants in this case claim plaintiff was not shown to have been prejudiced by the consolidation, but plaintiff is not permitted to show the arguments of jurors over their verdict nor offer the affidavit (nor testimony) of a juror as to what influenced his mind to render the verdict. Confusion of mind on the part of 1 or more jurors is very often caused by added complexity of issues. Jurors can take a dislike to an added litigant. In this case plaintiff sought to recover from the defendants for damages for his personal injuries, secondly, for damages to his car and loss of the use of it, and jurors would naturally take a dislike to an -added third drive against the funds of defendants by the inclusion of the wife’s case for damages for personal injuries.
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Reid, C. J.
Plaintiff brought his action against the 2 defendants to recover damages ■ for injuries to his person and to his automobile and loss of use of automobile, all occurring as the result of a collision between plaintiff’s automobile and an automobile owned by defendant Francis Nemecek and, Avith said defendant’s consent, driven by his son, defendant Otto Nemecek.
[617]*617From a verdict by tbe jury and judgment thereon for defendants, plaintiff appeals.
Consolidated with this suit for purposes of the trial by order of the court against plaintiff’s objection, was also the suit brought by plaintiff’s wife, Annette Card, against the same defendants for her personal injuries caused by the same accident.
The intersection of Jefferson avenue and Cherry street in Grand Rapids is controlled by an automatic overhead traffic signal which has a 60-second cycle showing green for 25 seconds on Cherry and 35 seconds on Jefferson, with an amber or caution light that shows for 3-J seconds as the light changes from green to red. The light was working properly on October 11, 1948. At about 5:20 p. m. of that day, the plaintiff Harold Card was driving his Packard automobile in an easterly direction on Cherry street approaching Jefferson. His wife Annette Card was sitting in the front seat with him. At that same time the defendant Otto Nemecek was driving a Chevrolet automobile, owned by his father defendant Francis Nemecek, in a southerly direction on Jefferson avenue approaching Cherry. The 2' cars continued to a collision in the intersection of these 2 streets, the impact being between the front end of the Nemecek vehicle and the center (or to the rear of the center) of the left side of the Card vehicle.
The condition of the traffic signal at the time of this accident is in sharp dispute. Plaintiff claims .and produced credible witnesses to prove that the traffic light was green in his favor as he entered the intersection. Defendants claim and ‘offered testimony to prove to the contrary that the traffic light was green in defendant’s favor as he entered the intersection. We cannot say that the testimony in favor of plaintiff is overwhelming and must accept [618]*618the verdict as establishing the facts so far as our decision is concerned.
Plaintiff claims erroneous the court’s order made before trial and against plaintiff’s objection, consolidating his case for trial with that of his wife against the same 2 defendants for her personal injuries, in the same accident. After the trial was had of the consolidated cases and verdict rendered, the court found that plaintiff Annette had been prejudiced by the consolidation, and the court set aside the verdict as to her, gave her a separate new trial and rendered judgment on the verdict against plaintiff Harold.
Defendants claim that the general powers granted courts are such as to include the right to order consolidation of 2 cases with different plaintiffs against the same 2 defendants for damages arising from the same collision.
Defendants cite and rely on decisions as to consolidation of cases, in Federal and State courts, where statutes differing from our statute are in effect.
Defendants do not claim that the statute, hereinafter quoted, gave the court any right to consolidate the 2 cases without consent of both plaintiffs.
While we have had occasion to note that in many instances, 2 cases with different plaintiffs arising out of the same collision have been consolidated by consent of the parties, still we have not determined that such consolidation may be ordered without the consent of the plaintiffs.
It is clear that the common law did not sanction the consolidation of actions by diverse plaintiffs without their consent. The legislature enacted a statute incorporated in the revised statutes of 1846, which (after successive amendments) was later, in' án amended form, incorporated as a part of the [619]*619judicature act of 1915, which part of the judicature act is as follows:
“The plaintiff may join in 1 action, at law or in equity, as many causes of action as he may have against the defendant, hut legal and equitable causes of action shall not be joined; but when there is more than 1 plaintiff, the causes of action joined must be' joint, and if there be more than 1 defendant, the liability must be one asserted against all of the material defendants, or sufficient grounds must appear for uniting the causes of action in order to promote the convenient administration of justice, or when several suits shall be commenced against joint and several debtors, in the same court, the plaintiff may, in any stage of the proceedings, consolidate them into 1 action. If it appear that any such causes of action cannot he conveniently disposed of together, the court may order separate trials, or whenever several suits shall he pending in the same court, hy the same plaintiff against the same defendant, for causes of action which may he joined, the court in which the same shall he prosecuted may, in its discretion, order the several suits to he consolidated into 1 action.” CL 1915, § 12309 (CL 1948, § 608.1 [Stat Ann § 27.591]). (Italics supplied.)
The words which are not italicized in the above .quotation from the statute all relate to what plaintiffs may do, while the words which are italicized contain a grant of authority to courts as to consolidation of cases. Impliedly, the legislature intended that the courts should go no further than such grant and the common law as thereby modified.
We. are not to extend the terms of such- statute beyond necessary inferences. The statute cannot !be extended by any reasonable inference to cover the consolidation in question in the instant case. It is ■not contended that the statute authorizes the consolidation order in the instant. case. Decisions in othef States 'and Federal courts where there is a [620]*620statute differing from ours, or no statute, as to consolidation, are not controlling.
In Bostrom v. Jennings, 326 Mich 146, a plaintiff husband sued in his individual capacity to recover for his own damages and as administrator of his deceased wife’s estate joined a cause of action to recover for damages for her personal injuries resulting in her death. In both-'the prevailing opinion at page 158 and the dissenting opinion at page 168, it was held that such 2 causes of action may- not be joined in 1 suit. Plaintiff in the Bostrom Case was required to present his different causes of action in 2 suits.
The Bostrom Case while not controlling the instant case, is authority for'-the proposition that plaintiff Card and his wife had no right to join' their separate causes of action in 1 suit.
Defendants in this case claim plaintiff was not shown to have been prejudiced by the consolidation, but plaintiff is not permitted to show the arguments of jurors over their verdict nor offer the affidavit (nor testimony) of a juror as to what influenced his mind to render the verdict. Confusion of mind on the part of 1 or more jurors is very often caused by added complexity of issues. Jurors can take a dislike to an added litigant. In this case plaintiff sought to recover from the defendants for damages for his personal injuries, secondly, for damages to his car and loss of the use of it, and jurors would naturally take a dislike to an -added third drive against the funds of defendants by the inclusion of the wife’s case for damages for personal injuries. Jurors often regard the husband and wife as having but a common pocketbook.
A strict showing of prejudice' should not be required where the legislature over a century of successive enactments, has seen fit for,evidently sufficient reasons, not to grant authority to make the [621]*621consolidation made in this case. From the entire record in this case it is fairly to be inferred that plaintiff was prejudiced by the consolidation.
Plaintiff complains of the ruling of the court against plaintiff’s objection permitting defendant Francis Nemecek to testify that while the title to the automobile driven by his son, defendant Otto L. Nemecek, stood in his (the father’s) name, still the son Otto paid all the money for the automobile, has always had it in his, the son’s possession and that he, the father, was on his farm near Bast Jordan (possibly 170 miles away) at the time of the accident and that he, the father, knew nothing about it, until his son, “called us up and told us he had an accident.” Plaintiff objected to such testimony and the court ruled it immaterial but still permitted the testimony to be given.
The declaration alleged that the title stood in the father’s name and that the son (defendant Otto) was driving the automobile with his father’s consent at the time of the collision, which allegations were admitted by the answer. Defendants’ counsel admitted that the legal title stood in the father’s name and that the father was the owner as long as the title stood in his name. Defendants claim that 'they wanted to show by the father’s testimony that the son (defendant Otto) was not driving a borrowed car but the father’s ownership was expressly disclosed by the declaration and answer, and no claim had been made that the son Otto was driving a car borrowed from a third party.
There was no legitimate pui’pose whatsoever to be served by the father’s testimony above referred ¡to. It could only serve to instill into the minds of 'the jury the thought that it would be unjust to call |the father guilty under such circumstances.
Later the court erroneously charged the jury,
[622]*622“So far as the liability.of the defendants is concerned, if you should find for the plaintiffs or either 1 of the plaintiffs, the verdict should be against these 2 defendants, because so far as the -law is concerned, the law recognizes that the father who has-the title to this car was the owner of it at that time and that this young man was the driver of it.”
While this charge corrected a false impression that the son was the owner of the car, yet the court erroneously left out the essential element of the father’s consent to his son’s driving the car.
If the consent had been recited to the jury it would have removed the impression that the father had done nothing to make him responsible for the accident, and was merely technically responsible for the accident.
The court nowhere in his charge recited the admitted consent of the father, nor did he instruct the jury to disregard sympathy arising from admission of testimony that the father was many miles away from the scene of the accident, had not. paid for the car and never had it in his possession.
The testimony as to liability was in sharp dispute, thus making it the more intolerable to admit immaterial testimony tending in any appreciable degree to create sympathy for a party to the case. '
The admission of the testimony of defendant Francis Nemecek, above cited, was prejudicial error. In view of our decision, other claimed errors-need not be considered.
For the reasons above indicated of improper consolidation of cases and erroneous admission of prejudicial testimony, the verdict is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to set aside the verdict and judgment appealed from and grant plaintiff a new trial. Costs to plaintiff.
[623]*623Boyles, North, Dethmees, and Carr, JJ., concurred with Reid, C. J..