Capek v. Mendelson

143 F.R.D. 97, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14738, 1992 WL 239326
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 22, 1992
DocketCiv. A. No. 91-7396
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 143 F.R.D. 97 (Capek v. Mendelson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Capek v. Mendelson, 143 F.R.D. 97, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14738, 1992 WL 239326 (E.D. Pa. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

ROBRENO, District Judge.

Present before the court is the quintessential business dispute involving multiple parties, complex issues of fact and law, skilled advocates and a not insubstantial amount of money at stake. Not surprisingly, the case has spawned numerous discovery disputes leading to a veritable discovery gridlock. The question before the court is how best to resolve these disputes without undue burden on scarce judicial resources while affording the parties their rights to pretrial discovery.

After a review of the pleadings in this case, consideration of the discovery motions before the court, and a hearing, it is clear to the court that, left to their own devices, the litigants in this case will continue to squander not only their own time and money but will continue to call upon scarce judicial resources.1 In light of this [98]*98background and for the reasons set forth below, I will deny all the discovery motions now pending and, in their place, will enter a case management order (the “Case Management Order”) setting forth in detail the procedure which will govern future progress of the litigation.

A. Background

The underlying dispute involves allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the presentation, marketing, and sale of shares in the Kidder Street Corporation. The complaint, pleaded in nine counts and 71 paragraphs, implicates federal and state securities statutes and common law causes of action against the defendants. The defendants, in turn, have brought a third-party complaint against the alleged promoters of the sale. Recently, I allowed' the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint making the third-party defendants direct defendants in the case.2

The following discovery motions are presently before the court: Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions and production seeking to compel outstanding answers to interrogatories and production of documents and to require the individual defendant to submit to a medical examination to determine the validity of the defendant’s position that he is medically unable to be deposed; defendant’s motion for protective order seeking to limit the scope of certain subpoenas served by plaintiffs on defendants’ private counsel and accountant which request production of “[a]ll records, financial records, pleadings, documents, files or anything having to do with [individual defendant], his wife or any partnership, company, business or organization with which [individual defendant] or his wife were in any way involved ... ”; plaintiff’s motion for production and sanctions seeking enforcement of the Order of July 2,1992, entered by the Honorable Robert F. Kelly directing the taking of the individual defendant’s deposition3 and the production of certain documents within five days of the date of the Order.4 There are also outstanding, although not yet due, a set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents propounded by defendants upon plaintiffs. The parties also have quarrelled over the order in which depositions are to be taken, the place where the documents are to be produced and the cost for duplicating the documents to be produced.

Despite this flurry of motion practice activity, the litigants have so far accomplished little if anything by way of discovery. While the case was filed in November of 1991, no depositions have yet been taken. Also, while the defendants have apparently answered some of plaintiffs’ interrogatories and produced certain documents, the plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the answers and deem the document production to be inadequate.5 Each side blames the other for the lack of progress and asks the court to impose monetary sanctions against the non-complying party.

B. Discussion

Discovery practice has become the staple of contemporary litigation. Its central features and the early high hopes connected with its adoption were summarized by the Supreme Court as follows:

The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under [99]*99the prior federal practice, the pre-trial functions of notice-giving issue-formulation and fact-revelation were performed primarily and inadequately by the pleadings. Inquiry into the issues and the facts before trial was narrowly confined and was often cumbersome in method. The new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for trial. The various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 16, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues. Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500, 67 S.Ct. 385, 388, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). Sadly, these lofty objectives often have crashed upon the shoals of “hard ball” litigation turning the art of advocacy into trench warfare. See S.Rep. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20-22 (1990) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1990, pp. 6802, 6823-6825 (discovery abuse transforming litigation into war of attrition). Public and professional criticism of these practices now abounds.6 The results are not only delay and expense to the parties but also interference with “access to the courts, adjudication of cases on the merits, and the ability of the civil justice system to provide proper and timely judicial relief for aggrieved parties.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 471 (1978 & Supp.1992) (historical and statutory notes; congressional statement of findings).

In response to this problem Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) which mandates the early and on-going judicial management of the pretrial process including controlling the extent of and timing for discovery.7 Under the mandate, “[fjederal trial courts are now required, by statute, to implement techniques and strategies designed to dispose of cases in an efficient and inexpensive manner.” Schwarzkopf Technologies Corp. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 142 F.R.D. 420, 423 (D.Del.1992). This activist approach, however, must be tempered by “a sense of proportion.” See Report of the Advisory Group of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Appointed under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 at 81 (1991). “If a judge sets out to extirpate every bit of excessive discovery, the cost to the litigants, let alone to the court, would soon exceed any savings that could be achieved. Conferences in chambers and the motion practice that would inevitably result also involve billable hours, hours that may or may not move the litigation forward.” Id.

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Various v. Various
278 F.R.D. 126 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2011)
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911 F. Supp. 775 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1996)
Capek v. Mendelson
821 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1993)
Martin v. Cooper Plumbing & Heating, Inc.
145 F.R.D. 372 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1992)
Tarkett, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.
144 F.R.D. 282 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
143 F.R.D. 97, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14738, 1992 WL 239326, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/capek-v-mendelson-paed-1992.