Canuto v. Department of Justice

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 20, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-3708
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TERESITA A. CANUTO,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 25-cv-3708

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff Teresita A. Canuto, proceeding pro se, alleges that she was sexually assaulted

1,411 times by members of the U.S. Army and Navy. Am. Compl. at 3–4, ECF No. 3. Canuto

asserts that each time she moves apartments, members of the military break into her new residence

“on the first or second night;” place her and her family into “deep sleep or unconscious[ness];”

attack her; and then steal her “photo album[s], copies of life insurance policy, [and] paper birth

records” before leaving. Id. at 17–19. Canuto brings claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act

(“FTCA”) against the Department of Justice, alleging that its attorneys negligently failed to stop

the assaults. See id. at 20–22. Canuto previously filed a nearly identical FTCA lawsuit against

the Department of Justice, which a different court in this District dismissed for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction. See Canuto v. Dep’t of Just., No. 22-cv-3538, 2024 WL 519560 (D.D.C. Feb.

9, 2024).

Although “pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than other complaints,

even a pro se plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter

jurisdiction.” Carmichael v. Pompeo, 486 F. Supp. 3d 360, 366 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Curran

v. Holder, 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 3 (D.D.C. 2009)). Federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction

Page 1 of 4 over any claim that is “patently insubstantial,” such that it “present[s] no federal question suitable

for decision.” Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Best v. Kelly,

39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974) (“Over

the years this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims

. . . if they are . . . wholly insubstantial . . . . (cleaned up)). Claims qualify as “patently insubstantial”

if they rely on “any bizarre conspiracy theories.” Best, 39 F.3d at 330.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is premised on the bizarre theory that, over the course of

nine years, members of the military have conspired to break into every residence she has moved

into on her first or second night there to drug her and her family into deep sleep, sexually assault

her, and then steal “photo album[s], copies of life insurance policy, [and] paper birth records”

before leaving. Am. Compl. at 17–19. Plaintiff further alleges that this conspiracy has resulted in

her being sexually assaulted by members of the military 1,411 times. Id. at 3–4. The Amended

Complaint offers no evidence for these assertions, except for the allegation that she has mysterious

bruises and an STD, which had to have been caused by the alleged assaults because Canuto

“practice[s] clean living and does not smoke, does not drink and does not use drugs.” Am. Compl.

at 19. The allegations in the Amended Complaint are so “doubtful or questionable” that they

render Plaintiff’s claims patently insubstantial. Best, 39 F.3d at 330 (quoting Hagans, 415 U.S. at

536–37). The court will therefore dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction.

In the alternative, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because “the government’s

alleged negligence falls within the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims

Act,” to which the FTCA’s “waiver of sovereign immunity does not extend.” Canuto, 2024 WL

519560, at *2. The purported failure of government attorneys to prosecute Canuto’s alleged

Page 2 of 4 assailants goes “to the heart of the discretionary function exception.” Id.; see also Moore v. Valder,

65 F.3d 189, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Deciding whether to prosecute [is] quintessentially

discretionary.”). Because the “discretionary function exception is a barrier to subject matter

jurisdiction,” Loughlin v. United States, 393 F.3d 155, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2004), the court would

dismiss the Amended Complaint on this alternative basis even if Plaintiff’s claims were not

patently insubstantial.

Finally, even if the court had subject-matter jurisdiction, Plaintiffs’ claims would be barred

by res judicata. Because res judicata is a doctrine of judicial economy that “belongs to courts as

well as litigants,” courts may raise “the issue sua sponte.” Stanton v. D.C. Ct. of App., 127 F.3d

72, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Under the doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment on the merits” in a

prior suit bars the same parties or their privies “from relitigating issues that were or could have

been raised” in the earlier action. Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis in

original) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). Whether a claim could have been

raised turns on whether it involves the same “nucleus of facts” as the claim or claims brought in

the prior suit. Id. (quoting Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). A court in

this district has already dismissed FTCA claims against the Department of Justice for failure to

prosecute the alleged participants in the conspiracy against Canuto. See Canuto, 2024 WL 519560,

at *2. She alleges no new facts that would change that court’s legal analysis.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 3, is

DISMISSED. The Clerk of the Court shall close this case.

Page 3 of 4 Date: November 20, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

Page 4 of 4