SMITH, Presiding Judge.
A jury convicted Taurus DeShawn Cantrell of trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.1 The two counts merged and Cantrell was sentenced to twenty years, with ten to serve in confinement. Cantrell contends on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We view the evidence on appeal in the light most favorable to the verdict, and no longer presume the defendant is innocent. We do not weigh the evidence or decide the witnesses’ credibility, but only determine if the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions. Campbell v. State, 278 Ga. 839, 840-841 (1) (607 SE2d 565) (2005). We construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence most strongly in favor of the jury’s verdict. Id.
Viewed in that light, the evidence at trial established that agents of the Hall County Multi Agency Narcotics Squad (“MANS”) initiated an undercover drug buy with a confidential informant (“Cl”) who told them he had met a man who had agreed to sell him five ounces of crack cocaine that afternoon at a local grocery store. The Cl met Cantrell at the store, then drove to a nearby AutoZone store, where Cantrell soon joined him in his vehicle and remained for some time. After the Cl issued a prearranged signal to MANS indicating he had seen the cocaine, the first undercover officer arrived on the scene in an unmarked black pickup truck. The officer was wearing a bullet-proof vest over the outside of his shirt with the word “POLICE” on the front and back, a badge around his neck, as well as handcuffs and a weapon. When the officer emerged from his car and shouted, “Stop, stop police,” Cantrell “took off running.”
A foot chase ensued through an alleyway, over multiple chain link fences, and on a path behind a residential area. Cantrell surrendered when several uniformed officers and patrol cars converged on the area. The officer who first gave chase testified that he saw Cantrell throw a large bag down in the area where the contraband was recovered. The police found almost four ounces of cocaine in a yard adjacent to the route of the chase and less than forty yards from where Cantrell was apprehended. In a statement given to police after [652]*652his arrest, Cantrell admitted that he had “cocaine on him” before being chased by police officers.
Testifying in his own defense, Cantrell explained that he had met the Cl through his cousin, talked to him at the grocery store parking lot, and then met up with him at the AutoZone lot where Cantrell was waiting for his sister so he could help fix her car. Cantrell testified that he was panicked by the sudden appearance of a stranger with a gun running toward him and that he never heard any shouts for him to stop, never possessed or threw any cocaine, and surrendered as soon as he saw uniformed police. Cantrell denied receiving Miranda warnings or making a statement.
Cantrell’s counsel argued during closing that the State introduced no fingerprints, DNA tests, recordings, cell phone records, or testimony by the Cl that would support the officers’ version of events. Based on these facts, Cantrell’s counsel urged the jury to accept his client’s version of events.
The State responded by comparing the two accounts and asking the jury which was reasonable, which was supported by the evidence, and which completely hinged on the credibility of one person — the defendant — together with the alleged complete fabrication of the events in issue by three law enforcement officers. The State concluded with the following:
I almost am reluctant to even mention this, go into this, but I feel obligated to because of the testimony of the defendant and closing argument of Mr. Burroughs, how three career law enforcement officers are going to risk their careers by lying to you ladies and gentlemen in order to convict one person.
Last week — please don’t interpret this as an attempt to inflame your passions whatsoever. It may be a bad time to bring it up, but Hall County suffered a tragedy last week when an officer was killed in the line of duty. I attended his funeral. Horse-drawn carriage with a casket on it, 21-gun salute, bugle playing taps, killed in the line of duty, an officer who dedicated his life to protecting the citizens of this county, fighting crime. And I am offended when a defendant and a defense attorney accuses officers of being liars, being cheats, and making up statements of defendants and fabricating evidence.
We all have contact with officers at some point in our lives, maybe even daily. You’ve had a chance to observe every one of the officers that testified. You judge their credibility, [653]*653because in order to find the defendant guilty, you will have to call each of those officers liars.
Cantrell’s trial counsel testified at his motion for new trial hearing that in retrospect, he thought that the State’s argument regarding the funeral of an officer who was not involved in this case was “clearly improper.” He thought the argument was intended to inflame the jury’s passions and improperly bolstered the officers’ testimony. The State argued that the trial court must view the closing as a whole and that its closing argument contained no statements of personal belief but was simply a response to Cantrell’s argument that the officers’ testimony was not credible. The recent funeral was part of the community’s experiences and constituted an example of an officer who loved his job, dedicated his life to it, and would not lie.
In denying Cantrell’s motion for new trial, the trial court cited Crews v. State, 226 Ga. App. 232 (486 SE2d 61) (1997), in which the State in closing argument asked why two officers with twenty-five years of experience would risk their careers to lie about the evidence. In finding the argument was not improper, this court held that “[t]he probability or improbability of the police officer’s testimony, as well as his interest or want of interest and personal credibility, could also properly be considered by the jury.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 236 (5) (b).
Cantrell argues on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this portion of the State’s closing argument. To prevail on this claim, Cantrell must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency; that is, that a reasonable possibility exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s deficiency. Strickland, v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Garvin v. State, 283 Ga. App. 242, 244 (3) (641 SE2d 176) (2007). We will affirm a trial court’s determination on the effectiveness of counsel unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Ballard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 55, 59 (5) (601 SE2d 434) (2004).
“As a general rule, prosecutors are granted wide latitude in conducting closing argument, and defining the bounds of such argument is within the trial court’s discretion.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Arnold v. State, 249 Ga. App. 156, 162 (4) (545 SE2d 312) (2001). This “wide latitude” encompasses the prosecutor’s ability to argue inferences raised by the evidence. Wyatt v. State, 267 Ga. 860, 864 (2) (a) (485 SE2d 470) (1997).
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SMITH, Presiding Judge.
A jury convicted Taurus DeShawn Cantrell of trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.1 The two counts merged and Cantrell was sentenced to twenty years, with ten to serve in confinement. Cantrell contends on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We view the evidence on appeal in the light most favorable to the verdict, and no longer presume the defendant is innocent. We do not weigh the evidence or decide the witnesses’ credibility, but only determine if the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions. Campbell v. State, 278 Ga. 839, 840-841 (1) (607 SE2d 565) (2005). We construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence most strongly in favor of the jury’s verdict. Id.
Viewed in that light, the evidence at trial established that agents of the Hall County Multi Agency Narcotics Squad (“MANS”) initiated an undercover drug buy with a confidential informant (“Cl”) who told them he had met a man who had agreed to sell him five ounces of crack cocaine that afternoon at a local grocery store. The Cl met Cantrell at the store, then drove to a nearby AutoZone store, where Cantrell soon joined him in his vehicle and remained for some time. After the Cl issued a prearranged signal to MANS indicating he had seen the cocaine, the first undercover officer arrived on the scene in an unmarked black pickup truck. The officer was wearing a bullet-proof vest over the outside of his shirt with the word “POLICE” on the front and back, a badge around his neck, as well as handcuffs and a weapon. When the officer emerged from his car and shouted, “Stop, stop police,” Cantrell “took off running.”
A foot chase ensued through an alleyway, over multiple chain link fences, and on a path behind a residential area. Cantrell surrendered when several uniformed officers and patrol cars converged on the area. The officer who first gave chase testified that he saw Cantrell throw a large bag down in the area where the contraband was recovered. The police found almost four ounces of cocaine in a yard adjacent to the route of the chase and less than forty yards from where Cantrell was apprehended. In a statement given to police after [652]*652his arrest, Cantrell admitted that he had “cocaine on him” before being chased by police officers.
Testifying in his own defense, Cantrell explained that he had met the Cl through his cousin, talked to him at the grocery store parking lot, and then met up with him at the AutoZone lot where Cantrell was waiting for his sister so he could help fix her car. Cantrell testified that he was panicked by the sudden appearance of a stranger with a gun running toward him and that he never heard any shouts for him to stop, never possessed or threw any cocaine, and surrendered as soon as he saw uniformed police. Cantrell denied receiving Miranda warnings or making a statement.
Cantrell’s counsel argued during closing that the State introduced no fingerprints, DNA tests, recordings, cell phone records, or testimony by the Cl that would support the officers’ version of events. Based on these facts, Cantrell’s counsel urged the jury to accept his client’s version of events.
The State responded by comparing the two accounts and asking the jury which was reasonable, which was supported by the evidence, and which completely hinged on the credibility of one person — the defendant — together with the alleged complete fabrication of the events in issue by three law enforcement officers. The State concluded with the following:
I almost am reluctant to even mention this, go into this, but I feel obligated to because of the testimony of the defendant and closing argument of Mr. Burroughs, how three career law enforcement officers are going to risk their careers by lying to you ladies and gentlemen in order to convict one person.
Last week — please don’t interpret this as an attempt to inflame your passions whatsoever. It may be a bad time to bring it up, but Hall County suffered a tragedy last week when an officer was killed in the line of duty. I attended his funeral. Horse-drawn carriage with a casket on it, 21-gun salute, bugle playing taps, killed in the line of duty, an officer who dedicated his life to protecting the citizens of this county, fighting crime. And I am offended when a defendant and a defense attorney accuses officers of being liars, being cheats, and making up statements of defendants and fabricating evidence.
We all have contact with officers at some point in our lives, maybe even daily. You’ve had a chance to observe every one of the officers that testified. You judge their credibility, [653]*653because in order to find the defendant guilty, you will have to call each of those officers liars.
Cantrell’s trial counsel testified at his motion for new trial hearing that in retrospect, he thought that the State’s argument regarding the funeral of an officer who was not involved in this case was “clearly improper.” He thought the argument was intended to inflame the jury’s passions and improperly bolstered the officers’ testimony. The State argued that the trial court must view the closing as a whole and that its closing argument contained no statements of personal belief but was simply a response to Cantrell’s argument that the officers’ testimony was not credible. The recent funeral was part of the community’s experiences and constituted an example of an officer who loved his job, dedicated his life to it, and would not lie.
In denying Cantrell’s motion for new trial, the trial court cited Crews v. State, 226 Ga. App. 232 (486 SE2d 61) (1997), in which the State in closing argument asked why two officers with twenty-five years of experience would risk their careers to lie about the evidence. In finding the argument was not improper, this court held that “[t]he probability or improbability of the police officer’s testimony, as well as his interest or want of interest and personal credibility, could also properly be considered by the jury.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 236 (5) (b).
Cantrell argues on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this portion of the State’s closing argument. To prevail on this claim, Cantrell must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency; that is, that a reasonable possibility exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s deficiency. Strickland, v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Garvin v. State, 283 Ga. App. 242, 244 (3) (641 SE2d 176) (2007). We will affirm a trial court’s determination on the effectiveness of counsel unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Ballard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 55, 59 (5) (601 SE2d 434) (2004).
“As a general rule, prosecutors are granted wide latitude in conducting closing argument, and defining the bounds of such argument is within the trial court’s discretion.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Arnold v. State, 249 Ga. App. 156, 162 (4) (545 SE2d 312) (2001). This “wide latitude” encompasses the prosecutor’s ability to argue inferences raised by the evidence. Wyatt v. State, 267 Ga. 860, 864 (2) (a) (485 SE2d 470) (1997). These inferences are permissible even if they “are remote, illogical or unreasonable____The probability or improbability of the police officer’s testimony, as well as his interest or want of interest and personal credibility, could also [654]*654properly be considered by the jury. OCGA § 24-4-4.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Abernathy v. State, 192 Ga. App. 355, 356 (2) (385 SE2d 25) (1989).
The wide range of discussion permitted in closing argument, however, “does have its limitations, the first and foremost of which is the longstanding prohibition against the injection into the argument of extrinsic and prejudicial matters which have no basis in the evidence.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bell v. State, 263 Ga. 776, 777 (439 SE2d 480) (1994).
Argument of counsel is a valuable privilege, and may not be unduly restricted. On the other hand, the court must not allow such latitude as will defeat the justice of the cause, such as introducing prejudicial matters not in evidence. The dignity of the court, and the public interest in having its courts properly conducted, are involved.
(Citation omitted.) Id. In Bell, a drug trafficking case, the prosecutor in closing referred to both a serial rapist and an unrelated triple murder. Id. at 776-778. Because no evidence of murder or rape arose during the trial, or evidence from which rape and murder would be a reasonable inference, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction.
Our courts have a long tradition of reversing criminal convictions when the State injects extrinsic prejudicial evidence into its closing argument. “Counsel should not go outside the facts appearing in the case and the inferences to be deduced therefrom, and lug in extraneous matters as if they were a part of the case... .” Smith v. State, 74 Ga. App. 777, 792 (4) (41 SE2d 541) (1947). In 1913, this court reversed a conviction for the illegal sale of liquor because the prosecution argued,
“These blind tigers are running around all over the country, sending souls to hell, and have no respect for Jesus Christ or woman, and you ought to stop that kind of stuff. Everything you hear is people all over the country talking about blind tigers, and I ask you not to tolerate this stuff, and I ask you to help me convict them.”
Manning v. State, 13 Ga. App. 709 (79 SE 905) (1913). Because the argument was not a fair inference from the record, the defendant was granted a new trial. Id. at 710.
Our opinion in Moss v. State, 278 Ga. App. 221, 223 (1) (628 SE2d 648) (2006), does not require a different conclusion. Moss affirmed the wide latitude given during closing argument by allowing a reference to a local shooting in which a 14-year-old bystander was killed in an [655]*655unrelated crime. Id. We held that the crime was analogous, because both it and the crime at trial began with one person insulting another and ended in a gunfight. Id. The State’s reference to an officer slain in the line of duty, however, has no relation to the crime for which Cantrell was indicted.
Nor can we find that the failure to object was based on trial strategy. See Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884,886 (2) (572 SE2d 612) (2002) (upholding conviction where ineffective assistance alleged after prosecutor made “golden rule” comparison in closing but where defense counsel made a conscious decision not to object so as not to draw attention to comparison). Cantrell’s former counsel, in contrast, testified at his hearing for new trial that in retrospect, he should have objected to the prosecution’s closing argument, that it seemed “intended to inflame” the jury, and that “it just got by me.”
It was the injection of extrinsic prejudicial matters which is the issue here, and trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing constituted deficient representation. Rather than arguing the issue of police credibility, the prosecutor showcased his attendance at the funeral of an officer killed in the line of duty — a tragic and emotionally charged event that had no relation to the evidence admitted or the case at hand. Under these circumstances, the argument was improper and trial counsel was deficient.
Cantrell is not entitled to a new trial, however, unless he can demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance. Based upon the overwhelming evidence of Cantrell’s guilt, we find that he failed to meet his burden of proving a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for his counsel’s failure to object during the State’s closing argument. See generally Laredo v. State, 253 Ga. App. 155, 158 (2) (558 SE2d 742) (2002); Bunkley v. State, 278 Ga. App. 450, 454 (1) (a) (629 SE2d 112) (2006). In a statement given to police after his arrest, Cantrell admitted that he had “the cocaine on him” before being chased by police officers. A police officer saw him throw a large bag down while he was being chased, and a large amount of cocaine was recovered in this same location, less than 40 yards from where Cantrell surrendered.
Judgment affirmed. Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur.
Barnes, C. J., Miller and Adams, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.