Cantini v. Tillman

54 F. 969, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 1511
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina
DecidedMarch 1, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 54 F. 969 (Cantini v. Tillman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cantini v. Tillman, 54 F. 969, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 1511 (circtdsc 1893).

Opinion

SIMOUTOU, District Judge.

This is a proceeding to test the constitutionality of an act of the general assembly of South Carolina, commonly known as the “Dispensary Act.” The purpose of the act, as expressed in its title, is to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage within this state, except as herein provided. There can be no doubt that the purpose thus expressed in this act is lawful. The supreme court of the United States, in Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 91, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15, say:

“By the general concurrence of opinion of every civilized community, there are few sources of crime and misery tci society equal to the dramshop, where intoxicating liquors in small quantities, to be drunk at the time, are sold indiscriminately to all parties applying. The statistics of every state show a greater amount of crime and misery attributable to the use of ardent spirits obtained at these retail liquor saloons than to any other source. The sale of such liquors in this way has therefore been at all times, by the courts of every state, considered as the proper subject of legislative regulation. Not only may a license be exacted from the keeper of the saloon before a glass of his liquors can be thus disposed of, but restrictions may be imposed as to the class of persons to whom they may be sold, and the hours of the day, and the days of the week, on which the saloons may be opened. Their sale in that form may be absolutely prohibited. It is a question of public expediency and public morality, and not of federal law. The police power of the state is fully competent to regulate the business, to investigate the evils, or to suppress it entirely. There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail. It is not a privilege of a citizen of the state, or of a citizen of the United States. As it is a business attended with danger to the community, it may, as has been already said, be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of regulation rests in the discretion of the governing power. ⅝ * * It is a matter of legislative, wiE only.”

The act in question, in its first section, declares—

“That from and after the first day of July, A. D. 1S93, the manufacture, sale, barter, or exchange, or the keeping or offering for sale, barter, or exchange, within this state, of any spirituous, malt, vinous, fermented, or other intoxicating liquors, or any compound or mixtures thereof, by whatever name called, which will produce intoxication, by any person, business firm, corporation, or association, shah be regulated and conducted as provided in this act.”

As we have seen, this is within the police power of the state, and is a matter of legislative will only. The general scope and purpose of the act being thus lawful, are any of its provisions in violation of the constitution of the United States?

The proceedings allege that the act is in violation of, and repugnant to, section 10, art. 1, of the constitution of the United States. This section has numerous provisions. Those which are sought to be applied to this case are the clauses forbidding any state to pass any ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, and the provisions forbidding a state, without the consent of con[973]*973gress, to levy any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws. The prohibition as to ex post facto laws applies only to crimes. Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Railroad Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395; Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall. 172; Carpenter v. Com., 17 How. 456.

There is no provision of this act open to this objection. The question on the other provisions stated was made before the supreme court in Re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865. On 8th August, 1890, (26 St. p. 313,) congress had enacted—

“That nil fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any state or territory, or remaining therein, for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein, shall, upon arrival in such state or territory, ho subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state or territory, enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such state or territory, and shall not ho exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced in original packages or otherwise.”

The petitioner had imported liquor into the state of Kansas in separate packages, and sold a part of it in the original package. Tiie law of Kansas forbade the sale of liquors except for medical purposes, and forbade any one to sell for these purposes without first having procured a druggist’s permit therefor from the probate judge of the county. The supreme court, after an exhaustive argument, sustained the constitutionality of this act of congress, aud declared that under its operation the law of Kansas was not in conflict with section 10, art 1, of the constitution.

Another objection to the act is that it is in violation of section 2, art. 4, of the constitution of the United States, and of the fourteenth amendment, in that this act discriminates both as to persons and products. Section 2, art. 4, declares that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states; and the fourteenth amendment declares that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Hut we have seen that the supreme court, in Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 91, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15, has declared that there is no inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail. It is not a privilege of a citizen of a, state or of a citizen of the United States. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 659, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 296, the court say:

“Prior to tlio adoption of the fourteenth amendment, stale enactments regu-la áng or proliibiiing the traffic in intoxicating liquors raised no question under the constitution of the United Stares. Such legislation was left to the discretion oí the respective states, subject to no other limitations than those imposed by their own consiitutions, or by Hie general principles supposed to limit all legislative power. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129.

Referring to the contention that the right to sell intoxicating liquors was secured by the fourteenth amendment, that case says:

‘So far as such a right exists, it is not one of the rights growing out of citizenship of the United States.”

[974]*974In Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, it was said -that as a measure of police regulation, looking to the preservation of public morals, a state law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to any clause of the constitution of the United States. And in Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 97, it is declared to be no longer an open question. All these cases are quoted and reaffirmed in the case of Mugler v. Kansas. The rubric of that case is as follows:

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Bluebook (online)
54 F. 969, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 1511, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cantini-v-tillman-circtdsc-1893.