OPINION
NYE, Chief Justice.
This is a maritime personal injury case. Appellant, Jesus Lopez Cano, sued appel-lees, Gonzalez Trawlers, Inc., and its vessel, the M/V “Compadre”, to recover damages for injuries which he allegedly received while employed as a seaman on the M/V “Compadre”. Appellant sought recovery under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688 (1975),1 and under general maritime law, involving negligence and unseaworthiness. He also sought maintenance and cure benefits. The trial court entered judgment favorable to appellant for $9,197.53 in past unpaid cure benefits and for $9,060.00 in maintenance payments. The trial court did not award prejudgment interest. By a single point of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred in failing to submit a special issue question concerning whether he should be awarded prejudgment interest on damages recovered under the general maritime law.
By their first cross-point, appellees complain that the trial court erred in granting judgment against the M/V “Compadre”. By their second and third cross-points, ap-pellees complain that the trial court erred in granting maintenance and cure benefits. We modify the trial court’s judgment, and as modified, we affirm.
Appellant alleges the following: Appel-lee, Gonzalez Trawlers, Inc., employed appellant aboard its vessel, the M/V “Compa-dre”. On or about July 13, 1985, the vessel’s rigman ordered him to help put the anchor into the water. Appellant was holding the anchor with his hands and against his stomach when, without warning, the rigman let go of the rope and “it struck [appellant’s] stomach and other parts of the body with the anchor.”
Appellant filed suit alleging that his injuries resulted from either the negligence of Gonzales Trawlers, Inc., its master, agents, servants, and employees, and/or because of the vessel’s unseaworthy condition. After the conclusion of all of the evidence, the jury found that the vessel’s unseaworthiness, if any, was not a proximate cause of appellant’s injury. The jury further found that Gonzalez Trawlers’ negligence, if any, was not a contributing cause of appellant’s injury.
Appellant’s only complaint was that the trial court erred in failing to submit a special question concerning whether he should be awarded prejudgment interest on damages recovered under the general maritime law. Appellant submitted the following special question to the trial court: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that prejudgment interest should be paid Jesus Lopez Cano for any damages suffered in the past?” The trial court refused.
In a maritime personal injury case brought under the Jones Act, federal law (not state) governs the plaintiff’s entitlement to prejudgment interest. Wyatt v. Penrod Drilling Co., 735 F.2d 951, 955 (5th [240]*240Cir.1984);2 Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Narvaez, 728 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). In this connection, the Fifth Circuit has said that prejudgment interest is not recoverable in Jones Act cases tried to a jury. Simeon v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1435 (5th Cir.1988); Wyatt, 735 F.2d at 955; Barrios v. Louisiana Construction Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157, 1168 (5th Cir.1972); Sanford Brothers Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d 958, 972-73 (5th Cir.1969). A principal reason for this rule, especially in personal injury cases, is that a large damage award component generally is attributable to future lost wages and future medical expenses. Prejudgment interest is not necessary to compensate the plaintiff for losses which have not yet accrued at the time judgment is entered. See Barrios, 465 F.2d at 1168.
When a recovery is based on both a Jones Act claim and an unseaworthiness claim, the plaintiff is not entitled to any prejudgment interest “unless the jury apportions the damages between the Jones Act claim and the unseaworthiness claim.” McPhillamy v. Brown & Root, Inc., 810 F.2d 529, 531-32 (5th Cir.1987). If the jury apportions damages, the plaintiff could, in such a case, receive prejudgment interest on the unseaworthiness award, but not on the Jones Act award. McPhillamy, 810 F.2d at 532. Usually, a plaintiff who seeks recovery under the Jones Act and general maritime law for injuries sustained in a single accident has no basis for apportioning his damages between each theory. The trial court may exercise its discretion to award prejudgment interest only when a pure admiralty item of damage — such as unseaworthiness damages — can be isolated and thus identified in the verdict. Absent this determination, no prejudgment interest may be awarded. Domangue v. Penrod Drilling Co., 748 F.2d 999, 1001 n. 1 (5th Cir.1984).
In the instant case, the jury was asked, “Was the unseaworthiness, if any, of the Compadre a proximate cause of Mr. Cano’s [appellant’s] injury?” The jury answered “no”. Therefore, no damage award was made under the general maritime law, and appellant’s recovery of damages was based solely upon the Jones Act. Under these circumstances, federal law does not provide for an award of prejudgment interest. Wyatt, 735 F.2d at 955; Narvaez, 728 S.W.2d at 926.
A maritime personal injury plaintiff may recover prejudgment interest on his award for maintenance and cure. Turner v. Inland Tugs Co., 689 F.Supp. 612, 616 (E.D.La.1988). When the maritime plaintiff seeks maintenance and cure in a jury-tried case, his entitlement to prejudgment interest is a factual question to be submitted to the jury. See Morales v. Garijak, Inc., 829 F.2d 1355, 1361 (5th Cir.1987) (The appellate court held that the trial court lacked authority to award prejudgment interest to a seaman found to be entitled to maintenance and cure where a factual question of entitlement to such interest was not submitted to the jury.). In such a situation, a trial court is required to submit a relevant special question if any evidence exists to support submission. Tio Mario, Inc. v. Matos, 778 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). In the instant case, the complete statement of facts was not filed with this court. Thus, we cannot determine if there was any evidence existing to support the submission of appellant’s special question. We hold that the trial court did not err in failing to submit appellant’s special question to the jury.
By their first cross-point, appellees complain that the trial court erred in granting judgment against the M/V “Compadre” because it was not served. Appellant sued Gonzalez Trawlers, Inc., and the M/V “Compadre”. The trial court’s “FINAL [241]
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OPINION
NYE, Chief Justice.
This is a maritime personal injury case. Appellant, Jesus Lopez Cano, sued appel-lees, Gonzalez Trawlers, Inc., and its vessel, the M/V “Compadre”, to recover damages for injuries which he allegedly received while employed as a seaman on the M/V “Compadre”. Appellant sought recovery under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688 (1975),1 and under general maritime law, involving negligence and unseaworthiness. He also sought maintenance and cure benefits. The trial court entered judgment favorable to appellant for $9,197.53 in past unpaid cure benefits and for $9,060.00 in maintenance payments. The trial court did not award prejudgment interest. By a single point of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred in failing to submit a special issue question concerning whether he should be awarded prejudgment interest on damages recovered under the general maritime law.
By their first cross-point, appellees complain that the trial court erred in granting judgment against the M/V “Compadre”. By their second and third cross-points, ap-pellees complain that the trial court erred in granting maintenance and cure benefits. We modify the trial court’s judgment, and as modified, we affirm.
Appellant alleges the following: Appel-lee, Gonzalez Trawlers, Inc., employed appellant aboard its vessel, the M/V “Compa-dre”. On or about July 13, 1985, the vessel’s rigman ordered him to help put the anchor into the water. Appellant was holding the anchor with his hands and against his stomach when, without warning, the rigman let go of the rope and “it struck [appellant’s] stomach and other parts of the body with the anchor.”
Appellant filed suit alleging that his injuries resulted from either the negligence of Gonzales Trawlers, Inc., its master, agents, servants, and employees, and/or because of the vessel’s unseaworthy condition. After the conclusion of all of the evidence, the jury found that the vessel’s unseaworthiness, if any, was not a proximate cause of appellant’s injury. The jury further found that Gonzalez Trawlers’ negligence, if any, was not a contributing cause of appellant’s injury.
Appellant’s only complaint was that the trial court erred in failing to submit a special question concerning whether he should be awarded prejudgment interest on damages recovered under the general maritime law. Appellant submitted the following special question to the trial court: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that prejudgment interest should be paid Jesus Lopez Cano for any damages suffered in the past?” The trial court refused.
In a maritime personal injury case brought under the Jones Act, federal law (not state) governs the plaintiff’s entitlement to prejudgment interest. Wyatt v. Penrod Drilling Co., 735 F.2d 951, 955 (5th [240]*240Cir.1984);2 Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Narvaez, 728 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). In this connection, the Fifth Circuit has said that prejudgment interest is not recoverable in Jones Act cases tried to a jury. Simeon v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1435 (5th Cir.1988); Wyatt, 735 F.2d at 955; Barrios v. Louisiana Construction Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157, 1168 (5th Cir.1972); Sanford Brothers Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d 958, 972-73 (5th Cir.1969). A principal reason for this rule, especially in personal injury cases, is that a large damage award component generally is attributable to future lost wages and future medical expenses. Prejudgment interest is not necessary to compensate the plaintiff for losses which have not yet accrued at the time judgment is entered. See Barrios, 465 F.2d at 1168.
When a recovery is based on both a Jones Act claim and an unseaworthiness claim, the plaintiff is not entitled to any prejudgment interest “unless the jury apportions the damages between the Jones Act claim and the unseaworthiness claim.” McPhillamy v. Brown & Root, Inc., 810 F.2d 529, 531-32 (5th Cir.1987). If the jury apportions damages, the plaintiff could, in such a case, receive prejudgment interest on the unseaworthiness award, but not on the Jones Act award. McPhillamy, 810 F.2d at 532. Usually, a plaintiff who seeks recovery under the Jones Act and general maritime law for injuries sustained in a single accident has no basis for apportioning his damages between each theory. The trial court may exercise its discretion to award prejudgment interest only when a pure admiralty item of damage — such as unseaworthiness damages — can be isolated and thus identified in the verdict. Absent this determination, no prejudgment interest may be awarded. Domangue v. Penrod Drilling Co., 748 F.2d 999, 1001 n. 1 (5th Cir.1984).
In the instant case, the jury was asked, “Was the unseaworthiness, if any, of the Compadre a proximate cause of Mr. Cano’s [appellant’s] injury?” The jury answered “no”. Therefore, no damage award was made under the general maritime law, and appellant’s recovery of damages was based solely upon the Jones Act. Under these circumstances, federal law does not provide for an award of prejudgment interest. Wyatt, 735 F.2d at 955; Narvaez, 728 S.W.2d at 926.
A maritime personal injury plaintiff may recover prejudgment interest on his award for maintenance and cure. Turner v. Inland Tugs Co., 689 F.Supp. 612, 616 (E.D.La.1988). When the maritime plaintiff seeks maintenance and cure in a jury-tried case, his entitlement to prejudgment interest is a factual question to be submitted to the jury. See Morales v. Garijak, Inc., 829 F.2d 1355, 1361 (5th Cir.1987) (The appellate court held that the trial court lacked authority to award prejudgment interest to a seaman found to be entitled to maintenance and cure where a factual question of entitlement to such interest was not submitted to the jury.). In such a situation, a trial court is required to submit a relevant special question if any evidence exists to support submission. Tio Mario, Inc. v. Matos, 778 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). In the instant case, the complete statement of facts was not filed with this court. Thus, we cannot determine if there was any evidence existing to support the submission of appellant’s special question. We hold that the trial court did not err in failing to submit appellant’s special question to the jury.
By their first cross-point, appellees complain that the trial court erred in granting judgment against the M/V “Compadre” because it was not served. Appellant sued Gonzalez Trawlers, Inc., and the M/V “Compadre”. The trial court’s “FINAL [241]*241JUDGMENT” indicates that appellant is entitled to recover damages against Gonzalez Trawlers, Inc., and the M/V “Compa-dre”.
Although this point is not raised in its cross-point, we must address a jurisdictional defect. A seaman may sue a vessel in rem to recover maintenance and cure. Baker v. Raymond International, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 185 (5th Cir.1981). The Fifth Circuit has held that a maritime action brought against a vessel in rem falls within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. Durden v. Exxon Corp., 803 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir.1986); T.N.T. Marine Service, Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847, 104 S.Ct. 151, 78 L.Ed.2d 141 (1983); Powell v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 644 F.2d 1063, 1065 n. 3 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 972, 102 S.Ct. 521, 70 L.Ed.2d 391 (1981). Consequently, a cause of action against a vessel in rem does not exist in state court. The cross-point is sustained. The trial court’s judgment is modified to delete appellant’s purported recovery damages from the M/V “Compa-dre”. Tex.R.App.P. 80(b)(2).
By their second cross-point, appel-lees complain that the trial court erred when it rendered judgment granting maintenance and cure benefits because appellant failed to secure an affirmative finding to a special issue which inquired whether he injured his back while in the vessel’s service. By their third cross-point, appel-lees complain that appellant did not submit special questions concerning the amounts of maintenance and cure benefits which he was entitled to receive. Tex.R.Civ.P. 278 (emphasis ours) provides, in pertinent part:
Failure to submit a question shall not be deemed a ground for reversal of the judgment, unless its submission, in substantially correct wording, has been requested in writing and tendered by the party complaining of the judgment; provided, however, that objection to such failure shall suffice in such respect if the question is one relied upon by the opposing party.
According to rule 278, appellees, prior to the submission of the charge, had the burden to lodge an objection to appellant’s failure to submit these special questions. No record of the charge hearing was brought forward. A ruling is also required to preserve error. See Tex.R.App.P. 52(a). Therefore, nothing is preserved for our review.
The trial court’s judgment is modified to delete appellant’s entitlement to recover damages against the M/V “Compadre”. As modified, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.