Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States

739 F.3d 1204, 2014 WL 104037, 113 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 492, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 605
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 13, 2014
Docket11-17879
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 739 F.3d 1204 (Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States, 739 F.3d 1204, 2014 WL 104037, 113 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 492, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 605 (9th Cir. 2014).

Opinion

OPINION

THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we examine some of the tax consequences arising from the sale of the Chronicle Publishing Company and, specifically, whether the Internal Revenue Service’s proposed adjustment of certain partnership tax items was time barred. Although the ultimate issue is relatively straightforward, both the back story and the legal framework are somewhat complex, requiring us to delve deep in the heart of taxes.

I

The storied Chronicle Publishing Company was founded in the mid-1800s in San Francisco by teenage brothers Charles and M.H. de Young with a borrowed $20 gold piece. Their first venture, the Daily Dramatic Chronicle, began with a small circulation, but its readership quickly tripled when it provided the only breaking news accounts of the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. It was rechristened as the Morning Chronicle and ultimately the San Francisco Chronicle. Within a few decades, it became the largest circulation newspaper on the West Coast. 1

After the death of Charles de Young in 1880, M.H. de Young assumed control of the paper, incorporated it as the Chronicle Publishing Company (“Chronicle Publishing”) in 1906, and ran the enterprise until his death in 1925. He left the newspaper assets in an irrevocable trust that would terminate on the death of all five of his children. From M.H. de Young’s death until the early 1990s, a family member remained at the helm of the media empire. Over the course of time, Chronicle Publishing expanded its operations, acquiring a television station along with other properties and forming a book publishing company.

The Chronicle was not the only media game in town. Mining entrepreneur George Hearst acquired the rival San Francisco Examiner in 1880 and turned its management over to his son William Randolph Hearst seven years later, when the elder Hearst became a United States Senator. Over the next century, the Examiner and Chronicle engaged in a fierce competition for readers. 2 With both pa *1207 pers experiencing financial challenges in the early 1960s, the Examiner and the Chronicle entered into a joint operating and profit sharing agreement in 1965. The joint operating agreement also granted Hearst the right of first refusal if Chronicle Publishing were put up for sale. Reilly v. Hearst Corp., 107 F.Supp.2d 1192-99 (N.D.Cal.2000).

When M.H. de Young’s last child died in 1988 and the irrevocable trust dissolved, Chronicle Publishing elected to be treated as a Delaware Subchapter S corporation. Companies generally take such actions to avoid the double taxation attendant to “C” corporations, where taxes are assessed on both corporations and shareholders. The Subchapter S corporate structure is often employed by small, family-held businesses. However, to discourage misuse of the Sub-chapter S vehicle, Congress provided that Subchapter S corporations would be subject to the normal double taxation if the corporation were sold within ten years of its creation. Estate of Litchfield v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1079, at *2 (T.C.2009) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1874).

In the late 1990s, amidst deteriorating family relationships and financial challenges, and after the ten-year Subchapter S waiting period expired, the de Young heirs decided to sell most of the assets of Chronicle Publishing to the rival Hearst Corporation and distribute the assets among the heirs according to their ownership percentages. The Chronicle was to continue as a morning paper, and the Examiner was sold to a third party.

In its discussions of the sale, Chronicle Publishing’s Board of Directors realized the possibility of future liability arising from a variety of potential issues, such as environmental problems, contractual disputes, and the risk that Chronicle Publishing might lose its Subchapter S status. Thus, the Directors prepared a recontribution agreement, which provided that the shareholders would contribute on a pro rata basis if there were future Chronicle Publishing liabilities. Each shareholder was required to execute the recontribution agreement as a condition of receiving a distribution of proceeds from the Chronicle Publishing sale.

Our case involves one group of de Young heirs, specifically Conseulo Martin (M.H. de Young’s granddaughter) and her five children (“the Martin heirs”). The Martin heirs owned 16.67% of the shares of Chronicle Publishing, either outright or through fourteen family trusts (“the Martin Family Trusts” or “trusts”). Some of the trusts had existed since the 1980s; others were created just before the Chronicle Publishing sale.

The Martin heirs sought advice on how to minimize the tax consequences of the proposed Chronicle Publishing sale and to protect themselves against future liabilities posed by the recontribution agreement. After consulting with several tax specialists, the Martin heirs decided to implement what the IRS now claims was a “Son of BOSS” tax shelter. 3 Although there are a number of variants, a “Son of BOSS” tax scheme generally involves a “series of contrived steps in a partnership interest to generate artificial tax losses designed to offset income from other transactions.” Nevada Partners Fund, L.L.C. ex rel. Sapphire II, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. I.R.S., 720 F.3d 594, 604 (5th Cir.2013). Assets encumbered by artificial liabilities are transferred into a partnership with the goal of increasing basis in the partnership. The net result is that the artificial loss offsets the taxable gain.

*1208 Thus, acting on tax advice, the Martin Family Trusts formed a tiered partnership structure, meaning that the trusts served as partners of an upper tier of partnerships that owned interests in a lower tier partnership, and then engaged in a short term hedging strategy using option contracts. There were three parts to the structure: (a) the fourteen Martin Family Trusts; (b) an upper partnership tier, which included multiple partnerships; and (c) a single, lower tier partnership. At the top of the structure were the fourteen Martin Family Trusts, which were the ultimate partners of the two tiers of partnerships below.

The upper partnership tier consisted of three partnerships, the most relevant of which is First Ship, LLC (“First Ship”). The fourteen Martin Family Trusts were the First Ship partners and 100% owners. After the Chronicle Publishing sale, the trusts contributed certain of the sale assets to First Ship. The other two upper-tier partnerships (the “minority partnerships”), were Fourth Ship, LLC (“Fourth Ship”) and LMGA Holdings, Inc. (“LMGA”).

The lower tier consisted solely of First Ship 2000-A, LLC (“2000-A”). First Ship, Fourth Ship, and LMGA were the three partners of 2000-A. First Ship owned 77.03 % of 2000-A, with Fourth Ship and LMGA owning minority partnership shares.

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739 F.3d 1204, 2014 WL 104037, 113 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 492, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 605, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/candyce-martin-1999-irrevocable-trust-v-united-states-ca9-2014.