1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Candace Kallen, et al., No. CV-25-00074-TUC-RCC
10 Appellants, ORDER
11 v.
12 United States Trustees Office,
13 Appellee. 14 15 Appellants Candace Kallen and My Arizona Lawyers, LLC (collectively 16 “Appellants” or “Firm”) appeal from a February 3, 2025 Order from the United States 17 Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona (“Bankruptcy Court”). Appellants filed an 18 Opening Brief on May 23, 2025 (Doc. 13), Appellee United States Trustee filed a Response 19 on June 27, 2025 (Doc. 17), and Appellants filed a Reply on July 7, 2025 (Doc. 20). Oral 20 argument was held on December 8, 2025. For the following reasons, the Court will affirm 21 the Bankruptcy Court’s February 3, 2025 Order. 22 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 23 Kallen is the sole owner of My Arizona Lawyers. (Doc. 18 at 153.) Appellants’ 24 practice covers multiple areas of law, including family, criminal, estate planning, and 25 personal injury. (Id.) Appellants’ bankruptcy practice is predominantly comprised of 26 Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases. (Id.) EZLegal, LLC (“EZLegal”) is a third-party financing 27 firm owned by Katherine Keisel. (Doc. 13 at 10.) EZLegal lends money for legal fees. (Id.) 28 /// 1 a. The Fee Sharing Arrangement 2 The business agreement between Appellants and EZLegal began around April 2021. 3 (Doc. 18 at 154.) EZLegal would finance bankruptcy cases for Appellants’ debtor-clients 4 who were unable to pay Appellants’ fee. (Doc. 13 at 10.) The parties acknowledge that 5 none of the terms of their business agreement, including the fee sharing arrangement, were 6 in writing. (See Doc. 19 at 286.) The fee sharing arrangement had three different iterations, 7 each with slight differences. (Doc. 13 at 11.) 8 The first iteration of the fee sharing arrangement was implemented from 9 approximately April 2021 to October 2022. (Doc. 19 at 286.) EZLegal advanced 75% of 10 the $3,000 Attorney Flat Fee to the Firm and, in exchange, EZLegal had the “right to collect 11 and retain the full Attorney Flat Fee from such debtor-clients.” (Id. at 287.) EZLegal also 12 had the option to return defaulted debtor accounts to the Firm. (Id.) 13 The second iteration of the fee sharing arrangement began around October 2022. 14 (Id.) This version was a verbal modification where EZLegal paid the Firm 62% of the $3,000 Attorney Flat Fee and, in exchange, EZLegal had the right to collect and retain the 15 full Attorney Flat Fee from debtor-clients. (Doc. 13 at 11.) EZLegal stopped returning 16 defaulted debtor-client accounts. (Doc. 19 at 287.) EZLegal also retained 38% of the 17 Attorney Flat Fee. (Id. at 287–88.) 18 The third iteration of the fee sharing agreement began in March 2023 and continued 19 until the Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) was issued (id.), after which Kallen terminated the 20 entire business relationship with EZLegal (Doc. 18 at 58). Here, EZLegal and Appellants 21 continued their 62% / 38% fee sharing arrangement. (Doc. 19 at 288.) However, EZLegal 22 began requiring debtor-clients to execute the Promises to Pay form. (Id.) This made debtor- 23 clients directly bound to EZLegal for the full amount of the Attorney Flat Fee. (Id.) The 24 Promises to Pay stated that debtor-clients were borrowing funds directly from EZLegal, 25 were required to pay the Attorney Flat Fee, and were also obligated to repay the principal 26 balance. (Id.) 27 b. The Retention Agreements and Promises to Pay 28 Under the third iteration, there were three documents debtor-clients were required 1 to sign before retaining Appellants for their services: the Pre- and Post-Petition Retention 2 Agreements and the Promises to Pay. The Pre-Petition Retention Agreement gave debtor- 3 clients two options: (1) to pay $2,500 upfront for filing a bankruptcy petition, and to retain 4 Appellants for after-filing services; or (2) to pay $3,000 later and the Firm would represent 5 the debtor-client for pre-petition filing and services, but would only continue to assist with 6 after-filing services upon the signing of the Post-Petition Retention Agreement. (Doc. 18 7 at 25.) The Retention Agreements both stated that any additional work would be at the 8 Appellants’ discretion at a rate of $300 per hour, plus $150 per hour for paralegal time. (Id. 9 at 25, 28.) Debtor-clients would also have to pay a flat fee of $350 per item for 10 Reaffirmations. (Id.) The Retention Agreements also stated that all payments would be 11 made to Appellants, who would then pay the lender, EZLegal. (Id. at 29, 33.) The Post- 12 Petition Retention Agreement also stated that debtor-clients would face a 19.99% annual 13 interest rate in the event of a default. (Id. at 36.) If the debtor-clients did not sign the Post- 14 Petition Retention Agreement, they could either represent themselves or hire another attorney. (Id. at 25, 32.) 15 Debtor-clients were told that they were required to sign the Promises to Pay for 16 continued post-petition representation. (Doc. 19 at 288.) The Promises to Pay allowed 17 EZLegal to recover the “full amount of the Attorney Flat Fee.” (Doc. 13 at 13.) The 18 Promises to Pay provided that the debtor-clients would borrow the funds from EZLegal to 19 cover the $3,000 Attorney Flat Fee. (Doc. 18 at 38.) Debtor-clients were then directly 20 obligated to repay EZLegal the principal balance in 12 monthly installments at 0% interest. 21 (See Doc. 18 at 38; see also Doc. 19 at 288.) The fee sharing arrangement was not stated 22 in any of the Retention Agreements. (Doc. 19 at 299.) The Promises to Pay also featured 23 an astounding 300% annual interest rate “or the maximum rate allowed by law” in the event 24 of a default. (Doc. 18 at 40.) The Promises to Pay did not disclose that Appellants were 25 accepting $1,860 (62%) in full satisfaction of the Attorney Flat Fee owed or that EZLegal 26 would retain $1,149 (38%) of the $3,000 Attorney Flat Fee. (See id.) 27 c. The Order to Show Cause 28 This Appeal arose from a hearing held on December 12, 2023, regarding Kallen’s 1 Attorney Disclosures in one of her debtor-client’s petitions. (Doc. 13 at 9.) When asked 2 about whether she communicated with most of her debtor-clients, Kallen tentatively 3 responded that she does regarding the specifics of their cases, but she does not advise them 4 about the content or terms of the Retention Agreements. (Doc. 18 at 12.) She continued 5 that if they had questions, they would have to reach out to outside counsel. (Id.) Kallen 6 confirmed that she and “staff in her office” drafted the Retention Agreements (id. at 10), 7 that additional work would cost $300 per hour (id. at 13–14), that the debtor-clients became 8 directly obligated to EZLegal (id. at 14–18), and that there was a high default interest rate 9 of 300% in the Promises to Pay (id. at 19). On April 16, 2024, Judge Brenda M. Whinery 10 issued the OSC, which required Appellants to show cause as to why the Bankruptcy Court 11 should not: (1) void all Post-Petition Retention Agreements before it “on the basis that they 12 violate the Bankruptcy Code and the Local Rules for the United States Bankruptcy Court 13 for the District of Arizona”; (2) order the disgorgement of all fees paid pursuant to or 14 otherwise attributable to the Post-Petition Retention Agreements; and/or (3) bar Appellants from practicing before the Bankruptcy Court “given what appear to be extensive violations 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, and given the structure and conflicts of interest inherent to her 16 Firm’s financing arrangement with EZ Legal Fees.” (Id. at 49.) The OSC further 17 established that this would be a “miscellaneous proceeding.” (Id.) 18 Appellants responded to the OSC on May 8, 2024. (Doc. 19 at 333.) In it, Appellants 19 noted that they were no longer working with EZLegal or any other third-party lender. (Doc. 20 18 at 58.) Appellants contended that they received the full $3,000 Attorney Flat Fee directly 21 from EZLegal, with a net of $2,662 after paying the filing fee. (Id. at 59.) Appellants did 22 not seek reimbursement for the filing fee. (Id.) Appellants continued that they were not 23 privy to the interactions between their debtor-clients and EZLegal, and that they performed 24 all agreed-upon services reasonably and diligently. (Id. at 59, 60.) Further, Appellants 25 argued that there was “no contractual agreement between MyAZ and EZLegal,” and that 26 they did not intentionally seek to violate the Bankruptcy Code. (Id. at 60.) 27 There were eight hearings in total related to this OSC, four of which will be detailed 28 below. (See Doc. 19 at 334, 336–37, 339, 341–44.) Prior to the first hearing, Judge Whinery 1 issued a similar OSC against another attorney, Ruth Ann Ambs, for her financing 2 arrangements with EZLegal and her referral arrangement with Want a Fresh Start, LLC. 3 (Id. at 8, n. 13.) In the first OSC hearing on May 15, 2024, Judge Whinery asked whether 4 Appellants used the referral services of Want a Fresh Start, owned by Daniel Richter, 5 Katherine Kiesel’s husband. (Doc. 18 at 65–66.) Appellants’ counsel, Randy Nussbaum, 6 indicated that Appellants had no relationship with the entity or Richter. (Id.) 7 The U.S. Trustee noted two concerns in the hearing. The first was that Kallen had 8 been subject to OSCs in other bankruptcy matters before Judge Daniel P. Collins for not 9 filing motions on behalf of her clients, which included the 38 cases listed in the OSC issued 10 by Judge Whinery. (Id. at 69–70.) The second was that many of the debtor-clients had 11 “negative disposable income” and did not “appear to have the ability to make these post- 12 petition payments” that were required under the Post-Petition Retention Agreements. (Id. 13 at 70.) The Bankruptcy Court ordered Appellants to disclose all documents related to any 14 financing agreements for cases that were financed by EZLegal between May 15, 2022, to May 15, 2024 (“Lookback Period”). (Id. at 72; Doc. 19 at 280.) 15 Next, in the June 10, 2024 hearing, Appellants’ counsel Nussbaum stated that the 16 fee sharing arrangement was “different than what is disclosed in the pleadings,” and that 17 the case lists filed by Appellants contained inconsistencies and discrepancies. (Doc. 18 at 18 107–08, 144–45.) This was the first instance of misrepresentation to the Bankruptcy Court. 19 There were discrepancies between the case list provided by Appellants and EZLegal’s case 20 list. (Id. at 145.) There were also gaps of missing cases from May 15 to May 31, 2022, and 21 January 11 to January 17, 2024. (Id. at 114.) The parties revealed in this hearing that there 22 was a 62% / 38% fee sharing arrangement between EZLegal and Appellants. (Id. at 108, 23 110.) The parties also confirmed that there were no written versions of this arrangement. 24 (Id. at 112–13.) The Bankruptcy Court then ordered Appellants to provide the Retention 25 Agreements for all cases filed within the Lookback Period. (Id. at 114.) The Court also 26 imposed interim sanctions, which prohibited Appellants from filing any new Chapter 7 27 Bankruptcy cases in the District of Arizona, unless (1) Appellants obtained wet signatures; 28 (2) Appellants paid the fee in full prior to the filing of the petition or the Firm financed 1 without an outside lender; (3) the fees were less than $1,860 per case; and (4) Appellants 2 fully complied with a Stipulated Order signed by Judge Collins. (Id. at 147.) 3 However, the Bankruptcy Court discovered in a July 23, 2024 hearing that two 4 attorneys who were still associated with the Firm had created a new law firm by the name 5 of Atlas Law just three days after the Court imposed its restrictions. (Id. at 161, 163–64, 6 203.) In addition, neither party had supplied the Bankruptcy Court with the necessary 7 documentation, such as a fully amended case list. (See id. at 170–71, 203.) The Bankruptcy 8 Court noted that it was not the Court’s responsibility to figure out how many cases were 9 within the Lookback period. (Id. at 171.) Although EZLegal and the U.S. Trustee had 10 reached a settlement agreement in this miscellaneous proceeding, because of the 11 Bankruptcy Court’s concern about compliance, it stated it would not consider any proposed 12 settlements unless the parties filed a certification of compliance with the June 10, 2024 13 Order. (Id. at 168, 203.) The Bankruptcy Court reimposed its original sanction prohibiting 14 Appellants from filing any Chapter 7 Bankruptcy cases. (Id. at 204.) The U.S. Trustee then filed a Motion to Examine Fees Paid, Disgorge Fees, and 15 Impose Sanctions Against Candace Kallen and My Arizona Lawyers, PLLC. (Id. at 207.) 16 The U.S. Trustee noted that Appellants had not fully complied with the Court’s June 10, 17 2024 Order: Appellants failed to file an amended case list, the Retention Agreements, or 18 the financing agreements in all cases filed within the Lookback Period. (Id. at 209.) The 19 U.S. Trustee argued that Appellants’ actions demonstrated that they “did not fully 20 understand the nature of the improprieties at issue.” (Id. at 217.) For example, the Trustee 21 stated that My Arizona Lawyers disregarded the Bankruptcy Court when two affiliated 22 attorneys left the firm and began litigating bankruptcy cases under the newly formed firm 23 Atlas Law. (Id. at 210.) In addition, Appellants failed to disclose the use of a third-party 24 financer and made contradictory representations about the details of their fee sharing 25 arrangement. (Id. at 215.) Furthermore the U.S. Trustee noted that it appeared that petitions 26 had never been reviewed by the debtor-clients. (Id. at 216–17.) Further, the U.S. Trustee 27 noted that Appellants’ filings were often untimely, and that both debtor-clients and 28 bankruptcy trustees had notified the U.S. Trustee of problems with the Firm, including 1 failing to meet with clients, using nonlegal professionals to provide legal advice, and being 2 consistently late in producing documents. (Id. at 220.) The U.S. Trustee requested full 3 disgorgement of fees paid within the Lookback period, penalties under 11 U.S.C. § 4 526(c)(5)(B), and sanctions under the Bankruptcy Court’s inherent powers and authority 5 under 11 U.S.C. § 105. (Id.) 6 Appellants responded, stating that (1) their fee was reasonable; (2) any violations of 7 the Bankruptcy Code, Local Rules, and/or Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were 8 inadvertent; (3) they would actively work to comply in the future; (4) they worked 9 diligently for their debtor-clients; and (5) the proposed sanctions and remedies would be 10 unduly harsh. (Doc. 19 at 282.) 11 d. October 16, 2024 Trial 12 A one-day trial was held on October 16, 2024. Kallen had become self-represented 13 after attorney Nussbaum had withdrawn. (Id. at 340–42.) Before trial, Kallen told Judge 14 Whinery that Richter had filed a lawsuit against the Judge and that Kallen was unsure how the lawsuit would affect the hearings that day. (Id. at 9.) “The complaint concerned a sua 15 sponte order to show cause Judge Whinery issued against [Ruth Ann Ambs], the financer 16 EZLegal, and Want a Fresh Start.” (Doc. 13 at 26.) Judge Whinery responded that “[i]t 17 does not” and that there had been “no motion filed,” and “to [her] knowledge, it doesn’t 18 [have an] impact on these proceedings today.” (Doc. 19 at 9–10.) 19 In the trial, Kallen was questioned about the nature of the Retention Agreements, 20 and how they contradicted the Promises to Pay and Kallen’s prior admissions to the 21 Bankruptcy Court; her continued violations of the Bankruptcy Code and Local Rules; and 22 her noncompliance with both Judge Whinery and Judge Collins’ orders. (See e.g., id. at 23 17–18, 20–21, 27–28, 34–42, 44–46, 81–83 100–102.) The Bankruptcy Court took the 24 matter under advisement and had the parties file post-trial briefs before issuing its Order 25 on February 3, 2025. (Id. at 283.) 26 e. The Bankruptcy Court’s February 3, 2025 Order 27 In its February 3, 2025 Order, the Bankruptcy Court found that Appellants had 28 “engaged in a clear and consistent, years-long pattern and practice of violating material 1 provisions of the foregoing sections of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules intended to protect 2 consumer debtors, and of violating Arizona’s Rules of Professional Conduct,” and had 3 consistently lied to the Court. (Doc. 19 at 298–99, 300.) The Bankruptcy Court found that 4 based on consistent misrepresentations, all Retention Agreements “in all EZ Legal 5 Financed Cases, as set forth on the Case List, are void, and that Ms. Kallen and her Firm 6 are liable for all fees and charges paid by such debtors.” 1 (Id. at 300 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 7 329, 526(c)(1), 526(c)(2)(A), 526(c)(2)(C); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016; In re Park-Helena 8 Corp., 63 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Basham, 208 B.R. 926 (9th Cir. BAP 1997), aff’d 9 sub nom. In re Byrne, 152 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 1998).) The Bankruptcy Court also found that 10 “full disgorgement of all fees that have been paid by debtors in the EZ Legal Financed 11 Cases” was appropriate. (Doc. 19 at 300.) 12 In addition to voiding the agreements, the Bankruptcy Court ordered Appellants to 13 disgorge $1,644,566.00 to the Clerk of Court, remove all negative credit notations related 14 to the Retention Agreements from debtor-clients’ credit reports; and refrain from filing any future bankruptcy petitions in the District of Arizona for two years. (See id. at 302–303.) 15 16 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The district court may review the bankruptcy court’s orders. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). 17 Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, while findings of fact are reviewed under the 18 clearly erroneous standard, meaning there is a “serious thumb on the scale for the 19 bankruptcy court.” U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at 20 Lakeridge LLC, 583 U.S. 387, 394 (2018); see also SVP Fin. Servs. Partners LLLP v. Sky 21 Fin. Inv. LLC, 588 B.R. 528, 533 (D. Ariz. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Silverman as Tr. of Stanley 22 C. Silverman Revocable Tr., dated Aug. 6, 2006 v. Birdsell, 796 F. App’x 935, 937 (9th 23 Cir. 2020). A factual finding is clearly erroneous when the court is “left with the definite 24 and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed[.]” SVP, 588 B.R. at 533 (citing In 25 re Greene, 583 F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 2009)). Otherwise, “the court must accept the 26 bankruptcy court’s findings of fact . . . .” Id. The district court must review the evidence 27
28 1 The Case List included 39 cases before Judge Whinery and over 800 cases before other judges in the Bankruptcy Court. (Doc. 19 at 300, 304–23.) 1 on the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. See In re Jake’s Granite 2 Supplies LLC, 442 B.R. 694, 698–99 (D. Ariz. 2010). 3 The court reviews the award of sanctions for abuse of discretion. Chambers v. 4 NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991). The “bankruptcy court abuses its discretion if it bases 5 a decision on an incorrect legal rule, or if its application of the law was illogical, 6 implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the 7 record.” In re Avon Townhomes Venture, No. BAO NC-11-1068-HDOD, 2012 WL 8 1068770, at *5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2012), aff’d, 575 F. App’x 715, 716 (9th Cir. 9 2014) (citing United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261–63 (9th Cir. 2009)). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 Appellants assert that the Bankruptcy Court erred because (1) Judge Whinery only 12 had subject matter jurisdiction over the 39 cases before her; (2) it did not have the inherent 13 authority, nor authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), which grants power to the court, to 14 impose sanctions; (3) Appellants did not violate any restrictions on debt relief agencies under 11 U.S.C. § 526(c)(2); (4) the sanctions imposed were excessive; and (5) Judge 15 Whinery should have recused herself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). (Doc. 13 at 10.) Each of 16 these arguments are addressed in turn. 17 a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 18 “The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo.” 19 Tesla Motors, Inc. v. Balan, 134 F.4th 558, 560 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States. v. 20 Peninsula Commc’ns, Inc., 287 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 2002)). Subject matter jurisdiction 21 means “the court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Steel Co. v. 22 Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). Subject matter jurisdiction can never be 23 forfeited or waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). 24 i. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) & 157 25 The Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction over “all civil proceedings arising under title 26 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 157 (emphasis 27 added). “Proceedings ‘arising under’ title 11 involve causes of action created or determined 28 by a statutory provision of the [Bankruptcy Code].” In re Wilshire Courtyard, 729 F.3d 1 1279, 1285 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “‘[R]elated to’ jurisdiction, is an 2 exceptionally broad category encompassing virtually any matter either directly or 3 indirectly related to the bankruptcy case.” In re GACN, Inc., 555 B.R. 684, 693 (B.A.P. 9th 4 Cir. 2016). 5 First, the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over this miscellaneous proceeding 6 because it “related to” Appellants’ actions in the 887 bankruptcy cases. 7 ii. 28 U.S.C. § 137(a) 8 The bankruptcy court retains “broad equitable power” to “issue any order, process, 9 or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” 11 10 U.S.C. § 105(a). The business of a court shall be divided among its judges as provided by 11 the rules and orders of the court. 28 U.S.C. § 137(a). Judges, however, often rule, issue 12 orders, or transfer cases between themselves. See Marshall v. Marshall, 721 F.3d 1032, 13 1040 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[J]udges are vested with ‘inherent’ authority to transfer cases among 14 themselves ‘for the expeditious administration of justice.’”) (quoting United States v. Stone, 411 F.2d 597, 598 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam)). 15 Here, Appellants argue that because Judge Whinery did not transfer all cases 16 involving EZLegal that were not before her to herself, that she lacked the jurisdiction to 17 issue any orders in all but 39 of the 887 cases. (Doc. 13 at 34.) The Court disagrees. First, 18 Appellants misunderstand the Bankruptcy Court’s power to transfer cases under § 137(a). 19 It simply describes how cases are divided between judges in the same court. As all 887 20 cases were bankruptcy cases filed within the District of Arizona, then the Bankruptcy Court 21 has jurisdiction over them. Furthermore, although this matter stemmed from a bankruptcy 22 proceeding already in progress, the Bankruptcy Court—within its § 105(a) powers— 23 initiated this case as a miscellaneous proceeding to review Appellants’ misconduct, which 24 spanned multiple cases over a two-year period. While the OSC in this case may have 25 affected the remaining open cases assigned to other judges at the time, it had become its 26 own case. (Doc. 33 at 2.) Judge Whinery noted she had ordered Appellants to file the 27 financing agreements in EZLegal’s cases because her colleagues had taken an interest in 28 the miscellaneous proceeding since it included many cases on their dockets. (Doc. 18 at 1 178.) 2 Regardless of whether Judge Whinery transferred the cases to her, she had 3 jurisdiction to issue the OSC order and order the filing of the fee sharing arrangements in 4 the bankruptcy cases not before her to carry out the bankruptcy provisions. 5 b. Inherent Authority 6 Appellants argue that the Bankruptcy Court lacked inherent authority to sanction 7 because there was no “intentional misconduct.” (Doc. 13 at 23.) 8 Bankruptcy courts have “inherent authority” to sanction “bad faith” or “willful 9 misconduct.” In re Rainbow Mag., Inc., 77 F.3d 278, 284 (9th Cir. 1996). The bankruptcy 10 court’s inherent power is “derived wholly from statute.” Id. To impose sanctions under its 11 inherent authority, the court must make “an explicit finding of bad faith or willful 12 misconduct.” In re Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may levy fee- 13 based sanctions when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 14 oppressive reasons, delaying or disrupting litigation, or has taken actions in the litigation for an improper purpose.” Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 15 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46)). Moreover, a court may impose sanctions through its 16 inherent authority when it finds, “[w]illful actions, including recklessness when combined 17 with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose. . . . 18 [A]n attorney’s reckless misstatements of law and fact, when coupled with an improper 19 purpose . . . .” Id. at 994. 20 First, the Bankruptcy Court need only find bad faith or willful misconduct, which it 21 did. (Doc. 19 at 299–300.) The Bankruptcy Court found that Kallen had made statements 22 “that she knew or reasonably should have known to be false and/or misleading” and that 23 “Ms. Kallen and her Firm’s position that their inadequate disclosures and violations of the 24 Bankruptcy Code and Federal Bankruptcy Rules were merely inadvertent to be totally 25 disingenuous and self-serving.” (Id. at 300.) 26 But regardless, this Court finds Appellants’ misconduct was intentional. During 27 each interaction, Appellants continually misrepresented or omitted information related to 28 the details of the fee sharing arrangement between themselves and EZLegal and made 1 material misrepresentations about the details of the contract terms to their debtor-clients. 2 Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court had the inherent authority to sanction Appellants. 3 i. 11 U.S.C. § 105 4 Next, Appellants argue that because the Bankruptcy Court “did not seek to remedy 5 violations of a specific court orders (instead seeking to remedy alleged violations of 6 bankruptcy rules), sanctions under § 105 were inappropriate.” (Doc. 20 at 5.) 7 There is a difference between the “civil contempt power” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and 8 the inherent sanctioning authority. Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1196. Section 105(a) “allows a court 9 to remedy a violation of a specific order . . . . The inherent sanction authority allows a 10 bankruptcy court to deter and provide compensation for a broad range of improper 11 litigation tactics.” Id. (citing Fink, 239 F.3d at 992–93). 12 Appellants argue that the Bankruptcy Court’s § 105(a) authority would only apply 13 had they violated a court order. It is clear that Appellants violated the Bankruptcy Court’s 14 June 10, 2024 Order when representatives of the Firm opened Atlas Law to continue practicing bankruptcy cases three days after the Order had been put in place, and when 15 Appellants did not provide an amended case list. (See Doc. 18 at 161, 163–64, 203.) 16 Further, Appellants continued to violate Judge Collins’ stipulated order for failure to appear 17 on behalf of their debtor-clients by not responding to motions. (See id. at 69, 124; Doc. 19 18 at 100–02.) 19 Even if Appellants had not violated court orders, the language of both statute and 20 caselaw permit courts to sanction to prevent the abuse of process. See 11 U.S. § 105(a); 21 Rainbow, 77 F.3d at 284. The record shows Appellants continuously left out information 22 and provided multiple misrepresentations regarding the details of the Retention 23 Agreements and the case list. For example, when asked about the financing arrangement 24 between Appellants and EZLegal, Appellants initially told the Bankruptcy Court that the 25 Firm received the $3,000 directly from EZLegal. (Doc. 18 at 59.) The apportionment of 26 the $3,000 Attorney Flat Fee between Appellants and EZLegal was not originally disclosed 27 to the Bankruptcy Court, nor to the debtor-clients. (Doc. 19 at 294.) The Appellants also 28 failed to file supplemental information and certain disclosures either in a timely manner or 1 in full compliance with the Bankruptcy Court’s orders. (Id. at 96–99, 294.) In fact, 2 Appellants consistently failed to meet deadlines throughout the proceedings. (Id.) 3 Therefore, Appellants’ failures and continued disregard for disclosure constituted bad faith, 4 willful misconduct, and abuse of process that allowed Judge Whinery to impose sanctions 5 under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) for violating a court order. 6 c. Legality of the Retention Agreements 7 Under Local Rule 9010-1(c)(1), an attorney who represents a debtor at the start of 8 their petition must represent the debtor in all matters, other than adversarial proceedings, 9 until their case is closed, or until the attorney requests withdrawal or is substituted. 10 Here, Appellants argue that the Bankruptcy Court’s sanctions were excessive 11 because (1) the Fee Sharing Arrangement was legal and (2) they did not violate 11 U.S.C. 12 § 526(c)(2). (Doc. 13 at 35.) 13 However, the legality of the agreement is not the issue. The issues here are whether 14 (1) the Retention Agreements were properly within the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code and Local Rule 9010-1(c)(1), and (2) the terms in the Retention Agreements were 15 consistent and properly explained to their clients. 16 Therefore, the legality argument is moot. The Court addresses the remaining issues. 17 d. Bankruptcy Requirements for Fee Agreements 18 1. 11 U.S.C. § 329 19 A “debt relief agency” is any person who provides any kind of bankruptcy assistance 20 to an assisted person in exchange for “money or other valuable consideration . . . .” 11 21 U.S.C. § 101(12A). Any attorney representing a debtor under Chapter 11 must file “a 22 statement of compensation paid or agreed to be paid” with the court. 11 U.S.C. § 329(a). 23 The compensation disclosure includes “the particulars of any fee sharing agreement.” Fed. 24 R. Bankr. P. 2016(b)(1). This is done through Bankruptcy Form 2030. See 25 https://www.uscourts.gov/forms-rules/forms/disclosure-compensation-attorney-debtor-0 26 (last visited Feb. 12, 2026). 27 Here, Bankruptcy Form 2030 falsely stated that Appellants were not sharing their 28 compensation with any other person outside of the firm. (Doc. 18 at 23.) Appellants argue 1 that § 329 does not apply because it “only makes an attorney liable for excess charges.” 2 (Doc. 20 at 7.) Section 329 is not just about excess legal fees. It is the statutory requirement 3 for an attorney to disclose information about the fee paid, or to be paid, for their services. 4 11 U.S.C. § 329(a). Judge Whinery found that Appellants failed to abide by this rule by 5 not disclosing the fee sharing arrangement, the presence of a third-party lender, or the true 6 source or amount of compensation paid or to be paid, and the record supports it. (Doc. 19 7 at 299.) 8 Therefore, Appellants’ compensation disclosure violated § 329(a). 9 ii. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2016(b) 10 Appellants argue that Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 2016(b) is not a sanctions 11 provision. (Doc. 20 at 8.) To impose sanctions for the violation of this rule, Appellants 12 claim the Bankruptcy Court would have to rely on its inherent authority. (Id.) 13 Disclosure is required under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2016(b). Courts 14 have held that an attorney who fails to comply with those requirements “forfeits any rights to compensation.” Basham, 208 B.R. at 930–31. “Once the bankruptcy court determines 15 that an attorney has violated § 329 and Rule 2016, the bankruptcy court has the authority 16 to order the attorney to disgorge all of his [or her] fees.” Id. at 31. 17 Here, as noted earlier, Appellants’ Form 2030 was not in compliance with Rule 18 2016(b). Judge Whinery found that Appellants had violated both § 329 and Rule 2016(b). 19 (Doc. 19 at 299.) Further, the Court has established that the Bankruptcy Court had inherent 20 authority to sanction. 21 Therefore, Appellants failed to comply Rule 2016(b) and the Bankruptcy Court was 22 well within its authority to request the full disgorgement of the fees. 23 iii. 11 U.S.C. § 526(c)(2) 24 A debt relief agency shall not “make any statement, or counsel or advise any assisted 25 person or prospective assisted person to make a statement in a document filed in a case or 26 proceeding under this title, that is untrue or misleading, or that upon the exercise of 27 reasonable care, should have been known by such agency to be untrue or misleading.” 11 28 U.S.C. § 526(a)(2). A debt relief agency also cannot “misrepresent to any assisted person 1 or prospective assisted person, directly or indirectly, affirmatively or by material omission, 2 with respect to -- (A) The services such agency will provide to such person; or (B) the 3 benefits and risks that may result if such person becomes a debtor in a case under this title 4 . . . .” Id. § 526(a)(3)(A)–(B). A debt relief agency must “execute a written contract” with 5 the assisted person that “explains clearly and conspicuously” “the (1) services being 6 provided and (2) the fees or charges for such services and the terms of payment.” Id. § 7 528(a)(1)(A)–(B). 8 “Any contract for bankruptcy assistance . . . that does not comply with the material 9 requirements of this section . . . or section 528 shall be void and may not be enforced by 10 any Federal or State court or by any other person, other than such assisted person.” Id. § 11 526(c)(1). The debt relief agency is liable to the debtor “in the amount of any fees or 12 charges in connection with providing bankruptcy assistance . . . .” Id. § 526(c)(2). This 13 includes actual damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees if the debt relief agency “is found. 14 . . to have -- (A) intentionally or negligently failed to comply with any provision of this section, [including] section 528 with respect to a case or proceeding . . . ; (C) intentionally 15 or negligently disregarded the material requirements of this title or the Federal Rules of 16 Bankruptcy Procedure . . . .” Id. at § 526(c)(2)(A), (C). In addition, if the bankruptcy court, 17 on its own motion or the motion of the U.S. Trustee or the debtor, finds that any attorney 18 violated this section “or engaged in a clear and consistent pattern or practice of violating 19 this section,” the bankruptcy court may; “(A) enjoin the violation of such section; or (B) 20 impose an appropriate civil penalty against such person.” Id. at § 526(c)(5)(A)–(B). 21 Here, Appellants argue that they are not liable under § 526(c)(2) because they did 22 not intend to make misrepresentations to their clients or to the Bankruptcy Court. (Doc. 13 23 at 23.) Appellants contend that they were well within the requirements for debt relief 24 agencies because they informed their clients of the charge for their services, the terms of 25 payment, and that the Bankruptcy Court “made no finding that [Appellants] were 26 overzealous attorneys who misrepresented information to the Bankruptcy Court in an effort 27 to obtain bankruptcy relief for their clients, or that [Appellants’] representation harmed the 28 clients.” (Id. at 37.) Appellants may have informed their debtor-clients about the amount 1 being charged for the services, but they did not disclose the fee sharing arrangement 2 between Appellants and EZLegal. 3 The purpose of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 4 (BAPCPA) is to “correct perceived abuses of the bankruptcy system.” Milavetz, Gallop, & 5 Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S., 559 U.S. 229, 231 (2010). This includes the regulation of conduct 6 of debt relief agencies. Id. at 232. The bankruptcy provisions at issue here were created to 7 allow for full transparency between the debtor and the attorney, as well as transparency 8 between the attorney and the court. Such transparency, logically, includes the disclosure of 9 any shared fee between an attorney and a non-legal entity. Appellants did not “clearly or 10 conspicuously” explain the $3,000 Attorney Flat Fee. Moreover, at no point in the 11 Retention Agreements did they notify the clients of the existence of the fee sharing 12 arrangement between EZLegal and Appellants. (See Doc. 18 at 25–30, 32–37.) The 13 Retention Agreements also include material misrepresentations about debtor payment 14 obligations, inconsistent terms that go against Local Rule 9010-1, and are inconsistent with the Promises to Pay. (See id. at 33, 34, 38.) 15 Therefore, Appellants are liable under 11 U.S.C. § 526(c)(2) “in the amount of any 16 fees or charges in connection with providing bankruptcy assistance.” 17 iv. 11 U.S.C. § 528 18 A debt relief agency must “execute a written contract” with the assisted person that 19 “explains clearly and conspicuously” “the (1) services being provided and (2) the fees or 20 charges for such services and the terms of payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(1)(A)–(B). “Any 21 contract for bankruptcy assistance . . . that does not comply with the material requirements 22 of this [section 526] or section 528 shall be void and may not be enforced by any Federal 23 or State court or by any other person, other than such assisted person.” Id. § 526(c)(1). 24 Appellants argue that because they followed § 528’s requirements for debt relief 25 agencies, they are not liable under the restrictions on debt relief agencies in § 526(c)(2). 26 (Doc. 13 at 37.) As indicated previously, Appellants did not “clearly and conspicuously” 27 disclose the Attorney Fee Arrangement, in violation of § 528. However, even if they had 28 not violated § 528, under § 526(c)(2), any contract may be voided, and the debt relief 1 agency can be liable if the agency makes a material omission or fails to file the required 2 documents. 11 U.S.C. § 526(c)(2), (a)(2), (a)(3)(A). Appellants prepared skeletal 3 bankruptcy documents that were not properly reviewed by the debtor-clients before filing. 4 (See Doc. 19 at 62–63.) This is a direct violation of § 526(a)(2). Therefore, Appellants can 5 be liable “in the amount of any fees or charges in connection with providing bankruptcy 6 assistance” for intentionally violating §526. 11 U.S.C. § 526(c)(2). 7 Secondly, the record reveals that Appellants misrepresented their required services 8 to their debtor-clients. The Retention Agreements state that any other work necessary for 9 continued representation through their bankruptcy petition would be at Appellants’ 10 discretion and would cost $300 extra an hour depending on the services needed, even 11 though they were required to continue that representation under Local Rule 9010-1(c). 12 (Doc. 18 at 34.) While Appellants argue they continued to represent their clients contrary 13 to the language of the Retention Agreements, debtors with no knowledge of the law, let 14 alone the Bankruptcy Code and the Local Rules, would not be able to conclude that such services were required. This is also a direct violation under § 526(a)(3)(A)–(B). 15 Therefore, even if Appellants conformed with the requirements under § 528, they 16 are still liable under § 526(c)(2) because of their violations under § 526(a)(3)(A). 17 e. Ethical Rule Compliance 18 Appellants argue that the Bankruptcy Court “erroneously found that My Arizona 19 Lawyers did not affirmatively explain the retention agreements.” (Doc. 13 at 15.) 20 Appellants contend that the Retention Agreements “correctly advised” debtor-clients 21 about: (1) the potential conflicts of interest; and (2) the benefit of obtaining independent 22 counsel; and (3) giving them a reasonable opportunity to obtain independent counsel. (Doc. 23 13 at 38.) 24 25 Under Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct 1.8: 26 (a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 27 interest adverse to a client unless: 28 (1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 1 writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client; (2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is 2 given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal 3 counsel on the transaction; and (3) the client gives informed consent in a writing signed by the client 4 to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the 5 transaction including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction[.] 6 . . . . 7 (f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one 8 other than the client unless: (1) the client gives informed consent; 9 (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of 10 professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and (3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as 11 required by ER 1.6. 12 ER 1.8. 13 The ethical rules specifically state that agreements must contain terms that are fair 14 and reasonable and must be fully disclosed in a way that is easy for the client to understand 15 and allows the client to give their informed consent. The Court finds they did not. Informed 16 consent “denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the 17 lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks 18 of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” United States 19 v. Lacey, No. CR-18-00422-001-PHX-SPL, 2018 WL 4953275, at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 12, 20 2018) (quoting E.R. 1.0(e)) (emphasis added). 21 Here, Kallen stated that she did not take the time to adequately explain the terms of 22 the contract with her debtor-clients, specifically the details of the business relationship 23 between the Firm and EZLegal. (Doc. 18 at 18; Doc. 19 at 48.) She merely stated that if 24 they had questions, they could ask her or obtain independent counsel. (Doc. 18 at 18; Doc. 25 19 at 52.) Further, the Retention Agreements contained material misrepresentations 26 regarding payment obligations, inconsistent provisions when compared to the Promises to 27 Pay, and numerous improper conflicts of interest waivers. (Doc. 18 at 29–30; see Doc. 19 28 at 291–92.) 1 Although it is well within the Ethical Rules to inform potential clients of the benefit 2 of obtaining independent counsel, this suggestion is rendered meaningless because 3 Appellants’ debtor-clients were not in the position to be able to afford both her services or 4 the services of another attorney to review the Retention Agreements and the Promises to 5 Pay. Furthermore, the debtor-clients lacked the informed consent needed to knowingly 6 agree because, as Appellants have admitted, they did not take the time to properly inform 7 and explain to the debtors the details of the business relationship, nor the potential conflicts 8 that could arise. As noted by the Bankruptcy Court, “To expect debtor-clients, who are 9 unsophisticated in the law, to understand documents which are complex, inconsistent, 10 contradictory, and overreaching, and which include numerous direct conflicts of interest 11 waivers is not only outrageous but in direct violation of E.R. 1.8 of the Arizona Rules of 12 Professional Conduct.” (Doc. 19 at 299.) 13 f. Sanctions Disproportionate with Findings of Fault 14 The court has “discretion to review newly presented issues on appeal if (1) there are ‘exceptional circumstances’ why the issue was not raised in the trial court, (2) the new 15 issue arises while the appeal is pending because of a change in the law, or (3) the issue 16 presented is purely one of law and the opposing party will suffer no prejudice as a result of 17 the failure to raise the issue in the trial court.” Avon, 2012 WL 1068770, at *10 (citing 18 Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 501 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010)). 19 Appellants argue that even if sanctions were appropriate, the sanctions imposed 20 were not proportionate with the findings of fault. (Doc. 13 at 40.) Appellants contend that 21 when sanctioning under its inherent powers, the Bankruptcy Court “must impose the least 22 restrictive sanctions that would be effective.” (Id. (citing 5 Fed. Proc. L. Ed. § 9:459.)) 23 Appellants argue that the Bankruptcy Court should have chosen less restrictive sanctions. 24 (Id. at 41–42.) 25 Appellants had the opportunity to make this argument in their post-trial briefs. They 26 did not. (See Doc. 19 at 263–276.) Further, they have made no argument that there is the 27 existence of some exceptional circumstance that prevented them from including this 28 argument before this appeal, that the law has recently changed, or that the opposing party 1 suffers no prejudice with this newly raised argument. Therefore, the Court will not review 2 this portion of Appellants’ argument. 3 g. Recusal of Judge Whinery 4 Any judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality 5 might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). A judge must seek disqualification 6 if: 7 (1) [s]he has personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; . . . (5) 8 the judge or their spouse, or a person with the third degree of that relationship 9 of them, or the spouse of such person; (i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (ii) is acting as a lawyer in the 10 proceeding; (iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be 11 substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; or (iv) is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. 12 13 Id. 14 The test for whether a judge is impartial is “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 15 be questioned.” McCray v. Ryan, 389 F. Supp. 3d 663, 665 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting United 16 States v. Nelson, 718 F.3d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983)). In other words, would a reasonable 17 person “perceive a significant risk that the judge will resolve the case on a basis other than 18 the merits.” Id. at 666 (citing In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 385 (7th Cir. 1990)). A reasonable 19 person means a “well-informed, thoughtful observer, not a ‘hypersensitive or unduly 20 suspicious person.’” Id. (quoting Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Calif., 428 21 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005)). Because there is always “some risk” of impartiality, the 22 risk must be “substantially out of the ordinary.” Id. (citing Mason, 916 F.2d at 383) 23 (emphasis in original). 24 A judge need not recuse simply because a litigant filed, or threatens to file, a lawsuit 25 against a judge. United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 958 (9th Cir. 2007). A judge also 26 need not recuse himself without a “factual connection or relationship” between the case 27 before them and a “previous investigation into the defendant that began during the judge’s 28 tenure as the United States Attorney.” United States v. Hunt, 153 F.4th 858, 864 (9th Cir. 1 2025) (quoting United States v. Silver, 345 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2001)). 2 Here, Appellants argue that Judge Whinery was improperly acting as “complaining 3 witness, prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner.” (Doc. 13 at 48 (quoting Matter of 4 Johnson, 921 F.2d 585, 586–87 (5th Cir. 1991).) Appellants also claim that because Daniel 5 Richter is married to the owner of EZLegal, Katherine Kiesel, he is a party to this case. 6 (Id.) In addition, Appellants claim Richter’s lawsuit against Judge Whinery was enough to 7 require her to recusal. (Id.) Appellants conclude that Judge Whinery was biased because 8 while acting in her capacity as the United States Trustee, she was heavily involved, and 9 played a key role in, Richter’s disbarment. However, the Court finds that Judge Whinery 10 was well within her authority to continue as judge in this matter. 11 First, Richter was never a party to this case. While he was a party to the Ruth Ann 12 Ambs matter, it was in his capacity as owner of Want a Fresh Start and its referral services. 13 (Doc. 18 at 65.) Kallen concluded that she had not used the referral services of Want a 14 Fresh Start, nor had she done any form of business with Richter. (Id. at 65–66.) Richter’s position as the husband of Ms. Keisel does not make him a party to this case. Neither he 15 nor his LLC were named in the miscellaneous proceeding at issue here or were required to 16 respond to any inquiries regarding Appellants’ agreements with EZLegal. 17 Second, the lawsuit against Judge Whinery was filed in Maricopa County just five 18 days before the October 16, 2024 trial. (Doc. 19 at 328, 344.) Richter sued Judge Whinery 19 after she issued an OSC “regarding the concerns the [Bankruptcy C]ourt had pertaining to 20 the disclosures of attorney compensation and agreements, as well as, Ms. Ambs’ disclosed 21 relationship with Fresh Start indicating that Fresh Start referred clients to her Firm, drafted 22 Firm agreements, and provided financing to the Firm.” (Doc. 30 at 4; see Doc. 13 at 26.) 23 The lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim on May 23, 2025. 24 (Doc. 19 at 330.) It is clear from the timing of the filing of that suit that it was the direct 25 result of an unsatisfactory outcome in the Ruth Ann Ambs case and filed for the sole 26 purpose of removing Judge Whinery from the instant matter. 27 Finally, Judge Whinery acted as the United States Trustee until June 25, 2002 and 28 Richter was not disbarred until 2011. (Doc. 17 at 37.) Further, the U.S. Trustee’s Office |] was not involved in Richter’s disbarment. (/d.) Appellants offer no other evidence showing 2|| that Judge Whinery had any involvement in Richter’s disbarment, save for his lawsuit that || was filed against her. (See Doc. 13 at 47.) Based on the record, the Court finds that Judge 4|| Whinery did not have any significant involvement with Richter’s disbarment. Regardless, 5 || Richter’s disbarment was not the subject of this case. 6 To the extent Appellants are arguing that Judge Whinery should have recused herself based on 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5), they have made no factual allegations or legal 8 || argument related to this subsection. Appellants have not shown that Judge Whinery’s 9 || impartiality should be reasonably questioned. Therefore, Judge Whinery was not required 10 || to recuse herself for this matter. ll IV. CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED: 13 1) Appellants’ Appeal is DENIED (Doc. 1) and the Bankruptcy Court’s February 3, 14 2025 Order is AFFIRMED. 15 2) Appellants’ Motion to Stay is DENIED AS MOOT. (Doc. 22.) 16 3) The Clerk of Court shall docket accordingly and close the case file in this matter. 7 Dated this 13th day of February, 2026. 18 a,
29 sernior United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28
-22-