Cancel v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 22, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2384
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOSE L. CANALES CANCEL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-02384 (UNA) ) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ) AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al., ) ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Currently before the court is plaintiff’s pro se complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and his

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The court grants the IFP

application, and as explained below, it dismisses this matter without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a), 12(h)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Plaintiff, a resident of Puerto Rico, sues the United States Department of Health and

Human Services (“HHS”), and several of its officials, for $250,000 in damages. See Compl. at 1–

4. The complaint is far from a model of clarity. Plaintiff broadly alleges that HHS has abused its

power, discriminated against him, disparaged him, engaged in misrepresentation, coercion, and

“detraction,” and he accuses its staff of being “professional gaslighters.” See id. at 4. He then

attaches screenshots of the purported salary of an HHS attorney, whom plaintiff contends earns

too much. See id. at 6–8. Finally, plaintiff alleges that a medical group located in Puerto Rico,

and its providers––none of whom are named as defendants––denied him services in violation of

his civil rights, by “invalidating” his “total and permanent disability” benefits, due to the way it

filled out his medical forms. See id. at 9. It appears that plaintiff may have reported this medical provider to HHS’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), and he is now dissatisfied with OCR’s

response. See id.

First, pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell v. Tisch,

656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires

complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction

[and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d

661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of

the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and

determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498

(D.D.C. 1977). When a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly

nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and

personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C., 319 F.R.D.

408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C.

Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). “A confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not

comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163,

169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The instant complaint falls

squarely within this category.

Second, sovereign immunity bars a suit against the United States, its agencies, and its

officials, except upon consent, which must be clear and unequivocal. See United States v. Mitchell,

445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 102–04 (D.C. Cir. 1984). A

waiver of sovereign immunity “must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text, and [it cannot]

be implied.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citations omitted). Here, plaintiff has neither pleaded nor established that defendants have expressly consented to be sued for damages. And,

relevant here, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity for constitutional claims, see FDIC v.

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994), or for alleged “an act or omission” of a federal employee

“based upon the . . . performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or

duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the

discretion involved be abused[,]” see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); Auleta v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 3d

198, 203 (D.D.C. 2015). Nor is there any waiver for alleged intentional torts. See 28 U.S.C. §

2680(h); Williams v. Wilkie, 320 F. Supp. 3d 191, 198 (D.D.C. 2018).

For all of these reasons, this matter will be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s motion

for appointment of counsel, ECF No. 3, is denied as moot. A separate order accompanies this

memorandum opinion.

Date: November 22, 2024 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge