Canales-Cancel v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, D. Puerto Rico·Decided March 31, 2022·No. 3:20-cv-01469·Unknown

Opinion

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO JOSE L. CANALES-CANCEL, Plaintiff,

v. Civil No. 20-1469 (BJM)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

Jose L. Canales-Cancel (“Canales”) seeks review of the Social Security Administration Commissioner’s (“the Commissioner’s”) finding that he is not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 423. Canales argues that the administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) incorrectly determined that Canales was not disabled because she failed to properly weigh the evidence or fully account for his pain, depression, allegedly worsening symptoms, and other issues. Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 46. The Commissioner opposed. Dkt. 48. This case is before me by consent of the parties. Dkts. 19, 20, 21. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS After reviewing the pleadings and record transcript, the court has “the power to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner.” 20 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner and his delegates employed the proper legal standards and found facts upon the proper quantum of evidence. Manso- Pizarro v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Services, 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g), but are not conclusive when derived by ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or judging matters entrusted to experts. Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999); Ortiz v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)

(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)) (internal citation omitted). The court “must affirm the [Commissioner’s] resolution, even if the record arguably could justify a different conclusion, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.” Rodríguez Pagán v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Services, 819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987). A claimant is disabled under the Act if he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Under the statute, a claimant is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity when he “is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In determining whether a claimant is disabled, all of the evidence in the record must be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3). The Commissioner employs a five-step evaluation process to decide whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); Goodermote v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Services, 690 F.2d 5, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1982). At Step One, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). At Step Two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If not, the disability claim is denied. At Step Three, the Commissioner must decide whether the claimant’s impairment is equivalent to a specific list of impairments contained in Appendix 1 of the regulations, impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d);

20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, he is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If not, the evaluation proceeds to Step Four, at which point the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines whether the claimant’s impairments prevent the claimant from doing the work he has performed in the past. An individual’s RFC is his ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from his impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) and 404.1545(a)(1). If the claimant can perform his previous work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If he cannot perform this work, the fifth and final Step asks whether the claimant can perform other work available in the national economy in view of his RFC, as well as age, education, and work experience. If the claimant cannot, then he is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §

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