Canale v. AutoZone, Inc.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 15, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-03295
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SCOTT CANALE, Case No. 2:24-cv-03295-CSK 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 14 AUTOZONE, INC., et al., (ECF No. 4) 15 Defendants. 16 17 Pending before the Court is Defendant AutoZone, Inc.’s motion to dismiss 18 pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 19 4, 9, 10.)1 A hearing was held on January 14, 2025. For the reasons stated below, the 20 Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint 21 with leave to amend. 22 / / / 23 24 / / / 25 / / / 26

27 1 This case proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) for all purposes, including the entry of judgment, pursuant to the consent of all parties. (ECF 28 Nos. 6, 7, 8.) 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background2 3 From July 5, 2023 to February 6, 2024, Plaintiff Scott Canale was employed by 4 Defendant AutoZone, Inc. as a manager. Compl. ¶ 7 (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiff was 5 classified as a non-exempt employee and paid $18 an hour. Id. Plaintiff alleges that 6 during his employment, he was discriminated against due to his gender, sex and 7 disability. Id. ¶¶ 8, 45. 8 From November 1, 2023 to May 1, 2024, Plaintiff was placed on a modified duty 9 restriction by his medical provider, which restricted Plaintiff from working night shifts. Id. 10 ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges despite Defendant being aware of Plaintiff’s work restrictions, 11 Plaintiff was forced to work late nights. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff also alleges his “medical 12 condition” was “broadcast[ed] to other employees who did not need to be informed,” 13 which resulted in Plaintiff being the “subject of ridicule for his disability.” Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff 14 alleges he was bullied “for not being ‘a real man’” and threatened with physical harm. Id. 15 Plaintiff alleges Defendant permitted and ratified this behavior. Id. Plaintiff also alleges 16 he was retaliated against for complaining of this behavior and was “picked on” by 17 Defendant and its agents and employees and “knowingly promoted one of Plaintiff’s 18 main tormentors.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant failed to compensate him for 19 “several rest periods and meal breaks. Id. ¶ 12. 20 B. Procedural Background 21 On September 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Sacramento County 22 Superior Court. See Compl. Defendant was served with process on October 29, 2024. 23 (ECF No. 1-2 at 5-6.) On November 26, 2024, Defendant removed the action to federal 24 court on diversity jurisdiction grounds. (ECF No. 1 at 2-5.) 25

26 2 These facts primarily derive from the Complaint (ECF No. 1-1), which are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. 27 Servs., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). However, the Court does not assume the truth of any conclusory factual allegations or legal conclusions. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 28 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). 1 Plaintiff alleges the following fifteen (15) state law causes of action: (1) violation of 2 California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Government Code § 12900, et 3 seq., (“FEHA”) for disability discrimination; (2) violation of FEHA for failure to provide 4 reasonable accommodation; (3) violation of FEHA for sex and gender discrimination; 5 (4) violation of FEHA for harassment and hostile work environment; (5) violation of FEHA 6 for failure to prevent discrimination and harassment; (6) violation of FEHA for retaliation; 7 (7) violation of California Labor Code § 2802 for failure to reimburse business expenses; 8 (8) violation of California Labor Code § 512 for failure to provide meal breaks; 9 (9) violation of California Labor Code § 226.7 for failure to provide rest periods; 10 (10) violation of California Labor Code §§ 201-203 for waiting time penalties; (11) unjust 11 enrichment; (12) breach of contract; (13) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 12 dealing; (14) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 for unfair 13 business practice; and (15) wrongful termination. Compl. ¶¶ 18-116. 14 On December 3, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 4.) 15 Defendant moves to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 16 be granted pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Def. Mot. (ECF No. 4.) 17 Plaintiff filed his opposition on December 16, 2024 (ECF No. 9), and Defendant filed its 18 reply on December 23, 2024 (ECF No. 10). A hearing was held on January 14, 2025. 19 Attorney Catherine Ann Allen appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Attorney Michael Hoffman 20 appeared on behalf of Defendant. (ECF No. 11). 21 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 22 A claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon 23 which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint fails to state a claim if 24 it either lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 25 theory. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). To state a claim on 26 which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to state a claim to 27 relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 28 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 1 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 2 alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678 (2009). When considering whether a claim has 3 been stated, the court must accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and 4 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. However, 5 the court is not required to accept as true conclusory factual allegations contradicted by 6 documents referenced in the complaint, or legal conclusions merely because they are 7 cast in the form of factual allegations. Paulsen, 559 F.3d at 1071. 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s entire Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The 10 Court considers Defendant’s arguments with respect to each of Plaintiff’s claims below. 11 A. First Cause of Action: Disability Discrimination 12 FEHA prohibits employment discrimination against any person because of a 13 physical or mental disability. Cal. Gov’t. Code § 12940(a). In order to establish a claim 14 for disability discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must allege and show that: (1) plaintiff 15 suffers from a disability; (2) plaintiff is otherwise qualified to do his job; and (3) plaintiff 16 was subjected to an adverse employment action because of his disability. Faust v. 17 California Portland Cement Co., 150 Cal. App. 4th 864, 886 (2007); Jaco v. Winco 18 Holdings, Inc., 2019 WL 1438069 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2019). Under FEHA, a 19 “physical disability” is any physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic 20 disfigurement or anatomical loss that both affects a specific bodily system and limits a 21 major life activity. Cal. Gov't Code § 12926(m). Under FEHA, a “mental disability” is any 22 mental or psychological disorder or condition, such as intellectual disability, organic brain 23 syndrome, emotional or mental illness, or specific learning disabilities, that limits a major 24 life activity. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(j). “A mental or psychological disorder or condition 25 limits a major life activity if it makes the achievement of the major life activity difficult.” 26 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(j)(1)(B). 27 Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead factual allegations, beyond 28 conclusory assertions, that Plaintiff is disabled under FEHA. Def. Mot. at 5-6. Plaintiff 1 argues the allegations in the Complaint alleging “he cannot work at night due to his 2 disability and that this was substantiated by a doctor’s work restriction” is sufficient to 3 plead a qualified disability under Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12926 and 12926.1. Pl. Opp’n at 4 4 (citing Compl. ¶ 9). The Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a cognizable 5 disability under FEHA or that he was subjected to an adverse employment action 6 because of his disability. 7 The Complaint alleges in a conclusory manner that Plaintiff is disabled. See 8 Compl. ¶¶ 9 (“Among other things, Mr. Canale was placed by his medical provider on 9 modified duty which included a restriction that he was not to work shifts from November 10 1, 2023 to May 1, 2024.”); 10 (“Defendant was well aware of Plaintiff’s restrictions.”); 11 10 (“Plaintiff’s condition was broadcast[ed],” employees were informed of Plaintiff’s “work 12 restrictions and/or his medical condition.”); 10 (Plaintiff was the “subject of ridicule for his 13 disability.”); 20 (Plaintiff “alleges that his physical and mental disabilities were a 14 motivating factor in Defendant’s discrimination.”); 28 (“Plaintiff was an individual with a 15 disability within the meaning of section 12926(i) and (k) of the government code”).3 Legal 16 conclusions are not allegations of fact. See Eclectic Properties East, LLC v. Marcus & 17 Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). 18 Additionally, the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff’s disability made the 19 achievement of a major life activity difficult. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12926(m), (j). 20 Without sufficient factual allegations detailing Plaintiff’s medical condition, and whether 21 such a condition makes achievement of a major life activity difficult, the Court is unable 22 to determine whether Plaintiff’s medical condition constitutes a protected disability under 23 FEHA. See Featherstone v. S. California Permanente Med. Grp., 10 Cal. App. 5th 1150, 24 3 Plaintiff submitted a declaration in support of his opposition, which include some facts 25 that were not pled in the Complaint. (ECF No. 9-1.) The Court notes, however, that its 26 review of the Complaint’s pleading sufficiency is limited to the Complaint and does not include Plaintiff’s declaration submitted in support of his opposition. At the hearing, 27 Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that Plaintiff’s declaration raised new factual allegations not pled in the Complaint and that the Court’s review for this motion was limited to the 28 Complaint. 1 1167 (2017) (“not every illness qualifies as a disability” under FEHA.); Cenis v. Winco 2 Holdings, Inc., 787 F. App'x 947, 948 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that vomiting and diarrhea 3 did not constitute a disability under FEHA and that plaintiff therefore could not make a 4 prima facie showing of disability discrimination in violation of FEHA). The Court therefore 5 dismisses Plaintiff’s first cause of action for disability discrimination with leave to amend. 6 B. Second Cause of Action: Failure to Provide Reasonable 7 Accommodations 8 Under FEHA, an employer must “make reasonable accommodation for the known 9 physical or mental disability” of an employee. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(m)(1). A 10 reasonable accommodation is any “modification or adjustment to the workplace that 11 enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired.” 12 Scotch v. Art Institute of California, 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 994 (2009). In order to 13 establish a claim for failure to accommodate under FEHA, a plaintiff must allege and 14 show that: (1) plaintiff has a disability; (2) plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential 15 functions of the position; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate 16 plaintiff's disability. Id. at 1009-10. 17 As set forth above, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that he has a disability is 18 insufficient to establish Plaintiff has a disability within the meaning of FEHA. Without 19 alleging additional facts supporting the existence of a qualifying disability under FEHA, 20 Plaintiff has not adequately pled his claim for failure to provide reasonable 21 accommodations under FEHA. See Jackson v. Kaplan Higher Educ., LLC, 106 F. Supp. 22 3d 1118, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that employer could not be held liable under 23 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m)(1) where plaintiff failed to provide evidence that she had a 24 disability under FEHA). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s second cause of action 25 for failure to accommodate with leave to amend. 26 C. Third Cause of Action: Sex and Gender Discrimination 27 FEHA prohibits employment discrimination against any person because of that 28 person’s “sex, gender, gender identity, or gender expression.” Cal. Gov’t. Code 1 § 12940(a). In order to establish a claim for discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must 2 allege and show that: (1) plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) plaintiff was 3 performing competently in the position he held; (3) plaintiff suffered an adverse 4 employment action; and (4) some other circumstance suggests that the employer acted 5 with a discriminatory motive. Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000). 6 Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead facts showing he was 7 subjected to discrimination based on his sex and gender. Def. Mot. at 8. Defendant 8 contends Plaintiff fails to allege facts establishing Plaintiff suffered from an adverse 9 employment action based on his sex and gender. Id. Plaintiff argues he was “made fun 10 of ‘including bullying Plaintiff for not being ‘a real man’ and threatening Plaintiff 11 physically”, which is sufficient to establish a claim for sex and gender discrimination. Pl. 12 Opp’n at 6 (citing Compl. ¶ 10). The Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a 13 cognizable sex and gender discrimination claim under FEHA. 14 The Complaint alleges Plaintiff’s “coworkers made numerous discriminatory 15 remarks based on Plaintiff’s sex and gender” and that after a “significant period of 16 satisfactory, competent, and diligent performance to the profit of Defendant, Plaintiff was 17 constructively terminated as a result of Defendant’s intolerable and unbearable working 18 conditions.” Compl. ¶¶ 37-38. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant “compelled, coerced, 19 aided and abetted the discrimination…levied at Plaintiff.” Id ¶ 11. Even if the Court 20 assumes without finding that constructive discharge has been alleged, the Complaint’s 21 allegations do not sufficiently assert a causal connection between the alleged adverse 22 employment action and Defendant’s alleged discriminatory motive based on sex and 23 gender. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). Plaintiff’s allegations as to motive are cursory 24 and conclusory. See Compl. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s third cause of 25 action for sex and gender discrimination with leave to amend. 26 D. Fourth Cause of Action: Harassment and Hostile Work Environment 27 FEHA prohibits harassment in the workplace. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1). 28 “’[H]arassment’ because of sex includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and 1 harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. Sexually 2 harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire.” Cal. Gov't 3 Code§ 12940(j)(4)(C). “Sexual harassment law in California requires an employee to 4 prove ‘severe or pervasive’ harassment.” Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., 97 5 Cal. App. 5th 865, 878 (2023) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 12923). “A single incident of 6 harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a 7 hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the 8 plaintiff's work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 9 environment.” Cal. Gov't Code § 12923(b); see also Beltran, 97 Cal. App. 5th at 878. “[A] 10 hostile work environment exists ‘when the harassing conduct sufficiently offends, 11 humiliates, distresses, or intrudes upon its victim, so as to disrupt the victim's emotional 12 tranquility in the workplace, affect the victim's ability to perform the job as usual, or 13 otherwise interfere with and undermine the victim's personal sense of well-being.’ The 14 plaintiff is not required to show a decline in productivity, only ‘that a reasonable person 15 subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the 16 harassment so altered working conditions as to ‘make it more difficult to do the job.’” 17 Beltran, 97 Cal. App. 5th at 878 (quoting Cal. Gov’t Code § 12923(a)). “The existence of 18 a hostile work environment depends upon the totality of the circumstances and a 19 discriminatory remark, even if not made directly in the context of an employment 20 decision or uttered by a nondecisionmaker, may be relevant, circumstantial evidence of 21 discrimination.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12923(c). 22 Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim fails to sufficiently allege severe or pervasive 23 harassment. Def. Mot. at 4-5. Plaintiff argues the Complaint sufficiently alleges an 24 ongoing course of harassment due to his gender, sex and disability. Pl. Opp’n at 3. 25 Plaintiff argues that the harassment created a hostile work environment because Plaintiff 26 was “’forced to work late nights’” despite his work restrictions related to his disability, 27 Plaintiff’s “employer humiliated Plaintiff by broadcasting his condition to other 28 employees,” Plaintiff was subjected to “ridicule for his disability including bullying Plaintiff 1 for not being a ‘real man,’ and even threatening Plaintiff with physical harm,” Defendant 2 ratified this behavior, and Defendant “rewarded his main tormentor by promoting him 3 over Plaintiff.” Id. (citing Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11, 45). 4 The Court agrees that Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a claim for harassment 5 and hostile work environment. Plaintiff’s general allegations do not clearly articulate the 6 incidents of harassment due to Plaintiff’s sex, gender and/or disability. The allegations 7 are conclusory, and it is unclear whether the alleged harassment “consists of conduct 8 outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for 9 personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.” 10 Roby, 47 Cal. 4th at 707 (citation omitted). Moreover, the Complaint does not sufficiently 11 allege how such harassment interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to fulfill his role as a 12 manager. See Beltran, 97 Cal. App. 5th at 878. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s 13 fourth cause of action for harassment and hostile work environment with leave to amend. 14 E. Fifth Cause of Action: Failure to Prevent Discrimination and 15 Harassment 16 Under FEHA, employers must take “all reasonable steps necessary to prevent 17 discrimination and harassment from occurring.” Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(k). A claim for 18 relief for failure to prevent discrimination and harassment is “dependent on a claim of 19 actual” discrimination and harassment. Dickson v. Burke Williams, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 20 4th 1307, 1315 (2015). “Without actionable discrimination, harassment…, there can be 21 no viable § 12940(k) claim.” Rubadeau v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 2013 WL 3356883, at 22 *14 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2013). Parties appear to agree that Plaintiff’s failure to prevent 23 discrimination and harassment claim is derivative of Plaintiff’s harassment claim. See 24 Def. Mot. at 10; Pl. Opp’n at 7-8; Def. Reply at 6 (ECF No. 10). Because Plaintiff has not 25 adequately pled his claims for discrimination and harassment, as set forth above, the 26 Court dismisses Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and 27 harassment with leave to amend. 28 / / / 1 F. Sixth Cause of Action: Retaliation 2 To assert a retaliation claim under FEHA, plaintiff must show that: (1) plaintiff 3 engaged in a protected activity; (2) plaintiff’s employer subjected him to adverse 4 employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and 5 the employer’s action. Kumar v. Alameda Cnty. Med. Ctr., 2011 WL 13244636, at *13 6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2011). “Although an employee need not formally file a charge in 7 order to qualify as being engaged in protected opposing activity, such activity must 8 oppose activity the employee reasonably believes constitutes unlawful discrimination, 9 and complaints about personal grievances or vague or conclusory remarks that fail to put 10 an employer on notice as to what conduct it should investigate will not suffice to 11 establish protected conduct.” Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1047 12 (2005). 13 Defendant argues Plaintiff’s allegations that he reported “harassing and 14 discriminatory treatment” is too vague and conclusory to adequately plead a claim for 15 retaliation. Def. Mot. at 8-10. Plaintiff argues the allegations that he was retaliated 16 against “for complaining of the unlawful behavior” and was “picked on” and “knowingly 17 promoted one of Plaintiff’s main tormentors over him” is sufficient to plead retaliation. Pl. 18 Opp’n at 6-7 (citing Compl. ¶ 11). The Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently 19 alleged a cognizable retaliation claim under FEHA. Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory 20 allegation that he “reported the harassing and discriminatory treatment” does not 21 sufficiently establish that Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity. See Compl. ¶ 57; see 22 also Dokes v. Safeway, Inc., 2018 WL 1518562, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2018) (finding 23 Plaintiff’s assertions that he was engaged in a protected activity “worth protecting” was 24 insufficient to establish he was engaged in a “protected activity” as prescribed by FEHA.) 25 Additionally, the Complaint, in its current form, fails to establish that Plaintiff’s action was 26 in opposition to a policy or practice of Defendant. See Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1047. 27 Because the Complaint does not sufficiently allege whether Plaintiff engaged in a 28 protected activity, the Court will therefore dismiss Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for 1 retaliation with leave to amend. 2 G. Seventh Cause of Action: Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses 3 California Labor Code § 2802(a) requires an employer to “indemnify his or her 4 employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct 5 consequence of the discharge of his or her duties[.]” The statute defines “necessary 6 expenditures or losses” to include “all reasonable costs.” Cal. Labor Code. § 2802(c). 7 Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for expenses incurred during the performance of Plaintiff’s 8 job duties. See Compl. ¶ 62. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim fails to identify the 9 business-related expenses incurred, thereby precluding any finding that the expenses 10 were reasonable and incurred in direct discharge of Plaintiff’s duties. Def. Mot. at 12. 11 The Court agrees. Plaintiff merely alleges expenses were incurred (Compl. ¶¶ 62-64), 12 but does not identify a single specific cost that was not reimbursed or explain why such 13 costs were required for his job. See Tavares v. Cargill Inc., 2019 WL 2918061, at *7 14 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2019) (dismissing claim for failure to reimburse business expenses 15 because plaintiff only alleged general allegations that she was not reimbursed for 16 uniforms and equipment and failed to allege “any single specific cost incurred”). Because 17 Plaintiff’s allegations are general and without any supporting factual allegations, the 18 Court dismisses Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for failure to reimburse business 19 expenses with leave to amend. 20 H. Eighth & Ninth Cause of Action: Failure to Provide Meal Breaks & 21 Failure to Provide Rest Periods 22 To establish a claim for failure to provide meal or rest breaks, plaintiff must show 23 facts specifically identifying an instance where plaintiff was deprived of a meal or rest 24 break. See Landers v. Quality Commc'ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 646 (9th Cir. 2014); see 25 also Boyack v. Regis Corp., 812 F. App'x 428, 431 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding rest break 26 claim fell short of the requirements of Landers by failing to allege a single workweek 27 where employee was impeded or discouraged from taking rest breaks). Defendant 28 argues that Plaintiff’s meal and rest period claims are conclusory and do not plead a 1 single instance of any missed meal or rest break. Def. Mot. at 10-12. The Court agrees. 2 Plaintiff’s allegations are a formulaic recitation of the governing statutory language. See 3 Compl. ¶¶ 12 (“[i]n further disregard for the law, Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff 4 for several missed rest periods and meal breaks”); 71 (“Defendant failed to relieve 5 Plaintiff of all duty for timely uninterrupted 30 minute periods and, in fact, facilitated 6 practices and procedures that impeded Plaintiff from taking interrupted meal breaks); 78 7 (“Defendant directly and or indirectly authorized and permitted Plaintiff to take rest 8 periods at all times suffered and, in fact, had practices and procedures that impeded 9 Plaintiff from taking breaks. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was not allowed all rest 10 breaks”). Because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead claims for failure to provide meal 11 breaks and rest periods, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action for failure 12 to provide meal breaks and ninth cause of action for failure to provide rest periods with 13 leave to amend. 14 I. Tenth Cause of Action: Waiting Time Penalties 15 The parties appear to agree that Plaintiff’s claim for waiting time penalties claim is 16 derivative of Plaintiff’s meal break, rest period and reimbursement claims. See Def. Mot. 17 at 12; Pl. Opp’n at 9; Def. Reply at 7. Because Plaintiff has not adequately pled his 18 claims for meal breaks, rest periods and reimbursement as set forth above, the Court 19 dismisses Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action for waiting time penalties as it relates to these 20 claims with leave to amend. See Sousa v. Walmart, Inc., 2023 WL 5278662, at *12 (E.D. 21 Cal. Aug. 16, 2023) (dismissing waiting time penalty claims due to dismissal of the 22 underlying meal break and rest period violations). 23 J. Eleventh Cause of Action: Unjust Enrichment 24 “[I]n California, there is not a standalone cause of action for unjust enrichment, 25 which is synonymous with restitution.” Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 26 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges a 27 standalone claim for unjust enrichment which is not a valid claim. See Compl. ¶¶ 87-90. 28 However, when a plaintiff alleges a standalone claim for unjust enrichment, a court “may 1 ‘construe the cause of action as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution.’” Astiana v. 2 Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Rutherford Holdings, 3 LLC v. Plaza Del Rey, 223 Cal. App. 4th 221, 231 (2014)). Even if the Court construed 4 this claim as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution, the Complaint’s conclusory and 5 vague allegations fail to sufficiently plead a claim for quasi-contract. See Compl. ¶¶ 88 6 (“[a]s a result of their breaches and wrongful acts, Defendant has been unjustly enriched 7 at Plaintiff’s expense”); 89 (Defendant has derived a benefit from its actions including 8 “withholding money that rightfully belongs to Plaintiff and failing to reimburse Plaintiff for 9 amounts due, including waiting time penalties”). Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s 10 eleventh cause of action for unjust enrichment with leave to amend to allege a quasi- 11 contract claim seeking restitution if Plaintiff can sufficiently plead such a claim. Plaintiff 12 does not have leave to amend to allege an unjust enrichment claim. 13 K. Twelfth Cause of Action: Breach of Contract 14 To establish a claim for breach of contract, plaintiff must show: (1) the existence 15 of a contract, (2) defendant's breach, (3) plaintiff's performance or excuse for 16 nonperformance, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff. Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. 17 Goldman, 51 Cal. 4th 811, 821 (2011). Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to plead the 18 terms of the contract; the Court agrees. See Def. Mot. at 12. Plaintiff generally alleges 19 the violation of a contract but does not sufficiently allege which specific employment 20 agreement is at issue. Based on the specific provisions identified (Compl. ¶¶ 93-94), 21 Plaintiff appears to allege violations of an employee handbook, policy or manual. See Pl. 22 Opp’n at 9-10. Because the Court cannot identify which actions violated the terms of a 23 specific contract, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. The Court also notes 24 that “[u]nless the parties contract otherwise, employment relationships in California are 25 ordinarily ‘at will,’ meaning that an employer can discharge an employee for any reason.” 26 See Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff may not 27 bring a breach of contract claim predicated on the termination of at-will employment. 28 Kasbarian v. Equinox Holdings, Inc., 739 F. App'x 397, 399 (9th Cir. 2018). For these 1 reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s twelfth cause of action for breach of contract with 2 leave to amend. 3 L. Thirteenth Cause of Action: Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith 4 and Fair Dealing 5 To establish a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, plaintiff must 6 show that: (1) the parties entered into a contract; (2) plaintiff fulfilled his obligations under 7 the contract; (3) any conditions precedent to defendant's performance occurred; 8 (4) defendant unfairly interfered with plaintiff's rights to receive the benefits of the 9 contract; and (5) plaintiff was harmed by defendant's conduct. Reinhardt v. Gemini Motor 10 Transp., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1145 (E.D. Cal. 2012). “Importantly, to state a claim for 11 breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must identify the 12 specific contractual provision that was frustrated.” Ahmadi v. United Cont'l Holdings, Inc., 13 2014 WL 2565924, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2014) (internal quotation and citation 14 omitted). Here, the Complaint does not identify the specific contract Defendant’s conduct 15 frustrates. Without reference to a contract, the Court cannot evaluate whether Plaintiff 16 sufficiently pleads this claim. See Ahmadi, 2014 WL 2565924, at *6. Therefore, the Court 17 dismisses Plaintiff’s thirteenth cause of action for breach of covenant of good faith and 18 fair dealing with leave to amend. 19 M. Fourteenth Cause of Action: Unfair Business Practice 20 Parties appear to agree that Plaintiff’s claim for unfair business practice claim is 21 derivative of Plaintiff’s other state law claims. See Def. Mot. at 13; Pl. Opp’n at 11; Def. 22 Reply at 8. Because Plaintiff has not adequately pled his other state law claims, the 23 Court dismisses Plaintiff’s fourteenth cause of action for unfair business practice with 24 leave to amend. See Lefevre v. Pac. Bell Directory, 2014 WL 5810530, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 25 Nov. 7, 2014) (dismissing unfair business practice claim due to dismissal of underlying 26 wage and hour law claims). 27 N. Fifteenth Cause of Action: Wrongful Termination 28 “[W]hile an at-will employee may be terminated for no reason, or for an arbitrary 1 or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate for an unlawful reason or a 2 || purpose that contravenes fundamental public policy.” Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 27 Cal. 3 | 4th 1097, 1104 (2002). To establish a claim for wrongful termination, plaintiff must show: 4 | (1) plaintiff was terminated; and (2) plaintiff's dismissal violated a policy that is 5 | fundamental, beneficial for the public and embodied in a statute or constitutional 6 || provision. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 1256 (1994). A constructive 7 | discharge may provide the basis for a wrongful termination claim in violation of public 8 || policy “when the employer's conduct effectively forces an employee to resign.” /d. at 9 | 1244. The parties appear to agree that Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim is derivative 10 | of Plaintiff's underlying FEHA claims. See Def. Mot. at 10; PI. Opp’n at 7-8; Def. Reply at 11 | 6. Because Plaintiff has not adequately pled his underlying FEHA claims as set forth 12 || above, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's fifteenth cause of action for wrongful termination 13 | with leave to amend. 14 | IV. CONCLUSION 15 For the reasons provided above, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 16 1. Defendant's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 4) is GRANTED; 17 2. The Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) is DISMISSED; 18 3. Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE to file an amended complaint as provided 19 above within thirty (80) days of this Order; 20 4. lf Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, it should be titled “First 21 Amended Complaint” with reference to the appropriate case number. An 22 amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any 23 prior pleading. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967); E.D. Cal. 24 Local Rule 220. If Plaintiff does not timely file an amended complaint, this 25 will be interpreted as consent to dismissal of this action. 26 27 || Dated: January 15, 2025 C iy S 28 | 4, cana3295.24 CHI S00 KIM 15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE