UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 26-mc-46-EGS-MAU
MEAGHAN BACA, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case arises from a fatal collision that occurred in Bernalillo County, New Mexico,
about which litigation is pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. ECF
No. 1-1 at 17; 1 see Canal Ins. Co. v. Tao Express, LLC, et. al. (24-cv-01130-SCY-KK). Meaghan
Baca is one of the defendants in that case. Before this Court is Baca’s Motion to Compel
Compliance with Subpoena, seeking to have non-party U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) produce certain information related to Baca’s opposition to declaratory
judgment in the underlying action. ECF No. 1. The District Court referred this case to this Court
for full case management. See Min. Order (Apr. 23, 2026). For the following reasons, the Court
recommends GRANTING Baca’s Motion.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Summary
The underlying action concerns the following allegations. On November 17, 2023, box
truck driver Marco Vasquez-Pena rear-ended a pickup truck. ECF No. 1-1 at 20. The driver of the
1 Citations are to the page numbers in the ECF headers. 1 pickup truck, Steve Cox, suffered catastrophic injuries and died. Id. at 20. Tao Express and
Amazon controlled the box truck Vasquez-Pena drove at the time of the accident. Id. at 80. Dairon
Enrrique Aleman Quintana is the sole owner and manager of Tao Express, a company insured by
Canal Insurance, Inc. (“Canal”). Id. at 19.
Baca is the personal representative of Cox’s estate. Id. at 20. Baca and other individuals
connected to Cox sued Tao Express, Vasquez-Pena, Amazon, and several other parties in New
Mexico state court for wrongful death, personal injuries, loss of consortium, and other damages.
Id. at 11, 54, 62. Canal moved for declaratory judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Mexico. Id. at 17. Canal contends that it does not owe a duty to defend or indemnify Tao
Express or Vasquez-Pena because Tao Express failed to cooperate with the investigation and
because Tao Express and Vasquez-Pena failed to report the accident, claim, and loss, among other
reasons. Id. at 33. Canal’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is pending before the District
Court in New Mexico. Baca has filed a Motion for Extension of Time to respond under Rule 56(d),
pending her ability to obtain evidence it seeks in this case. ECF No. 1 at 5.
Baca’s attorney investigated Quintana’s whereabouts with the goal of discussing his
cooperation in the underlying action. ECF No. 1-1 at 11–12. During this investigation, Quintana’s
attorneys advised that they believed Quintana “had been deported, possibly to his country of origin,
Cuba.” Id. at 11. Baca’s attorney then attempted to verify this information through the ICE
Information Center Hotline Call Center (“Hotline”). Id. Baca’s attorney reports that an individual
on the Hotline orally confirmed that Quintana had been deported. Id.
Baca claims that the information she seeks about Quintana’s detention and deportation
explains why Quintana had not informed Canal of the accident or cooperated with this
investigation, providing a defense to overcome Canal’s motion for declaratory judgment. ECF No.
2 1 at ¶¶ 15, 16 (citing authority to argue that insurers are not justified in denying coverage to insured
parties that are incapacitated). Baca thus seeks this information in a format that is admissible as
evidence to defend against Canal. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 13.
II. Procedural History
On November 25, 2025, Baca served a Rule 45 subpoena on ICE to Produce Documents,
Information, or Objects to Permit Inspection of Premises in a Civil Action, specifically seeking
any and all documentation identifying Quintana’s date of deportation and the country to which
Quintana was deported. ECF No. 1-1 at 2, 5. This subpoena commanded ICE to produce these
documents on December 12, 2025. Id. at 2. On December 9, 2025, ICE responded to Baca
explaining that, under its Touhy regulations, 6 C.F.R. §§ 5.41 to 5.49, ICE could not provide the
requested information without a more detailed request that “set forth in writing, and with as much
specificity as possible, the nature and relevance of the official information sought.” ECF No. 1-1
at 7–8 (quoting 6 C.F.R. § 5.45 (2026)).
On January 28, 2026, Baca provided ICE with a more detailed explanation of the nature
and relevance of the requested documentation. ECF No. 1-1 at 10–12. A few weeks later, on
February 9, 2026, Baca sent a letter to ICE following up on her January 28 request and modifying
her initial request to also include any documentation related to Quintana’s date of detention. ECF
No. 1-1 at 203. ICE rejected Baca’s request on February 12, 2026, asserting that 6 C.F.R. § 5.48(a)
(2026) and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 522a, preclude DHS from disclosing information
concerning an individual without that individual’s consent or a court order. ECF No. 1-1 at 210–
11. Accordingly, Baca moved in this Court to compel ICE to comply with her subpoena and
provide the requested documentation regarding Quintana’s date of detention, date of deportation,
and location of deportation. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 14, 19.
3 ANALYSIS
I. The Parties’ Arguments
Baca advances four arguments to support her Motion: (1) the requested discovery is
relevant to the underlying action; (2) the requested discovery does not pose an undue burden for
ICE; (3) ICE’s Touhy regulations, 6 C.F.R. § 5.48(a), do not prohibit disclosure of the requested
documents; and (4) the requested discovery, if ordered by this Court, falls within an exception to
the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(12), because the information is compelled pursuant to a court
order. See ECF No. 1 at 8–12. When arguing that the requested discovery is relevant and not
unduly burdensome, Baca repeatedly emphasizes that the response to the subpoena will likely
amount to two to three pages in total, that ICE has already provided this information orally through
its Hotline, and that this information is critical to overcoming Canal’s motion for declaratory
judgment in the underlying action. ECF Nos. 1 at 8–9; 5 at ¶¶ 3–8. For the Touhy regulations,
Baca argues that the factors contained in the regulations show that, on balance, they do not prohibit
disclosure. ECF No. 1 at 9–11. Finally, when addressing the Privacy Act, Baca explains that she
cannot secure Quintana’s written consent, asks for the Court’s order as an exception to the Privacy
Act, and expresses that she “would not oppose a protective order, in camera inspection, or notice
period should the Court determine that to be appropriate.” Id. at 11–12; see ECF No. 5 at ¶ 12.
According to ICE, the requested discovery is prohibited by its Touhy regulations and is in
violation of the Privacy Act, although ICE does not make much of an argument beyond generally
citing those authorities. See ECF No. 4 at 6–7. In conclusory fashion, ICE asserts that the
discovery would be unduly burdensome, ICE should not be involved in litigation between private
parties, it should concentrate on its core duties and responsibilities, and it cannot disclose the
requested information without Quintana’s written consent. Id. Notably, as Baca points out, ICE
4 quotes a portion of the Privacy Act, but excludes the relevant portion that addresses the Act’s
numerous exceptions. ECF Nos. 4 at 7; 5 at ¶ 12. Although ICE does not directly respond to
Baca’s request for this Court to order disclosure as an exception to the Privacy Act, ICE does state
that the Privacy Act precludes disclosure “without that individual’s prior notarized consent or an
appropriate court order.” ECF No. 4 at 7 (emphasis added).
II. Standard of Review
Rule 45 governs third party subpoenas. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. A Rule 45 subpoena may
command a third party to produce documents or electronically stored information. Fed. R. Civ. P.
45(c)(2)(A). If the third party objects to the subpoena, the party seeking discovery “may move the
court for the district where compliance is required for an order compelling production or
inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i). When considering a Rule 45 motion to compel, a court
“must first consider whether the discovery sought is relevant to a party’s claim or defense in the
underlying litigation, as defined by Rule 26(b)(1).” BuzzFeed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 318 F.
Supp. 3d 347, 356 (D.D.C. 2018). The party seeking discovery bears the burden of showing that
the request is sufficiently relevant. Tequila Centinela, S.A. de C.V. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 242
F.R.D. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2007). If the requested discovery is relevant, the court then considers
objections to the subpoena under Rule 45, including whether it poses an undue burden on the third
party. BuzzFeed, 318 F. Supp. at 356. The burden falls on the party resisting discovery to show
that compliance would be unduly burdensome. In re Micron Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 264 F.R.D. 7,
9 (D.D.C. 2010).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) governs the scope and limits of discovery. Unless
limited by court order, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering,”
5 among other factors, 2 “the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). Discovery is relevant “if there is any possibility that the information sought may be
relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” In re Denture Cream Prods. Liab. Litig., 292 F.R.D.
120, 123 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Hesco Bastion Ltd. v. Greenberg Traurig LLP, No. 09-0357, 2009
WL 5216932, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2009) (citation omitted)). In the discovery context, relevance
is “liberally construed.” Id. It is not, however, “so liberal as to allow a party to roam in shadow
zones of relevancy and to explore matter which does not presently appear germane on the theory
that it might conceivably become so.” St. John v. Napolitano, 274 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2011)
(quoting Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 103 F.3d 1007,
1012 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
Courts must quash or modify a subpoena that subjects a third party to an undue burden,
even if the subpoena is relevant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3). This standard requires district courts
“to be generally sensitive to the costs imposed upon third parties.” Watts v. S.E.C., 482 F.3d 501,
509 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The relevance factors set forth in Rule 26(b)(1) and (2) also assist in
determining whether discovery creates an undue burden. See id.; see also In re Motion to Compel
Compliance with Subpoena Directed to Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 257 F.R.D. 12, 18 (D.D.C 2009).
The heavy burden of demonstrating that the requested discovery would be unduly burdensome
falls on the party resisting discovery. Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 180 F.R.D. 168, 173, 176
(D.D.C. 1998).
2 Other listed factors are “the importance of issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources . . . and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 6 The Federal Housekeeping Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 301, authorizes government agencies to
create procedures for responding to subpoenas. In re Dep’t of Veteran’s Affairs, 257 F.R.D. at 15.
Known as Touhy regulations, these provisions do not “alter the procedures set forth in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or . . . preclude the production of documents ‘that are relevant to a
judicial proceeding.’” S.E.C. v. Selden, 484 F. Supp. 2d 105, 107 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting U.S. ex
rel. Touhy, 340 U.S. 462, 471 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Touhy regulations do not
authorize a federal agency to withhold documents from a federal court. Houston Business Journal,
Inc. v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 86 F.3d 1208, 1212 (D.C. Cir.
1996). Nor do they “confer a separate privilege upon the government” or “create a special basis
to withhold information pursuant to a federal subpoena.” In re Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 257
F.R.D. at 15.
III. The Requested Information is Relevant and Not Unduly Burdensome.
At the outset, it is important to note that, although ICE argues that the subpoena should be
quashed, it did not move to quash.
A. Baca demonstrates that the information is relevant.
Baca carries her burden of showing that the requested discovery is relevant to the
underlying action, having shown that the information in an admissible format would help her
overcome Canal’s declaratory judgment action. ECF Nos. 1 at 8–9, 5 at ¶¶ 4–6. Because Baca
seeks information directly related to her defense against Canal, namely, that Tao Express could not
cooperate or notify Canal because its sole owner had been deported, the requested information
falls within the scope of Rule 26’s relevance standard. See In re Denture Cream Prods. Liab. Litig.,
292 F.R.D. at 124–25 (determining that requested discovery was relevant and discoverable because
7 the defendants demonstrated that the requested materials were potentially relevant to the plaintiff’s
claims). Moreover, ICE does not make any meaningful argument that the information is irrelevant.
B. ICE fails to show that the information is unduly burdensome.
As the party resisting discovery, ICE bears the heavy burden of demonstrating how the
requested information would pose an undue burden. See In re Micron Tech, 264 F.R.D. at 9. Here,
ICE has failed to carry that burden. ICE fails to introduce an affidavit or otherwise show with any
specificity how or why producing the requested documents would be unduly burdensome. ICE’s
only argument as to undue burden is that “Defendant is seeking information concerning a third-
party individual’s immigration status and present location.” ECF No. 4 at 6–7. ICE’s lack of any
affirmative description of how gathering and producing the three requested records would pose an
undue burden stands in stark contrast with Linder, where the court found a discovery request was
unduly burdensome based upon the Central Intelligence Agency’s affidavit explaining that
discovery would involve 27 man years of effort to hand search more than one million records. 180
F.R.D. at 175–76. Even then, the Linder court modified the requested discovery to documents
generated within a two-year window rather than quash the subpoena outright. Id. at 176.
Baca, on the other hand, states that “[t]he records cannot be obtained from some other
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive: these are records that would
solely be in ICE’s possession.” ECF No. 5 at ¶ 7. Baca also explains that the issues are directly
relevant to the issues in the underlying action and that it should not be burdensome for ICE to
produce an estimated two to three records. Id.; ECF No. 1 at 8–9. Additionally, Baca points out
that “producing the records along with a records custodian affidavit would avoid the need for an
ICE employee to be deposed or to testify at trial in the Underlying Action.” ECF No. 5 at ¶ 8.
8 IV. The Touhy Regulations Do Not Prevent ICE’s Compliance.
ICE’s arguments under the Touhy regulations are also largely conclusory and lack any
evidentiary support. The only argument that ICE makes with any specificity is that the Touhy
regulations bar compliance where such compliance “would violate a statute or regulation.” ECF
No. 4 at 7 (citing 6 C.F.R. § 5.48(b)). The Court addresses that argument in the next Section.
ICE’s Touhy regulations identify eight factors that Department officials and attorneys
consider when deciding how to respond to a subpoena:
(1) Whether such compliance would be unduly burdensome or otherwise inappropriate under the applicable rules of discovery or the rules of procedure governing the case or matter in which the demand arose; (2) Whether the compliance is appropriate under the relevant substantive law concerning privilege or disclosure of information; (3) The public interest; (4) The need to conserve the time of Department employees for the conduct of official business; (5) The need to avoid spending the time and money of the United States for private purposes; (6) The need to maintain impartiality between private litigants in cases where a substantial government interest is not implicated; (7) Whether compliance would have an adverse effect on performance by the Department of its mission and duties; and (8) The need to avoid involving the Department in controversial issues not related to its mission. 6 C.F.R. § 5.48(a). Additionally, ICE’s Touhy regulations note that “compliance will not ordinarily
be authorized . . . [when] compliance would violate a statute or a rule of procedure.” 6 C.F.R.
§ 5.48(b)(1).
Baca applies individual Touhy factors to her case to demonstrate that they have, on balance,
been satisfied. See ECF No. 1 at 9–11. But in cases involving agencies’ decisions not to comply
with subpoenas under their respective Touhy regulations, courts typically do not undertake a factor-
by-factor analysis. See, e.g., In re Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 257 F.R.D. at 15–16 (rejecting the
Department of Veterans Affairs’ argument that the agency’s Touhy regulations provide the
9 appropriate standard for determining whether it must comply with the subpoena without
considering each factor individually, and instead applying Rule 45 to find the subpoena unduly
burdensome). Touhy regulations do not create a new framework for responding to and complying
with subpoenas, and “neither the Federal Housekeeping Statute nor the Touhy decision authorizes
a federal agency to withhold documents from a federal court.” Houston Business Journal, 86 F.3d
at 1212. Indeed, “the Supreme Court in Touhy assumed a federal agency could be subject to a
third-party subpoena duces tecum, for otherwise the agency would not need to promulgate
regulations for centralizing its response to such a subpoena.” Yousuf v. Samantar, 451 F.3d 248,
257 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Instead, agency resistance to producing documents is reviewed under Rule
45. Chen v. Ho, 368 F. Supp. 2d 97, 99 (D.D.C. 2005). As discussed above, Baca has shown that
the information she seeks is both relevant and not unduly burdensome, and none of ICE’s
arguments regarding its Touhy regulations serve to bar the discovery Baca seeks.
V. The Privacy Act.
ICE argues that it cannot release the relevant records without violating the Privacy Act
because ICE has not received Quintana’s written and notarized consent regarding the release of his
private information. ECF No. 4 at 8. The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 522a(b), provides that:
No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be— . . . (12) pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
According to the D.C. Circuit, “subpoenas—grand jury or otherwise—do not qualify as ‘orders of
a court of competent jurisdiction’ under [the Privacy Act]), unless they are specifically approved
by a court.” Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (cleaned up) (emphasis added).
“[R]ecords can be disclosed only if they come within a legitimate exception to the Privacy Act,
10 e.g., a written request by the head of another agency or an authentic ‘order of the court.’” Doe v.
Stephens, 851 F.2d 1457, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
By granting Baca’s motion to compel and requiring ICE to produce the requested
documents, this Court’s order will fall squarely under the Privacy Act’s exception for “order[s] of
a court of competent jurisdiction.” 5 U.S.C. § 522a(b)(12). In creating this exception, “Congress
has expressly permitted court-ordered disclosure” of materials otherwise protected by the Privacy
Act. Laxalt v. McClatchy, 809 F.2d 885, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Although “the District Court’s
supervisory responsibilities may in many cases be weightier than in the usual discovery context”
when the Privacy Act is at issue, discovery proceeds through the normal process, with Rule 26’s
relevance standard providing the test for discoverability. Laxalt, 809 F.2d at 889. As the district
court observed on remand, Laxalt stands for the principle that “a court may order the production
of documents otherwise protected by the Privacy Act if they are relevant.” Laxalt v. McClatchy,
No. 86-0051, 1987 WL 1361998, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 1987). Therefore, for a court to properly
order discovery of Privacy Act-protected material, the party requesting the discovery need not
prove anything beyond demonstrating relevance to the underlying litigation to warrant a court
order. Laxalt, 809 F.2d at 889.
As discussed above, Baca has demonstrated how the requested discovery is relevant to her
defense in the underlying action. Because the Court recommends granting Baca’s motion to
compel and ordering ICE to produce the requested documents, that court order will satisfy the
exception in 5 U.S.C. § 522a(b)(12), allowing for disclosure of the requested material. See Laxalt,
809 F.2d at 888–89. For these reasons, the Court recommends granting Baca’s motion and
compelling ICE to produce the requested documents.
11 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends GRANTING Baca’s Motion to Compel
Compliance with Subpoena. The Court further recommends that the District Court order ICE to
produce the information Baca seeks subject to the condition that the parties will use it only for
purposes of the underlying litigation and, if necessary, seek to file it under seal in the relevant
court.
SO ORDERED.
Date: July 31, 2026 ____________________________________ MOXILA A. UPADHYAYA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
12 Local Civil Rule 72.3(b) Notice
The Parties are advised that under the provisions of Local Rule 72.3(b), any Party who objects to
a Report and Recommendation must file a written objection with the Clerk of Court within fourteen
days of the party’s receipt of the Report and Recommendation. The written objections must
specifically identify the portion of the report or recommendation to which objection is made and
the basis for such objections. Failure to file timely objections to the findings and recommendations
set forth in this Report may waive that party’s right of appeal from an order of the District Court
that adopts such findings and recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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