Camden County Democratic Committee, Inc. v. Susan Druckenbrod

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: April 17, 2026
• Docket: A-3621-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3621-24

CAMDEN COUNTY DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE, INC. and JAMES BEACH,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

SUSAN DRUCKENBROD, RENA MARGULIS, and DAVID STAHL,

Defendants-Appellants. _____________________________

Submitted March 18, 2026 – Decided April 17, 2026

Before Judges Mayer, Gummer and Paganelli.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-2089-25.

Bromberg Law LLC, attorney for appellants (Yael Bromberg, on the briefs).

Brown & Connery, LLP, attorneys for respondents (William M. Tambussi, of counsel and on the brief; Michael J. Miles, on the brief). Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for amicus curiae Attorney General of the State of New Jersey (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christina Brandt-Young, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief; Jennifer Lerman, Michelle Kostyack, and Nancy Trasande, Deputy Attorneys General, on the brief).

Jardim Meisner Salmon Sprague & Susser PC, attorneys for amicus curiae Good Government Coalition of New Jersey (Scott D. Salmon, of counsel and on the brief; Julia Burzynski, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendants Susan Druckenbrod, David Stahl, and Rena Margulis appeal

from a July 11, 2025 order enjoining them from conducting an organizational

meeting of the Cherry Hill Democratic Committee (Cherry Hill Committee) and

other post-election activities after their June 10, 2025 election as Cherry Hill

Committee members. Defendants ran as the South Jersey Progressive

Democrats (Progressive Democrats) to fill seventy-four seats for the Cherry Hill

Committee.

Plaintiffs Camden County Democratic Committee, Inc. and its Chairman

James Beach challenged the June 10, 2025 election results, arguing defendants

won only three out of seventy-four seats on the Cherry Hill Committee.

Therefore, plaintiffs claimed seventy-one seats remained vacant. Plaintiffs

asserted the seventy-one vacant seats should be filled from the seventy-four

A-3621-24 2 candidates who had run as a slate for the Camden County Democratic Committee

(CCDC) in the June 2025 election. After entering an order to show cause

(OTSC) and considering the parties' arguments, the judge enjoined defendants

from taking any post-election organizational activities and directed the CCDC

to fill seventy-one vacant seats from its slate of unsuccessful candidates. We

reverse.

The Cherry Hill Committee consists of seventy-four members

representing Cherry Hill's interests on the larger CCDC. The ballot design for

the June 10, 2025 election for the Cherry Hill Committee was different from the

ballot format used in prior elections.

The June 2025 ballot did not have an oval "to the left or to the right of the

name of each candidate." N.J.S.A. 19:23-23.2(a)(1).1 Instead of seventy-four

ovals for each of the seventy-four candidates vying for office, the voters were

given two options. The voters were instructed to "Vote for One" of two slates—

the Progressive Democrats or the CCDC. The Progressive Democrats ran a slate

of three individuals. The CCDC ran a slate of seventy-four people. In

1 The ballot design was not challenged by the parties to this appeal. The issue was presented in the briefs submitted by amici. Generally, amici "cannot raise issues not raised by the parties." Chipola v. Flannery, 261 N.J. 460, 466 (2025) (quoting State v. O'Driscoll, 215 N.J. 461, 479 (2013)). A-3621-24 3 accordance with the ballot instructions, Cherry Hill voters selected between the

two groups rather than seventy-four candidates individually.

The Cherry Hill voters elected the Progressive Democrats over the CCDC

candidates by a vote of 5,547 to 3,350, or 62.3% of the votes cast. Because only

three candidates were listed for the Progressive Democrats, seventy-one seats

remained vacant.

Defendants, as the duly elected members to the Cherry Hill Committee,

sought to fill the vacant seventy-one seats under N.J.S.A. 19:5-2. Defendants

circulated an interest form to solicit residents of Cherry Hill who might be

interested in filling those vacancies. About eighty Cherry Hill residents

responded.

Two weeks after the election, plaintiffs filed a verified complaint and an

OTSC to prevent defendants from acting as the Cherry Hill Committee by filling

vacancies, adopting bylaws, and holding a post-election organizational meeting.

Defendants filed a brief in response to the OTSC. The judge granted a motion

by the New Jersey Attorney General to appear as amicus curiae and file a brief

in support of defendants' position.

On the return date of the OTSC, the judge entered the July 11, 2025 order

granting plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief. In the order, the judge enjoined

A-3621-24 4 defendants "from conducting an organizational meeting of the Cherry Hill . . .

Committee, adopting bylaws for the Cherry Hill . . . Committee, or attempting

to fill the [seventy-one] open seats on the Cherry Hill . . . Committee." The

order further allowed "the members of the CCDC residing in Cherry Hill" to

"fill the [seventy-one] vacancies on the Cherry Hill . . . Committee from among

the [seventy-four] candidates who have thus received the same number of votes

at the primary in accordance with N.J.S.A. 19:13-20(c)."2

The issue before the trial court was whether N.J.S.A. 19:5-2 and -3

governed the results of a June 2025 county and municipal democratic committee

election as defendants argued or, as plaintiffs argued, N.J.S.A. 19:13-20

governed.

Because this election was labeled a primary election, the judge found

N.J.S.A. 19:13-20 applied. The judge determined N.J.S.A. 19:5-2 and -3 applied

only in situations where "somebody is elected and dies, . . . leaves Cherry Hill,

moves to Mongolia, whatever it is." Although the judge agreed the situation

was "not a perfect fit" under the language of N.J.S.A. 19:13-20, he concluded

that statute was "close enough." The judge found "what happened in Cherry Hill

2 The judge entered an August 8, 2025 consent order staying the July 11 order pending the outcome of this appeal. A-3621-24 5 with this election . . . there's no precedent for it" and "[t]here's no case law in

terms of how to deal with it. . . ."

The judge determined the June 10, 2025 election for Cherry Hill

Committee resulted in a "tie." The judge explained the "tie" was "unusual"

because it involved seventy-four individuals; however, voters had only two

election slates from which to choose. The judge held defendants had finished

in first, second, and third places "without the bracketing" per the ballot's design,

which placed defendants in a three-way tie for first place. He found all but three

of the CCDC candidates "finished [four]th through [seventy-four]th." The judge

determined the "equitable result" meant three seats went to defendants and the

remaining seats should be filled by the CCDC candidates.

The judge accepted that there was no statutory requirement to run a full

ticket of seventy-four candidates for the Cherry Hill Committee election.

However, he rejected defendants' argument that a quorum could be calculated

from the three elected Progressive Democrats rather than a quorum based on the

entire seventy-four-person membership. The judge found defendants' argument

"defeat[ed] the purpose of having a quorum requirement" because if only "one

person gets elected," that person would have "a lifelong built-in quorum" and if

A-3621-24 6 three people were elected, then "one person" would still "always . . . be a

quorum."

On appeal, defendants contend the judge should have applied N.J.S.A.

19:5-2 and -3 rather than N.J.S.A. 19:13-20. Additionally, defendants assert the

applicable statutes do not require a quorum of members to fill the seventy-one

vacant seats on the Cherry Hill Committee. Defendants also argue the judge

"retroactively chang[ed] elections laws" after the election, resulting in "election

subversion."

In support of defendants' position, the Attorney General argues the judge

erred "by disrupting the rules for filling vacancies after the election," thereby

"thwarting the expressed will of the voters." The Attorney General further

asserts the law "requires these vacancies to be filled by the three duly elected

Committee members." The Good Government Coalition of New Jersey 3 echoes

the Attorney General's arguments in support of defendants' appeal.

This case presents a question of law involving principles of statutory

interpretation. We review matters involving statutory interpretation de novo.

Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019) (citing State v. Fuqua,

3 In a November 12, 2025 order, we granted a motion by the Good Government Coalition of New Jersey to participate as amicus curiae on behalf of defendants. A-3621-24 7 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018)). A "trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal

consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special

deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J.

366, 378 (1995). Our de novo review of a judge's analysis of a statute does not

accord deference to "mistaken" "interpretive conclusions of statutes." Scaduto

v. Dep't of Env't Prot., 474 N.J. Super. 427, 435 (App. Div. 2023) (citing

Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013)).

"Principles of statutory construction require 'that a statute must be

interpreted in light of its common law antecedents.'" In re Commitment of B.L.,

346 N.J. Super. 285, 301-02 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Johnson Mach. Co. v.

Manville Sales Corp., 248 N.J. Super. 285, 306 (App. Div. 1991)). "[A]

legislative body in this State is presumed to be familiar not only with the

statutory law of the State, but also with the common law." Id. at 302 (quoting

Magierowski v. Buckley, 39 N.J. Super. 534, 554 (App. Div. 1956)).

The courts are to "apply [a] statute as enacted." DiProspero v. Penn, 183

N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (quoting In re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., 83 N.J.

540, 548 (1980)). "It is not the function of th[e c]ourt to 'rewrite a plainly-

written enactment,'" add language, or "engage in conjecture or surmise which

will circumvent the plain meaning of the act." Ibid. (first quoting O'Connell v.

A-3621-24 8 State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002); and then quoting Jamesburg High Sch., 83 N.J.

at 548). Courts interpret a statute's words according to "their 'generally accepted

meaning.'" Kocanowski, 237 N.J. at 9 (quoting Spade v. Select Comfort Corp.,

232 N.J. 504, 514-15 (2018)). "If the plain language of a statute is clear, our

task is complete." Musker v. Suuchi, Inc., 260 N.J. 178, 186 (2025) (quoting

Savage v. Twp. of Neptune, 257 N.J. 204, 215 (2024)).

"The Elections Clause of the United States Constitution grants the State

with the right and ability to make laws concerning the time, place, and manner

of elections." N.J.S.A. 19:23-23.1(a); accord U.S. Const. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1. When

a case implicates "New Jersey election laws, [courts] are directed by principle

and precedent to construe those laws so as to preserve the paramount right of

the voters to exercise the franchise." N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson,

175 N.J. 178, 190 (2002). Consistent with that principle and case law, courts

"construe statutes that govern elections liberally." Johnson v. Wilkerson, 262

N.J. 75, 81 (2025) (citing Kilmurray v. Gilfert, 10 N.J. 435, 440-41 (1952)). The

term "liberal" in the context of elections is construed "to allow the greatest scope

for public participation in the electoral process, to allow candidates to get on the

ballot, to allow parties to put their candidates on the ballot, and most importantly

A-3621-24 9 to allow the voters a choice on Election Day." Ibid. (quoting Catania v. Haberle,

123 N.J. 438, 448 (1990)).

Here, as a matter of law, the judge was required to apply the proper statute

reflecting the voters' choice for the filling of vacancies for municipal and county

democratic committee members after the Camden County June 2025 election.

N.J.S.A. 19:5-2, which governs vacancies on municipal committees, provides:

"a vacancy in the office of a member of a municipal committee of any political

party, howsoever caused, shall be filled for the unexpired term by the remaining

members of the committee in the municipality in which the vacancy occurs."

(Emphasis added). Consistent with its plain meaning, this statute applies when

there is a vacancy "howsoever" the vacancy arises. Ibid.

N.J.S.A. 19:5-3 governs the filling of vacancies on county committees for

political parties. The statute provides:

A vacancy in the office of a member of the county committee of any political party, caused by death, resignation, failure to elect, or removal for cause, shall be filled for the unexpired term by the municipal committee of the municipality wherein the vacancy occurs, if there is such a committee[.]

[N.J.S.A. 19:5-3 (emphasis added).]

Under N.J.S.A. 19:5-3, elected members of municipal party committees

are responsible for filling vacancies on the county party committee within their

A-3621-24 10 municipality.4 As N.J.S.A. 19:5-2 directs, the elected municipal party

committee members are to fill a vacancy "howsoever" caused. Under N.J.S.A.

19:5-3, one of the reasons for a vacancy is the voters' "failure to elect" someone

to fill a seat. The statute's "failure to elect" language has been unchanged by the

Legislature for nearly a century despite the Legislature regularly amending the

election statutes over the years.

There is no quorum requirement under N.J.S.A. 19:5-2 or -3 for the filling

of political party committee vacancies. Instead, case law provides a "majority

of a public body constitutes a quorum." N.J. Election L. Enf't Comm'n v.

DiVincenzo, 445 N.J. Super. 187, 199 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Matawan Reg'l

Tchrs. Ass'n v. Matawan-Aberdeen Reg'l Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 223 N.J.

Super. 504, 507 (App. Div. 1988)). "Under the common law quorum rule, any

position left vacant, . . . is not counted to determine what the legal quorum is."

Id. at 200. "The common law rule applies absent a 'pertinent statute to the

contrary.'" Ibid. (quoting King v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 205 N.J. Super. 411,

415 (App. Div. 1985)).

4 In Camden County, the county committee consists of elected members of the municipal committees. A-3621-24 11 The parties do not dispute there are seventy-one vacancies on the Cherry

Hill Committee after the June 2025 election. Defendants, who were elected by

the voters in Cherry Hill, can constitute a quorum. Consistent with settled case

law, the existence of a quorum can be determined based on defendants, the three

individuals who were elected by the voters in Cherry Hill to conduct themselves

as the Cherry Hill Committee. A quorum of that duly elected committee is

empowered to fill the vacant seats. There is no statute to the contrary.

Here, instead of applying N.J.S.A. 19:5-2 and -3, the judge found N.J.S.A.

19:13-20 governed the June 2025 election for the Cherry Hill Committee.

However, N.J.S.A. 19:13-20 applies to vacancies and ties in a primary election

where there is a subsequent general election. Specifically, N.J.S.A. 19:13 -20

governs the filling of vacancies "howsoever caused, among candidates

nominated at a primary election for the general election, which vacancy shall

occur not later than the [seventieth] day before the general election, or in the

event of an inability to select a candidate because of a tie vote at such primary."

(Emphasis added).

A review of the case law evidences N.J.S.A. 19:13-20 applies only in

those situations where a vacancy exists after the primary election and the

vacancy must be filled before the general election. See Samson, 175 N.J. at 194

A-3621-24 12 (stating there is "no question but that the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 19:13 -20

'to afford the various election officials sufficient time in which to attend to the

mechanics of preparing for the general election'") (quoting Kilmurray, 10 N.J.

at 440). Plaintiffs cited no case law applying N.J.S.A. 19:13-20 to vacancies in

elections for municipal and county committee members.

Having reviewed the statutes, we conclude N.J.S.A. 19:5-2 and -3 govern

the filling of the seventy-one vacancies on the Cherry Hill Committee. The June

2025 ballot had only two ovals. One of the ovals reflected a slate of three

candidates, representing the Progressive Democrats, and another oval reflected

a slate of seventy-four candidates, representing the CCDC. The majority of

voters selected the oval demarcating the Progressive Democrats to serve as

elected members on the Cherry Hill Committee. The election result left a failure

to elect candidates for the remaining seventy-one seats.

The seventy-one unfilled seats on the Cherry Hill Committee were vacant

"howsoever caused" under N.J.S.A. 19:5-2. Specifically, the cause of the

seventy-one vacancies was a "failure to elect" all seventy-four members to

committee positions under N.J.S.A. 19:5-3. Defendants, as the individuals

elected to serve on the Cherry Hill Committee, could constitute a quorum of the

municipal committee. Therefore, under N.J.S.A. 19:5-2, the seventy-one

A-3621-24 13 vacancies on the Cherry Hill Committee are to be filled by defendants as the

elected members.

In this matter, there was only one election for municipal and county

committee members. That election was held on June 10, 2025. Although

labeled a "primary election," no subsequent general election for municipal and

county committee members took place. Whoever won the June 10, 2025 election

for committee persons did not advance to a general election. Because N.J.S.A.

19:13-20 applies to vacancies in the party nominations for public office to be

filled at the general election, the judge misstepped by applying that statute to

determine the filling of the seventy-one vacant seats for the Cherry Hill

Defendants won the June 10, 2025 election for the Cherry Hill Committee.

In accordance with N.J.S.A. 19:5-2 and -3, defendants, in their capacity as duly

elected members of the Cherry Hill Committee, are responsible for filling the

seventy-one vacant seats based on a failure to elect. There is no statutorily

imposed quorum requirement preventing defendants from serving as the Cherry

Hill Committee because the quorum is determined based on the three individuals

duly elected in the June 2025 election. Defendants are not required to fill the

A-3621-24 14 vacancies on the Cherry Hill Committee from the seventy-four unsuccessful

candidates on the CCDC slate.

To the extent we have not addressed any remaining arguments, the

arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of a

judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. The trial court's stay order is

dissolved. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-3621-24 15