[Cite as Camacho v. Rose-Mary, Johanna Graselli Rehab., Inc., 2024-Ohio-2802.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CHRISTINA CAMACHO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 112793 v. :
ROSE-MARY, JOHANNA : GRASSELLI REHABILITATION, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellants. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 25, 2024
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-21-955752
Appearances:
Rittgers Rittgers & Nakajima, Gus J. Lazares, Wesley M. Nakajima, and Charlie M. Rittgers, for appellee.
Tucker Ellis LLP and Jonathan R. Cooper, Kevin M. Young, Lindsey E. Sacher, and C. Ashley Saferight, for appellant Rose-Mary, The Johanna Grasselli Center.
LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:
Defendants-appellants, Rose-Mary, the Johanna Grasselli
Rehabilitation & Education Center, Inc., d.b.a. Rose-Mary Center, Catholic Charities Corporation d.b.a. Catholic Charities Diocese of Cleveland, and Bishop
Edward C. Malesic (collectively “Rose-Mary”), appeal from a discovery order
requiring them to respond to discovery requests propounded by plaintiff-appellee,
Christina Camacho (“Camacho”) individually and as personal representative of the
estate of Jared Camacho (“Jared”). Rose-Mary argues that certain discovery
requests at issue call for the release of information protected by a physician-patient
privilege and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(“HIPAA”), and no exception exists to support the release of this information.
Rose-Mary argues that the trial judge erred in ordering the release of these
protected records and information. We affirm the trial court’s order because Rose-
Mary has not established that any responsive information or document within its
possession or control is subject to any privilege such that they would be protected
from discovery.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Camacho sued Rose-Mary for its actions that allegedly caused the
death of Jared. On November 12, 2021, Camacho filed a complaint individually and
as administrator of Jared’s estate, claiming that Jared was entrusted to the care of a
children’s group home operated by Rose-Mary. In June 2019, Jared was an 11-year-
old boy who had previously been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. On
June 5, 2019, Jared took up residence at Rose-Mary Ridgewood Home, a group
residential facility operated by Rose-Mary. The complaint alleged that staff at the
residential facility physically abused Jared on January 28, 2020, and September 10, 2020. According to the complaint, these instances were investigated, and the
allegations were substantiated by the Cuyahoga County Board of Developmental
Disabilities. The complaint further alleged that Rose-Mary staff left Jared
unattended in an open gymnasium at the facility, allowing him to wander outside,
unsupervised. Tragically, he was struck by a car and killed.
The complaint asserted claims for wrongful death and personal injury
and sought compensatory and punitive damages. Camacho engaged in discovery,
propounding her first set of requests for admissions, requests for production of
documents, and interrogatories. On March 10, 2022, Camacho filed an amended
complaint adding the Catholic Charities of Cleveland and Bishop Edward C. Malesic
of the Catholic Diocese of Cleveland as defendants. Answers were filed and
Camacho propounded a second set of discovery requests.
Discovery disputes arose, and pertinent to the present appeal,
Camacho filed a motion to compel on November 17, 2022, seeking responses to
interrogatories Nos. 2, 20, and 54; requests for production of documents Nos. 20
through 30, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 42, 48, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 71, 79, 80, 81, 95,
98, 99, and 100; and requests for admissions Nos. 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19,
20, 28, 34, 40, and 56. Rose-Mary opposed the motion and sought a protective
order. Rose-Mary argued, among other things, that interrogatory No. 20; requests
for production of documents Nos. 79, 80, 95, 98, and 99; and request for admission
No. 6 sought privileged information. On December 22, 2022, Camacho filed a second motion to compel
seeking to compel responses to interrogatories Nos. 21 and 23, and requests for
production of documents Nos. 2, 38, 51, 60, 88, 89, 90, 91, 96, 97, and 98 from the
original discovery requests; the entire second set of interrogatories and requests for
documents sent to the original defendants in the case; and responses to discovery
requests sent to the new party defendants. The motion alleged that Rose-Mary
responded to several interrogatories and document requests with denials based on,
among other reasons, privilege, and that Rose-Mary only partially responded to
other discovery requests. Rose-Mary refused to provide a privilege log identifying
and describing each document it claimed was privileged, and refused to produce
redacted documents. Rose-Mary again filed a brief in opposition.
On May 4, 2024, the trial court, without exposition, issued an order
granting in part Camacho’s first and second motions to compel. The court ordered
Rose-Mary to provide responses to the following discovery requests: “[Camacho’s]
first set of interrogatories numbers 2, 20, 21, and 23. [Camacho’s] first request for
production of documents numbers 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 38,
42, 48, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 71, 79, 80, 88, 89, 90, 91, 96, 97, 98, 99, and
100.” The trial court denied Camacho’s motions regarding a few specific requests
for production of documents and denied the motion to compel responses to the
requests for admissions in their entirety.
Rose-Mary filed the instant appeal raising a single assignment of
error: The trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion to compel that forces defendants to produce personal medical information of non-party minor residents protected by the physician-patient privilege, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, R.C. 3798.04 and the Ohio Supreme Court case of Roe v. Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio, [2009-Ohio-2973].
A. Scope of the Appeal
Not all the discovery requests outlined in the trial court’s order to
compel are the subject of this appeal. Rose-Mary argued to the trial court below that
the following discovery requests sought protected and/or privileged information:
interrogatory No. 20; requests for production of documents Nos. 79, 80, 95, 98 and
99; and request for admission No. 6. Notably, the trial court’s order did not compel
responses to request for production of document No. 95 or request for admission
No. 6.
Rose-Mary’s appellate brief does not specify which discovery requests
they challenge on appeal. In the combined statements of the case and facts, Rose-
Mary notes that “[r]elevant to this appeal,” Comacho’s first set of discovery requests
“sought ‘all incidents involving allegations of investigations of abuse . . .,’ a privilege
log, all documents ‘related to any inquiries of investigation . . . from 2010 to
present[,]’ the ‘supervision and care needs of every resident[,]’ and ‘all
documentation of incidents involving allegations of abuse,’” citing the following
discovery requests: request for admission No. 6; interrogatory No. 20; and requests
for production of documents Nos. 78, 79, 80, 95, 98 and 99. According to Rose- Mary, the requested information and documents are protected from discovery by
“HIPAA, R.C. 3798.01, general privacy considerations and Ohio case law.”
In its substantive legal argument, Rose-Mary quotes a portion of the
request for production of documents No. 98. This document request sought
documents pertaining to incidents involving allegations of abuse and other
mistreatment.
Rose-Mary also asserts that, “[p]laintiff requested documentation of
all incidents, investigations, and accidents from 2010 through 2020. Specifically,
she requested accidents and investigations involving allegations of abuse, neglect,
mistreatment, physical injury, death or safety violations.” (T.d. 92 at pg. 10.)
Though Rose-Mary did not specify which discovery requests they were referring to,
we note that request for production of documents No. 51 sought, among other
things, documents related to the number of allegations of abuse at the facility;
request for production of documents No. 99 sought the production of documents
pertaining to any investigations conducted by governmental entities; and,
interrogatory No. 20 asked for information related to incidents and investigations
into allegations of abuse, neglect and other forms of mistreatment.
In the brief of appellee, Camacho argues that three discovery requests
are before this court on appeal: interrogatory No. 20, and requests for production of
documents Nos. 51 and 98. Camacho’s assertion is derived from the motion for stay
Rose-Mary filed with the trial court and principles of judicial estoppel and judicial
admission. Rose-Mary’s motion for stay pending appeal filed in the trial court on May 30, 2023, sought to stay responses to four discovery requests: interrogatory No.
20, and requests for production of documents Nos. 51, 74, and 98. (Docket No. 118.)
Rose-Mary’s motion provides, “[Rose-Mary has] no objection to continuing with the
discovery in this matter and progressing this litigation. [Rose-Mary] merely
requested that this Court Stay discovery only with respect to Interrogatory No. 20,
and Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 51, 74, and 98 that are currently
the subject of an interlocutory appeal.” Rose-Mary did not seek a stay related to its
response to request for production of documents No. 99. Though a stay was
requested regarding request for production of document No. 74, that request is not
referred to in Rose-Mary’s appellate briefing, either by number or by substance.
Rose-Mary did not further seek to stay discovery in this court.
On reply, Rose-Mary does not dispute that the three discovery
requests identified by Camacho are the only three at issue in this appeal.
Nevertheless, during oral argument before this court, Rose-Mary asserted that on
appeal, they are challenging the trial court’s order compelling discovery as it relates
to interrogatory No. 20, and requests for production of documents Nos. 51, 98, and
99.
Despite these issues and Rose-Mary’s failure to clearly delineate
which discovery requests are the subject of this appeal, we will review the following
discovery requests:
interrogatory No. 20: Identify any and all incidents involving allegations or investigation of abuse, neglect, mistreatment, physical injury, death or safety violations related to any child under your supervision from 2010 through September 2020 and identify the person(s) responsible for conducting the investigation(s) and the person(s) who participated in the investigation(s). This interrogatory includes any internal investigations by Rose-Mary.
request for production of documents No. 51: Please produce a copy of all e-mail transmissions from the administrator of the facility to any corporate employee, agent, or representative, or from any corporate employee, agent, or representative to the administrator of the facility concerning staffing issues at the facility during the residency and six months prior to the residency of Jared Camacho. This request specifically seeks e-mails related to lack of staff and/or the effect of lack of staff on resident care, including e-mails related to the high number of abuse, or escape incidents at the facility. (Defendant may redact the names of residents other than Jared Camacho.)
request for production of documents No. 98: Please produce any and all documentation of incidents involving allegations of abuse, neglect, or safety violations related to, referring to, or referencing physical injury or death of a child that was at a Rose-Mary facility from 2010 to the present.
request for production of document No. 99: Produce any and all documents received by you or anyone on your behalf or sent by you or on your behalf related to any inquiries or investigation by a governmental agency concerning a resident or residents including [J.C.] at any Rose-Mary Facility from 2010 to the present related to, reference, memorializing or investigating safety, abuse, neglect, mistreatment, lack of supervision, inadequate supervision, lack of staffing, inadequate staffing, inadequate training, lack of training, the facility’s physical environment, quality of care provided to residents.
In response to each of these requests, Rose-Mary included the same
language asserting that a privilege existed: “Moreover, this Interrogatory seeks
information regarding the care of other non-party minor residents in violation of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (‘HIPAA’) and Roe v. Planned
Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region, [2009-Ohio-2973].” II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Pursuant to Civ.R. 26(B)(1), parties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter, not privileged, “that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case . . . .” According to the rule, when information
is withheld based on privilege, “the claim shall be made expressly and shall be
supported by a description of the nature of the documents, communications, or
things not produced that is sufficient to enable the demanding party to contest the
claim.” Civ.R. 26(B)(8). “The burden of showing that testimony or documents are
confidential or privileged rests upon the party seeking to exclude it.” Medina v.
Medina Gen. Hosp., 2011-Ohio-3990, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio
St.3d 258, 263-264 (1983).
Generally, a trial court’s decision involving a discovery dispute is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 9. However, where the matter under
review is a question of privilege, appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review.
Id., citing Roe, 2009-Ohio-2973, at ¶ 29. “De novo review requires an independent
review of the trial court’s decision without any deference to the trial court’s
determination.” State v. McCullough, 2018-Ohio-1967 (8th Dist.).
B. Ohio and Federal Protection of Health Information
In the present appeal, Rose-Mary argues that discovery responses to
the relevant requests seek information protected by R.C. 2317.02(B) (the physician-
patient privilege) and HIPAA. They also argue the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Roe, interpreting these state and federal protections, makes disclosure
inappropriate.
1. HIPAA
Generally, medical records are privileged from disclosure under state
and federal law. Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Schlotterer, 2009-Ohio-2496, ¶ 14. HIPAA,
among other things, prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of “protected health
information” by a “covered entity.” Both terms are statutorily defined under federal
regulations and Ohio statute.1 “Protected health information” is defined as
individually identifiable health information that is transmitted or maintained
electronically or in any other form or medium. 45 C.F.R. 160.103. “Health
information” is defined as
any information, including genetic information, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that:
(1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse; and
(2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual.
Id. See also R.C. Ch. 3798 (Ohio’s codification of HIPAA regulations). A “covered
entity” is defined in part to include “a health care provider who transmits any health
information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this
1 R.C. Ch. 3798 codifies into state law the regulations promulgated under HIPAA.
R.C. 3798.02. subchapter.” Id. Finally, a “health care provider” means “a provider of services (as
defined in section 1861(u) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395x(u)), a provider of medical or
health services (as defined in section 1861(s) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395x(s)), and any
other person or organization who furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in the
normal course of business.”
“‘[T]he HIPAA Privacy Rule strives to balance the interest of
individuals in maintaining the confidentiality of their health information with the
interests of society in obtaining, using, and disclosing health information to carry
out a variety of public and private activities.’” Menorah Park Ctr. for Senior Living
v. Rolston, 2020-Ohio-6658, ¶ 19, quoting Tovino, A Timely Right to Privacy, 104
Iowa L.Rev. 1361, 1367 (2019). To this end, HIPAA contains a provision that allows
the release of protected health information pursuant to court order. 45 C.F.R.
164.512; Loparo v. Univ. Hosps. Health Sys., 2024-Ohio-663, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing
Grove v. Northeast Ohio Nephrology Assocs. Inc., 2005-Ohio-6914 (9th Dist.).
Further, health information that has been properly “de-identified” may be released
under the circumstances outlined in 45 C.F.R. 164.502(d).
2. R.C. 2317.02(B)
In Ohio, R.C. 2317.02(B) provides a more stringent level of protection
for communications between a physician and a patient made for the purposes of
medical diagnosis and treatment. Rolston at ¶ 28-30; Loparo at ¶ 19. Where the
privilege applies, with only limited statutory exception, the disclosure of medical
records is prohibited. However, “[a] request is not seeking privileged information under the statute if it does not involve something that the patient communicated to
the physician or vice versa.” Medina, 2011-Ohio-3990, at ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing
Turk v. Oiler, 732 F.Supp.2d 758 (N.D.Ohio 2010). Even then, not all
communications between patients and physicians are privileged.
R.C. 2317.02(B)(5) defines a covered communication:
“[C]ommunication” means acquiring, recording, or transmitting any information, in any manner, concerning any facts, opinions, or statements necessary to enable a physician, advanced practice registered nurse, or dentist to diagnose, treat, prescribe, or act for a patient. A “communication” may include, but is not limited to, any medical or dental, office, or hospital communication such as a record, chart, letter, memorandum, laboratory test and results, x-ray, photograph, financial statement, diagnosis, or prognosis.
Based on these statutory definitions, “[t]he conclusion that protected
health information is privileged depends on two factors: [first], whether the
information is a communication between a patient and their healthcare provider,
and [second], whether the purpose of the communication was for diagnosis or
treatment.” Loparo at ¶ 15, citing Ward v. Summa Health Sys., 2010-Ohio-6275,
¶ 25. If the party seeking to assert the privilege does not establish either of these
factors, then it is not error to compel discovery of the information. Id. at ¶ 22, citing
Morawski v. Davis, 2023-Ohio-1898, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.); Zimpfer v. Roach, 2016-
Ohio-5176, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.).
3. Roe, 2009-Ohio-2973
Rose-Mary also argues that Comacho’s discovery requests seek
medical records of individuals who are not parties to this suit; that in Roe, the Ohio
Supreme Court categorically prohibited the discovery of the medical records of third parties; and that Roe further established that the redaction of personally identifiable
information does not remove the privileged status of the records.
In Roe, the plaintiffs sought discovery of “any reports of abuse made
pursuant to R.C. 2151.142 and the medical records of nonparty minors who had been
patients at [defendant] Planned Parenthood during a ten-year period.” The parties
did not dispute that the discovery requests sought medical records. The Court
addressed whether confidential abuse reports and medical records were privileged
under the physician-patient privilege and a prior version of a statute that required
medical professionals to report child abuse codified in R.C. 2151.421(H)(1). Roe at
¶ 53. The Court held that the documents at issue were not subject to disclosure in
the action. Id. The Court has also held that there is no “absolute protection against
disclosure of medical information.” Ward at ¶ 30.
Since the decision in Roe was announced in 2009, this court has had
numerous opportunities to analyze its holding and apply it to the facts of various
discovery disputes. This court characterized the holding in Roe as follows:
In Roe, the parties stipulated that the disputed discovery included privileged communications within nonparty medical records. The plaintiffs sought patients’ actual medical records with the protected health information redacted. “Medical record” means data in any form pertaining to a patient’s medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition generated and maintained by a health care provider in the process of the patient’s health care treatment. R.C. 3798.01 and 45 C.F.R. 160.103. Redaction cannot overcome a privilege protection; only a statutory exception can. Roe at ¶ 53.
Loparo, 2024-Ohio-663, at ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). This court went on to find that not all
information contained within a given medical record constitutes privileged information. We held that “health information, such as provider names, triage
priority data, and time data (ex., triage times, discharge times, and treatment times),
are not privileged because they do not involve communications as defined in
R.C. 2317.02.” Id. at ¶ 30.
This court again looked to Roe for guidance in considering whether
HIPAA or Ohio’s physician-patient privilege protected “identification of [defendant
doctor’s] conduct” where the discovery requests did not, on their face, “seek the
disclosure of nonparty patient’s confidential medical records.” Medina, 2011-Ohio-
3990, at ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). There, this court examined interrogatories that did not call
for “the disclosure of any nonparty information;” rather, the interrogatory sought
information about a particular anesthesiologist and records of procedures the
anesthesiologist may have performed and documented. The Medina Court
distinguished Roe, finding that the discovery requests at issue did not seek
privileged information. Id. at ¶ 14-15. The requests sought information that was
contained within certain records that included medical records, but it was not
privileged information under the physician-patient privilege or protected health
information under HIPAA. Id.
C. Application of these Standards to this Case
Applying the above statutes and standards to the specific requests at
issue in this case, we find that Rose-Mary has not established that the trial court
erred in granting Camacho’s motion to compel because Rose-Mary has not
established that responsive information is privileged. Interrogatory No. 20 asked Rose-Mary to identify any allegations or
investigations of abuse during a ten-year period and identify those that participated
in the investigation. Request for production of documents No. 51 sought emails
between Rose-Mary administration and others regarding staffing levels. Request
for production of documents No. 98 sought documents related to incidents of
“allegations of abuse, neglect, or safety violations related to, referring to, or
referencing physical injury or death of a child that was at a Rose-Mary facility from
2010 to the present.” Finally, request for production of documents No. 99 sought
documents related to any governmental investigation into allegations of abuse at
Rose-Mary facilities. These requests seek the disclosure of any investigations of
allegations of mistreatment of residents, documents related to those investigations
and the names of those involved in the investigations, and administrative emails
regarding staffing levels.
Importantly, it is not at all clear that Rose-Mary even knows whether
they have any information responsive to discovery requests that are privileged. In
their appellate brief, Rose-Mary asserts that nonparty residents have an expectation
of privacy in their medical records. At oral arguments, Rose-Mary argued that even
a review of records to create a privilege log would violate their residents’ rights of
privacy. However, in other cases where a physician-patient privilege was asserted
over records of third parties, the litigants were still able to generate a privilege log in
compliance with Civ.R. 26(B). See, e.g., Dubson v. Montefiore Home, 2012-Ohio-
2384, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.) (discovery of medical records of nonparty employees held by employer); Howell v. Park E. Care & Rehab., 2019-Ohio-3283, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.)
(Discovery of records of a nonparty alleged tortfeasor and noting that a privilege log
was submitted in this case dealing with the release of records alleged to be privileged
under HIPAA, R.C. 2317.02, and others). Rose-Mary has not put forth any
legitimate justification to excuse the production of a privilege log in compliance with
Civ.R. 26(B).
Rose-Mary has not shown that these requests seek information that
is privileged under R.C. 2317.02(B). Rose-Mary’s responses to these discovery
requests were general claims that information sought constituted privileged medical
records. The discovery requests involved in this appeal do not, on their face, seek
protected information. No particularized information was adduced that would
afford the trial court with the necessary information to establish that responsive
records within Rose-Mary’s possession required the disclosure of communications
with doctors, dentists, or advanced practice registered nurses for the purpose of
diagnosis or treatment. The requests seek emails between administrators about
staffing and information related to incidents of abuse, neglect, mistreatment,
physical injury, or safety violations concerning residents of Rose-Mary facilities.
“‘Medical record’ means data in any form pertaining to a patient’s
medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition generated and
maintained by a health care provider in the process of the patient’s health care
treatment.” Loparo, 2024-Ohio-663, at ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing R.C. 3798.01 and 45
C.F.R. 160.103. Rose-Mary has not established that any of the discovery requests seek medical records as that term is defined. For instance, the names of those Rose-
Mary employees involved in investigations of abuse, even physicians, would not
ordinarily be privileged. Medina, 2011-Ohio-3990, at ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Turk,
732 F.Supp.2d 758, citing Ingram v. Adena Health Sys., 2002-Ohio-4878 (4th
Dist.); Hudson v. United Servs. Auto. Assn. Ins. Co., 2008-Ohio-7084 (C.P.).
Where responses to these requests may contain communications
between covered health care professionals, Rose-Mary must establish that the
communications within any given responsive record are subject to a privilege.
Loparo at ¶ 22. “If an individual makes statements to a physician or psychologist
for purposes other than diagnosis or treatment, such statements are not protected
by the privilege.” Skorvanek v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Correction, 2018-Ohio-
3870, ¶ 57 (10th Dist.), citing In re Jones, 2003-Ohio-3182, ¶ 13. Reporting abuse
to staff members of a residential facility is not necessarily a communication for the
purpose of diagnosis and treatment. Rose-Mary must demonstrate that the
privilege applies to responsive information in its possession. Rose-Mary has not
done so.
Rose-Mary made blanket assertions that what Camacho seeks is
covered by privilege. Blanket assertions that discovery responses are privileged are
insufficient to meet the burden of establishing the existence of a privilege. Muehrcke
v. Housel, 2005-Ohio-5440, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.) (finding that a blanket assertion of
attorney-client privilege without even requesting an in camera inspection was insufficient to meet the burden of establishing that the documents at issue were
privileged).
As noted, the discovery requests do not, on their face, seek privileged
information and Rose-Mary’s failure to establish that any of the relevant discovery
requests seek privileged information also means that Roe is inapplicable to this case.
Roe held that privileged information contained within medical records of third
parties was not subject to discovery absent a statutory exception and redacting
certain information did not overcome the protections afforded by R.C. 2317.02(B).
Roe, 2009-Ohio-2973, at ¶ 53. Here, Rose-Mary has not made the threshold
showing that information responsive to the discovery requests is privileged.
Therefore, Roe does not prevent the disclosure of information responsive to the
discovery requests at issue in this appeal.
Rose-Mary has also not shown that the disclosure of any information
responsive to the discovery requests at issue would constitute the unauthorized
disclosure of protected health information prohibited under HIPAA. “[T]he HIPAA
privacy regulation, 45 C.F.R. 164.512, allows disclosure of protected health
information in the course of any judicial or administrative proceeding in response
to a court order.” Howell, 2018-Ohio-2054, at ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), citing Grove, 2005-
Ohio-6914, at ¶ 22 (9th Dist.).
As this court has previously stated, “[A]n in camera document review
for relevancy and privilege is considered the ‘best practice.’” Howell at ¶ 34, citing
Sessions v. Sloane, 789 S.E.2d 844, 856 (N.C.App. 2016); Doe v. Mt. Carmel Health Sys., 2004-Ohio-1407 (10th Dist.). However, Rose-Mary failed to establish that an
in camera review was necessary because it did not meet its burden of demonstrating
that a privilege applied. Rose-Mary’s unsupported arguments are insufficient to
meet its burden to establish that any information responsive to Camacho’s discovery
requests was privileged. They have failed to provide the trial court and this court
with the necessary information that would allow a ruling in their favor. On the
record before this court, the trial court did not err in ordering Rose-Mary to respond
to the discovery requests at issue in this appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellants costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR