Calloway v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Calloway v. State

301 S.E.2d 678, 165 Ga. App. 511, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1927

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 22, 1983

Docket65202

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 301 S.E.2d 678 (Calloway v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Calloway v. State, 301 S.E.2d 678, 165 Ga. App. 511, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1927 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).

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Opinion

Pope, Judge.

Malcolm Douglas Calloway brings this appeal from his conviction of burglary. The sole enumeration on appeal cites as error the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial following allegedly improper and prejudicial testimony by a state’s witness as to another crime. The testimony complained of was given by the arresting officer. In response to a question as to his activities on the day the [512]*512subject crime occurred, he testified, “We had received a call from another police officer that was involved [in] a shoplifting case at the Majik Mart. Later on, at the time I received another call that gave out a description of the same guy that was involved at the — well, a suspect that was involved at the Majik Mart, that had [committed] a burglary. And by that time I started combing the area trying to find the suspect.” The officer then identified appellant as the person who matched the description. Appellant objected to this testimony, and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard any reference to appellant’s being a possible suspect in some other venture. Appellant’s subsequent motion for mistrial was denied.

Decided February 22, 1983. H. Haywood Turner III, for appellant. William J. Smith, District Attorney, Michael D. Reynolds, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

In our view, the evidence objected to was material and relevant to explain the conduct of the witness in seeking and arresting appellant. Evidence which is otherwise admissible does not become inadmissible simply because it incidentally puts the appellant’s character in issue. Moss v. State, 144 Ga. App. 226 (1) (240 SE2d 773) (1977). Even assuming that the officer’s remarks were improper, this testimony was not so prejudicial that the curative instructions given by the trial court were ineffective. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for mistrial. See Spraggins v. State, 240 Ga. 759 (2) (243 SE2d 20) (1978); see also Clark v. State, 159 Ga. App. 136 (1) (282 SE2d 752) (1981).

Judgment affirmed.

Deen, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.

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Pope, Judge.

Malcolm Douglas Calloway brings this appeal from his conviction of burglary. The sole enumeration on appeal cites as error the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial following allegedly improper and prejudicial testimony by a state’s witness as to another crime. The testimony complained of was given by the arresting officer. In response to a question as to his activities on the day the [512]*512subject crime occurred, he testified, “We had received a call from another police officer that was involved [in] a shoplifting case at the Majik Mart. Later on, at the time I received another call that gave out a description of the same guy that was involved at the — well, a suspect that was involved at the Majik Mart, that had [committed] a burglary. And by that time I started combing the area trying to find the suspect.” The officer then identified appellant as the person who matched the description. Appellant objected to this testimony, and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard any reference to appellant’s being a possible suspect in some other venture. Appellant’s subsequent motion for mistrial was denied.

Decided February 22, 1983. H. Haywood Turner III, for appellant. William J. Smith, District Attorney, Michael D. Reynolds, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

In our view, the evidence objected to was material and relevant to explain the conduct of the witness in seeking and arresting appellant. Evidence which is otherwise admissible does not become inadmissible simply because it incidentally puts the appellant’s character in issue. Moss v. State, 144 Ga. App. 226 (1) (240 SE2d 773) (1977). Even assuming that the officer’s remarks were improper, this testimony was not so prejudicial that the curative instructions given by the trial court were ineffective. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for mistrial. See Spraggins v. State, 240 Ga. 759 (2) (243 SE2d 20) (1978); see also Clark v. State, 159 Ga. App. 136 (1) (282 SE2d 752) (1981).

Judgment affirmed.

Deen, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.

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301 S.E.2d 678, 165 Ga. App. 511, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1927, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/calloway-v-state-gactapp-1983.

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