HAUK, District Judge.
This matter arises upon the Complaint of the California Teachers Assoelation on behalf of all of its members, and particularly the eight teachers named therein, against various school districts in the County of Orange and in the County of Riverside, State of California, seeking injunctive relief restraining the School Districts from imposing any wage and fringe benefit freeze on the salaries and benefits of the teachers; and from refusing to pay increased salaries and fringe benefits to which the teachers are allegedly entitled under individual written contracts between the School Districts and the teachers, as well as pursuant to 1971-1972 salary schedules previously adopted by the Districts. It is claimed, of course, that the wage and fringe benefit freeze was imposed by the School Districts in obedience to Presidential Executive Order No. 11615 of August 15, 1971, 36 Fed.Reg. 15727 (1971),
pursuant to the Economic Sta
bilization Act of 1970, P.L. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, Title II (1970), as amended P.L. 92-15, 85 Stat. 38 (1971).
And it is charged that this Executive Order
as well as the statute under which it was issued are both violative of the Federal Constitution, with the alleged result that the teachers are entitled to injunctive relief not only by way of final judgment, but also by way of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction
pendente lite,
to be issued by a three-judge Federal Court which the school teachers request be convened pursuant to Title 28 United States Code, Sections 2281, 2282, 2284.
The Court issued its Order to Show Cause on September 20, 1971, setting a hearing on the application for the temporary restraining order, the prayer for a preliminary injunction
pendente lite,
and the request for the convening of a three-judge court, for October 4, 1971. At the hearing all parties stipulated that the Court should expand the hearing to include the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed by the Riverside Respondents as well as the Order to Show Cause, the Anthony affidavit in support thereof, and the Orange Respondents’ Return thereto, along with the respective points and authorities submitted by all parties, including the United States of America as Amicus Curiae.
Now having analyzed and considered all of the aforesaid pleadings, including the points and authorities submitted by the Assistant United States Attorney upon the Court’s Certification to the United States Attorney General, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403 that the constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 affecting the public interest has been drawn in question in this suit, and having heard and considered the arguments and further points and authorities made and submitted by counsel for Petitioners, Respondents and Amicus Curiae at the said hearing, the Court now renders its Decision and Order Denying the application for a temporary restraining order and the prayer for a preliminary injunction
pendente lite;
denying the request for a three-judge court; and dismissing the Complaint with leave to amend.
At the outset and without belaboring the matter at too great length, we ask ourselves what are the guidelines by which we are to convene or not to convene a three-judge Federal Court. It has been said by the Fifth Circuit that except for situations in which there can be absolutely
no doubt at all
that there is no constitutional issue, the request for a three-judge court must be granted. Jackson v. Choate, 404 F.2d 910, 912-913 (5th Cir. 1968). But despite the protestations of Chief Judge Brown in
Jackson
that this is the better course, he does admit that it inevitably leads to unwarranted expenditures of judicial energy. And it has been rejected in other Circuits. The Third Circuit, through Chief Judge Biggs, refused to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s “no-doubt-at-all” test, and holds that when an application is made which might require adjudication by a three-judge court, both the district judge and the chief judge of the circuit, each acting separately, must perform the judicial function of judging and concluding, as a matter of law, whether the pending case raises a substantial constitutional issue and therefore requires three judges for its adjudication. Miller v. Smith, 236 F.Supp. 927, 933 (E.D.Penn. 1964).
The First Circuit, speaking through Chief Judge Aldrich, has stated what we believe to be the correct rule. Judge Aldrich discusses both the Third and the Fifth Circuit views and, rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s “no-doubt-at-all” test, holds that “in determining whether a complaint alleges a case appropriate for a three-judge court, the district judge performs a judicial, as distinguished from a ministerial, function,” and accordingly, he must ascertain whether the “request possesses a reasonable degree of legal merit.” But contrary to the Third Circuit’s view, Judge Aldrich goes on to say that once the district judge finds that a three-judge court should be convened, and once the request has been formally made by the district judge, then the chief
judge’s duty is “solely ministerial” for the reason that “it is the district judge’s case, 28 U.S.C. § 2284(1), whereas unless the chief judge designates himself, his contact with the case is merely ephemeral.” Merced Rosa v. Herrero, 423 F.2d 591, 593 (1st Cir. 1970).
Moreover, we must always proceed with great caution and reluctance in reviewing the request for a three-judge court since the statute authorizing this unusual tripartite bench is to be treated “not as a measure of broad social policy to be construed with great liberality, but as an enactment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied as such.” Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251, 61 S.Ct. 480, 483, 85 L.Ed. 800 (1941).
As
Phillips
points out, a three-judge court “entails a serious drain upon the federal judicial system.” 312 U.S. at 250, 61 S.Ct. at 483. And as Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed in Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 92-93, 80 S.Ct. 568, 579, 4 L.Ed.2d 568 (1960) (dissenting opinion) quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Harlan in Swift and Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 128, 86 S.Ct. 258, 15 L.Ed.2d 194 (1965):
“[T]he convening of a three-judge trial court makes for dislocation of the normal structure and functioning of the lower federal courts, particularly in the vast non-metropolitan regions; and direct review of District Court judgments by this Court not only expands this Court’s obligatory jurisdiction but contradicts the dominant principle of having this Court review decisions only after they have gone through two judicial sieves. *
*
* ”
Thus proceeding with the care and circumspection directed by the Supreme Court, we scrutinize the Complaint here in the light of the guidelines which under recent decision are decisive:
(a) Does the complaint pose any substantial attack upon the constitutionality of the Statute itself or the President’s Executive Order? Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 [54 S.Ct. 3, 78 L.Ed. 152] (1933), reh. denied, 366 U.S. 922 [81 S.Ct. 1090, 6 L.Ed.2d 245] (1961); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Certain Carriers, [118 U.S.App.D.C. 100] 331 F.2d 1020 (D.C.Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 918 [84 S.Ct. 1181, 12 L.Ed.2d 187] (1964); Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vincent, 375 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839 [88 S.Ct. 63, 19 L.Ed.2d 102] (1967).
(b) Does the complaint seek injunctive relief against a Federal officer or agency engaged in the enforcement, operation or execution of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970? Ex Parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565 [48 S.Ct. 585, 72 L.Ed. 990] (1928); Ex Parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 [60 S.Ct. 947, 84 L.Ed. 1249] (1940).
(e) Is the enforcement, operation or execution of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 the direct object of the requested injunctive relief? Krebs v. Ashbrook, 275 F.Supp. 111 (D.D.C.1967), aff’d [132 U.S.App.D.C. 176] 407 F.2d 306 (D.C.Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 [89 S.Ct. 619, 21 L.Ed.2d 570] (1969).
NO SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK
As a threshold issue this Court must first determine whether or not a “substantial constitutional question” has been raised by the Petitioners contentions hereinafter stated. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F.Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.1970); Carlough v. Finch, 309 F.Supp. 1025 (S.D.Fla.1969); Veen v. Davis, 326 F. Supp. 116 (C.D.Cal.1971).
Petitioners have raised five grounds for challenging the constitutionality of the act in question, all of which we find are plainly insubstantial.
1.
Due Process
— Fifth
Amendment
Petitioners commence their attack with the allegation that the implementation of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 has unlawfully de
prived them of the wage increases to which they are entitled without a proper hearing, and is thus a violation of due process under the Fifth
and Fourteenth
Amendments. Petitioners’ reliance upon the Fourteenth Amendment is obviously misplaced and worthy of no comment except to note that it applies only to the States and not the Federal Government. Turning to the Fifth Amendment, it is undeniable that while it does forbid the taking of property or the deprivation of it without due process, the prohibition refers only to direct appropriation of an individual’s property. Laycock v. Kenney, 270 F.2d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 933, 80 S.Ct. 373, 4 L.Ed.2d 355 (1960). Here there has been no direct appropriation of Petitioners’ property by the Government. Any hardship caused Petitioners by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 is not prohibited by the Fifth [or Fourteenth] Amendments which have “never been supposed to have any bearing upon or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals.” Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551, 20 L.Ed. 287 (1870). Even if there had been here a direct appropriation of Petitioners’ property by the Government, it is well settled that one may be deprived of property by summary Federal Administrative action taken without a hearing when such action is essential to protect a vital governmental interest. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 70 S.Ct. 870, 94 L.Ed. 1088 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 67 S.Ct. 1552, 91 L.Ed. 2030 (1947); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641, 88 L.Ed. 892 (1944). There can be no question that the Government’s efforts in fighting inflation and stabilizing the economy are obviously directed to the protection and preservation of a most important governmental interest that can surely be characterized as vital to the lives and fortunes of the citizens of the United States, since there is no doubt that a stable economy free of runaway inflation is a basic foundation for stable government, essential to its self preservation and survival.
2.
Impairment of Contracts
— Article
1, Section 10
Petitioners’ second contention is that the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 is in violation of Article 1, Section 10
of the United States Constitution in that it impairs the contractual relationship between Petitioners and Respondents by “placing a temporary freeze” on the pay increases that allegedly are due certain Petitioners under “individual written contracts.” At the outset, it must be understood that this constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts is not a restriction upon the Federal Government, which Petitioners’ impliedly admit in citing Supreme Court cases which unequivocally affirm what is plain to read in Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution itself. These cases simply find in the “due process” clause of the Fifth Amendment the constitutional imperative that the Federal Government may not impair the obligation of contracts validly entered into because to permit this would be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of law. For example, the language of the Supreme Court in the Sinking Fund Cases, Union Pacific Railroad v. United States and Central Pacific Railroad v. Gallatin, 99 U.S. 700, at 718, 25 L.Ed. 496 (1878):
“The United States cannot any more than a State interfere with private
rights, except for legitimate governmental purposes. They are not included within the constitutional prohibition which prevents States from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, but equally with the States they are prohibited from depriving persons or corporations of property without due process of law.”
And even subsuming through the due process clause, the rationale of the impairment of contract prohibition against the States to application against the Federal Government all contracts implicitly include the reservation by the Government (whether State or Federal) of its sovereign power to protect the vital interests of the people. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 506-508, 85 S.Ct. 577, 13 L.Ed.2d 446 (1965); Home Building and Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1934). As previously emphasized, a solid, stable economy is one of the most vital interests which any Government must safeguard for its people. The Supreme Court has held again and again that economic conditions may arise in which a temporary restraint of the enforcement of certain contracts will be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the contract clause and thus well within the range of the reserved power of a government to protect the interests of its people. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding Co. Inc. v. Feldman, et al., 256 U.S. 170, 41 S.Ct. 465, 65 L.Ed. 877 (1921); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 42 S.Ct. 289, 66 L.Ed. 595 (1922). There can be no doubt that the stabilization of the oscillating yet ever escalating inflation which has gripped this country recently is a justifiable, if not essential, exercise of Federal sovereign power. Any indirect contractual impairment such as here alleged, which may result is not unconstitutional since it is insubstantial when balanced against the governmental objective being pursued. City of El Paso v. Simmons,
supra;
Block v. Hirsh,
supra.
3.
Federal Usurpation of State Power
The third contention made by Petitioners is that the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 is unconstitutional because it has usurped the powers reserved to the State of-California by the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Petitioner’s argument, stated succinctly, is that the interpretation of the Act by Respondents has caused certain teachers to be paid salaries in violation of local school board rules and the laws of California. Petitioners are necessarily relying on the misconception that Congress did not have the power to enact the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. It is neither within the purview, nor the purpose of this Court to make a declaration of which constitutional power or powers Congress exercised in enacting this legislation. Our proper role is simply to analyze this usurpation of power contention to determine whether a “substantial constitutional question” has been raised by it. We find the charge that this Act is outside the boundaries of Congress’ power and is a usurpation of State authority to be without merit. Price control is one of the means available to the Congress for the protection and promotion of the welfare of the economy. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 394, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940). To accomplish this goal of protecting the economy, Congress may act pursuant to any one of the abundant powers it possesses under the Constitution. Whether Congress enacted this statute pursuant to its “war power”, Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641, 88 L.Ed. 892 (1944); its power under the “commerce clause”, Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183, 88 S.Ct. 2017, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968); its power under the “general welfare” clause, First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Wisconsin v. Loomis, 97 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1938); or any other power in its constitutional arsenal of powers, is of no concern to this court.
As Chief Justice Stone so aptly put it in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424, 64 S.Ct. 660, 667, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944), holding the Emergency Price Control'Act of 1942 to be constitutional:
“The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government does not demand the impossible or the impracticable. It does not require that Congress find for itself every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to the application of the legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate.”
We are satisfied that Congress could have enacted the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 under numerous specific powers of the many it possesses under the Constitution. We need not decide which power or powers Congress exercised to legislate the Act. Suffice it to say that the charge of Petitioners that Congress has usurped California State powers or functions in some way is without merit and does not raise “a substantial constitutional question.”
4.
Unconstitutional Delegation of Power
— Article
1, Section 1.
A further contention is made by Petitioners that the authority given to the President under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 is unconstitutional because it is a delegation of legislative power to the President and thus violates the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section l.
The Supreme Court, in construing the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, a statute very similar in form and content to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, held that it could find no unlawful delegation of legislative authority. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641, 88 L.Ed. 892 (1944). The further argument has been made by Petitioners that the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 has allowed too great an amount of discretion to be placed in the hands of the President in his implementation, of the Act. But the fact that a statute delegates broad powers to executives of an administrative agency to determine the details of any legislative scheme is no argument against its constitutionality. United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 574, 59 S.Ct. 993, 83 L.Ed. 1446 (1939). What was said in Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694 (1948) is equally appropriate here:
“It is not necessary that Congress supply administrative officials with a specific formula for their guidance in a field where flexibility and the adaptation of the congressional policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the program. * * * Standards prescribed by Congress are to be read in the light of the conditions to which they are to be applied. ‘They derive much meaningful content from the purpose of the Act, its factual background and the statutory context in which they appear’ American Power & Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 104, [67 S.Ct. 133, 141, 91 L.Ed. 103] (1946)”
The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 authorizes the President to issue orders “to stabilize prices, wages and salaries. * * * ” The Court can take judicial notice of the conditions of an unstable'economy, rising prices, decreasing sales, monetary depreciation and all of the other indicia of a rapidly escalating inflation that had beset the economic life of the nation. Surely, the fact that Congress refrained from listing in the Act a detailed enumeration of all the dismaying and disconcerting events that precipitated Congressional action, is no cause for finding the Act unconstitutional. The legislative history of the Act as amended explicitly sets forth the purpose of the Act “to give the President maximum authority for fighting inflation.”
In delegating power to the executive and to the administrative, it is not necessary that Congress prescribe standards that can be applied with mathematical certainty. If Congress lays down an intelligible principle which prescribes a limited area of action, which in effect “canalizes” the field of delegated legislation then such legislative action is not a prohibited delegation of legislative authority. J. W. Hampton, Jr., Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 816 (2nd Cir. 1956). The principle of “stabilizing prices, wages and salaries in fighting inflation” is obviously intelligible and the field of operation delegated to the President and by him to the adminis
trative agency and officers is definitely a narrow one. So we find no substantial constitutional question raised by Petitioners’ fourth contention.
5.
Arbitrary Distinction
— Lack
of Due Process
— Fifth
Amendment.
Finally, Petitioners allege that the distinction made (for the purposes of freezing wages) between teachers physically working prior to August 15, 1971, and those who were not, is an arbitrary- and- capricious distinction and therefore a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Petitioner cites no authority for this position and we find no “substantial constitutional question” raised by it. Teachers who commenced work after August 15, 1971 are in exactly the same position as every other individual in the United States who began work after that date. They are restrained from receiving higher salaries or wages than were in effect during the 30 day period ending August 14, 1971.
While it is true that legislation arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably discriminating against some and favoring others is unconstitutional, nevertheless, if a statute is uniform in the privileges or obligations imposed upon all members of a legitimate class to which it is applicable, no one belonging to another legitimate class to which the legislation is not applicable can complain of denial of due process or equal protection of the laws. As was said in Pfeiffer Brewing Co. v. Bowles, 146 F.2d 1006, 1007 (Em.Ct. of App. 1945) cert. denied, 324 U.S. 865, 65 S.Ct. 914, 89 L.Ed. 1421 (1945), in rejecting a similar argument to the one raised herein: “This we think is horn-book law.”
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT AGAINST IMPROPER PARTIES
The lack of a “substantial constitutional question” is not the only infirmity which causes this Court to deny Petitioners’ request for the convening of a three-judge court, and to dismiss the Complaint. In order properly to seek a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2282 prayer must be made for injunctive relief against the “enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress.” This, of course, means that Petitioners must seek to enjoin those agencies and officers who are specifically charged by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 with the “enforcement, operation or execution” thereof. Petitioners have failed to comply with this requirement. The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 as amended grants primary authority to the President while expressly authorizing him to delegate any function under the Act as he may deem appropriate.
Under this authority, the President on August 15, 1970, established the Cost of Living Council and delegated to it all of the powers conferred on him by the Economic Stabilization Act,
and at the same time, he authorized the further delegation by the Council of its authority.
On August 17, 1971 the Cost of Living Council delegated to the Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, responsibility and authority to implement, administer, monitor and en
force the stabilization of prices, rents, wages and salaries.
Pursuant to this authority, the Director has issued various rules and regulations implementing his policies. Certain of these have allegedly affected the Petitioners herein.
However, Petitioners have failed to designate as Respondents any of these agencies and officers charged with the enforcement, operation or execution of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, namely, the President, the Cost of Living Council, the Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness or their officers and employees. Petitioners seek to enjoin the activities of County school boards, officers and officials who are not charged with the duty or responsibility of enforcing, operating or executing the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. The application for a three-judge court is obviously unsupported and unsupportable.
FEDERAL STATUTE NOT DIRECT OBJECT OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT
Petitioners’ Complaint contains a third, and equally fatal defect. In order to come within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 2282, the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress must be the direct object of the injunction sought. Krebs v. Ashbrook, 275 F. Supp. 111 (D.D.C.1967), aff’d 132 U.S. App.D.C. 176, 407 F.2d 306 (D.C.Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026, 89 S.Ct. 619, 21 L.Ed.2d 570 (1969). To obtain a three-judge court, Petitioners must seek an interlocutory or permanent injunction directly against the enforcement, operation, or execution of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. Petitioners’ complaint seeks to enjoin and restrain the Respondent County school districts, officers and officials from “imposing a wage and fringe benefit freeze on the salaries and benefits of Petitioners” and from “refusing to pay the increased salaries and fringe benefits” to which Petitioners are allegedly entitled under “individual written contracts.” (Petitioner’s Complaint, p. 19, lines 25-32). This tangential litigation by Petitioners for wages allegedly owed under written contracts with Respondents cannot conceivably come within the purview of a three-judge court since the litigation does not have as its direct object the enjoining of an Act of Congress, in this case, the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.
To hold otherwise would open the Federal three-judge court to a massive flood of litigating wage earners seeking remuneration which had been “frozen” by employers in conformance with the mandate of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. Most surely, the three-judge court procedure was not instituted by Congress to determine simple contract disputes between individuals residing in the same State, no matter how cleverly in constitutional terms, the disputes may be couched.
CONCLUSIONS
Having in mind the problems, the dangers and the possible duplication, or perhaps more accurately the
triplication
of work — three judges involved in all aspects of the litigation — as well as the wasted effort inherent in hastily and improvidently convened three-judge courts in situations where, as here, a single-judge court is properly if not mandatorily so, capable of handling and deciding the issues raised by the Complaint which either directly, or as here peripherally, attack the constitutionality of a Federal Statute, we conclude that we should not here certify to the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit the necessity of a three-judge court. On the contrary, we are convinced that this matter should proceed from beginning to end in a single-judge court because we cannot find any substantial constitutional issue raised in Petitioners’ attack on the Federal statute or upon its enforcement, operation or execution.
Nor have the Petitioners joined the persons or parties who are essential to the convening of a three-judge court, namely the officers and agencies who are charged by the statute with the enforcement, operation and execution of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, to wit, the President, the Cost of Living Council, the Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness and their officers and employees.
And finally, the injunction which Petitioners seek does not and cannot conceivably have as its direct object the restraining of the enforcement, operation or execution of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now makes and enters the following:
ORDER
(1) The application for a temporary restraining order is hereby denied, and since the Court does not presently find any facts showing the actuality or possibility of irreparable injury to the Petitioners which would support a preliminary injunction
pendente lite,
the prayer for it is also hereby denied.
(2) The request for the convening of a three-judge court is denied for the reasons that upon the Complaint and all other pleadings before the Court at this moment we cannot find any substantial question of Federal unconstitutionality raised by the Petitioners, a mandatory prerequisite for convening a three-judge court under the cases and decisions binding this Court; that to the contrary it appears that thére is actually and obviously no substantial question of Federal unconstitutionality involved herein; that the Complaint does not seek any relief against any of the Federal agencies or officers charged with the duty of enforcing, operating and executing the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970; and finally that the direct object of the injunctive relief sought is not the enforcement, operation or execution of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, but rather the actions of the Respondent School district, officers and officials in freezing wages and fringe benefits of school teacher Petitioners.
(3) The Complaint is, and each and every cause of action therein alleged are, hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of this Court over the subject matter thereof and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, but with leave to file an amended complaint within 20 days of the filing of this Order.
(4) The Clerk of this Court shall forthwith file and enter this Order; serve it upon counsel of record for Petitioners, Respondents and Amicus Curiae; and send courtesy copies to the Honorable Philip C. Wilkins and the Honor
able Aubrey E. Robinson, United States District Judges of the Eastern District of California and the District of Columbia.