Calhoun v. Cook

362 F. Supp. 1249, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14168
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedApril 4, 1973
DocketCiv. A. 6298
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 362 F. Supp. 1249 (Calhoun v. Cook) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14168 (N.D. Ga. 1973).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This is an ancient class action filed in 1958 involving the desegregation of the Atlanta Public Schools, brought on behalf of the parents of all black students enrolled therein. In concept, it is a classic civil rights class action under old Rule 23(a)(3). E. g. Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963).

Heretofore, on February 23, 1973, the plaintiffs and defendants presented to the court a jointly proposed plan for settlement and final resolution of all issues covered therein. The court has carefully reviewed the plan and it appears that the plan was freely evolved by the parties, together with the Biracial Committee previously appointed by the court, *1250 and that the plan is consented to by an attorney of record for each of the parties for its adoption by the court.

THE SETTLEMENT.

At a prior hearing for such purposes on December 28, 1972, the question of representation was heard and all parties and persons were granted an opportunity to object to representation of record. None were advanced. 1 By voluntary agreement, it was then determined by the court that the plaintiffs were to be represented exclusively’ thereafter by Attorneys Howard Moore, Jr., Elizabeth R. Rindskopf, and Benjamin W. Spaulding, jointly and severally, in all their dealings with defendants, and the court. 2 It is undisputed that Mrs. Rindskopf and Mr. Spaulding, in the absence of Mr. Moore, were designated to handle the settlement negotiations for the entire plaintiff class and did, in fact, proceed in good faith to do so through numerous lengthy conferences for such purpose. Substantial portions of the plan were drafted by both. When the agreed plan was filed with the court on February 23, 1973, it was signed by Attorney Snaulding only. Upon inquiry, Attorney Riridskopf stated that she had “no objections” to its adoption by the court and had the express authority to allow its approval in such posture. However, since that time, she advised the court that her authority to do so has since been withdrawn by her employers. Thus, at the March 8th hearing, she and Attorney Moore made appearances to present objections to acceptance of the plan by the court.

Where the record reveals that counsel in fact (as here) negotiated and agreed on a compromise prior to trial, federal courts have held under a great variety of circumstances that a settlement agreement once entered into cannot be repudiated by either party and will be summarily enforced by the court. See Cia Anon Venezolana De Navegacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1967) and the compendium of authorities therein. There, as here, it was contended. that the attorney’s authority had been withdrawn between the time of settlement and court approval or consummation. See also Ga.Code, § 9-605; e. g. Elliott v. Elliott, 184 Ga. 417, 191 S.E. 465 (1937). Under such circumstances, the court views such eleventh hour maneuvering as inconsequential and without legal effect. The question presently before the court is the advisability of approval under Rule 23(e).

THE NOTICE.

The filing of the plan and the hearing of March 8th received wide publicity within the several schools and through the local press, radio and television and the court is satisfied that all interested persons were more aware of its pendancy by such means than could possibly be effected by a legal notice or otherwise to the parents of some 75,000 black school pupils enrolled in the Atlanta system, and comprising the plaintiff class.

However, notice by such means was questioned at the hearing. Accordingly, by an order of March 12th, the court ordered publication of notice of the pending settlement proposal in the newspapers of general circulation in the City 3 on a daily basis until another hearing on March 29th. Copies of the proposal were made available at the Clerk’s office, the School Board office, and during *1251 both day and night hours at a centrally located school in each of the City’s Wards.

Both hearings were well attended and numerous counsel, officials, parties, and other interested persons stated their views to the court. 4 In addition, both formal and informal written communications were received by the court, 5 all of which have been considered and filed.

THE PLAN.

The plan incorporates the mandatory Fifth Circuit provisions of majority-to-minority transfer [United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836 (94) (5th Cir. 1966)] and faculty and staff desegregation 6 [Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970)]. It also provides a reasonable pupil assignment plan considering the small percentage of white children (2Í%) now remaining in the system, and all white pupils are assigned to integrated schools. 7 This preponderance of blacks is in itself a unique situation. Under such circumstances, it is not necessary to distribute the remaining minority whites pro-rata throughout the entire system. Harris v. St. John the Baptist Parish, La., 419 F.2d 1211, 1221 (5th Cir. 1969); Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 429 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1970); Hightower v. West, 430 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1970); Love v. Dade County School Board, 447 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. den., 405 U.S. 1064, 92 S.Ct. 1493, 31 L.Ed.2d 794; United States v. State of Georgia, No. 12974 (N.D.Ga.) (Order of Aug. 15, 1971, Hancock County, Ga). The proposal, together with the previous orders of the court, produces a result which, in light of the circumstances present, is “viable, realistic and workable.” Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). The fact that it might be handled differently in some particular is irrelevant. Carr v.

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Bluebook (online)
362 F. Supp. 1249, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14168, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/calhoun-v-cook-gand-1973.