Caleb J. TRUAX, Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services of the United States, Appellee

842 F.2d 995, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3448, 1988 WL 22235

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: March 18, 1988
• Docket: 87-5047
• Status: Published

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

Caleb Truax appeals the United States Magistrate’s¹ order denying his motion for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Truax was awarded disability insurance benefits commencing on April 13, 1979, following a heart attack. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) reviewed Truax’s case in 1982, and on October 1, 1982, notified Truax that evidence in his file indicated that he had become able to engage in substantial gainful activity and that his benefits would accordingly terminate in December 1982. After this decision was sustained at all levels of administrative review, Truax commenced the present action in district court appealing the termination of benefits.

After reviewing the merits of Truax’s claim, the district court “was ready to rule in [Truax’s] favor,” however, before the court did so, Congress passed the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794, which required that disability-termination cases pending as of September 19, 1984, be remanded to the Secretary for a reevaluation using the newly codified medical-improvement standards. Upon remand, the Secretary applied the new standards, reinstated Truax's benefits and awarded approximately $14,000 in back-benefits; judgment was accordingly entered in favor of Truax in the district court.

Truax thereafter filed a timely motion for attorney’s fees and costs, in the sum of $2,103.75, under the EAJA; Truax’s counsel filed for fees in the amount of $2,043.75, under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The magistrate awarded attorney’s fees to Truax’s counsel to be paid out of Truax’s back benefits under section 406(b). He denied attorney’s fees under the EAJA, concluding that because Truax’s benefits were reinstated due to the Secretary’s own volition, Truax was not a “prevailing party” as required for an award under the EAJA. The magistrate further concluded that the Secretary’s position in terminating Truax’s benefits was “substantially justified” in light of the turmoil which existed in the state of the law regarding disability-termination standards. The magistrate also noted that Truax failed to file an itemized statement required by the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). This appeal followed.

The EAJA authorizes an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party unless the position of the government was substantially justified, or unless special circumstances exist which make an award of fees unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). This court reviews the denial of an EAJA award under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gamber v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 242, 244 (8th Cir.1987).

Truax argues that, even though his court action was mooted prior to a decision on the merits, he is a “prevailing party” because (1) had he not filed his federal suit, he would have lost his right to recover back benefits and (2) his suit, along with others, acted as a catalyst in causing Congress to enact the new termination standards.

The EAJA does not define “prevailing party.” In the context of other fee-shifting statutes,² this court has held that a party may be considered a “prevailing party” where remedial action on the part of the defendant moots the lawsuit before trial, if the party’s lawsuit was a “catalyst” that brought about or prompted the defendant’s remedial action. See Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir.1980) (per curiam) (class action; attorney’s fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1617 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988); United Handicapped Fed’n v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342, 346-47 (8th Cir.1980) (class action; attorney’s fees under 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b)).

In the present case, however, even granting that Congress’ enactment of the Reform Act was partly a result of the thousands of suits filed by terminated claimants against the Secretary, see Stone v. Heckler, 658 F.Supp. 670, 674-75 (S.D.Ill.1987), we believe that the causal link between Truax’s individual lawsuit and Congress’s action is too tenuous to satisfy the catalyst test. Moreover, although it is true that had Truax not filed his lawsuit he would not have obtained relief, we fail to see how this “but for” argument establishes a causal connection between the litigation and the Secretary’s remedial action.

In factually similar circumstances other courts have concluded, as the magistrate did here, that the plaintiff was not a “prevailing party.” See, e.g., Mathus v. Heckler, 661 F.Supp. 241 (N.D.Ill.1987).

We are mindful that other courts have adopted the catalyst approach and awarded EAJA fees in cases similar to the present one. See Vitale v. Secretary of HHS, 673 F.Supp. 1171 (N.D.N.Y.1987); Stone v. Heckler, 658 F.Supp. at 671-75. See also Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 382 (4th Cir.1986) (class action). In light of the tenuous causal link between Truax’s suit and the Secretary’s remedial actions, however, we cannot conclude that the magistrate abused his discretion in concluding that Truax was not a “prevailing party” under the EAJA.

Accordingly, although we fully agree with the dissent that in the present case the Secretary’s position was not “substantially justified,” infra p. 1001, we affirm the judgment below.

1 . The Honorable Bernard P. Becker, United States Magistrate for the District of Minnesota.

2 . It is clear from the legislative history of the EAJA that the interpretation of "prevailing party" is to be consistent with the law developed under other fee-shifting statutes. McGill v. Secretary of HHS, 712 F.2d 28, 30-31 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068, 104 S.Ct. 1420, 79 L.Ed.2d 745 (1984).