Case: 25-50854 Document: 70-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/04/2026
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit
No. 25-50854 FILED June 4, 2026 ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Cal-Tex Compression Services, L.L.C., Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
LTM Consulting, L.L.C.,
Defendant—Appellee. ______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:25-CV-893 ______________________________
Before Smith, Willett, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Cal-Tex Compression Services, L.L.C. appeals from an order abstaining under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) and remanding this case to state court. Because § 1334(d) bars appellate review of that order, LTM’s motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction is GRANTED, and Cal-Tex’s appeal is DISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
_____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 25-50854 Document: 70-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/04/2026
No. 25-50854
I Cal-Tex sued LTM Consulting, L.L.C. in Bexar County, Texas, alleging breach of contract, usury, and tortious interference arising from a loan agreement that financed Cal-Tex’s purchase of oil and gas compressors. LTM counterclaimed against Cal-Tex and several affiliated parties, asserting breach of contract, fraud, conversion, civil conspiracy, and other claims. The following year, Cal-Tex filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas. In re Cal-Tex Compression Servs., LLC, No. 25-32180, Dkt. 1 (Apr. 22, 2025). Shortly thereafter, two third-party defendants filed a notice of removal in the bankruptcy court. Because § 1452(a) requires removal to the district court where the state action is pending, the bankruptcy court sua sponte transferred the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a). After transfer, LTM moved for abstention and remand, arguing that § 1334(c)(2) required the district court to abstain. LTM asserted that the case involved non-core, state-law claims between nondiverse parties and had no independent basis for federal jurisdiction apart from Cal-Tex’s bankruptcy. LTM served the motion electronically through the district court’s filing system on the attorneys listed for Cal-Tex on the docket. Cal-Tex did not respond. The district court granted LTM’s motion. It determined that abstention was mandatory because the removed action was: (1) subject to a timely abstention motion; (2) based on state law; (3) related to a bankruptcy case; (4) unsupported by any independent basis for federal jurisdiction; and (5) capable of timely adjudication in the pending state-court action. See In re Grober, 100 F.3d 1195, 1206 (5th Cir. 1996). Having found all five
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requirements satisfied, the district court abstained and remanded the case to state court. Cal-Tex appealed. II We begin, as we must, with our jurisdiction. Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 14 (2023); Casteneda v. Falcon, 166 F.3d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1999). Section 1334 gives federal courts jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and proceedings, including certain state-court proceedings removed under § 1452(a). But bankruptcy “related to” jurisdiction is not “limitless.” In re Zale Corp., 62 F.3d 746, 752 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995)). To prevent “an overbroad construction of § 1334” from sweeping into federal court “matters that should be left for state courts to decide,” id. (citation omitted), Congress specified when a district court may—or must— abstain. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1)–(2). Section 1334(c)(1) permits abstention “whenever appropriate ‘in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law,’” whereas § 1334(c)(2) requires abstention when its statutory conditions are met. In re Grober, 100 F.3d at 1206 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)); see also In re EP Energy E&P Co. L.P., 169 F.4th 609, 624 n.44 (5th Cir. 2026) (same). Congress also limited appellate review. Under § 1334(d), “[a]ny decision to abstain or not to abstain made under subsection (c)” is unreviewable by a court of appeals, except “a decision not to abstain” in a mandatory-abstention proceeding under § 1334(c)(2). 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d). The exception is narrow: we may review a district court’s refusal to abstain under § 1334(c)(2), but we may not review a district court’s decision to abstain—whether permissively under § 1334(c)(1) or mandatorily under § 1334(c)(2). See id.
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III Cal-Tex does not cite § 1334(d) in its opening brief, much less explain why it permits review here. Nor does Cal-Tex provide support in its opposition to LTM’s motion to dismiss for the assertion that “§ 1334(d) does not apply to this appeal.” Instead, Cal-Tex says it is not challenging the abstention order at all. Its theory is that LTM’s allegedly defective service of the abstention-and-remand motion violated due process, rendering the district court’s order void and outside § 1334(d)’s review bar. We disagree. Appellate jurisdiction turns on the order appealed from, not the label a party attaches to its arguments. See, e.g., BancPass, Inc. v. Highway Toll Admin., L.L.C., 863 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hether there is jurisdiction over the appeal . . . must be determined by focusing upon the category of order appealed from, rather than upon the strength of the grounds for reversing the order.” (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311 (1996)); Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Valero Mktg. & Supply Co., 963 F.3d 479, 482 (5th Cir. 2020) (“We do not look at the ‘characterization of the ruling at issue [but rather] to the substance of what the lower court decided.’” (citation omitted)). The order Cal-Tex asks us to vacate is, in substance and form, a decision to abstain under § 1334(c)(2). The district court expressly invoked mandatory abstention, analyzed the five mandatory-abstention requirements, and concluded that it “must abstain and remand the instant action pursuant to § 1334(c)(2).” Section 1334(d) bars appellate review of that decision. Its exception does not apply because the district court did not refuse to abstain; it abstained. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d). Cal-Tex cannot manufacture appellate jurisdiction by recasting an unreviewable abstention order as a due-process challenge.
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Case: 25-50854 Document: 70-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/04/2026
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit
No. 25-50854 FILED June 4, 2026 ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Cal-Tex Compression Services, L.L.C., Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
LTM Consulting, L.L.C.,
Defendant—Appellee. ______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:25-CV-893 ______________________________
Before Smith, Willett, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Cal-Tex Compression Services, L.L.C. appeals from an order abstaining under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) and remanding this case to state court. Because § 1334(d) bars appellate review of that order, LTM’s motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction is GRANTED, and Cal-Tex’s appeal is DISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
_____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 25-50854 Document: 70-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/04/2026
No. 25-50854
I Cal-Tex sued LTM Consulting, L.L.C. in Bexar County, Texas, alleging breach of contract, usury, and tortious interference arising from a loan agreement that financed Cal-Tex’s purchase of oil and gas compressors. LTM counterclaimed against Cal-Tex and several affiliated parties, asserting breach of contract, fraud, conversion, civil conspiracy, and other claims. The following year, Cal-Tex filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas. In re Cal-Tex Compression Servs., LLC, No. 25-32180, Dkt. 1 (Apr. 22, 2025). Shortly thereafter, two third-party defendants filed a notice of removal in the bankruptcy court. Because § 1452(a) requires removal to the district court where the state action is pending, the bankruptcy court sua sponte transferred the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a). After transfer, LTM moved for abstention and remand, arguing that § 1334(c)(2) required the district court to abstain. LTM asserted that the case involved non-core, state-law claims between nondiverse parties and had no independent basis for federal jurisdiction apart from Cal-Tex’s bankruptcy. LTM served the motion electronically through the district court’s filing system on the attorneys listed for Cal-Tex on the docket. Cal-Tex did not respond. The district court granted LTM’s motion. It determined that abstention was mandatory because the removed action was: (1) subject to a timely abstention motion; (2) based on state law; (3) related to a bankruptcy case; (4) unsupported by any independent basis for federal jurisdiction; and (5) capable of timely adjudication in the pending state-court action. See In re Grober, 100 F.3d 1195, 1206 (5th Cir. 1996). Having found all five
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requirements satisfied, the district court abstained and remanded the case to state court. Cal-Tex appealed. II We begin, as we must, with our jurisdiction. Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 14 (2023); Casteneda v. Falcon, 166 F.3d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1999). Section 1334 gives federal courts jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and proceedings, including certain state-court proceedings removed under § 1452(a). But bankruptcy “related to” jurisdiction is not “limitless.” In re Zale Corp., 62 F.3d 746, 752 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995)). To prevent “an overbroad construction of § 1334” from sweeping into federal court “matters that should be left for state courts to decide,” id. (citation omitted), Congress specified when a district court may—or must— abstain. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1)–(2). Section 1334(c)(1) permits abstention “whenever appropriate ‘in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law,’” whereas § 1334(c)(2) requires abstention when its statutory conditions are met. In re Grober, 100 F.3d at 1206 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)); see also In re EP Energy E&P Co. L.P., 169 F.4th 609, 624 n.44 (5th Cir. 2026) (same). Congress also limited appellate review. Under § 1334(d), “[a]ny decision to abstain or not to abstain made under subsection (c)” is unreviewable by a court of appeals, except “a decision not to abstain” in a mandatory-abstention proceeding under § 1334(c)(2). 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d). The exception is narrow: we may review a district court’s refusal to abstain under § 1334(c)(2), but we may not review a district court’s decision to abstain—whether permissively under § 1334(c)(1) or mandatorily under § 1334(c)(2). See id.
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III Cal-Tex does not cite § 1334(d) in its opening brief, much less explain why it permits review here. Nor does Cal-Tex provide support in its opposition to LTM’s motion to dismiss for the assertion that “§ 1334(d) does not apply to this appeal.” Instead, Cal-Tex says it is not challenging the abstention order at all. Its theory is that LTM’s allegedly defective service of the abstention-and-remand motion violated due process, rendering the district court’s order void and outside § 1334(d)’s review bar. We disagree. Appellate jurisdiction turns on the order appealed from, not the label a party attaches to its arguments. See, e.g., BancPass, Inc. v. Highway Toll Admin., L.L.C., 863 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hether there is jurisdiction over the appeal . . . must be determined by focusing upon the category of order appealed from, rather than upon the strength of the grounds for reversing the order.” (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311 (1996)); Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Valero Mktg. & Supply Co., 963 F.3d 479, 482 (5th Cir. 2020) (“We do not look at the ‘characterization of the ruling at issue [but rather] to the substance of what the lower court decided.’” (citation omitted)). The order Cal-Tex asks us to vacate is, in substance and form, a decision to abstain under § 1334(c)(2). The district court expressly invoked mandatory abstention, analyzed the five mandatory-abstention requirements, and concluded that it “must abstain and remand the instant action pursuant to § 1334(c)(2).” Section 1334(d) bars appellate review of that decision. Its exception does not apply because the district court did not refuse to abstain; it abstained. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d). Cal-Tex cannot manufacture appellate jurisdiction by recasting an unreviewable abstention order as a due-process challenge. See In re TMT Procurement Corp., 764 F.3d 512, 525 (5th Cir. 2014). Were it otherwise,
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§ 1334(d) would have little work to do: any disappointed litigant could obtain review of an abstention order simply by incanting magic words and constitutionalizing an objection to the proceedings that produced it. Congress chose a different rule. It authorized appellate review only when a district court refuses mandatory abstention under § 1334(c)(2). See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d). The district court here did the opposite. And because Congress knows how to create exceptions to jurisdiction-stripping provisions, e.g., id.; see also id. § 1447(d), we must enforce the exception Congress enacted—not one Cal-Tex asks us to imply. See Comsat Corp. v. FCC, 250 F.3d 931, 937–38 (5th Cir. 2001). 1 IV Cal-Tex’s constitutional framing does not change the character of the order before us. The district court granted mandatory abstention under § 1334(c)(2), and § 1334(d) makes that decision unreviewable on appeal. We therefore GRANT LTM’s motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction and DISMISS Cal-Tex’s appeal without reaching Cal-Tex’s due-process argument. 2
_____________________ 1 Because § 1334(d) is dispositive, we need not decide whether § 1452(b) independently bars review of the remand order. 2 We DENY the request for sanctions.