BORDEN, J.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a motorcycle is a “passenger motor vehicle” within the meaning of General Statutes § 42-179 (a) (2),1 which is part of Connecticut’s Lemon Law, General Statutes §§ 42-179 through 42-186. The plaintiff, Cagiva North America, Inc. (Cagiva), a wholesale distributor [3] of motorcycles, appeals2 from the judgment of the trial court denying its application to vacate or modify an arbitration award made under the Lemon Law in favor of the defendant, Edward Schenk, a motorcycle purchaser. Cagiva claims that the trial court improperly concluded that a motorcycle is a passenger motor vehicle within the meaning of § 42-179.3 We agree with Cagiva that a motorcycle is not a passenger motor vehicle within the meaning of § 42-179 and, consequently, is not within the purview of the Lemon Law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural histoiy are undisputed. Cagiva is the exclusive importer and wholesale distributor of Ducati motorcycles in the United States. On May 16, 1992, Schenk purchased a 1992 Ducati motorcycle from a dealer in Norwalk. Over the next several years, Schenk experienced repeated mechanical problems with his motorcycle. As a result, in 1995, Schenk initiated compulsory arbitration proceedings against Cagiva pursuant to General Statutes § 42-181,4 [4] the Lemon Law arbitration procedure of the department of consumer protection (department). At the arbitration proceedings, Cagiva argued that claims regarding motorcycles are not covered by the Lemon Law and, therefore, that the department could not require Cagiva [5] to arbitrate Schenk’s claim. The arbitration panel rejected this contention, and after a hearing, rendered a decision in favor of Schenk.5
Cagiva filed an application with the trial court for an order vacating, correcting or modifying the arbitration [6] award. The department intervened as a party defendant pursuant to Practice Book § 996 and General Statutes § 52-107.7 In the trial court, Cagiva renewed its claim that the Lemon Law does not cover motorcycles. Cagiva also claimed that certain of the arbitration panel’s factual conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court rejected all of Cagiva’s legal and factual claims, and confirmed the arbitration award. This appeal followed.
The Lemon Law is a remedial statute that protects purchasers of new passenger motor vehicles. It was designed to compel manufacturers of passenger motor vehicles to fulfill all express warranties made to consumers, and to facilitate a consumer’s recovery against the manufacturer of a defective vehicle should a dispute arise.8 The Lemon Law directs that “[i]f a new motor vehicle does not conform to all applicable express warranties, and the consumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer . . . during the period of two years following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to a consumer or during the period of the first eighteen thousand miles of operation, whichever period ends first, the manufacturer . . . shall make such [7] repairs as are necessary to conform the vehicle to such express warranties . . . .” General Statutes § 42-179 (b). The Lemon Law also establishes an arbitration procedure, under the auspices of the department, that a consumer can invoke in the event of a dispute over these warranties with a motor vehicle manufacturer. General Statutes § 42-181. If the arbitration panel finds that the manufacturer has failed to meet its warranty obligations, the statute authorizes a variety of remedies, including a refund of the purchase price. General Statutes § 42-179 (d).
Whether a motorcycle is a “passenger motor vehicle” for the purposes of § 42-179 (a) (2) and General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (40) is a question of statutory interpretation.9 This is a question of law over which our review is plenary. State v. Burns, 236 Conn. 18, 22, 670 A.2d 851 (1996).10 “[I]t is axiomatic that the process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 512, 613 A.2d 748 (1992); Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 459-60, 600 A.2d 310 (1991). In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . . Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431-32, 650 A.2d 557 (1994).” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Izzo v. Meriden-Wallingford Hospital, 237 Conn. 259, 266, 676 A.2d 857 (1996).
[8] On appeal, Cagiva’s primary claim is that the department lacks the authority under the Lemon Law to compel arbitration with regard to motorcycles, because a motorcycle is not a passenger motor vehicle as defined in § 42-179 and General Statutes § 14-1 (59). Cagiva first claims that § 42-179 (a) (2) incorporates the current definition of passenger motor vehicle, namely that contained in § 14-1 (59). Cagiva notes that General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 42-179 was amended in 1993, subsequent to the 1990 changes in General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1, and relies on the principle that “[t]here is a presumption that the legislature, in enacting a law, did so in view of existing relevant statutes and intended it to be read with them so as to make one consistent body of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Citrano v. Berkshire Mutual Ins. Co., 171 Conn. 248, 255, 368 A.2d 54 (1976). Cagiva also asserts that the plain language of the current definition excludes motorcycles.11 Finally, Cagiva argues that motorcycles are not covered under the Lemon Law even if § 42-179 (a) (2) incorporates the pre-1990 definition of passenger motor vehicle, because that definition is limited to the class of vehicles commonly known as “automobiles.”12
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BORDEN, J.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a motorcycle is a “passenger motor vehicle” within the meaning of General Statutes § 42-179 (a) (2),1 which is part of Connecticut’s Lemon Law, General Statutes §§ 42-179 through 42-186. The plaintiff, Cagiva North America, Inc. (Cagiva), a wholesale distributor [3] of motorcycles, appeals2 from the judgment of the trial court denying its application to vacate or modify an arbitration award made under the Lemon Law in favor of the defendant, Edward Schenk, a motorcycle purchaser. Cagiva claims that the trial court improperly concluded that a motorcycle is a passenger motor vehicle within the meaning of § 42-179.3 We agree with Cagiva that a motorcycle is not a passenger motor vehicle within the meaning of § 42-179 and, consequently, is not within the purview of the Lemon Law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural histoiy are undisputed. Cagiva is the exclusive importer and wholesale distributor of Ducati motorcycles in the United States. On May 16, 1992, Schenk purchased a 1992 Ducati motorcycle from a dealer in Norwalk. Over the next several years, Schenk experienced repeated mechanical problems with his motorcycle. As a result, in 1995, Schenk initiated compulsory arbitration proceedings against Cagiva pursuant to General Statutes § 42-181,4 [4] the Lemon Law arbitration procedure of the department of consumer protection (department). At the arbitration proceedings, Cagiva argued that claims regarding motorcycles are not covered by the Lemon Law and, therefore, that the department could not require Cagiva [5] to arbitrate Schenk’s claim. The arbitration panel rejected this contention, and after a hearing, rendered a decision in favor of Schenk.5
Cagiva filed an application with the trial court for an order vacating, correcting or modifying the arbitration [6] award. The department intervened as a party defendant pursuant to Practice Book § 996 and General Statutes § 52-107.7 In the trial court, Cagiva renewed its claim that the Lemon Law does not cover motorcycles. Cagiva also claimed that certain of the arbitration panel’s factual conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court rejected all of Cagiva’s legal and factual claims, and confirmed the arbitration award. This appeal followed.
The Lemon Law is a remedial statute that protects purchasers of new passenger motor vehicles. It was designed to compel manufacturers of passenger motor vehicles to fulfill all express warranties made to consumers, and to facilitate a consumer’s recovery against the manufacturer of a defective vehicle should a dispute arise.8 The Lemon Law directs that “[i]f a new motor vehicle does not conform to all applicable express warranties, and the consumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer . . . during the period of two years following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to a consumer or during the period of the first eighteen thousand miles of operation, whichever period ends first, the manufacturer . . . shall make such [7] repairs as are necessary to conform the vehicle to such express warranties . . . .” General Statutes § 42-179 (b). The Lemon Law also establishes an arbitration procedure, under the auspices of the department, that a consumer can invoke in the event of a dispute over these warranties with a motor vehicle manufacturer. General Statutes § 42-181. If the arbitration panel finds that the manufacturer has failed to meet its warranty obligations, the statute authorizes a variety of remedies, including a refund of the purchase price. General Statutes § 42-179 (d).
Whether a motorcycle is a “passenger motor vehicle” for the purposes of § 42-179 (a) (2) and General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (40) is a question of statutory interpretation.9 This is a question of law over which our review is plenary. State v. Burns, 236 Conn. 18, 22, 670 A.2d 851 (1996).10 “[I]t is axiomatic that the process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 512, 613 A.2d 748 (1992); Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 459-60, 600 A.2d 310 (1991). In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . . Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431-32, 650 A.2d 557 (1994).” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Izzo v. Meriden-Wallingford Hospital, 237 Conn. 259, 266, 676 A.2d 857 (1996).
[8] On appeal, Cagiva’s primary claim is that the department lacks the authority under the Lemon Law to compel arbitration with regard to motorcycles, because a motorcycle is not a passenger motor vehicle as defined in § 42-179 and General Statutes § 14-1 (59). Cagiva first claims that § 42-179 (a) (2) incorporates the current definition of passenger motor vehicle, namely that contained in § 14-1 (59). Cagiva notes that General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 42-179 was amended in 1993, subsequent to the 1990 changes in General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1, and relies on the principle that “[t]here is a presumption that the legislature, in enacting a law, did so in view of existing relevant statutes and intended it to be read with them so as to make one consistent body of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Citrano v. Berkshire Mutual Ins. Co., 171 Conn. 248, 255, 368 A.2d 54 (1976). Cagiva also asserts that the plain language of the current definition excludes motorcycles.11 Finally, Cagiva argues that motorcycles are not covered under the Lemon Law even if § 42-179 (a) (2) incorporates the pre-1990 definition of passenger motor vehicle, because that definition is limited to the class of vehicles commonly known as “automobiles.”12
The department13 does not contend that a motorcycle is a passenger motor vehicle under the definition con[9] tained in § 14-1 as amended in 1990. The department argues, instead, that the pre-1990 § 14-1 definition of passenger motor vehicle is still incorporated in § 42-179 (a) (2). The department relies on the proposition that “[a]s a general rule, the . . . modification ... of a statutory provision adopted by another statute through incorporation by reference is inoperative so far as the adopting statute is concerned, in the absence of expressed or implied legislative intent to the contrary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. State, 160 Conn. 492, 498, 280 A.2d 351 (1971). The department further argues that the pre-1990 definition ought to be liberally construed, in light of the fact that the Lemon Law is a remedial statute. See Chrysler Corp. v. Maiocco, 209 Conn. 579, 594-95, 552 A.2d 1207 (1989). Thus, the department argues, because the language of the pre-1990 definition, liberally construed, can be read to include motorcycles, consumers of motorcycles are protected by the Lemon Law.
We conclude that the phrase “passenger motor vehicle” as originally defined in 1982, and retained until 1990; see General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (40); refers only to automobiles and larger versions thereof and not motorcycles. Because the parties agree that motorcycles also do not satisfy the definition of passenger motor vehicle in effect in 1990,14 we further conclude that a motorcycle is not a passenger motor vehicle within the meaning of § 42-179 (a) (2),15 and thus that a motorcycle is not a passenger motor vehicle for the purposes of the Lemon Law.
[10] We begin our analysis with the language of § 42-179 and the pre-1990 definition of passenger motor vehicle in General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (40). Section 42-179 (b) provides that the protections of the Lemon Law apply to “new motor vehicles.” A “motor vehicle” for the purpose of the Lemon Law is defined in § 42-179 (a) (2) as “a passenger motor vehicle or a passenger and commercial motor vehicle, as defined in section 14-1, which is sold or leased in this state.”16 (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (40) defines a “passenger motor vehicle” as “a motor vehicle which has a capacity of carrying not more than ten passengers, and which is designed and used for the purpose of transporting persons with their necessary personal belongings.”
We first note that the pre-1990 § 14-1 contains separate definitions for “motor vehicle”17 and “passenger [11] motor vehicle.”18 Although the definition of “motor vehicle” is broad enough to include motorcycles,19 the addition of the word “passenger” in the phrase “passenger motor vehicle” suggests that the legislature meant something different, and to limit the scope of that phrase. We generally read statutes so that no word is “treated as superfluous, void or insignificant unless there are impelling reasons . . . why this principle cannot be followed.” General Motors Corp. v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 126, 55 A.2d 732 (1947).
Reading General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 as a whole strongly suggests that motorcycles are not “passenger motor vehicles.”20 First, § 14-1 contains a distinct, explicit definition of “motorcycle.”21 Including motorcycles in the class of “passenger motor vehicles” would, therefore, be redundant. Second, no definition in § 14-1 expressly refers only to automobiles. Yet the drafters of § 14-1 surely intended to be able to refer with specificity to this important predominant class of vehicles in the statute. The only definition in § 14-1 that implicitly fills this role is that of “passenger motor vehicle.” Thus, if automobiles were not the exclusive category of “passenger motor vehicle,” there would be no specific definition of an automobile in § 14-1, a rather bizarre circumstance. We do not ordinarily read statu[12] tory language to work bizarre results. See State v. Hill, 237 Conn. 81, 102, 675 A.2d 866 (1996).
Indeed, other motor vehicle statutes indicate that the legislature uses the phrase “passenger motor vehicle” to refer specifically to automobiles, while it uses the separate term “motorcycle” when intending to refer to those vehicles. When construing a statute, we may look for guidance to other statutes relating to the same general subject matter, as the legislature is presumed to have created a consistent body of law. Vecca v. State, 29 Conn. App. 559, 564, 616 A.2d 823 (1992). For example, General Statutes § 14-49 (a) governs fees for “passenger motor vehicles,” while § 14-49 (b) specifically governs fees for “motorcycles.” General Statutes § 14-100a (a), which governs safety belts, refers only to “passenger motor vehicles,” providing that “[n]o new passenger motor vehicle may be sold or registered in this state unless equipped with at least two sets of seat safety belts for the front and rear seats of the motor vehicle . . . “Passenger motor vehicle” logically must be read in context as referring only to automobiles, because motorcycles are not generally equipped, or required to be equipped, with seat belts. Thus, § 14-100á (a) exemplifies a situation in which the legislature intended to refer specifically and exclusively to automobiles, and used the phrase “passenger motor vehicle” to do so.
The legislative history of the Lemon Law also supports our conclusion that the phrase “passenger motor vehicles” covers only what are commonly thought of as automobiles, and larger versions thereof such as station wagons and vans, but not motorcycles. The definition of “passenger motor vehicle,” as incorporated by the Lemon Law, must be read in fight of the purpose of the incorporating legislation. The legislative history of the Lemon Law indicates that it was designed to protect consumers of new automobiles and that, despite [13] the arguably ambiguous language of the 1982 definition of “passenger motor vehicle,” its language was not intended to be read literally so as to apply to all motor vehicles that could conceivably fit within it.
During the committee hearings on House Bill No. 5729, the bill that ultimately became the Lemon Law, Representative John J. Woodcock, the bill’s sponsor, described its purpose as follows: “The legislative proposal before you fills a major gap in our consumer law . . . [b]ecause it will give our new car buying public relief from defective new cars .... What the bill does is establish a standard for when a reasonable number of repair attempts have been undertaken by a new car warrantor.” (Emphasis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, General Law, Pt. 2, 1982 Sess., p. 233. Indeed, all of the testimony before the committee regarding the proposed Lemon Law, including testimony from members of the general public, specifically involved defective cars. See generally id., pp. 232-311.
Woodcock later described the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives. He explained that the law was intended to address the problem of “lemon cars”; (emphasis added) 25 H.R. Proc., Pt. 10, 1982 Sess., p. 3117; and that the bill was designed “to strengthen the new car consumer’s hand.” (Emphasis added.) Id., p. 3118. He noted that, “[t]he rationale behind the lemon bill has been to improve and enhance the responsiveness an[d] accountability of automobile manufacturers to consumer complaints with defective new cars.” (Emphasis added.) Id., p. 3161. “The lemon bill . . . givejs the] consumer rights against . . . the party responsible for the defective car.” (Emphasis added.) Id., p. 3123.
Woodcock also read into the record a number of consumer letters supporting the bill, all of which specifically described problems the writers had experienced [14] with lemon cars. Id., pp. 3125-35. At no time during the House proceedings were motorcycles, or any vehicles other than cars, mentioned. Comments made on the floor of the Senate22 further demonstrate that the Lemon Law was intended to protect only consumers of automobiles.
It is true, as the department argues, that the Lemon Law is a remedial statute that ought to be read broadly in favor of those consumers whom the law is designed to protect. But a recitation of that general principle merely begs the question of which consumers the Lemon Law was, in fact, designed to protect. We agree that the law should be read broadly in favor of automobile consumers. Given the language, purpose, and legislative history of the Lemon Law, however, we are not persuaded that its remedial purpose is broad enough to include motorcycles.
We conclude, therefore, that motorcycles are not passenger motor vehicles within the meaning of § 42-179 (a) (2) and General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (40). Accordingly, we agree with Cagiva that the trial court’s conclusion to the contrary was improper.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to vacate the arbitration award.
In this opinion PETERS, C. J., and CALLAHAN, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, Js., concurred.
In 1982, when § 42-179 was first enacted, § 14-1 was amended to define “passenger motor vehicle” as “a motor vehicle having a capacity of carrying not more than ten passengers, designed and used for the purpose of transporting persons with their necessary personal belongings.” See General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 14-1 (35). This language was basically retained when § 14-1 underwent technical amendment and renumbering in 1984. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 14-1 (40).
In 1990, the legislature amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (40), and changed the definition of “passenger motor vehicle” to its current form. General Statutes § 14-1 (59) now defines “passenger motor vehicle” as “a motor vehicle used for the private transportation of persons and their personal belongings, designed to carry occupants in comfort and safety, with not less than fifty per cent of the total area enclosed by the outermost body contour lines, excluding the area enclosing the engine, as seen in a plan view, utilized for designated seating positions and necessary legroom with a capacity of carrying not more than ten passengers including the operator thereof.”
“(b) If any motor vehicle purchased at any time on or after October 1, 1984, or leased at any time on or after June 17, 1987, fails to conform to such applicable warranties as defined in said section 42-179, a consumer may bring a grievance to an arbitration panel if the manufacturer of the vehicle has not established an informal dispute settlement procedure which the attorney general has certified as complying in all respects with the requirements of said section 42-179. . . .
“(c) The department of consumer protection shall investigate, gather and organize all information necessary for a fair and timely decision in each dispute. The commissioner may issue subpoenas on behalf of any arbitration panel to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents, papers and records relevant to the dispute. ... An arbitration panel shall, as expeditiously as possible, but not later than sixty days after the time the consumer files the complaint form together with the filing fee, render a fair decision based on the information gathered and disclose its findings and the reasons therefor to the parties involved. The failure of the arbitrators to render a decision within sixty days shall not void any subsequent decision or otherwise limit the powers of the arbitrators. The arbitration panel shall base its determination of liability solely on whether the manufacturer has failed to comply with section 42-179. The arbitration decision shall be final and binding as to the rights of the parties pursuant to section 42-179, subject only to judicial review as set forth in this subsection. The decision shall provide appropriate remedies, including, but not limited to one or more of the following:
“(1) Replacement of the vehicle with an identical or comparable new vehicle acceptable to the consumer;
“(2) Refund of the full contract price, plus collateral charges as specified in subsection (d) of said section 42-179;
“(3) Reimbursement for expenses and compensation for incidental damages as specified in subsection (d) of said section 42-179;
“(4) Any other remedies available under the applicable warranties, section 42-179, this section and sections 42-182 to 42-184, inclusive, or the MagnusonMoss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975), 15 USC 2301 et seq., as in effect on October 1, 1982, other than repair of the vehicle. The decision shall specify a date for performance and completion of all awarded remedies. Notwithstanding any provision of the [5] general statutes or any regulation to the contrary, the department of consumer protection shall not amend, reverse, rescind or revoke any decision or action of an arbitration panel. The department shall contact the consumer, within ten working days after the date for performance, to determine whether performance has occurred. The manufacturer shall act in good faith in abiding by any arbitration decision. In addition, either parly to the arbitration may make application to the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof for an order confirming, vacating, modifying or correcting any award, in accordance with the provisions of this section and sections 52-417, 52-418, 52-419 and 52-420. Upon filing such application the moving party shall mail a copy of the application to the attorney general and, upon entry of any judgment or decree, shall mail a copy of such judgment or decree to the attorney general. A review of such application shall be confined to the record of the proceedings before the arbitration panel. The court shall conduct a de novo review of the questions of law raised in the application. In addition to the grounds set forth in sections 52-418 and 52-419, the court shall consider questions of fact raised in the application. In reviewing questions of fact, the court shall uphold the award unless it determines that the factual findings of the arbitrators are not supported by substantial evidence in the record and that the substantial rights of the moving party have been prejudiced. If the arbitrators fail to state findings or reasons for the award, or the stated findings or reasons are inadequate, the court, shall search the record to determine whether a basis exists to uphold the award. If it is determined by the court that the manufacturer has acted without good cause in bringing an appeal of an award, the court, in its discretion, may grant to the consumer his costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. If the manufacturer fails to perform all awarded remedies by the date for performance specified by the arbitrators, and the enforcement of the award has not been stayed pursuant to subsection (c) of section 52-420, then each additional day the manufacturer wilfully fails to comply shall be deemed a separate violation for purposes of section 42-184.”