Caesar v. Bernard

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Caesar v. Bernard

156 A.D. 736, 141 N.Y.S. 668, 1913 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5847

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 9, 1913

StatusPublished

This text of 156 A.D. 736 (Caesar v. Bernard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Caesar v. Bernard, 156 A.D. 736, 141 N.Y.S. 668, 1913 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5847 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1913).

Pincite

Opinion

Laughlin, J.:

The opinion on another appeal herein, wherein the defendant Runyon is respondent (156 App.’ Div. 724), which is to be decided herewith, is decisive in favor of the ajppellants on all points save one. The learned counsel for this respondent pointedly contends that the statement of. a cause of action against an officer or director to enforce this personal liability requires an allegation that he violated the statute, or was concerned in its violation, in his capacity as an officer or director of the corporation-. That point is sufficiently discussed in the opinion on the appeal in which William M. Bernard is the respondent (156 App. Div. 737), and is there .decided adversely to 'this respondent. He was a director, and as such voted to authorize a mortgage,' alleged to have been executed in‘violation of the statute, and as secretary of the corporation he executed the [737]*737necessary papers, and in his individual capacity he benefited by the transaction by receiving a preferential payment.

It follows that the determination of the Appellate Term and order of the Special Term of the City Court should be reversed, with costs, and motion denied, with costs.

McLaughlin and Hotchkiss, JJ., concurred; Ingraham, P. J., and Dowling, J., dissented.

Determination and order reversed, with costs, and motion denied, with costs.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Laughlin, J.:

The opinion on another appeal herein, wherein the defendant Runyon is respondent (156 App.’ Div. 724), which is to be decided herewith, is decisive in favor of the ajppellants on all points save one. The learned counsel for this respondent pointedly contends that the statement of. a cause of action against an officer or director to enforce this personal liability requires an allegation that he violated the statute, or was concerned in its violation, in his capacity as an officer or director of the corporation-. That point is sufficiently discussed in the opinion on the appeal in which William M. Bernard is the respondent (156 App. Div. 737), and is there .decided adversely to 'this respondent. He was a director, and as such voted to authorize a mortgage,' alleged to have been executed in‘violation of the statute, and as secretary of the corporation he executed the [737]*737necessary papers, and in his individual capacity he benefited by the transaction by receiving a preferential payment.

It follows that the determination of the Appellate Term and order of the Special Term of the City Court should be reversed, with costs, and motion denied, with costs.

McLaughlin and Hotchkiss, JJ., concurred; Ingraham, P. J., and Dowling, J., dissented.

Determination and order reversed, with costs, and motion denied, with costs.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

156 A.D. 736, 141 N.Y.S. 668, 1913 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5847, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/caesar-v-bernard-nyappdiv-1913.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack