Cadle Co. v. Glen Developers, Inc., No. Cv 92 0341912 S (Nov. 22, 2000)

2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 14416
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedNovember 22, 2000
DocketNo. CV 92 0341912 S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 14416 (Cadle Co. v. Glen Developers, Inc., No. Cv 92 0341912 S (Nov. 22, 2000)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cadle Co. v. Glen Developers, Inc., No. Cv 92 0341912 S (Nov. 22, 2000), 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 14416 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The judgment creditor, The Cadle Company,1 seeks to enforce a money judgment obtained against the judgment debtors, Glen Developers, Dominick Sanzo and Peter Sanzo. The judgment arose out of the parties' failure to make payments when due and owing under the terms of a note, mortgage and guarantee agreement that the parties entered into with Fleet Bank.

On December 12, 1986, Glen Developers executed a note and mortgage in favor of Fleet Bank in the principal amount of $2,500,000. Also, on December 12, 1986, Dominic Sanzo and Peter Sanzo executed a guaranty agreement on behalf of Glen Developers in favor of Fleet Bank. In their guaranty agreement, Dominic Sanzo and Peter Sanzo guaranteed the payment and performance of any and all of the obligations of Glen Developers to Fleet Bank pursuant to the terms of the note and mortgage. Glen Developers, Dominic Sanzo and Peter Sanzo failed, however, to make payments for which they were obligated to make under the terms of the note, mortgage and guaranty agreement. On or about November 30, 1992, therefore, Fleet Bank filed suit against Glen Developers, Dominic Sanzo and Peter Sanzo.

On December 20, 1994, the trial court, Moran, J., granted the judgment creditor's motion for judgment in accordance with stipulation executed by both the judgment creditor and the judgment debtors. Under the terms of the stipulated judgment, the judgment debtors owed the judgment creditor $310,950.82, to be paid over time upon the completion of certain requirements. The judgment debtors failed, however, to meet the requirements of the stipulated judgment and to make full payment to the judgment creditor.

Sometime after December 20, 1994, the judgment creditor learned through postjudgment discovery that the judgment debtor, Dominic Sanzo, is the owner of an undivided one half interest in a mortgage note dated February 3, 1993, made payable to Dominic and Katherine Sanzo, the judgment debtor's wife. The mortgage note was given to the judgment debtor and his wife by Q.V. Limited Partnership. The principal amount of the mortgage note is $835,000. CT Page 14418

On May 11, May 16, and May 17, 2000, the judgment creditor, in an effort to collect on the money judgment, served property executions upon the judgment debtor, Katherine Sanzo and the judgment debtor's attorney of record, Day, Berry Howard, LLP, demanding that the original mortgage note be turned over to the judgment creditor for an execution sale to satisfy the judgment creditor's outstanding judgment. Despite the demands of the sheriff, however, neither the judgment debtor, Katherine Sanzo nor Day, Berry Howard turned over the original mortgage note. The parties claim that the original mortgage note has been either lost or misplaced and, therefore, they are unable to turn it over to the judgment creditor at the present time.

On May 26, 2000, the judgment creditor filed an application for orders in aid of execution seeking an order from the court directing the judgment debtor to deliver the original mortgage note or, in lieu of the original mortgage note, a lost note affidavit to the judgment creditor or appropriate levying officer for an execution sale pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-356a and 52-356b. The judgment creditor has submitted a memorandum of law in support of its application for orders in aid of execution. On September 21, 2000, the judgment creditor filed a supplemental memorandum of law in support of the application for orders in aid of execution.

On September 25, 2000, the judgment debtor and Katherine Sanzo filed a position statement and brief objecting to the relief requested by Cadle and appealing to the equitable powers of the court to issue an order which recognizes the rights of the judgment creditor while at the same time avoids harm to the judgment debtor and Katherine Sanzo. On September 25, 2000, the judgment creditor filed a reply to the judgment debtor's position statement and brief.

DISCUSSION
General Statutes § 52-356b (a) provides in relevant part that "[i]f a judgment is unsatisfied, the judgment creditor may apply to the court for an execution and an order in aid of the execution directing the judgment debtor, or any third person, to transfer to the levying officer either or both of the following: (1) Possession of specified personal property that is sought to be levied on; or (2) possession of documentary evidence of title to property of, or a debt owed to, the judgment debtor that is sought to be levied on."

The judgment creditor argues that it is entitled to an execution sale of the judgment debtor's undivided one half interest in the mortgage note because the judgment creditor holds a money judgment against the judgment debtor, which remains unsatisfied, and the mortgage note is nonexempt CT Page 14419 personal property subject to a turnover order. The judgment creditor further argues that § 52-356b provides judicial assistance in obtaining physical possession of the original mortgage note so as to permit a levy and execution sale.

The judgment creditor argues that in order to conduct an execution sale, and to be in a position to vest the purchaser with the status of a "holder" and, therefore, one who is "entitled to enforce the instrument" under the applicable provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code pursuant to § 42a-3-301,2 the court should order the turnover of the original mortgage note or, in lieu of the original mortgage note, a lost note affidavit signed by the judgment debtor. The original mortgage note or lost note affidavit should be delivered to the judgment creditor or to the appropriate levying officer who shall execute the sale of the judgment debtor's undivided one half interest in the mortgage note and then deliver the original mortgage note to a court appointed custodian who will hold it for the joint benefit of Katherine Sanzo and the execution sale purchaser. The judgment creditor argues that this will permit the proper levy and execution sale of the judgment debtor's undivided one half interest in the mortgage note while at the same time permitting Katherine Sanzo to retain her one half interest in the mortgage note and all the rights attendant to such an interest.

The judgment debtor opposes an execution sale of his undivided one half interest in the mortgage note claiming that both he and Katherine Sanzo, against whom there is no money judgment, are unfairly disadvantaged by an execution sale that is likely to result in the purchase of the mortgage note at a fire sale price and leave the judgment creditor with the prospect of a windfall. The judgment debtor argues that because it is not known how such an execution sale will effect the collection of the mortgage note or issues of confidentiality surrounding the mortgage note, which will arise if the obligor on the mortgage note purchases the interest.of the judgment debtor, the mortgage note should not be turned over for sale. Moreover, the judgment debtor argues that any execution sale should be stayed until the subsequent federal action brought by the judgment creditor against Dominic and Katherine Sanzo for fraudulent transfers, currently pending in the district court, is decided.

"A money judgment . . . is directly enforceable . . .

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Bluebook (online)
2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 14416, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cadle-co-v-glen-developers-inc-no-cv-92-0341912-s-nov-22-2000-connsuperct-2000.