Cadence Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Paddock Laboratories Inc.

886 F. Supp. 2d 445, 2012 WL 3609687, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118933
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedAugust 22, 2012
DocketNo. CA 11-733-LPS
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 886 F. Supp. 2d 445 (Cadence Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Paddock Laboratories Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Cadence Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Paddock Laboratories Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 445, 2012 WL 3609687, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118933 (D. Del. 2012).

Opinion

[450]*450 MEMORANDUM OPINION

STARK, District Judge:

Pending before the Court is the issue of claim construction of various disputed terms found in U.S. Patent Nos. 6,028,222 (the “'222 patent”) and 6,992,218 (the “'218 patent”) (collectively, the “patents-in-suit”).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Cadence Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and SCR Pharmatop (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this patent infringement action against defendants Paddock Laboratories, Inc., Perrigo Company, Paddock Laboratories, LLC, Exela Pharma Sciences, LLC, Exela PharmSci, Inc., and Exela Holdings, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) on August 18, 2011, alleging infringement of the patents-in-suit. (D.I. 1) The patents-in-suit relate to formulations and methods for making liquid acetaminophen compositions. The '222 patent claims to address an oxygenation problem by including “a buffering agent” and a free radical scavenger/antagonist in the chemical composition of liquid acetaminophen. (See '222 patent col. 18 11. 50-55) The '218 patent relates to an “extreme, and possibly complete” deoxygenation process, which reduces the oxygen content of the drug during the manufacturing process and potentially removes all oxygen from the chemical formulation. (See '218 patent col. 4 11. 18-20; id. at col. 6 11. 50-53)

The parties completed briefing on claim construction on July 10, 2012. (See D.I. 165) The Court held a Markman hearing on August 10, 2012. See Markman Hr’g Tr., Aug. 10, 2012 (D.I. 187) (hereinafter “Tr ”)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

“It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Construing the claims of a patent presents a question of law. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977-78 (Fed.Cir.1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 388-90, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). “[T]here is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324. Instead, the court is free to attach the appropriate weight to appropriate sources “in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law.” Id.

“[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning ... [which is] the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Id. at 1312-13 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he ordinary meaning of a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.” Id. at 1321 (internal quotation marks omitted). The patent specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dis-positive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996).

While “the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms,” the context of the surrounding words of the claim also must be considered. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Furthermore, “[o]ther claims of the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted, can also be valuable sources of enlightenment ... [b]ecause claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent....” Id. (internal citation omitted).

[451]*451It is likewise true that “[(Differences among claims can also be a useful guide.... For example, the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim.” Id. at 1314-15 (internal citation omitted). This “presumption is especially strong when the limitation in dispute is the only meaningful difference between an independent and dependent claim, and one party is urging that the limitation in the dependent claim should be read into the independent claim.” Sun-Race Roots Enter. Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed.Cir.2003).

It is also possible that “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. It bears emphasis that “[e]ven when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.” LiebeV-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), affd, 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed.Cir.2007).

In addition to the specification, a court “should also consider the patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. The prosecution history, which is “intrinsic evidence,” “consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO [Patent and Trademark Office] and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. “[T]he prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Id.

A court also may rely on “extrinsic evidence,” which “consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. For instance, technical dictionaries can assist the court in determining the meaning of a term to those of skill in the relevant art because such dictionaries “endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of terms used in various fields of science and technology.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. In addition, expert testimony can be useful “to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of ordinary skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent field.” Id. Nonetheless, courts must not lose sight of the fact that “expert reports and testimony [are] generated at the time of and for the purpose of litigation and thus can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence.” Id. Overall, while extrinsic evidence “may be useful” to the court, it is “less reliable” than intrinsic evidence, and its consideration “is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.” Id. at 1318-19.

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886 F. Supp. 2d 445, 2012 WL 3609687, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118933, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cadence-pharmaceuticals-inc-v-paddock-laboratories-inc-ded-2012.