Caccavale v. Hewlett-Packard Company

District Court, E.D. New York·Decided March 21, 2025·No. 2:20-cv-00974·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Tony Caccavale, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 2:20-cv-974 -v- (NJC) (ST)

Hewlett-Packard Company A/K/A HP Inc., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge: Before me is a Renewed Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class and Collective Action Settlement, Conditional Certification of the Settlement Class and Collective, Appointment of Plaintiffs’ Counsel as Class Counsel, and Approval of the Parties’ Proposed Notice of Settlement (the “Renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval”) filed by named Plaintiff Douglas Sorbie (“Sorbie”) and Defendant Unisys Corporation (“Unisys”). (Mot., ECF No. 273.) On March 14, 2025, Magistrate Judge Steven Tiscione issued a Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”) recommending that the Renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval be granted. (R&R, ECF No. 277.) For the reasons set forth below, I adopt the R&R in full and grant the Renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval in its entirety. BACKGROUND

Sorbie brings claims against Unisys for failure to timely pay regular and overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) §§ 191(1)(a) and 198, on behalf of himself, a conditionally certified FLSA collective, and a proposed class of Unisys’s former service delivery employees. (Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 154–71, ECF No. 201; see also Cond. Cert. Order, ECF No. 83.) On March 13, 2025, I denied without prejudice and with leave to renew Sorbie’s initial motion for preliminary approval of a proposed class and collective action settlement with Unisys because the parties had failed to provide sufficient information for me to assess whether the proposed settlement was likely to be approved under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”), Moses v. New York Times Co., 79 F.4th 235 (2d Cir. 2023), and Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015), and because certain provisions of the proposed agreement rendered it unfair and unreasonable under these precedents. Caccavale v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 20-cv- 974, 2024 WL 4250337 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2024), ECF No. 252. The March 13, 2024 Opinion and Order is incorporated by reference, and I assume the parties’ familiarity with it. See Williams v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), No. 18-cv-7070, 2019 WL 3423267, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July

30, 2019) (incorporating by reference prior recitations of procedural history and facts). Sorbie and Unisys negotiated modifications to their proposed agreement and filed the Renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval on June 24, 2024. (Mot.) On March 14, 2025, Magistrate Judge Steve Tiscione issued the R&R recommending that the Renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval be granted. (R&R.) The R&R was electronically served on Sorbie and Unisys the same day, on March 14, 2025. (Id.) The R&R instructed that any objections to the R&R must be submitted in writing to the Clerk of Court within fourteen (14) days of service, i.e., by March 28, 2025. (Id. at 42.) On March 18, 2025, Sorbie and Unisys filed a joint letter which in which the parties “note[d] that they have no objections to the R&R and ask[ed] that it be adopted in full.” (ECF No. 278.) DISCUSSION

In reviewing a report and recommendation, the court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). If no objections are filed, a district court reviews a report and recommendation for clear error. King v. Paradise Auto Sales I, Inc., No. 15-cv-1188, 2016 WL 4595991, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2016) (citation omitted); Covey v. Simonton, 481 F. Supp. 2d 224, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Because the parties have stated that they have no objections to the R&R (ECF No. 278), I may review the R&R for clear error. Nevertheless, I reviewed the R&R de novo out of an abundance of caution. Having reviewed the motion papers, the applicable law, and the R&R, I adopt the thorough and well-reasoned R&R (ECF No. 277) in its entirety. For the reasons set forth in the R&R, the parties’ revised proposed Settlement Agreement and Release (“Proposed

Agreement”) (ECF No. 273-3) is preliminarily approved because it is likely fair and reasonable under Rule 23(e), Fed. R. Civ. P., Moses, 79 F.4th 235, and Cheeks, 796 F.3d 199. I supplement the careful and thorough R&R only to set forth additional findings regarding the parties’ Proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Proposed Notice”) (ECF No. 273-4). I find that the Proposed Notice complies with Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and Rule 23(e) and with the Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and is thus approved as well. Under Rule 12(e)(1)(B), once a court has determined that it will likely be able to approve a proposed class settlement and certify a class for the purposes of the settlement, the court “must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B). Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires that, for the purposes of notice of a

preliminary approved settlement agreement, “the court must direct [that] class members [be provided with] the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). This notice may be made by mail, electronic means, or other appropriate means and it must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language: (i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class certified; (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires; (v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; (vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); see also In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig. (“In re Payment Card”), 330 F.R.D. 11, 58–59 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). “The standard for the adequacy of a settlement notice in a class action under either the Due Process Clause or the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] is measured by reasonableness.” Fikes Wholesale, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 62 F.4th 704, 719–20 (2d Cir. 2023). “There are no rigid rules to determine whether a settlement notice to the class satisfies constitutional or Rule 23(e) requirements; the settlement notice must fairly apprise the prospective members of the class of the terms of the proposed settlement and of the options that are open to them in connection with the proceedings.” Id. The Second Circuit has found that notice “is adequate if it may be understood by the average class member.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 114 (2d Cir.

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Related

Covey v. Simonton
481 F. Supp. 2d 224 (E.D. New York, 2007)
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc.
396 F.3d 96 (Second Circuit, 2005)
Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc.
796 F.3d 199 (Second Circuit, 2015)