Opinion
KINGSLEY, Acting P. J.
Lynette G. appeals from an order of the Juvenile Court, which order found that she is a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because she committed a robbery (a violation of Pen. Code, § 211). She was found to be a ward of the court and placed on probation in her father’s home. Miss G. contends that: (1) she was illegally detained and transported to the scene of the crime for an on-the-scene identification; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to show that she aided and abetted in the commission of the robbery.
For the reasons stated below we affirm the judgment.
Evidence presented at the juvenile court hearing established. that, shortly before 3 p.m. on November 6, 1974, Frances Divine was walking toward her home in Lincoln Heights when a teen-age girl ran up to her and hit her two times over the head with a heavy object. Mrs. Divine was carrying her purse and a Bullock’s shopping bag which contained a new purse she had just purchased. She had $31 in her wallet.
Mrs. Divine stared at the girl, who was holding Mrs. Divine’s handbag up toward her chest. The blows were hard and Mrs. Divine started to [1091]*1091bleed. She was stunned. Mrs. Divine saw three other young black girls huddled together five feet away from the girl who had struck her.
The girl who struck Mrs. Divine took her purse and shopping bag and ran away with the other three girls. They ran across the street and up toward North Broadway.
Mrs. Divine called for help. Three men came out of a house across the street and chased the girls. As they ran, two of the girls, the one who struck Mrs. Divine,1 and one of the other three girls, were fighting over Mrs. Divine’s purse. Witnesses could not identify which of the other three girls was the one involved in the struggle. The girls threw the purses down and bystanders brought them back to Mrs. Divine. Her wallet was missing from her purse.
A neighbor of Mrs. Divine, Margaret Gurule, was waiting for her children to return from school when she witnessed the attack on Mrs. Divine. Mrs. Gurule saw all four girls run from the scene.
About 3 p.m., Los Angeles Police Officer John Munguia received a radio call concerning a possible robbery. He proceeded to the intersection of North Broadway and Avenue 19 and there observed Mrs. Divine being treated by ambulance attendants.
Officer Munguia interviewed Irma Martinez, who told him that four black females had just attacked Mrs. Divine and had run north on Avenue 19 toward North Broadway. She and several bystanders, who would not give their names, described the clothing worn by three of the four girls. Miss G.’s clothing was not described.
Officer Munguia searched the immediate area and observed four black females coming out of the parking lot of a bowling alley adjacent to a gas station. The clothing worn by three of them matched the descriptions of the clothing worn by three of the four girls who ran away.
The girls crossed over a small fence into the gas station parking lot. All four of the girls were carrying packages. Two of the girls, Nadine H. and Melody H. were barefoot. Nadine was carrying a pair of platform shoes in her hand. Lynette G. was carrying a brown paper sack containing two pairs of platform shoes.
[1092]*1092The girls were detained by Officer Munguia and brought back to the scene of the robbery, half a block away. Mrs. Gurule identified the four girls Officer Munguia brought back to the scene of the robbery as the same four girls she had seen run away. Other people at the scene identified the girls. The four girls were arrested and booked. They had only $4 in cash between them.
I
Lynette G. contends that she was illegally detained and transported to the scene of the crime for an on-the-scene identification.
It is well established that a temporary detention may be justified by circumstances falling short of probable cause to arrest a suspect. (People v. Harris (1975) 15 Cal.3d 384, 388 [124 Cal.Rptr. 536, 540 P.2d 632]; People v. Mickelson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 448, 450 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658].) “A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, .. . when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer’s duties. [Citations.] The good faith suspicion which warrants an officer’s detention of a person for investigative reasons is necessarily of a lesser standard than that required to effect an arrest. [Citation.] Where there is a rational belief of criminal activity with which the suspect is connected, a detention for reasonable investigative procedures infringes no constitutional restraint. [Citation.]” (People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 [115 Cal.Rptr. 225, 524 P.2d 353]; People v. Harris, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 388-389.)
We conclude that Officer Munguia had rational grounds for believing that Miss G. was one of the four girls involved in the robbery of Mrs. Divine. Four girls had been at the scene of the robbeiy; four girls ran away together; four girls were seen together, shortly after the robbery and in its immediate vicinity; three of the girls admittedly fitted the description of three of the girls at the scene of the crime and in the group that had run away; the fourth girl, although identified only by her race, sex and age, could quite reasonably be detained in order to discover whether she was one of the original group or a late joiner, replacing one of the original group. The facts of Miss G.’s race, sex and age, although not by themselves enough to support an ultimate charge of complicity, were enough to arouse a rational .suspicion of complicity sufficient to justify, if not to require, detention and further investigation. Contrary to the intimation in the dissent, the result would be the same if all four girls [1093]*1093originally involved had been Caucasian. The racial element had, and has, no significance other than that it included, rather than excluded, Miss G. from being a potential associate of the three identifiable girls.
As to whether the transporation of the four girls back to the scene of the crime for identification by the victim and other witnesses was legal, we believe the recent Supreme Court case of People v. Harris, supra, is dispositive. In Harris, the victims’ home was burglarized. The victims gave a description of one of the suspects as “male Caucasian, dark hair, moustache, about 5'8" tall, about 150 pounds, wearing a light cardigan sweater and dark trousers.” Investigating police spotted the defendant as approximating the description furnished by the victims, three blocks away from the burglary. The suspects were stopped and interrogated separately. Each gave conflicting stories and both appeared nervous. The suspects were searched, handcuffed and placed in the back of a police car. Without asking the suspects’ consent, the officers drove the suspects back to the scene of the crime for possible identification by the victims. The victims were unable to identify either suspect.
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Opinion
KINGSLEY, Acting P. J.
Lynette G. appeals from an order of the Juvenile Court, which order found that she is a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because she committed a robbery (a violation of Pen. Code, § 211). She was found to be a ward of the court and placed on probation in her father’s home. Miss G. contends that: (1) she was illegally detained and transported to the scene of the crime for an on-the-scene identification; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to show that she aided and abetted in the commission of the robbery.
For the reasons stated below we affirm the judgment.
Evidence presented at the juvenile court hearing established. that, shortly before 3 p.m. on November 6, 1974, Frances Divine was walking toward her home in Lincoln Heights when a teen-age girl ran up to her and hit her two times over the head with a heavy object. Mrs. Divine was carrying her purse and a Bullock’s shopping bag which contained a new purse she had just purchased. She had $31 in her wallet.
Mrs. Divine stared at the girl, who was holding Mrs. Divine’s handbag up toward her chest. The blows were hard and Mrs. Divine started to [1091]*1091bleed. She was stunned. Mrs. Divine saw three other young black girls huddled together five feet away from the girl who had struck her.
The girl who struck Mrs. Divine took her purse and shopping bag and ran away with the other three girls. They ran across the street and up toward North Broadway.
Mrs. Divine called for help. Three men came out of a house across the street and chased the girls. As they ran, two of the girls, the one who struck Mrs. Divine,1 and one of the other three girls, were fighting over Mrs. Divine’s purse. Witnesses could not identify which of the other three girls was the one involved in the struggle. The girls threw the purses down and bystanders brought them back to Mrs. Divine. Her wallet was missing from her purse.
A neighbor of Mrs. Divine, Margaret Gurule, was waiting for her children to return from school when she witnessed the attack on Mrs. Divine. Mrs. Gurule saw all four girls run from the scene.
About 3 p.m., Los Angeles Police Officer John Munguia received a radio call concerning a possible robbery. He proceeded to the intersection of North Broadway and Avenue 19 and there observed Mrs. Divine being treated by ambulance attendants.
Officer Munguia interviewed Irma Martinez, who told him that four black females had just attacked Mrs. Divine and had run north on Avenue 19 toward North Broadway. She and several bystanders, who would not give their names, described the clothing worn by three of the four girls. Miss G.’s clothing was not described.
Officer Munguia searched the immediate area and observed four black females coming out of the parking lot of a bowling alley adjacent to a gas station. The clothing worn by three of them matched the descriptions of the clothing worn by three of the four girls who ran away.
The girls crossed over a small fence into the gas station parking lot. All four of the girls were carrying packages. Two of the girls, Nadine H. and Melody H. were barefoot. Nadine was carrying a pair of platform shoes in her hand. Lynette G. was carrying a brown paper sack containing two pairs of platform shoes.
[1092]*1092The girls were detained by Officer Munguia and brought back to the scene of the robbery, half a block away. Mrs. Gurule identified the four girls Officer Munguia brought back to the scene of the robbery as the same four girls she had seen run away. Other people at the scene identified the girls. The four girls were arrested and booked. They had only $4 in cash between them.
I
Lynette G. contends that she was illegally detained and transported to the scene of the crime for an on-the-scene identification.
It is well established that a temporary detention may be justified by circumstances falling short of probable cause to arrest a suspect. (People v. Harris (1975) 15 Cal.3d 384, 388 [124 Cal.Rptr. 536, 540 P.2d 632]; People v. Mickelson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 448, 450 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658].) “A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, .. . when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer’s duties. [Citations.] The good faith suspicion which warrants an officer’s detention of a person for investigative reasons is necessarily of a lesser standard than that required to effect an arrest. [Citation.] Where there is a rational belief of criminal activity with which the suspect is connected, a detention for reasonable investigative procedures infringes no constitutional restraint. [Citation.]” (People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 [115 Cal.Rptr. 225, 524 P.2d 353]; People v. Harris, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 388-389.)
We conclude that Officer Munguia had rational grounds for believing that Miss G. was one of the four girls involved in the robbery of Mrs. Divine. Four girls had been at the scene of the robbeiy; four girls ran away together; four girls were seen together, shortly after the robbery and in its immediate vicinity; three of the girls admittedly fitted the description of three of the girls at the scene of the crime and in the group that had run away; the fourth girl, although identified only by her race, sex and age, could quite reasonably be detained in order to discover whether she was one of the original group or a late joiner, replacing one of the original group. The facts of Miss G.’s race, sex and age, although not by themselves enough to support an ultimate charge of complicity, were enough to arouse a rational .suspicion of complicity sufficient to justify, if not to require, detention and further investigation. Contrary to the intimation in the dissent, the result would be the same if all four girls [1093]*1093originally involved had been Caucasian. The racial element had, and has, no significance other than that it included, rather than excluded, Miss G. from being a potential associate of the three identifiable girls.
As to whether the transporation of the four girls back to the scene of the crime for identification by the victim and other witnesses was legal, we believe the recent Supreme Court case of People v. Harris, supra, is dispositive. In Harris, the victims’ home was burglarized. The victims gave a description of one of the suspects as “male Caucasian, dark hair, moustache, about 5'8" tall, about 150 pounds, wearing a light cardigan sweater and dark trousers.” Investigating police spotted the defendant as approximating the description furnished by the victims, three blocks away from the burglary. The suspects were stopped and interrogated separately. Each gave conflicting stories and both appeared nervous. The suspects were searched, handcuffed and placed in the back of a police car. Without asking the suspects’ consent, the officers drove the suspects back to the scene of the crime for possible identification by the victims. The victims were unable to identify either suspect. While the officers were interrogating the suspects another officer noticed that defendant’s shoes had soles similar to a shoe that had left a footprint found at the point of entry into the house. The suspects were than placed under arrest. Further investigation revealed that the burglar or burglars had removed some change from a piggy bank as well as a folded $10 bill and a $1 silver certificate from a jewelry box. An inventory search conducted incidentally to the suspects’ booking disclosed a $1 silver certificate in defendant’s wallet and a folded $10 bill in his companion’s wallet. Defendant, contending that his detention and subsequent conveyance to the victims’ residence were unlawful, moved to suppress the currency together with evidence of the matching shoeprint. The motion was denied and the evidence (shoeprint and currency) introduced at trial formed the major basis for defendant’s conviction. The California Supreme Court held that although the detention was lawful the police procedures used to transport the suspects back to the scene of the crime violated defendant’s constitutional rights and reversed the conviction.
Although the Supreme Court ruled that the transport was illegal under those factual circumstances, it was careful to point out that it could conceive of factual situations in which it would be reasonable to transport a suspect to the scene of the crime for possible identification. (People v. Harris, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 391; cf., People v. Courtney (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1185 [90 Cal.Rptr. 370] (reasonable to transport—hostile crowd endangered police officer’s safety).) In fact, the court stated that if [1094]*1094“the victim of an assault or other serious offense was injured or otherwise physically unable to be taken promptly to view the suspect, or a witness was similarly incapacitated, and the circumstances warranted a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was indeed the offender, a ‘transport’ detention might well be upheld. Similarly, the surrounding circumstances may reasonably indicate that it would be less of an intrusion upon the suspect’s rights to convey him speedily a few blocks to the crime scene, permitting the suspect’s early release rather than prolonging unduly the field detention.” People v. Harris, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 391. As the Supreme Court states where, as here, the victim is injured and physically unable to be taken promptly to view the suspects, the police do not infringe upon the suspects’ (Lynette G.’s) constitutional rights when they transport the suspects speedily a Half block to the scene of the crime for immediate identification by the victim and other witnesses. The detention and transportation to the scene of the crime were therefore lawful.
II
Lynette G. also contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that she aided and abetted in the commission of the robbery.
Whether a person has aided and abetted in the commission of a crime ordinarily is a question of fact. (People v. Herrera (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 846, 852 [86 Cal.Rptr. 165]; People v. Morga (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 200, 207 [78 Cal.Rptr. 120]; People v. George (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 424, 429 [66 Cal.Rptr. 442].) Consequently, “ ‘all intendments are in favor of the judgment and a verdict will not be set aside unless the record clearly shows that upon no hypothesis whatsoever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.’ ” (People v. Moore (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 303, 306 [260 P.2d 1011].)
In order to hold Lynette G. as an aider and abettor it must be determined whether she, in any way, directly or indirectly, aided the ■ perpetrator, with knowledge of the latter’s wrongful purpose. (People v. Villa (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 134 [318 P.2d 828]; People v. Fleming (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 163, 168 [12 Cal.Rptr. 530]; People v. Tambini (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 757, 765 [80 Cal.Rptr. 179].)
Among the factors which may be considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense. (People [1095]*1095v. Hawkins (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 99, 104 [73 Cal.Rptr. 748]; People v. Perryman (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 813, 820 [58 Cal.Rptr. 921]; People v. Fleming, supra; People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171, 181 [74 Cal.Rptr. 262, 449 P.2d 198], cert, den., 395 U.S. 968 [23 L.Ed.2d 755, 89 S.Ct. 2116] and cert, den., 406 U.S. 971 [32 L.Ed.2d 671, 92 S.Ct. 2416]; People v. Moore, supra.) In addition, flight is one of the factors which is relevant in determining consciousness of guilt. (People v. Mulqueen (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 532, 543 [88 Cal.Rptr. 235].)
Testimony by witnesses at the trial disclosed that Miss G. was present at the scene of the crime and had fled with the perpetrator and two others after the crime had been committed and was still in their company shortly thereafter. Although flight, in and of itself, may be explained by a desire merely to disassociate oneself from an unexpected criminal activity, the trial court was not required to adopt that view; it could, reasonably, have concluded that had Miss G.’s flight been from fear of an unjustified charge of involvement, she also would have immediately disassociated herself from the other three girls.
On the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that Lynette G. had aided and abetted the robbery of Mrs. Divine.
The order appealed from is affirmed.
Dunn, J., concurred.