C Daoud Mousa Janini v. London Townhouses Condominium Association

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 1, 2022
Docket355191
StatusUnpublished

This text of C Daoud Mousa Janini v. London Townhouses Condominium Association (C Daoud Mousa Janini v. London Townhouses Condominium Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
C Daoud Mousa Janini v. London Townhouses Condominium Association, (Mich. Ct. App. 2022).

Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

DAOUD MOUSA JANINI and FERYAL JANINI, UNPUBLISHED February 1, 2022 Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v No. 355191 Wayne Circuit Court LONDON TOWNHOUSES CONDOMINIUM LC No. 19-008520-NO ASSOCIATION,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

JAMES PYDA,

Defendant.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and SHAPIRO and GADOLA, JJ.

SHAPIRO, J. (concurring).

I agree with the majority that Francescutti v Fox Chase Condo Ass’n, 312 Mich App 640; 886 NW2d 891 (2015), requires reversal of the trial court’s decision to deny summary disposition to the defendant condominium association. However, because I believe Francescutti was wrongly decided and absent its binding authority would affirm the trial court, I would issue a published decision requesting that a special panel be convened to reconsider whether condominium associations should be immune from premises liability actions brought by condominium unit owners. See MCR 7.215(J)(2)-(3). I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Daoud Janini is the owner of a condominium unit in the London Townhouses, a condominium project operated by defendant, a non-profit corporation known as the London

-1- Townhouses Condominium Association.1 Plaintiff filed suit alleging that he suffered a serious injury when he fell as a result of the Association’s failure to take reasonable measures within a reasonable time to address icy conditions on the project’s sidewalks, which are considered to be common elements of the project.2 That the Association bears responsibility for taking such measures is not in dispute. The Association’s bylaws provide that “[t]he Association shall be responsible for construction, repair and maintenance of the Common Elements,” and in its answer to interrogatories, the Association admitted that it “was responsible for salting on the sidewalks” and for “[s]now and ice removal on the sidewalks.”

The Association filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that although it was responsible to perform snow and ice removal, plaintiff could not bring a premises liability suit against it because as a unit owner he possesses an undifferentiated property interest in the common elements along with all other unit owners as “co-owners”3 of the project. The Association relied on this Court’s decision in Francescutti that co-owners are barred from suing the condominium association for the condition of the common elements under common law. The trial court, while granting some aspects of the Association’s motion, denied it as to plaintiff’s premises liability claim. I. ANALYSIS

Were I free to do so, I would affirm the denial of summary disposition because contrary to the Association’s argument, in premises liability actions, the focus is not on ownership or title as such but on who has possession and control of the land. See Finazzo v Fire Equip Co, 323 Mich App 620, 627; 918 NW2d 200 (2018) (“Generally, for a party to be subject to premises liability in favor of persons coming on the land, the party must possess and control the property at issue but not necessarily be its owner.”). This is because the “party in possession is in a position of control, and normally best able to prevent any harm to others.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Stanley v Town Square Coop, 203 Mich App 143, 147; 512 NW2d 51 (1993) (“[The party with] exclusive control over the common areas of the premises, . . . is the only one who can take the necessary precautions to ensure that the common areas are safe for those who use them.”). The issue was discussed at length in Oriel v Uni-Rak Sales Co, Inc, 454 Mich 564, 568; 562 NW2d 241 (1997):

1 For purposes of clarity, I refer to various entities by the name provided by the Condominium Act, MCL 559.101 et seq. Plaintiff’s dwelling will be referred to as his “condominium unit.” MCL 559.104(3). Lincoln Townhouses will be referred to as the “condominium project” or “project.” MCL 559.104(1). Because plaintiff Feryal Janini’s claims are derivative of her husband’s claims, the term “plaintiff” as used in this opinion refers only to plaintiff Daoud Janini. 2 Common elements are defined by statute as “the portions of the condominium project other than the condominium units.” MCL 559.103. In some cases, they are also referred to as “common areas.” 3 MCL 559.106(1) defines “co-owner” as “a person, firm, corporation, partnership, association, trust, or other legal entity or any combination of those entities, who owns a condominium unit within the condominium project.”

-2- Premises liability is conditioned upon the presence of both possession and control over the land. This is so because

“[T]he man in possession is in a position of control, and normally best able to prevent any harm to others.” Michigan has consistently applied this principle in imposing liability for defective premises.

Our application of this principle is in accordance with the Restatement of Torts. The Restatement imposes liability for injuries occurring to trespassers, licensees, and invitees upon those who are “possessors” of the land. A “possessor” is defined as:

“(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it or

“(b) a person who has been in occupation of land with intent to control it, if no other person has subsequently occupied it with intent to control it, or

“(c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if no other person is in possession under Clauses (a) and (b).”

Ownership alone is not dispositive. Possession and control are certainly incidents of title ownership, but these possessory rights can be “loaned” to another, thereby conferring the duty to make the premises safe while simultaneously absolving oneself of responsibility. [Quoting Merritt v Nickelson, 407 Mich 544, 552-553; 287 NW2d 178 (1980).]

Thus, a land owner who has not retained at least some degree of possession or control of the premises owes no duty to the entrants. See e.g., Merritt, 407 Mich at 554; Wheeler v Iron Co Rd Comm, 173 Mich App 542, 544-545; 434 NW2d 188 (1988). Accordingly, the Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions do not state that an “owner” has the duty to protect those who come on the land, rather it imposes a duty on “the possessor” of the premises. See e.g., M Civ JI 19.03.

It is not in dispute that the Association is in possession and control of the common elements. By contrast, while a condominium unit owner has a nonexclusive and undifferentiated right to use those elements, no unit owner possesses a right of possession and control over them. Condominium unit owners may not modify the common elements, may not maintain them, may not deny others the right to access those areas and may not sell their “share” of the common elements.4 The Association cannot point to any indicia of ownership present other than the right of reasonable, nonexclusive use that terminates immediately upon the sale of their unit. I would conclude that because the Association is the sole party in possession and control of common

4 MCL 559.137(5) provides that “[e]xcept to the extent otherwise expressly provided by this act, the undivided interest in the common elements allocated to any condominium unit shall not be altered, and any transfer, encumbrance, or other disposition of that interest without the condominium unit to which it appertains is void.”

-3- elements, it may be sued in premises liability for injuries arising out of dangerous conditions, even by one who has an ownership interest in the common elements.

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