Byrd v. Superior Court of the District of Columbia

District of Columbia

Byrd v. Superior Court of the District of Columbia

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia

DecidedNovember 10, 2015

DocketCivil Action No. 2015-1948

StatusPublished

This text of Byrd v. Superior Court of the District of Columbia (Byrd v. Superior Court of the District of Columbia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Byrd v. Superior Court of the District of Columbia, (D.D.C. 2015).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DONETTA BYRD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case: 1:15—cv—O1948 Jury Demand V. ) Assigned To : Unassigned ) ASSIgn. Date: 11/3/2015 JUDGE ROBERT D_ OKUN, ) Description: Pro Se Gen. Civil (F Deck) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the court on review of plaintiff‘s application to proceed in forma pauperis and pro se civil complaint. The Court will grant the application and dismiss the

complaint.

It appears that plaintiff demands damages of $999,999,999,999 from Judge Okun of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia who dismissed a case plaintiff had brought against the Metropolitan Police Department. Judge Okun enjoys absolute immunity from liability for damages for acts taken in his judicial capacity. See Mirales v. Waco, 502 US. 9 (1991) (ﬁnding that “judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages”); Forrester v. White, 484 US. 219, 226-27 (1988) (discussing “purposes served by judicial immunity from liability in damages”); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 US. 349, 364 (1978) (concluding that state judge was “immune from damages liability even if his [decision] was in error”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 US. 547, 553-54 (1967) (“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the

doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872).”). Moreover, this federal

district court has no jurisdiction to review or reverse the decisions of a Superior Court judge.

See, e.g., Rowland v. United States Superior Court, No. 14—138, 2014 WL 345986, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2014); Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994), aff’d,

1994 WL 474995 (DC. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 US. 1150 (1995); see also 28 U.S.C. §§

1331, 1332 (general jurisdictional provisions).

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss this action with prejudice, see 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is issued separately.

DATE:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DONETTA BYRD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case: 1:15—cv—O1948 Jury Demand V. ) Assigned To : Unassigned ) ASSIgn. Date: 11/3/2015 JUDGE ROBERT D_ OKUN, ) Description: Pro Se Gen. Civil (F Deck) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the court on review of plaintiff‘s application to proceed in forma pauperis and pro se civil complaint. The Court will grant the application and dismiss the

complaint.

It appears that plaintiff demands damages of $999,999,999,999 from Judge Okun of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia who dismissed a case plaintiff had brought against the Metropolitan Police Department. Judge Okun enjoys absolute immunity from liability for damages for acts taken in his judicial capacity. See Mirales v. Waco, 502 US. 9 (1991) (ﬁnding that “judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages”); Forrester v. White, 484 US. 219, 226-27 (1988) (discussing “purposes served by judicial immunity from liability in damages”); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 US. 349, 364 (1978) (concluding that state judge was “immune from damages liability even if his [decision] was in error”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 US. 547, 553-54 (1967) (“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the

doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872).”). Moreover, this federal

district court has no jurisdiction to review or reverse the decisions of a Superior Court judge.

See, e.g., Rowland v. United States Superior Court, No. 14—138, 2014 WL 345986, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2014); Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994), aff’d,

1994 WL 474995 (DC. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 US. 1150 (1995); see also 28 U.S.C. §§

1331, 1332 (general jurisdictional provisions).

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss this action with prejudice, see 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is issued separately.

DATE:

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