Bybee v. Cienfuegos

Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

SPENCER BYBEE, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

UMA IRENE MAGDA AVALOS AYON Y CIENFUEGOS, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0936 FC

FILED 08-17-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. FC2022-091750

The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge (Ret.)

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED & REMANDED IN PART

APPEARANCES

Uma Irene Magda Avalos Ayon y Cienfuegos, Mesa Respondent/Appellant

BYBEE v. CIENFUEGOS Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Uma Irene Magda Avalos Ayon y Cienfuegos (“Mother”) appeals from the superior court’s rulings addressing her petition to prevent relocation of her child, J.B. For the following reasons, we affirm part of the court’s rulings but vacate and remand other portions.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Spencer Bybee (“Father”) have three children in common, including J.B., who was born in 2008. Father petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in 2022, and about two years later the court issued a decree dissolving the marriage, awarding the parties joint legal decision-making authority and equal parenting time.

¶3 On August 21, 2025, Mother petitioned to prevent relocation, alleging in part that Father intended to send J.B. “to Spain for schooling and for soccer training,” and that she never agreed to relocation. The court ordered the parties to appear for a temporary orders hearing and directed the parties to submit exhibits “at least 3 days before the hearing.” Mother submitted a pretrial statement and her exhibits on August 25, but Father did not timely submit his exhibits in preparation for the hearing, which was held on August 28.

¶4 At the scheduled hearing, the court took no testimony, but admitted the parties’ exhibits “for purposes of making the record for possible appeal or review by a subsequent judicial officer,” and explained it was “clear that [Mother’s] petition . . . was a material misrepresentation of fact and law.” The court did not address the untimeliness of Father’s exhibits, but instead determined that Father “had a good faith basis for purchasing the [plane] ticket, removing [J.B.] from a local school, and trying to have [J.B.] enrolled in a school in Spain while participating in a soccer club.” And Mother “knew all of this and left it out of her petition,” leading to “material omissions of fact about the truth of the matter that [J.B.] was going to be enrolled in school in a timely fashion, and those material

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BYBEE v. CIENFUEGOS Decision of the Court

[o]missions of fact resulted in [the] hearing being set where no good cause actually exist[ed].” The court also concluded that Mother’s exhibits showed “a clear effort to manipulate and misrepresent” the parties’ communications about plans for J.B. to travel to Spain.

¶5 The court explained it would not proceed with the hearing, and that Mother’s misrepresentations or omissions of fact justified sanctions. See A.R.S. § 25-415. The court authorized Father’s counsel to file an application for attorneys’ fees and sanctions, noting Mother had the right to object.

¶6 After the court asked Father’s counsel if there was “[a]ny other record to be made,” counsel stated that the parties had agreed to share travel and tuition costs and asked that Mother “be responsible for half of those costs, which are $4,000.” The court ordered Mother to “pay $4,000 immediately or face possible contempt of court filings.” After Mother was asked if she wanted to put anything on the record, she stated, “I am understanding I will not be able to present my case. Is that accurate, Your Honor?” The court replied, “No. You don’t have a case, that’s accurate. . . . You misrepresented things . . . . and there is not going to be a hearing, because there never should have been a hearing.”

¶7 Father filed his application for attorneys’ fees, claiming $6,510 in fees incurred plus $6,000 as a sanction. Mother objected to Father’s application, asserting in part that Father’s attorney included billing entries where the legal work performed occurred well before Mother petitioned to prevent relocation. She also argued that most of the fees Father sought related to the parties’ dispute over their marital residence and asked that the court not allow “the $5,180 overcharge” he claimed in his fee application. Without addressing the specifics of Mother’s objection, the court granted Father’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs but denied his request for an additional sanction. Mother timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Although Mother filed this appeal, she questions our appellate jurisdiction, asserting the superior court improperly certified the judgment as final under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 78(c) “despite the existence of substantive post-decree motions that remained unresolved.” For example, Mother contends her June 6, 2025 contempt petition is pending before the superior court. It is well established, however, that contempt orders are not appealable and may be reviewed only through a special action. Stoddard v. Donahoe, 224 Ariz. 152,

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BYBEE v. CIENFUEGOS Decision of the Court

154, ¶ 7 (App. 2010). Mother is correct in stating the court has not yet ruled on her petition for contempt, but because this issue is beyond our jurisdiction, and we decline to accept special action jurisdiction, we address the merits of Mother’s other arguments. We have jurisdiction over those arguments under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).

¶9 “We review due process claims de novo.” Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 260, ¶ 16 (App. 2014) (citation omitted). We review an award of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion. Medlin v. Medlin, 194 Ariz. 306, 309, ¶ 17 (App. 1999). We apply these standards of review and analyze Mother’s arguments through the lens of Father’s failure to file an answering brief. See Tiller v. Tiller, 98 Ariz. 156, 157 (1965). When an appellant raises debatable issues and the appellee has no excuse for failing to respond, we generally construe that failure as a confession of reversible error. Nelson v. Nelson, 91 Ariz. 215, 217 (1962); Mower v. Street, 79 Ariz. 282, 283 (1955). Debatable issues include circumstances when the opening brief claims error with supporting authority and it would require significant work to refute the opening brief, Merrill v. Wheeler, 17 Ariz. 348, 350 (1915), or there is grave doubt about the superior court’s order, Adkins v. Adkins, 39 Ariz. 530, 532 (1932). A matter is not debatable when the answer is clear from the record. See, e.g., Honsey v. Honsey, 126 Ariz. 336, 337 (App. 1980).

¶10 Nothing in the record suggests Father had an excuse for his failure to file an answering brief. The record shows Mother provided Father’s attorney with the notice of appeal on October 22, 2025, and the superior court mailed a notice of appeal to Father on October 24, 2025. Because Father did not file an answering brief, we ordered the appeal submitted for decision on the record and Mother’s opening brief. Thus, if Mother has raised a debatable issue, Father has confessed reversible error.

¶11 Mother argues the court erred by (1) “cancelling a scheduled [temporary orders] hearing on [her] petition to prevent relocation, but thereafter receiving evidence and issuing rulings without permitting [her] to . . . participate,” and (2) admitting Father’s untimely exhibits, including email correspondence between the parties, without giving her an opportunity to be heard. But Mother has waived these arguments because she failed to timely raise them in the superior court. See Medlin, 194 Ariz. at 308, ¶ 6 (explaining that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally waived); see also Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 83, ¶ 24 (2017) (recognizing that self-represented litigants are held to the same standard as attorneys). Moreover, to the extent Mother suggests the court erred in denying her petition, that issue is moot because the time when J.B. was scheduled to attend school in Spain has long passed, and he is now 18

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BYBEE v. CIENFUEGOS Decision of the Court

years old. See Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 617, ¶ 5 (App. 2012) (noting a moot issue is one where the actions of a reviewing court will not affect the parties).

¶12 Mother argues the court improperly relied on unsworn statements and exhibits lacking foundation offered by Father’s attorney on whether the parties agreed to equally split J.B.’s travel and tuition costs. Because Mother failed to timely raise any objection in the superior court, she has waived this argument on appeal. Even so, Mother has not waived her challenge to the amount she was ordered to pay for J.B.’s tuition costs. According to Father’s exhibits, monthly tuition costs were anticipated to be $600, presumably paid for four months. It is unclear how the court arrived at a figure of $4,000. Granted, it appears from the record that counsel included travel costs as part of that figure. Yet the record does not provide a reasonable basis for the court’s written order that Mother pay $4,000 in “tuition” costs. Thus, she has raised a debatable issue on whether the court erred in stating the amount she owes to Father for such costs. See Adkins, 39 Ariz. at 532.

¶13 Mother also contends the court erred in awarding Father $6,510 in attorneys’ fees because that amount “included work unrelated to the relocation motion.” Father’s fee application includes billing entries ranging from May 5, 2025 to September 4, 2025. But Mother petitioned to prevent relocation on August 21, 2025. Because Father’s application claimed fees from before Mother’s petition and included several unrelated matters filed after the petition, at a minimum, Mother has raised a debatable issue. See Lothman v. Lohman, 11 Ariz. App. 419, 421 (1970). On remand, the court shall reconsider Father’s fee application without considering irrelevant billing entries.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We vacate the portions of the court’s order requiring Mother to pay Father $4,000 in tuition costs and granting Father $6,510 in attorneys’ fees. We remand for reconsideration of those matters but otherwise affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR