Butler v. Flex

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedJune 27, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-02120
StatusUnknown

This text of Butler v. Flex (Butler v. Flex) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Butler v. Flex, (W.D. Tenn. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION

SHEILA BUTLER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 24-cv-2120-MSN-tmp ) FLEX, ) ) Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is pro se plaintiff Sheila Butler’s complaint.1 (ECF No. 1.) Because Butler is proceeding in forma pauperis, the undersigned must screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).2 For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends that Butler’s complaint be dismissed. I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT Butler filed her complaint on February 23, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) Using the form complaint provided by the Clerk’s office to assist pro se litigants asserting employment discrimination claims, Butler alleges that defendant Flex violated the Age

1Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been referred to the United States magistrate judge for management of all pretrial matters for determination or report and recommendation, as appropriate.

2The undersigned granted Butler leave to proceed in forma pauperis on June 27, 2025. (ECF No. 7.) Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 et seq. (Id. at PageID. 1.) Butler alleges that, on

September 16, 2022, Flex discriminated against her by failing to hire her and failing to accommodate her disability. (Id. at PageID 3.) According to Butler, she was born in 1966 and was more than forty years old at the time of the alleged discrimination. (Id. at PageID 4.) In the space provided to outline the facts of her case, Butler wrote “see attachment.” (Id.) However, it appears that Butler only attached the right- to-sue letter she received from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (id. at PageID 7), and she has not otherwise alleged any facts in support of her claims. II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW This court is required to screen in forma pauperis

complaints and must dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6). “A claim is plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Without factual allegations in support, mere legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus liberally construed. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2002)). Even so, pro se litigants must adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), and the court cannot create a claim that has not been

spelled out in a pleading, see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003). Butler first alleges failure to hire under the ADEA. To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) they were a member of a protected class; (2) they were qualified for the job in question; (3) they were subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002)). Although plaintiffs are not required to allege every element of a prima facie case at the pleading stage, Dickson v. Green Dot Pub. Sch.

Tenn., No. 2:22-cv-02070-SHM-cgc, 2022 WL 4285554, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 27, 2022) (citing Rhodes v. R & L Carriers, Inc., 491 Fed. Appx. 579, 584 (6th Cir. 2012)) (recommending dismissal of plaintiff’s ADEA claim), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3931462 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2022), Butler has not provided any facts, and thus fails to plausibly state an ADEA claim. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that this claim be dismissed. Butler next alleges failure to hire and to accommodate under the ADA. To prove a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) [they are]

disabled; (2) [they are] otherwise qualified for the position; (3) [they] suffered an adverse employment decision; (4) the employer knew or had reason to know of [their] disability; and, (5) the position remained open while the employer sought other applicants or the disabled individual was replaced.” Id. at *4 (citing Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012)) (recommending dismissal of plaintiff’s ADA claim). As with ADEA claims, a plaintiff is not required to establish a prima facie case at the pleading stage, id., but Butler has not alleged any facts in support and thus fails to plausibly state a claim.

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that this claim be dismissed. As to Butler’s failure to accommodate claim, these claims “necessarily involve direct evidence of the failure to accommodate,” and it is incumbent upon the plaintiff “to request an accommodation based upon [their] existing medical restrictions.” Id. (citing Kovac v. Superior Dairy, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 2d 609, 619 (N.D. Ohio 2014)) (citation modified) (recommending dismissal of plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim). Butler has not alleged any facts to suggest that she is disabled or that she requested an accommodation, and thus fails to plausibly state a claim. Accordingly, the undersigned

recommends that this claim be dismissed. III.

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Related

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.
534 U.S. 506 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Williams v. Curtin
631 F.3d 380 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
Roy Brown v. Linda Matauszak
415 F. App'x 608 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano
648 F.3d 365 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
Eric Martin v. William Overton
391 F.3d 710 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)
Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc.
681 F.3d 312 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)
Eugene Rhodes v. R&L Carriers, Inc.
491 F. App'x 579 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)
Peggy Blizzard v. Marion Technical College
698 F.3d 275 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)
Payne v. Secretary of the Treasury
73 F. App'x 836 (Sixth Circuit, 2003)
Kovac v. Superior Dairy, Inc.
998 F. Supp. 2d 609 (N.D. Ohio, 2014)
Wells v. Brown
891 F.2d 591 (Sixth Circuit, 1989)

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Butler v. Flex, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/butler-v-flex-tnwd-2025.