Bustamante 290392 v. Taylor

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedFebruary 1, 2024
Docket4:23-cv-00022
StatusUnknown

This text of Bustamante 290392 v. Taylor (Bustamante 290392 v. Taylor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bustamante 290392 v. Taylor, (D. Ariz. 2024).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Julian Abraham Bustamante, No. CV-23-00022-TUC-RM

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Tony Taylor, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff Julian Abraham Bustamante, who is currently confined in the Arizona 16 State Prison Complex, filed a one-count pro se Complaint on January 11, 2023, alleging 17 that Defendants used excessive force against him during an incident in the Pima County 18 Jail. (Doc. 1.) On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court ordered Defendants 19 Tony Taylor, Stephen Perko, and Manh Vu to answer the excessive force claim alleged 20 against them, and the Court dismissed the remaining Defendants. (Doc. 11.) Pima 21 County representative Lisa Strole accepted service on Defendant Taylor’s behalf on May 22 9, 2023. (Doc. 15.) The Process Receipt and Return forms for Perko and Vu indicate 23 the United States Marshal’s Service has been unable to serve those defendants at the 24 addresses provided by Plaintiff. (Docs. 14, 16, 36, 37.) 25 Defendant Taylor did not timely respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint, and the Clerk of 26 Court entered default against him on September 27, 2023. (Doc. 25.) Pending before the 27 Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. (Doc. 28.) 28 . . . . 1 I. Motion for Entry of Default Judgment Against Defendant Taylor 2 “When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed 3 to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk 4 must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The plaintiff may thereafter apply 5 for entry of a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). The Court may conduct a hearing 6 if necessary to enter or effectuate judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). In determining 7 whether to grant a default judgment, courts consider “(1) the possibility of prejudice to 8 the plaintiff, (2) the merits of [the] plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the 9 complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action[,] (5) the possibility of a dispute 10 concerning material facts[,] (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) 11 the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on 12 the merits.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). 13 A. Eitel Factors 14 The first Eitel factor favors default judgment. Despite being served with process, 15 Taylor has not answered or otherwise responded to the Complaint. If default judgment is 16 not entered, Plaintiff would lose the right to judicial resolution of his claim against 17 Taylor. 18 The Court has already determined that Plaintiff’s Complaint states a Fourteenth 19 Amendment excessive force claim against Taylor. (See Doc. 11 at 6.) Where a 20 complaint states a plausible claim for relief under the pleading standards of Federal Rule 21 of Civil Procedure 8, the second and third Eitel factors favor default judgment. 22 Valenzuela v. Regency Theater, No. CV-18-2013-PHX-DGC, 2019 WL 5721062, at *1 23 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2019) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 24 1978)). 25 The fourth Eitel factor also favors default judgment. In his Complaint, Plaintiff 26 sued multiple defendants for excessive force and sought a total of $115,000 in 27 compensatory damages for his injuries. (Doc. 1 at 7.) In an Affidavit filed in support of 28 his Application for Entry of Default, Plaintiff indicates he seeks damages of $30,000 1 against Taylor. (Doc. 24.)1 The amount of damages at issue is not “too large or 2 unreasonable in relation to defendant’s conduct.” Mayer v. Redix, No. ED CV-12-515- 3 DMG(E), 2014 WL 4258125, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2014) (internal quotation marks 4 omitted). 5 “Upon entry of default, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true, 6 except those relating to damages.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 7 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Given Taylor’s complete failure to respond or appear and 8 the Clerk’s entry of default against him, there is no indication in the current record of a 9 possible dispute concerning material facts. Nor is there any indication in the current 10 record that Taylor’s default was due to excusable neglect. Accordingly, the fifth and 11 sixth Eitel factors favor default judgment. The policy favoring decisions on the merits 12 supports denying default judgment, but it does not sufficiently outweigh the other Eitel 13 factors, which as a whole support granting default judgment. Accordingly, the Court will 14 enter default judgment against Taylor on the issue of liability. 15 B. Damages 16 A complaint’s factual allegations relating to the amount of damages are not taken 17 as true on default. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). A 18 plaintiff seeking default judgment must present “an evidentiary basis for the damages 19 sought.” Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund. v. Metro Found. 20 Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2012). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 55(b)(2)(B) allows the court to conduct hearings to determine the amount of damages. 22 In his Motion for Default Judgment, Plaintiff avers that he continues to suffer 23 ringing in his ears, blurred vision, memory loss, extreme daily headaches, nightmares, 24 and difficulty walking as a result of Defendant’s conduct. (Doc. 28 at 2.) However, 25 1 In his Motion for Default Judgment, Plaintiff purports to increase his compensatory 26 damages request to $900,000 and to add a request for punitive damages in the amount of $1,200,000. (Doc. 28 at 3.) However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) provides 27 that a “default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Accordingly, in a default judgment, Plaintiff may not obtain 28 compensatory damages exceeding what he demanded in his Complaint, and he may not obtain punitive damages. 1 Plaintiff has not submitted any documentary evidence in support of his requested 2 compensatory damages. Furthermore, it is unclear from the Complaint which portion of 3 Plaintiff’s alleged injuries are attributable to Taylor and which are attributable to Perko 4 and Vu. Accordingly, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is necessary under Rule 5 55(b)(2)(B) to determine the amount of damages. 6 The Court will order that Plaintiff appear at the evidentiary hearing via video 7 teleconference. If Plaintiff seeks to appear in person, he may file a motion for issuance of 8 writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. 9 If Plaintiff intends to subpoena any witnesses to testify at the evidentiary hearing, 10 he must comply with General Order 18-19, which states: 11 [A]ny self-represented litigant who wishes to serve a subpoena must file a motion with the Court for issuance of the subpoena.

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