Burris v. First Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided September 8, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-00999·Unknown

Opinion

* * *

John Scott Burris, Case No. 2:20-cv-00999-APG-BNW

Plaintiff, ORDER v.

First Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, Defendant. Before the Court is Defendant First Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company’s (“FRS”) motion seeking reconsideration of a prior discovery order (ECF No. 44). ECF No. 45. Plaintiff John Burris opposed and filed a supplemental opposition. ECF Nos. 47, 48. FRS replied and seeks to strike the second response filed by Plaintiff. ECF No. 49. To place this Order in context, this Court previously issued a discovery order on June 2, 2021, and made rulings on whether FRS had to respond to 203 Requests for Admissions (RFA) and 48 Requests for Production (RFP) propounded by Plaintiff. ECF No. 44. The Court ordered FRS to respond to 58 RFAs and 10 RFPs. FRS now moves this Court to reconsider its ruling on 28 RFAs arguing that, based on the same rationale this Court previously employed, FRS should not have to respond. I. PRELIMINARY ISSUES A. “Objections within 10 days of this Order” Plaintiff argues this Court only allowed 10 days for Defendant to make objections. As a result, Plaintiff explains the instant objections are late and should not be considered. But Defendant is not lodging additional objections. Rather, Defendant is simply asking this Court to reconsider its previous order issued on June 2, 2021. The instant motion was filed on June 18, 2021. As a result, the request is not untimely. See LR 59-1 (c) (stating that motions to reconsider must be brought within a reasonable time). B. Motion for Reconsideration Plaintiff argues that this request does not fall within LR 59-1. The Court disagrees. LR 59- 1 provides that “[a] party seeking reconsideration under this rule must state with particularity the points of law or fact that the court has overlooked or misunderstood.” That is exactly what Defendant has done, explaining that, based on the same rationale this Court previously employed, the Court should not have required Defendant to respond to certain discovery requests. C. “Meet and Confer” The Court understands there may not have been a perfect meet and confer. Nevertheless, it is not clear to the Court there was a need to do so. Defendant is simply asking the Court to reconsider the motion. It is not asking the Court to intervene in a dispute between the parties. D. Striking Second Response Plaintiff supplemented its response without leave of court in violation of LR 7-2(g). The Court, in its discretion, will not strike this document. The Court admonishes Plaintiff that repeated violations of the local rules may result in adverse consequences. In cases involving the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), discovery typically plays a far more limited role because the primary purpose of ERISA is “to provide a method for workers and beneficiaries to resolve disputes over benefits inexpensively and expeditiously.” Taft v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 9 F.3d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (overruled on other grounds by Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Insurance Co., 458 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2006)). In addition, the appropriate scope of discovery in an ERISA case “is directly related to the standard of review employed by the Court.” Santos v. Quebecor World Long Term Disability Plan, 254 F.R.D. 643, 647 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Generally, district courts review an ERISA plan administrator’s decision to deny benefits de novo, “unless benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Under de novo review, the district court may consider evidence outside of the administrative record. Abatie, 458 F.3d at 970. If the plan “does confer discretionary authority as a matter of contractual agreement, then the standard of review shifts to abuse of discretion,” which is a “more lenient” standard of review. Id. at 963. Abuse of discretion review is typically confined to the administrative record. Id. at 973. Yet, the “court may, in its discretion, consider evidence outside the administrative record to decide the nature, extent, and effect on the decision-making process of any conflict of interest.” Id. In addition, in cases where procedural irregularities are alleged, typically the standard of review will be abuse of discretion unless the violations are flagrant. Id. at 972. When procedural irregularities are apparent in an administrator’s determination, a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the effects of the irregularity. Pac. Shores Hosp. v. United Behav. Health, 764 F.3d 1030, 1041 (9th Cir. 2014). It may also take additional evidence when the irregularities have prevented full development of the administrative record. Abatie, 458 F.3d at 973. A failure to comply with procedural requirements ordinarily will not alter the standard of review unless the irregularities are substantial. Id. at 971 (explaining irregularities must be wholesale and flagrant for de novo review to apply). Even when a plaintiff is entitled to discovery beyond the administrative record in an ERISA case, the plaintiff may only “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Whether discovery is proportional to the needs of the case hinges on “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. When a party moves for a protective order, the court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to Youngevity Int’l, Inc. v. Smith, 2017 WL 2692928, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 22, 2017). The party moving for a protective order has the burden of demonstrating good cause for its issuance. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Entertainment, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 428, 432 (D. Nev. 2006). This burden may be met by showing that the discovery requested is irrelevant, overly broad, burdensome, or oppressive. Youngevity Int’l, Inc., 2017 WL 2692928, at *3. A. RFA No. 194: “Please admit FRS represented that it delivered the entire AR to Plaintiff on or about April 16, 2020.” Previously, the Court held that the answer to this question could shed light on (1) the effect of procedural irregularities, if any, on the determination of the case and (2) whether de novo review should apply. ECF No. 44 at 6. FRS points out that RFA No. 194 requests information regarding events that took place after the determination was made. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks FRS to admit that it delivered the entire administrative record on or about April 16, 2020. Yet, the determination to deny benefits was made sometime in July 2019. Thus, FRS argues, the answer to this question is irrelevant as it would never provide information as to the effect of a conflict of interest or procedural irregularity on the final determination. In addition, FRS argues that even if the answer were relevant, the information can be derived from information already

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Burris v. First Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, (D. Nev. 2021).

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Related

Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co.
458 F.3d 955 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)
Pacific Shores Hospital v. United Behavioral Health
764 F.3d 1030 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Society
9 F.3d 1469 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)
Santos v. Quebecor World Long Term Disability Plan
254 F.R.D. 643 (E.D. California, 2009)