Burnham v. Seaverns

101 Mass. 360
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court·Decided March 15, 1869·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

Colt, J.

Under the finding of the jury, the alleged malicious suit was commenced entirely without the knowledge or authority of the defendant, who was, during its pendency, an infant. It was prosecuted by the prochein ami, in theory at least receiving his appointment from the court, and having sole control of the case, so long as he is allowed by the court to retain the place. The defendant had no power to prosecute or discontinue the suit during his minority. Bac. Ab. Infancy and Age, K, 2. Guild v. Cranston, 8 Cush. 506. If the infant expressly assented to the suit after he had knowledge of it, yet he cannot become a trespasser by such assent, being liable only for his own personal acts. 1 Chit. Pl. (6th ed.) 76. The case of Sterling v. Adams, 3 Day, 411, which bears some resemblance to this, differs in the fact that there the suit was prosecuted by the defendant after he became of age, though commenced be-"ore. Exceptions overruled.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Burnham v. Seaverns, 101 Mass. 360 (Mass. 1869).

101 Mass. 360 (Burnham v. Seaverns) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Palmer v. Miller
43 N.E.2d 973 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1942)
Haynie v. Jones
127 S.W.2d 105 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1939)
Shriver v. Frawley
167 Iowa 419 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1914)
Covault v. Nevitt
146 N.W. 1115 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1914)
Burke v. Burke
49 N.E. 753 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1898)
State v. Jackson
36 Ohio St. (N.S.) 281 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1880)