Burley v. Sumner County 18th Judicial Drug Task Force

District Court, M.D. Tennessee·Decided January 31, 2023·No. 3:19-cv-00118·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

IVAN ANTJUAN BURLEY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) NO. 3:19-cv-00118 v. ) ) JUDGE CAMPBELL SUMNER COUNTY 18TH JUDICIAL ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE NEWBERN DISTRICT DRUG TASK FORCE and ) SUMNER COUNTY, ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Magistrate Judge Newbern’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 108), which was filed on December 30, 2022. Through the Report and Recommendation, Judge Newbern recommends that the Drug Task Force and Sumner County’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 89) be granted and that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 94) be denied. On January 19, 2023, the Court received Plaintiff’s objections to the Report and Recommendation. (See Doc. No. 112). For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation is adopted and approved. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.02, a district court reviews de novo any portion of a report and recommendation to which a specific objection is made. United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2001). General or conclusory objections are insufficient. See Zimmerman v. Cason, 354 F. Appx. 228, 230 (6th Cir. 2009). Thus, “only those specific objections to the magistrate’s report made to the district court will be preserved for appellate review.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987)). In conducting the review, the court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Plaintiff brings the present action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the Drug Task Force and Sumner County violated his federally protected rights by seizing his property unlawfully. (Doc. No. 29). Judge Newbern recommends that summary judgment be granted in favor of the

Drug Task Force based on her finding that the Drug Task Force lacks the legal capacity to be sued under Tennessee law or as an unincorporated association under Rule 17(b). (See Doc. No. 108 at 9-18). Plaintiff does not object or otherwise challenge Judge Newbern’s finding that the Drug Task Force lacks the legal capacity. (See Doc. No. 112). Judge Newbern recommends that summary judgment be granted in favor of Sumner County on Plaintiff’s due process claim based on her determination that Plaintiff has not asserted a violation of his constitutionally protected right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment: Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Burley has a constitutionally protected property interest in his personal property. Cash, 388 F.3d at 542. To succeed on a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, Burley “must show (1) the existence of a protected property interest at issue, (2) a deprivation of that protected property interest, and (3) that he or she was not afforded adequate procedures.” Paterek v. Vill. of Armada, 801 F.3d 630, 649 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d 893, 904 (6th Cir.2014)). The Sixth Circuit “often has sought to place procedural due process suits into two categories: ‘those involving a direct challenge to an established state procedure’ and ‘those challenging random and unauthorized acts.’” Daily Servs., 756 F.3d at 907 (quoting Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353, 1365 (6th Cir. 1993)). “‘Unauthorized’ actions . . . occur when the official in question lacks the broad power or authority to effect the deprivation.” Id. at 909. When a plaintiff alleges a violation of due process through an unauthorized action, “‘postdeprivation tort remedies are all the process that is due, simply because they are the only remedies the State could be expected to provide’; ‘no matter how significant the private interest at stake and the risk of its erroneous deprivation, the State cannot be required constitutionally to do the impossible by providing predeprivation process.’” Id. at 905 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128, 129 (1990)).

Burley asserts the unauthorized seizure of his property. Accordingly, “pre-deprivation process is impossible and, therefore, adequate post-deprivation state procedures comport with the constitutional requirements of due process.” Macene v. MJW, Inc., 951 F.2d 700, 706 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)). Burley, the Drug Task Force, and Sumner County agree that Burley used state post-deprivation procedures to successfully challenge the seizure. Burley regained his property when the Davidson County Chancery Court ruled that the Sumner County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to issue the forfeiture warrants and ordered the seized property to be returned to Burley. (Doc. No. 90-1.) After being notified by Burley’s lawyer of the state court decision, the Drug Task Force arranged to have Burley’s property returned. (Doc. No. 91.) Because Burley has not asserted that the state’s post-deprivation process was inadequate, he has not asserted a violation of his constitutionally protected right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

(Doc. No. 108 at 21-25). Plaintiff objects, arguing that Judge Newbern improperly construed his claim as one challenging an unauthorized act. (Doc. No. 112 at PageID # 712). However, Plaintiff concedes that he “does allege the unauthorized seizures of his property[.]” (Id. at PageID # 712- 713). While Plaintiff also contends that the unauthorized seizures were the result of an established Sumner County custom, he fails to show that Judge Newbern erred in finding that his due process claim challenges the unauthorized seizure of property. Accordingly, this objection is overruled. Judge Newbern recommends that summary judgment be granted in favor of Sumner County on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim based on her determination that Sumner County has shown the absence of a genuine issue of material fact that it engages in a custom of using unlawful warrants to seize property. (Doc. No. 108 at 22-25). Plaintiff objects, arguing that he provided evidence supporting his claim that Sumner County has a custom of allowing its officials to execute unlawful seizures and forfeitures. (See Doc. No. 112 at PageID # 713-715). However, Judge Newbern considered the materials Plaintiff filed to show that Sumner County engages in a custom of using unlawful warrants to seize property and determined that the materials do not support a finding that Sumner has such a custom: To show a “clear and persistent pattern of illegal activity,” Burley has provided materials that he argues show that Sumner County judges issued forfeiture warrants for property located outside their jurisdiction in 2019 and 2021. (Doc. No. 94.) The first document is an incomplete and undated memorandum apparently issued by Drug Task Force Director Kelly Murphy. (Id.) The memorandum identifies Burley’s wife as Sze Ka Joyce Chan and states that, in recorded telephone conversations from the Sumner County Jail, Burley “apologized to Mrs.

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Burley v. Sumner County 18th Judicial Drug Task Force, (M.D. Tenn. 2023).

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Related

Parratt v. Taylor
451 U.S. 527 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Vandiver v. Martin
304 F. Supp. 2d 934 (E.D. Michigan, 2004)
Zinermon v. Burch
494 U.S. 113 (Supreme Court, 1990)
Daily Services, LLC v. Tracy Valentino
756 F.3d 893 (Sixth Circuit, 2014)
Paterek v. Village of Armada, Michigan
801 F.3d 630 (Sixth Circuit, 2015)
Zimmerman v. Cason
354 F. App'x 228 (Sixth Circuit, 2009)
Macene v. MJW, Inc.
951 F.2d 700 (Sixth Circuit, 1991)
Mertik v. Blalock
983 F.2d 1353 (Sixth Circuit, 1993)