Burgess Cellulose Company v. Wood Flong Corporation

431 F.2d 505, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 417, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8002
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJuly 24, 1970
Docket31481_1
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 431 F.2d 505 (Burgess Cellulose Company v. Wood Flong Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burgess Cellulose Company v. Wood Flong Corporation, 431 F.2d 505, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 417, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8002 (2d Cir. 1970).

Opinions

[506]*506MOORE, Circuit Judge:

The appellant, Burgess Cellulose Company, is one of four manufacturers of stereotype mats in the United States. Two of the other manufacturers are licensed by Burgess under the patent in suit. The remaining manufacturer, Wood Flong Corporation, has not been licensed by Burgess and is being sued for patent infringement.

A stereotype mat is used in the casting of the metal cylindrical rolls of a printing press. It consists of a relatively thick sheet of felted cellulose fibers, a fine powder filler, and a coating. The text to be printed is composed in a flat form which is then impressed upon the stereotype mat. The mat is moist and plastic when it receives the impression. It is then curved and scorched or dried to produce a hard and smooth mold for the casting of the cylindrical rolls.

The stereotype mat, sometimes called matrix paper or flong paper, has been in used for many years. Commonly employed fillers included powdered clay, talc, and diatomaceous earth. The patented stereotype mat is manufactured in the usual way with the innovation that the patent teaches being the use of a synthetic silicate as a substitute for naturally occurring substances used as fillers.

The patent in suit, Patent No. 2,739,068, was issued to Russell R. Eich-' meier, a Burgess employee, and assigned to Burgess. His use of synthetic silicates as a filler in stereotype mats was initiated when he saw an advertisement on the back cover of the February, 1949 issue of TAPPI, a trade publication in the pulp and paper industry. The advertised product, Silene EF, was described as “a white, very finely divided, precipitated hydrated calcium silicate” with a bulk density of 15 to 16 lbs. per cubic food. The advertisement invited the recipients of the magazine, all members of the Technical Association of the Pulp and Paper Industry, to “explor[e] the possibilities which Silene EF may afford your products.” Eichmeier obtained a sample of the product and it immediately produced good results as a stereotype mat filler.

A patent application was filed in 1950. The file wrapper reveals that patent office objections were based on obviousness in the light of prior disclosures in the art of paper products. The application was finally allowed in July of 1954, but at the same time, Burgess learned of the manufacture of synthetic silicates by Johns-Manville Corporation. Burgess experimented with the Johns-Manville product, Micro-Cel, 500 Series, and found that it gave promise of being a superior filler. Therefore, Burgess filed a “continuation” of the original application to include claims which it hoped would cover Micro-Cel.

Burgess employed the Armour Research Foundation in Chicago to determine what filler properties affected stereotype mats. As a result of the hurried research conducted to take advantage of the 1950 filing date, the amended application was drafted to add claim eight, which described the filler as containing :

“as an essential constituent, a synthetic alkaline earth metal silicate exhibiting the following characteristics: a surface area of at least 10 square meters per gram * * * and a substantial amount of said silicate being in the amorphous state as determined by * * * the X-ray diffraction pattern * * *.”

The original application had described the filler as a “precipitated synthetic silicate.” To avoid the prohibition of new matter in amendments, 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1964), Burgess argued that the eighth claim merely described the earlier disclosed filler in terms of its physical characteristics, rather than in terms of its method of manufacture. The amended application was allowed on Burgess’ representation that the application was “identical with the parent application.” The patent was issued on March 20, 1956.

[507]*507Johns-Manville subsequently produced a synthetic silicate called “Micro-Cel T-26.” In January of 1958 Johns-Manville suggested to Wood Flong that it use the Micro-Cel silicates as a filler in stereotype mats. Wood Flong has been using Micro-Cel T-26 since July 1959. This use is the basis of the alleged infringement.

The district court held the patent invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103 since the prior art made the subject matter obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. The art relating to paper making was found to be analogous to the manufacture of stereotype mats. Having examined the prior art, the district court found that the patent in suit was not a sufficient advance to constitute invention. The patent merely substituted “an old and known material, a synthetic precipitated alkaline earth metal silicate, for other fillers in an old and known product, stereotype dry mat.”

The district court, assuming arguendo that the patent was valid, also passed on the claims of infringement. It found that there was no literal infringement of the patent claims. Claims one through seven, derived from the original application, required that the filler be precipitated. Claim eight was allowed on the representation that it was merely an alternative description of the same material disclosed in the original application. The district court held that to avoid invalidity for having introduced new matter, claim eight must be limited to precipitate material. The infringing material — the Micro-Cel T-26 — had not been established to be a precipitate.1

The court also held that even if claim eight did not require a precipitate, Micro-Cell T-26 did not literally infringe since it did not show an amorphous ring on the X-ray diffraction pattern.

In spite of the findings that there was no literal infringement, the district court held that if the patent is valid, there is infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. That doctrine applies where the infringing product performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result as the patented product. E.g., Graver Tank and Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950).

The history of the formulation of the conditions of patentability has been discussed by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966). The traditional conditions of novelty and utility were supplemented in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 13 L.Ed. 683 (1851) by the condition that a patentable invention reveal more ingenuity and skill than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business. In the 1952 Patent Act, Congress incorporated the Hotchkiss requirement into section 103 which states “nonobviousness” as an explicit condition of patentability.2 In interpreting section 103, the Court said:

“Under § 103 the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and [508]*508the claims at issue are to be ascertained ; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.

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Burgess Cellulose Company v. Wood Flong Corporation
431 F.2d 505 (Second Circuit, 1970)

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Bluebook (online)
431 F.2d 505, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 417, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8002, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burgess-cellulose-company-v-wood-flong-corporation-ca2-1970.